Surfers Paradise Investments Pty Ltd v United Investments Pty Ltd, Eilazak Pty Ltd
[1997] QSC 179
•25 September 1997
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
Brisbane
Before Mr Justice Ambrose
[Surfers Paradise Investments Pty Ltd v United Investments Pty Ltd, Eilazak Pty Ltd & Anor]
Writ No. 4401 of 1997
BETWEEN:
SURFERS PARADISE INVESTMENTS PTY. LTD.
(ACN 058 247 064)
Plaintiff
AND:
UNITED (T&C) INVESTMENTS PTY. LTD.
(ACN 060 660 193)
First Defendant
AND
C.T & T. INTERNATIONAL PTY. LTD.
(ACN 071 291 122)
Second Defendant
AND
EILAZAK PTY LTD
(ACN 0066 647 863)
Third Defendant
AND:Writ No. 3934 of 1997
BETWEEN:
SURFERS PARADISE INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
(ACN 058 247 064)
Plaintiff
AND:
KAREN ALISON JACQUES-LUDLOW
First Defendant
AND:
WING KEUNG CHEUNG AND MEI FOO SUN CHUEN
Second Defendants
AND:
EILAZAK PTY. LTD.
(ACN 066 647 963)
Third Defendant
AND:
O.S. No. 4279 of 1997
IN THE MATTER of Section 127 of the
Land Titles Act 1994
-and-
IN THE MATTER of a Caveat Dealing No.
701968985 of SURFERS PARADISE
INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
-and-
IN THE MATTER of an application by
UNITED (T.&C. INVESTMENTS PTY
LTD and C.T. & T. INTERNATIONAL
PTY. LTD.
CATCHWORDS: CAVEAT - whether right to obtain relief as beneficiary of a constructive trust gives that beneficiary a caveatable interest
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST - whether features of this case constitute serious issues to be determined
Counsel:Mr P. Keane Q.C. (on 29.5.97)
and Mr J. Douglas Q.C. (on 28.8.97 & 12.9.97)
with them Mr D. Campbell for Surfers Paradise Investments
Mr A. Heyworth-Smith for United (T.&C. Investments) and
C.T.&T. International
Mr L. Stephens for Eilazak Pty. Ltd. (on 5.9.97 and 12.9.97)
Mr S. English for Jacques-Ludlow
Solicitors:D’Arcys for Surfers Paradise Investments
Sciacca and Associates for United (T.&C.) Investments &
C.T.&T. International
Allan Barrell for Jacques-Ludlow
Hearing Dates: 29 May, 15 August, 28 August, 5 September and 12 September 1997
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - B.W. AMBROSE J.
Judgment delivered 25 September 1997
I deal with a variety of applications that have been argued on five occasions being 29 May, 15 August, 28 August, 5 September and 12 September 1997.
There has been an enormous amount of material filed and on each of the days when matters have been argued voluminous and detailed submissions appending copies of authorities and extracts from legal texts etc have been handed up in support of lengthy argument. On four of those occasions argument was transcribed which is recorded in nearly 170 pages of transcript.
Before embarking upon a consideration of the various applications made and the relief sought in them, it is convenient to state briefly what seem to me to be the principal facts asserted by Surfers Paradise Investments Pty Ltd (“the plaintiff”) in its most lately amended statement of claim, delivered in the course of the many appearances to which I have referred pursuant to leave given to do so.
I will refrain from investigating factual matters in dispute and will depart from the content of the pleading only to the extent necessary to trace the procedural path taken to reach the present state of the pleadings so that the various arguments advanced can be considered in that context. It is the plaintiff’s case that in March 1996 Eilazak Pty Ltd (“Eilazak”) currently the third defendant in the plaintiff’s action 4401 of 1997 had two shareholders and directors. One was a man named Devlin and the other a woman named Jacques-Ludlow.
It is the plaintiff’s case that Jacques-Ludlow agreed to sell to the plaintiff her share in Eilazak and was paid $20,000 by the plaintiff under that agreement.
It is the plaintiff’s case that both Devlin, the other shareholder and director in Eilazak, and the first and second defendants United (T&C) Investments and C.T.&T. International both knew that Jacques-Ludlow had sold her interest in Eilazak to the plaintiff. It is the plaintiff’s case that LJ Hooker Coorparoo (“Hooker”) carried on business as a real estate agent at Coorparoo in Brisbane. Associated with if not controlling this real estate agency was the first defendant United (T&C) Investments and a man named Simon Kam Yuen Cheung. The plaintiff asserts that at all material times the man Devlin being the other shareholder/director of Eilazak was an employee of Hooker. The plaintiff further asserts that at all material times a man named Jasper Tam was the director/secretary and a shareholder of both United (T&C) Investments and C.T.& T. International and the “governing mind both of those two companies and of Hooker”. The plaintiff contends that the sale by Jacques-Ludlow of her interest in Eilazak was known to the persons who carried on business as Hooker, and specifically both to Devlin and Tam.
It is the plaintiff’s case that at a time not yet particularised Eilazak, through Devlin retained Hooker to act as its agent to purchase land from a woman named Heseltine and promised to pay Hooker a commission of $18,000 if it succeeded.
On about 16 November 1995 nearly five months before Jacques-Ludlow agreed to sell her interest in Eilazak to the plaintiff and was paid for it, Hooker procured the woman Heseltine to sell to Eilazak the land which it sought to purchase for the price of $615,000 conditional upon Eilazak obtaining the rezoning necessary for the proposed development within six months of the date of the contract. Later the contract was varied to extend the time for obtaining rezoning, planning approval etc from six months to ten months in consideration of Eilazak agreeing to pay an increased purchase price of $652,000.
Rezoning and development approval was obtained by 23 February 1997. It is the plaintiff’s contention that in the circumstances, Heseltine held the land the subject of the contract on trust for Eilazak to the knowledge of all defendants.
It is the plaintiff’s case that in March 1996 - and inferentially subsequent to Jacques-Ludlow agreeing to sell her interest in Eilazak to the plaintiff, Devlin with the knowledge of United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International and for the benefit of those companies told Heseltine that Eilazak was unable to complete the contract of sale it had with her and that she was entitled to terminate that contract. This was without any reference to the plaintiff to give it the opportunity to provide all the funds necessary to effect settlement. He also offered her the opportunity of entering into a new contract to sell that land to United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International at the same price as that for which she had agreed to sell it to Eilazak.
It is the plaintiff’s case that United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International knowingly assisted Devlin to mislead Heseltine and to procure her to rescind her contract with Eilazak and substitute for it a fresh one with United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International.
Within a couple of days of the recission by Heseltine of the contract with Eilazak she entered into a fresh one with United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International and within a couple of days United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International paid the whole of the purchase price to Heseltine and lodged a transfer in registrable form of that land from Heseltine to United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International. The price paid by the defendants to Heseltine is in dispute but it is unnecessary to resolve that dispute on these applications.
When shortly afterwards the plaintiff learnt of what had happened, it used Eilazak’s name to commence action seeking relief against Heseltine, United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International as well as against Hooker of which companies and firm Jasper Tam is alleged to be the “governing mind”.
In about September 1996, Jacques-Ludlow and Devlin purported to appoint Tam as a director of Eilazak and Devlin purported to transfer his share in Eilazak to the first defendant, United (T&C) Investments.
Tam was then appointed as a director of Eilazak together with Devlin and another man.
Shortly after these events, Jacques-Ludlow purported to transfer her share in Eilazak to Wing Keung Cheung in Hong Kong.
It is the plaintiff’s case that the transferee of that share is closely related to Simon Kam Yueng Cheung who at material times was one of the people carrying on the Hooker real estate business at Coorparoo.
In about May 1997, upon instructions from its then directors, Eilazak purportedly terminated the action which it had taken against Heseltine, United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International and Hooker to which I have already referred.
In March 1996, Eilazak had lodged caveats to protect its interests in the Heseltine land under its contract with Heseltine. Shortly afterwards those caveats were withdrawn without notice to the plaintiff. A further caveat to protect Eilazak’s interests was lodged in May 1997 but was withdrawn by that company again without notice to the plaintiff.
At this stage two firms of solicitors were purporting to act for Eilazak - one asserting that having regard to the shareholding recorded in the share register and composition of the then Board of Directors, it alone could act for that company - albeit that at that stage it seemed to be acting solely in the interest of the Tam group. It is unnecessary to embark upon a consideration of the arguments advanced on this topic in some of the applications that were argued.
However on 13 May 1997, the plaintiff lodged Caveat No. 701968985 over the land which had been the subject of the contract between Eilazak and Heseltine to protect an interest which it claimed in the land.
It is the plaintiff’s case that United (T&C) Investments and C.T.&T. International both hold their interest in the land on trust for Eilazak and derivatively for the plaintiff. It seeks an injunction restraining those first two defendants from removing the caveat it lodged and an injunction restraining them also inter alia from in any way dealing with the land. It also seeks damages or compensation in equity “for participation in a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff and to Eilazak”. Alternatively it seeks damages at common law.
In Action No. 3934/97 the plaintiff claims against Jacques-Ludlow, Wing Keung Cheung and Eilazak Pty Ltd -
(a)A declaration that the transfer by Jacques-Ludlow of her share in the issued share capital of Eilazak to Cheung is void and of no effect;
(b)A declaration that the plaintiff is beneficially entitled to that ordinary share in Eilazak;
(c)An order that Eilazak’s share register be rectified to remove the second defendant Cheung as owner of that ordinary share and to record Surfers Paradise Investments as owner of that share.
It further seeks against Jacques-Ludlow a declaration that the share sale agreement with the plaintiff is still in force and specific performance of that agreement. It seeks a declaration against the person to whom Jacques-Ludlow allegedly improperly transferred her share that the transferee shareholder holds it on a constructive trust for the plaintiff and it seeks also damages for unlawful interference with the contractual relations between the plaintiff and Jacques-Ludlow defined by the share sales agreement between them. It also seeks compensation in equity for breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff - based upon an alleged involvement and relationship between Wing Keung Cheung, the transferee of the Jacques-Ludlow share and Simon Kam Yeung Cheung who was carrying on business with others as Hooker.
Defences have been delivered in the actions which put many of the plaintiff’s assertions in issue. It would unprofitable for me to analyze those contentions. It is the case for the defendants that on its face the plaintiff’s pleading against them is not maintainable and ought be struck out.
It is also the case for the defendants that on the facts it alleges the plaintiff has not even arguably a caveatable interest in the Heseltine land.
I might mention that the plaintiff lodged its caveat to protect its alleged equitable interest in the Heseltine land after the Memorandum of Transfer from Heseltine to the two defendants United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International had been lodged for registration but before it had actually been registered. Those defendants contend that the plaintiff can claim no caveatable interest on the facts pleaded and that their development business is being put to significant expense because they are unable to deal with the land which is simply part of their stock in trade.
It was Eilazak which applied for and obtained the rezoning - planning consent necessary for the development of the Heseltine land. I am informed that it has now entered into a joint venture agreement with United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International for its development.
In the course of argument advanced on a number of occasions over the months that have passed, there has been discussion as to the nature of the interest at the end of the day which the plaintiff may obtain with respect to the Heseltine land if it succeeds entirely on its argument. It has been conceded, on the last couple of occasions in any event, that the plaintiff will have only a 50% interest in the land and will be required to pay to the defendants half the purchase price which they paid to Heseltine under their contract. It is not suggested that the plaintiff, if it succeeds entirely on its argument, will have anything more than an equitable interest, should the Court hold that the defendants by reason of the matters pleaded hold the land as constructive trustees for the plaintiff, greater than 50% of its value - providing presumably that the plaintiff reimburses those proprietors for 50% of the purchase price which they paid to Heseltine.
I will deal firstly with the question as to whether the Writ of Summons or statement of claim ought be struck out, set aside or stayed.
It is clear that the plaintiff’s action against the defendants in Writ 4401 of 1997 claiming an interest in land of which they are entitled to become registered proprietors as presently framed, is one for relief which may depend, at least to some extent, upon its argument being accepted that it has a properly constituted derivative action as against Eilazak as third defendant.
The plaintiff however has other arguments against the transferees of the Jacques-Ludlow share which may provide some basis for relief other than a declaration that the defendants hold the Heseltine land as constructive trustees for its benefit. For example if it succeeds in Action 3934 of 1997 it will become an equal shareholder in Eilazak and thus enjoy half of whatever benefit that defendant has under the planning approval it obtained from Brisbane City Council to develop the land which of course explains the joint venture agreement it has with the defendants in Action 4401 of 1997 to develop it.
In my view the factual issues are complicated and it would be quite inappropriate at this stage to make orders on the “preliminary points of law” raised by the defendants as to the extent to which Equity will go behind the requirements of the articles of association of Eilazak dealing with registration of a transfer of its shares contrary to the wishes of the persons currently controlling that company in the Tam interests, should the plaintiff prove breaches of fiduciary duty of the sort alleged and to embark upon consideration of the question of locus standi and as to whether to the extent that the action is a derivative one, it is properly constituted.
The real factual issues although at first sight complicated, seem to be within a fairly short compass and in my view it would be inappropriate to embark upon determination of preliminary points of law of the sort canvassed by the defendants without the advantage of the determination of the facts in issue on the pleadings material to their application; those factual matters ought be properly canvassed upon trial with the advantage of discovery and interrogatories if required. In this respect I adopt the approach of Dixon J in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioner (1949) 78 CLR 62 at p. 91.
I decline to strike out or set aside the statements of claim or stay the plaintiff’s actions.
With respect to the relief sought by way of removal of the plaintiff’s caveat, it seems to me that any equitable interest to which the plaintiff may become entitled should a court declare that the defendants hold the land as constructive trustees for the plaintiff to the extent of 50% of its value does not unarguably amount to a claim to a caveatable interest in that land; there is a marked difference of opinion in this regard. In Re Pile’s Caveats (1981) Qd.R. 81, Dunn J. took the view that a personal equity did not necessarily constitute sufficient equitable interest to support a caveat and that where there is a personal equity only the status quo may be maintained pending trial only by means of an injunction rather than by caveat. Ryan J. in Re McKean’s Caveat (1988) 1 Qd.R. 524 held that the right to set aside a contract of sale gave an equitable interest which was caveatable as distinct from a mere equity. Ryan J. followed the observations of Needham J. in Sinclair v. Hope Investments Pty. Ltd. (1982) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 870.
Pincus J. in Andel Pty. Ltd. v. Century Car Care Pty. Ltd. & Ors. (1989) 92 ANZ Conv. R. 253 (Fed. Court) preferred the approach of Ryan J. to that of Dunn J.
In my judgment the better view is that the right to obtain relief as beneficiary of a constructive trust of land gives that beneficiary a caveatable interest in that land.
In A-G for HongKong v. Reid (1994) 1 A.C. 324. Lord Templeton delivering the judgment of the Privy Council after outlining the circumstances in which the constructive trust was there alleged to arise observed at p. 331:-
“The legal estate in freehold property conveyed to the false fiduciary by way of bribe vests in him. Equity, however, which acts in personam, insists that it is unconscionable for a fiduciary to obtain and retain a benefit in breach of duty...
Equity considers as done that which ought to have been done. As soon as the bribe was received, whether in cash or in kind, the false fiduciary held the bribe on a constructive trust for the person injured...”
At p. 339 he continued:-
“The Attorney-General for Hong Kong has registered caveats against the title of the three New Zealand properties. He seeks to renew the caveats to prevent any dealing with the property pending the hearing of proceedings which, their Lordships are informed, have been initiated for the purpose of claiming the properties on a constructive trust. The respondents oppose the renewal of the caveats on the grounds that the Crown had no equitable interest in the three New Zealand properties. For the reasons indicated their Lordships consider that the three properties so far as they represent bribes accepted by the first respondent are held in trust for the Crown.”
The Privy Council reversed the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal that the Hong Kong government did not, prior to obtaining judgment that the land in issue was held on constructive trust, have a sufficient equity in land into which it was alleged bribes could be traced, to protect that interest by caveat.
It is no answer to a person’s claim to lodge a caveat to say that the concept of a constructive trust is purely remedial and incapable of giving rise to a proprietary caveatable interest until its declaration.
The whole matter is considered in Caveats by Colbran and Jackson at p. 238-241.
As Deane J. observed in Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583 at 615 a
constructive trust may be considered:
“as an in personam remedy attaching to property which may be moulded and adjusted to give effect to the application and interplay of equitable principles in the circumstances of the particular case.”
Both the plaintiff’s application for an interlocutory injunction and the defendant’s application for removal of the plaintiff’s caveat are interlocutory proceedings in the actions pending between them and hearsay evidence is admissible. The interlocutory injunction and the maintenance of the caveat are each designed to preserve the value of the land - i.e. to maintain the status quo - pending determination of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants.
In my view the plaintiff has established serious questions to be tried. The same considerations then govern the exercise of discretion in both applications - vide Re Burman’s Caveat (1994) 1 Qd.R. 123 at p. 127-128.
Undoubtedly to succeed in its actions against the defendants, in respect of some of the relief claimed the plaintiff will need to persuade the Court on the evidence at the end of the day, that its claim for equitable relief based upon its beneficial entitlement to the share of which Jacques-Ludlow was a registered shareholder in Eilazak, justifies a declaration that United (T.&C) Investments and C.T.&T. International hold 50% of their interest in the Heseltine land as constructive trustees for the plaintiff. On the assumption that the plaintiff succeeds in proving that Devlin, Jacques-Ludlow, Hooker and the Tam interests generally were in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to it (calling in aid Barnes v. Addy (1874) 9 Ch. App. 244) then in my view there will undoubtedly be a serious issue to be determined as to whether the equitable relief sought by the plaintiff may be defeated by or unavailable having regard to, the conduct of the various defendants who seek to rely on Salomon v Salomon & Co (1897) A.C. 22 and the discretion which the persons for the time being constituting the Board of Directors of Eilazak had to decline to register any share transfer from Jacques-Ludlow to the plaintiff. Equity acts in personam and in my view it is far from clear that should the plaintiff succeed in making out its allegations against the defendants, a court would not be able and willing to make the necessary orders against the defendants and their servants and agents to give the equitable relief which the plaintiff seeks. Although the defendants contend strongly to the contrary, in my view it is inappropriate that the availability of such equitable relief should be canvassed and argued in a preliminary way at this time rather than being disposed of upon trial in the ordinary way upon the determination of factual issues which calls for the application of the appropriate rules of law.
I find therefore that there are serious issues to be determined as to whether the plaintiff has an equitable interest as beneficiary under a constructive trust upon which the relevant land is held by the defendants United (T.&C.) Investments and C.T.&T. International pursuant to the contract entered into with Heseltine and as to the availability of an equitable remedy to permit the plaintiff to become registered as the holder of the share it alleges it purchased from Jacques-Ludlow.
The plaintiff is clearly a company with a very significant asset backing. Similarly, the director of that company, Thomas Patrick Hayes is a man of substance. Affidavit material has been filed indicating that Mr Hayes is prepared to give a personal guarantee that the plaintiff will meet any damages which flow from the granting of the interlocutory injunction which the plaintiff seeks and also which might flow from the wrongful lodgment of the caveat should the plaintiff fail to establish the constructive trust of which it asserts it is the beneficiary.
I have given consideration to whether the circumstance that the plaintiff asserts that its beneficial interest under the constructive trust is only as to 50% of the land in question, ought persuade me to order that the caveat be removed and that the defendants be enjoined only from disposing of the land entirely from encumbering it to the extent of more than 50% of its value. It is far from clear to me that if in fact the value of the land should increase between the time of the breach of fiduciary duty (if established) of the defendants and the time any order is made for the disposition of that land if it becomes necessary to do so to enable the plaintiff to enjoy its beneficial interest in the land, that will at law limit the plaintiff’s interest at that time to only half of its then value. A lot will depend I should think upon the component of land value attributable to the zoning and planning approval which Eilazak contributed to the joint venture it entered into with United (T.&C. ) Investments and C.T.&T. International. In any event that is a matter that was not canvassed at any length upon the hearing and it is unnecessary for me to embark upon consideration of possibilities as to the ultimate quantification of the value of any equitable interest in the land the plaintiff may establish should it succeed in its action leading ultimately to disposition of the land.
Other matters of difficulty were raised should the defendants be permitted to mortgage the whole of the land which it is alleged they hold as constructive trustees as to 50% of its value for the plaintiff. Such matters related to problems that might arise if the defendants were by design or accident to breach some term of the mortgage thus enabling the mortgagee to exercise its powers under the mortgage.
The plaintiff argues strongly against making any order other than ones that might normally be made either granting the interlocutory injunction sought on the usual undertaking as to damages and dismissing the defendants’ application to remove the caveat or refusing the interlocutory injunction and ordering the caveat’s removal. It is the plaintiff’s contention that the defendants can be fully protected against damages which they will undoubtedly suffer in having part of their land stock for which they ultimately paid either $652,000 or $675,000 tied up for another six months or so without being able to use it in any way - even as collateral security for other real estate developments in the event that the plaintiff fails in its action against them.
Having given careful thought to the whole matter I have come to the conclusion that the balance of convenience comes down on the side of granting the interlocutory injunction sought on the usual undertaking as to damages and refusing to remove the plaintiff’s caveat until trial of the action again on the undertaking of the plaintiff to secure a sufficient sum for the payment of any damages that might be sustained by the defendants by reason of the maintenance of the caveat should the plaintiff fail to establish the interest claimed in the land in issue.
I take the view that the same security ought be given in respect of damage that might be recovered as the result of the grant of the interlocutory injunction and damage that might be recovered as the result of the wrongful maintenance of the caveat. One personal guarantee secured to the satisfaction of the Registrar to cover both eventualities should be given by Thomas Patrick Hayes, the director of the plaintiff in the sum of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars.
Although the matter was not raised during argument on the application for an order for speedy trial, a relevant consideration which might be addressed should that application be further pursued is any period of time during which the approved development must be completed from the date of approvals granted by Brisbane City Council.
I make the following orders:
I dismiss the various applications made by the first and second defendants in Action 4401 of 1997 to strike out the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, to set aside the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim and to stay further proceedings on that Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim.
I refuse the defendants’ application to remove Caveat Dealing No. 701968985 on condition that Thomas Patrick Hayes the director of the plaintiff give a personal guarantee secured to the satisfaction of the Registrar to the extent of $.35M for the plaintiff’s liability for damages in respect of the unjustified lodgment and maintenance of that caveat by the plaintiff.
I grant an injunction restraining the defendants in Action 4401 of 1997 from in any way dealing with the land the subject of that action (the Heseltine land) pending the trial of these actions subject to the usual undertaking as to damages given by the plaintiff secured by the personal guarantee secured to the extent of $.35M. to the satisfaction of the Registrar of Thomas Patrick Hayes the director of the plaintiff.
The one personal guarantee of Thomas Patrick Hayes secured to the extent of $.35M is to be security for the plaintiff’s obligation both under its undertaking given in respect of the granting of the interlocutory injunction and its liability for damages if any, by reason of its lodgment and maintenance of its caveat.
I decline to order that the points of law raised in defences delivered in Actions 4401 of 1997 and 3934 of 1997 be set down and disposed of prior to the time when the actions are heard in the ordinary way upon trial.
I order that Mei Foo Sun Cheun be struck out as a second defendant in Action No. 3934 of 1997 so that Wing Keung Chueng becomes the sole second defendant in that action.
I order that Actions No. 4401 of 1997 and 3934 of 1997 and O.S. No. 4279 of 1997 be heard together conditional upon Wing Keung Cheung being served forthwith in compliance with the Rules of this Court with the Writ of Summons (or as the case may be notice thereof) and pleadings in both Actions 4401 and 3934 of 1997 together with a notification that he has the right to be heard within the time limited for his appearance under the Rules of Court upon an application to vary or set aside this order.
I make the following orders for directions:
(a)That the plaintiff in both 4401 of 1997 and 3934 of 1997 effect any further amendments to its statements of claim in those actions and provide any further particulars thereof sought with 14 days of this order, within twenty-eight days of the date hereof;
(b)That thereafter the time constraints of the Rules of Court relating to delivery of pleadings, the provision of particulars, disclosure and discovery of documents and the delivery of and answer to interrogatories be strictly complied with;
(c)All parties have liberty to apply for further directions upon three days notice to other parties;
(d)Upon close of pleadings and completion of disclosure-discovery of documents and answers made to any interrogatories delivered, all parties have liberty to apply for an order for mediation and/or case appraisal and/or for further directions if required concerning the exchange of witness statements preparatory to embarking upon either mediation or case appraisal;
(e)I adjourn to a date to be fixed further consideration of the application for speedy trial pending compliance with the orders for directions already made.
I reserve the question of costs in respect of all applications made and argued before me between 29 May 1997 and 12 September 1997.
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