Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ors No. Scgrg-99-1257 Judgment No. S462 - [1999] SASC 462

SUMNER V UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[1999] SASC 462

Full Court: Doyle CJ, Debelle and Lander JJ

1 This is an appeal by the plaintiff in these proceedings from the decision of a single judge of this Court refusing the plaintiff's application for an interim injunction.
2 The Court permitted Mr Lindon, a practitioner of the Court, and Mr Byrt, to assist the plaintiff in arguing the appeal. The plaintiff told us that he was unable to present his case adequately.
3 The Court did so only because it was desirable to deal with the appeal promptly, and as an indulgence to Mr Sumner. The appellant should not assume that the High Court would take the same approach. Nor, usually, would this Court do what it did in this case.
4 The plaintiff's proceedings were issued on 23 October 1999. In those proceedings, the plaintiff sought relief against a number of different parties. The plaintiff has named as first defendant the "United Kingdom of Great Britain". The second defendant is the State of South Australia. The third defendant is "Alexandrina Council". The fourth and fifth defendants are property developers at Hindmarsh Island. The sixth defendant is a former premier of South Australia and a former Leader of the Australian Labor Party in this State. The seventh defendant is a former premier of South Australia and a Minister in the present Government. The eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth defendants are Ministers in the Government of this State. The thirteenth defendant is the Premier of South Australia. The fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth defendants are parties directly associated with the construction of the proposed bridge from Goolwa to Hindmarsh Island. The eighteenth defendant is the fourth and fifth defendants' solicitor. The nineteenth defendant, is a journalist. The twentieth defendant is the Commonwealth of Australia.
5 The plaintiff has sought various forms of relief against those defendants. He seeks:

A declaration that the deeds to construct a bridge at Goolwa are either void for illegality (contrary to public policy) or voidable at the election of the third defendant (Alexandrina Council).

An interim order and a permanent order restraining the defendants, whether by their agents, servants or howsoever from acting on the agreements evidenced by the deeds in any way or any further action towards commencing construction of the bridge at the proposed Goolwa site.

An order restraining the fourth and fifth defendants from any public statement on this matter unless that statement has been submitted to the plaintiff for consideration and liberty to apply at short notice for the plaintiff prior to any publication of such a statement to any other person.

An order that the first defendant commence proceedings in the International Court of Justice against Australia for its breaches of the Genocide Convention and Vienna Law of Treaties.

An order that the twentieth defendant seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to the lawfulness of the jurisdiction claimed by…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

AGLC: Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ors No. Scgrg-99-1257 Judgment No. S462 [1999] SASC 462
Case: [1999] SASC 462
Decision Date: 2 November 1999

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ors No. Scgrg-99-1257 Judgment No. S462 involves an appeal by the plaintiff, Darrell Sumner, against the decision of a single judge of the South Australian Supreme Court who refused the plaintiff's application for an interim injunction. The plaintiff seeks various forms of relief against multiple defendants, including the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the State of South Australia, and various property developers, government officials, and entities involved in the proposed construction of a bridge at Goolwa. The plaintiff's claims primarily focus on the alleged illegality and voidness of the agreements to construct the bridge, as well as seeking injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from proceeding with the construction.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff should have been granted the interlocutory injunction sought. To grant such an injunction, the plaintiff must establish a serious question to be tried, a likelihood of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, and that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction. The Court examined the plaintiff's claims and found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a real probability of success on the claims against the defendants. The plaintiff's claims in contract, negligence, and based on legitimate expectations and fiduciary duties were found to be inadequately supported by the evidence and legal arguments presented.

The Court concluded that the plaintiff had not established a serious question to be tried against the defendants, and that the balance of convenience clearly favoured the defendants. The appeal was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of the respondents who had appeared in the case. The Court held that the plaintiff had not adequately explained the delay in bringing the proceedings, had failed to provide a satisfactory undertaking for damages, and had not demonstrated irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. The Court found that the plaintiff's claims were speculative and not supported by the evidence, leading to the refusal of the injunction.

Orders