Summers v Wilks - [1999] QSC 66

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
CAIRNS

No. 261 of 1994

Before the Hon. Mr Justice Derrington
[Summers v Wilks]
BETWEEN:
  HELEN MARIE SUMMERS
  Plaintiff
AND:
  DAVID JOHN WILKS
  Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DERRINGTON J

Judgment delivered on 25 March 1999

CATCHWORDS: QUANTUM - personal injuries - relatively minor injuries - unusual reactive disorder - late reactive disorder - whether later illness related to original injuries - termination of consequences of accident - loss of sick leave - how assessed - change of occupation - whether any residual loss.

GENERAL DAMAGES - short concussion, lacerations and bruising - two reactive disorders - mild depression - loss of some recreational activities - general damages $30,000.

Wilson v Persley (1975) 7 ALR 571
Schmidt v Alderson (unreported, Court of Appeal, 26 February 1999, Appeal No.7264 of 1997.

Counsel:J Webb for the plaintiff
T Matthews for the defendant

Solicitors:Vandeleur and Todd for the plaintiff
Quinlan Miller and Treston for the defendant

Hearing dates: 25 and 26 February 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
CAIRNS

No. 261 of 1994

Before the Hon. Mr Justice Derrington
[Summers v Wilks]
BETWEEN:
  HELEN MARIE SUMMERS
  Plaintiff
AND:
  DAVID JOHN WILKS
  Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DERRINGTON J

Judgment delivered on 25 March 1999

This is a claim for damages for personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident on 15 December 1991. The plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle which came into collision with a vehicle driven by the defendant, who admits liability. She was then about 28 years of age and is now 35 years. She has been a qualified primary and pre-school teacher since the end of 1984.
The consequence of her injuries proved to be unusually serious for their relative mildness. She suffered from concussion for two to three minutes, but was then conscious and without any signs of adverse effects according to the thorough examination of the ambulance officer who attended her. Her recollection suggests a longer period of post-traumatic amnesia than this, but while some post-concussional effects of this kind might be understood, her state of consciousness was very satisfactory soon after she recovered and there may be overstatement of these symptoms due to her tendency to see them enlarged in retrospect. She also suffered a laceration of her arm and general bruising and abrasions. One bruise was on her left forehead, which was probably associated with her concussion. After treatment at the hospital for her lacerations and abrasions and full testing, she was allowed to return home without being admitted.
Fortunately she has little or no recollection of pain at that time, nor does she have any recollection of the trauma of the accident or for a short time prior to it, so that there is no lasting recollection of the traumatic event that would cause continuing stress. The stress that she suffered was the pain and suffering and temporary disability consequent upon her injuries. She saw Dr Di Palma on the following day and again after another five days, and the evidence as to these visits relates only to complaints concerning physical injuries. There was no suggestion of cognitive disruption or reactive disorder at that stage. She rested for nine days. After that she did not obtain further medical assistance for over four months.
When she returned to work at the end of the school vacation, she had some difficulty in coping with her work. No doubt there was some residue of symptoms from her physical injuries, but these largely abated after a few months. Her principal problem was a reactive disorder in adjusting to the stress caused by her injuries and their consequences, and this was magnified in the ordinary stress of her classroom situation. It is also probable that her difficulty in coping with her work imposed an added stress from some sense of shame at malfunctioning from a psychological cause.
Consistently with her unusually severe reaction to relatively minor injuries and the nature of her complaints, her presentation at the trial and her evidence suggests that she is a person who worries excessively. Her pre-accident freedom from stress-related illness as indicated by her slight use of sick-leave, does not imply the contrary since she was younger then. Further, as Dr Richards indicated, the effects of stress are cumulative, and it may be that the pre-accident accumulation of stress before her injuries had not yet manifested itself in serious symptoms. The stress from her injuries may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back, as Dr Richards described the process in another context, and this would explain her unusually severe reaction to these injuries.
At that time, her physical symptoms from her physical injuries persisted but not for any significant length of time and, other than in respect of a pre-existing eye condition, many of her later complaints of physical symptoms were not shown by testing to be related to any physical causes. She saw Dr Birchley about these on three occasions from 28 April to 14 May 1992, and, after almost a year, on 15 April and 29 April 1993. On her first visit she also complained of memory, concentration and mood disorders, and this seems to reflect the onset of her reaction to a maladjustment to the stress brought on by her injuries. She was given two weeks sick leave. By the end of her first set of visits, she agreed with Dr Birchley that many of her symptoms were due to her stress as a teacher.
She married on 20 June 1992 and continued with her employment, but from October to December 1992 she took special leave without pay because of stress.
On her second set of visits to Dr Birchley, although she felt under less stress from work, she again complained of many physical symptoms, which again were mostly unrelated to her injuries, and of memory, concentration and mood disorders. She was also having unspecified ongoing domestic problems at that time. The causes of her symptoms seem to have been much the same as on her earlier set of visits. She did not seek further medical assistance until she saw Dr Di Palma again in August 1993.
By a process of rationalisation she attributes all her complaints in this and subsequent periods, even colds and influenza, to the relevant injuries. Further, her explanations of her failure during relevant periods to obtain medical assistance for or to complain of symptoms of which she now speaks, should be received with considerable reservation. However, she certainly suffered the distress of an adjustment disorder, which may have produced further distressing consequences, such as the onset of hoarseness of her voice from raising it in excessive anger towards her pupils. But she also tends to overstate the significance of these things. For example, she had one medical consultation about her hoarseness, and it quickly passed although she did not pursue the therapy that was recommended. And although she claims that her excessive anger continued, she had no further problems with her voice.
When she saw Dr DiPalma on 26 August 1993 and on 8 September 1993 he diagnosed mild depression and prescribed suitable medication and counselling which, after a brief relapse, quickly improved the plaintiff’s condition substantially, and she completed the year in a much better state of mind. She became pregnant in December 1993, but did not realise it until March 1994, whereupon she terminated her medication to avoid damage to her child.
She says that as the result of a decision made in December 1993, she reduced her work to half-time from the beginning of 1994 because she was not coping well, but denies that her pregnancy had anything to do with this. However, there is no contemporary medical record of any complaint of disorder or depression during any relevant time, and it is probable that the decision was made after she fell pregnant. Her dismissal of this as a causal or contributory factor, in spite of her progress on anti-depressive medication, is unjustified. It is outside her knowledge and again it is consistent with her tendency to attribute all her symptoms to her injuries. This error is more likely in these circumstances where she was unaware of her pregnancy as a possible alternative source of her symptoms. However, it is probable that her concerns and reaction arising out of her recent experience added to the stress of any symptoms from pregnancy sufficiently to cause her to reduce her working time where normally she would probably not have done so. Under this regime she seems to have coped very well and although she consulted medical advice concerning her pregnancy, there is no evidence of any complaints of physical or psychological disorder.
In June 1994, she took maternity leave until the commencement of the 1995 academic year. Her child was born in September 1994. She had mild physical complications on the birth but suffered no post-natal depression or other adverse effects. She intends to have other children but is presently undecided as to the number. She resumed working half-time, that is only five days per fortnight, but this was in accordance with her pre-existing intention to work only limited hours while her children were in their pre-school years. Despite her quantum statement, it is quite clear that her injuries had nothing to do with this decision, though no doubt she was happy to benefit from the reduced stress that it brought. Her freedom from any need for relevant medical assistance continued.
She commenced these proceedings in the District Court in December 1994, and it was not until June 1998 that they were removed to this court.
For about two years from the beginning of 1994, she appears to have coped well, and her evidence to the contrary is probably an unconscious retrospective exaggeration of occasions of minor stress together with some lack of confidence caused by her earlier experience. There was also an alternative source of stress. She was leaving her first young baby at home for five days in each fortnight and, although at that time her husband was available to care for the child, that is not a complete answer. In any case, for the whole of this time she did not seek medical assistance despite the very beneficial effect of the last treatment she had received. When she did resume treatment, on the first consultation her complaints were of her recent stressors and did not refer to any other serious symptoms during the antecedent period of remission. It is probable that these features indicate the absence of serious symptoms. Over these two years, she had only seven days sick leave in all, including only one day in the whole of 1994.
This period was probably a watershed in her medical history and indicates the cessation of the substantial adjustment disorder which she suffered as the direct result of her injuries. The nature of an adjustment disorder is a reactive disturbance to a stressor, and whilst the accident itself was not a stressor since she has no recollection of it, her injuries were. With their abatement, they ceased to be operative, and while her reaction may have been more durable, even that had largely disappeared by early 1994. However, the consequences of the reaction itself were probably not yet fully played out.
In April 1996 she experienced further stress-related disorder associated with her having one pupil and another potential pupil with serious behavioural difficulties. She consulted medical assistance and was given counselling and anti-depressant medication which may have been inadequate, for a later increase in the dosage had substantially beneficial effects. In the following month, because of her disorder she took extended leave from the Department of Education and has not yet returned to teaching. She says that she feels that she will never be capable of doing so, but significantly she has not resigned and her present status will give her priority of employment when she chooses to apply. After she commenced her extended leave, she received a temporary disablement pension provided by the Superannuation Board, and she later sought employment as a part-time book-keeper.
In June 1997, she commenced her own private day-care business for which she is professionally qualified. She provides day-care at her home for up to four pre-school children and three school children at any one time. Her child counts for one of the former, and when she goes to school, another child may be taken on in her place. Although the plaintiff’s child would then displace one of the school children that could be taken, because that work is confined only to after-school hours, the final result would probably enlarge the plaintiff’s income from the business above that of a part-time teacher.
Apart from the avoidance of stress in the classroom, this new arrangement must have been attractive to the plaintiff since it provided her with the opportunity to care for her own child on a full-time basis, particularly as her husband’s present work precludes his capacity to mind a growing child. It has also permitted her to avoid the cost of day-care for her own child which she would have had to meet if she had worked as a teacher; and it will have a similar effect in respect of her future children. Since her present business suits her circumstances very well, and involves little, if any, financial loss, it follows that her disinclination to return to employment as a teacher does not indicate present or permanent future disability. However, for the overall benefit of her health, it is better that she should not resume teaching for about six months. This will be discussed further below.
By Christmas 1997, she felt back to normal and abandoned her medication, perhaps unwisely. When examined for medico-legal purposes on 4 February 1998, it was noted that she had no clumsiness or unco-ordination of her hand nor any clinical evidence of cognitive or memory impairment. She still claims to suffer from some disorder particularly of mood, and there is probably some residue of this, but it is exaggerated in her perception and aggravated by this litigation. These too will be discussed further below.
The explanation for her relapse in April 1996 is probably that in addition to the new stressors at work, she retained some residual fear of and concern for recurrence of her earlier maladjustment disorder, which itself had caused her shame and this was a further stressor of a kind that was re-enlivened by the others. With some caution it should be accepted that there had been some intermittent continuity of minor symptoms, aggravated by this fear, not sufficient to require medical help but sufficient, when she was under pressure from other serious stressors, to provide a critical contribution to her disorder. The work-related stressors alone, though relatively serious, were probably not sufficient to precipitate such a serious result, even operating cumulatively with the stress of leaving her child.
Her natural state would account for part of her response to the later work-related stressors, and she should not be compensated for that; but the defendant must compensate her for the harm that he caused her, for he must take her as he found her. The continuing stress of her fears and its critical effect upon her vulnerable state in the face of other stressors comes within this description but except in this indirect way, that harm did not increase her vulnerability.
Although pre-existing natural vulnerability to such harm should be taken into account as a diminishing factor where the losses suffered or to be suffered would have occurred in any case, (Wilson v Persley (1975) 7 ALR 571, 574; cf Schmidt v Alderson (unreported, Court of Appeal, 26 February 1999), it cannot be said that any such losses in the relevant period would probably have befallen her in any case. This may have become a factor if they had continued significantly into the future.
The views of Mr Walkley, a psychologist, that the accident caused a more serious depressive injury should be rejected. Apart from the strong and persuasive contradiction of him by far more knowledgeable and experienced expert witnesses on both sides, his evidence was unconvincing. Unfortunately, his diagnosis seems to have led Dr Rigano, a psychiatrist, into some error. The latter did not give evidence and his written analysis, based on Mr Walkley’s views, is inadequate. It does not properly address the contra-indicators referred to unanimously by the psychiatrists from both sides who were called at the hearing.
As between the latter, there is some dispute as to whether the further onset of symptoms in April 1996 was in any way attributable to the original event. Dr Nothling who was led for the defence says that the original stressor, the effect of the injuries from the accident, having ceased, the substantial remission from 1994 to 1996 indicates that the consequences of that stressor had terminated; and that the further onset was due entirely to new and unconnected stressors which acted upon the plaintiff’s natural vulnerability.
Dr Richards sees a connection between the original stressors and the condition in 1996, and even for the future, but he had difficulty in trying to justify it. In the end he was obliged to rely to some extent upon the plaintiff’s complaints of continuing cognitive defects (T109/45), but this was not properly made out. It may also be a small point but in addition to the absence of improvement of the plaintiff’s motor function, his own clinical examination of her showed no evidence of cognitive or memory impairment (exhibit 9). That is supported by Dr Nothling’s clinical examination. That her earlier complaints of motor problems in her right hand were consistent with an injury to the left side of her brain, and that she received a blow to the left forehead, does not establish brain damage at all. Such a finding would be without adequate foundation on the facts of this case and contrary to the acceptable medical evidence. Her symptoms relating to cognitive motor functions were probably associated with her adjustment disorder.
Save for one qualification, generally Dr Nothling’s evidence was preferable upon this issue, particularly the evidence that the direct effects of the physical injuries had substantially ceased for two years. It was more closely supported by the evidence and he had more conviction, which seems to have been justified. That qualification to the acceptance of his views relates to the recurrence in 1996 of the plaintiff’s distress at and concern for her original inability to cope and her fear of its recurrence. This had been explained above. In effect, it was a consequence of the original injury and amounted to a new latent stressor that continued to affect her when she came under other stress that challenged her vulnerability. It was probably also enlivened to some extent by her tendency to rationalise unconnected problems occurring after September 1993 with her original disorder. There may also still have been a small residue of her original disorder.
Consequently, Dr Nothling’s point is substantially made but his reasoning has not taken this factor into account. Although the plaintiff’s earlier experience would not have increased her vulnerability, this is not a matter of increased vulnerability but the continuation of a consequential stressor. It may be the factor that Dr Richards unsuccessfully searched for to explain his obvious impression of some connection between the two adjustment disorders. They were proximate enough in time to suggest it, but his solution involving a long-enduring direct and more serious cause is not made out. This explanation would seem to meet his concern while remaining generally consistent with Dr Nothling’s reasoning and the evidence. Moreover, Dr Richards’ view that this litigation is playing a part in her complaints would also operate in much the same way.

Accordingly, Dr Nothling’s conclusion should be modified to allow for the probability that the consequences of the original disorder contributed to the stress which precipitated the illness in April 1996. Although it was not the major factor, it had sufficient recency and apparent continuity in the mind of this lady to have an operative effect, and as it was probably critical in taking her into disorder where otherwise she would probably have coped, albeit with difficulty, its effect must be the subject of compensation. However, it could not be associated with any future disorder since is has been shown to have a diminishing effect with the passage of time. The termination of this litigation should also have a significantly beneficial effect. Consequently, her recovery from her present disorder should see the end of any causation that can be rationally linked with her original injuries. According to Dr Nothling’s prognosis it should take up to two years to accomplish fully, though it is not shown that its effect on her earning capacity will extend beyond the six months period of recovery to which Dr Richards refers.
ECONOMIC LOSS
The components of the plaintiff’s economic loss consist of her loss from various periods of leave taken without pay up to the time when she began her business; the loss of the possible benefit of accrued sick leave which was used and that which has not accumulated during the periods of unpaid leave; her loss from working only half-time for five months from January to June 1994; a similar loss of superannuation entitlement and holiday pay during her unpaid absences; an indeterminate loss when the economic benefits from her business did not match what she would have received without the intervention of the accident; and a small component of a global nature to meet some small deficit in the value of her earning capacity for a further limited period, a higher contingency of loss in her business from her current indisposition and a very small residual chance that her past experience and its consequences will have some adverse economic result in the future. These assessments will now be dealt with in detail, but they are made difficult by the absence of evidence as to her tax exemption status. It has been assumed, to her advantage, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary she was entitled to the general exemption. Equally, no evidence was led as to her superannuation entitlements, and the assessment of her loss in that respect is the best that can be made in the circumstances.
Despite her general vulnerability to stress, there should be little if any discounting for its effects during the relevant period since it is relatively short, and there have probably been no stressors which, without the residual effects of the disorder due to the accident, would have been so substantial as to have caused actual financial loss. The chances of loss from this source would have been greater had the period relevant to damages been longer.
With minor exceptions, her new business now provides her with substantially the same income as would her earnings from part-time employment with the Department. Her expenses are small and with the saving in day-care fees and child minding fees and taxation advantages in respect of her home, her business probably provides her with a net result about as good as the income from the limited employment in which she would have been engaged if the accident had never happened. It is probable that this, and incidental benefits of a non-pecuniary kind, suit her very well and have, in her present circumstances, reduced her motivation to return to teaching.
In June 1997 when she commenced her business, her part-time gross earnings as a teacher would have been one-half of $1,523.75 per fortnight, increasing in July to $1,582.55, and presently to $1,620.40, or $381.00, $395.00 and $405.00 per week respectively.
Unfortunately, clear details of her earnings in her present business are not available since, surprisingly, no tax returns or other formal documentation were tendered. She initially took one or two children on a part-time basis, and when she gained confidence she accepted more children and for longer periods. She says that for the balance of the calendar year 1997 her income was $5,798.13, and her expenses, including setting up expenses were approximately $490.00. During this period she would have earned about $10,000.00 as a teacher but received only about $5,300.00 from the business. Although it is not altogether clear, this means that the loss for this period should be assessed at $4,700.00 gross or about $3,300.00 net, attracting interest of $200.00.
In 1998, her gross weekly income was a little over $400.00 before small expenses and tax, which compares reasonably favourably with the gross wage as a half-time teacher as set out above. However, the incidental benefits of her business may not quite match the value of sick leave, recreation leave and superannuation of a part-time teacher. Except for a small global figure of $2,000.00 net, including interest, to cover this, there is no loss since the end of 1997 that has the support of reasonable evidence. The quality of the evidence in these matters is worse, if anything, than the other deficiencies mentioned elsewhere.
To the present time, there is no suggestion of any loss of income from her business due to sickness, but she will have lost the accumulation of sick leave as a part-time teacher during the period since she ceased her employment, a figure of about 8 days. As against that there is the real contingency that, had she remained teaching, she may well have used sick leave as the result of ordinary stress which was not due to the accident. This item is subject to discounting for acceleration of receipt of the benefit and the chance that it may never have been used. Because of all the contingent factors, it will be included in the award for loss of sick leave below. So too, the loss of superannuation benefits during this period will be included in the award below for general loss of superannuation benefits.
She speaks of reducing her income from her business by refusing to accept day-care work for one afternoon per week to allow her to go shopping, and for ten weeks per year for vacations similar to those of a teacher. As to the former, she does not explain its necessity, having regard to the availability of late night or weekend shopping; and as to the latter, there is no reasonable explanation as to why she will require vacations to match the teaching year. It is noteworthy that she has not followed such practices in the past and there is no hint of any incapacity to cope well under that regime. The better view is that she will continue to earn a net income which is close to what she would have been earning if she had never been injured until the last of her children is of school age. By that time, she should not be disadvantaged by any residual symptoms from the accident.
Prior to the commencement of the business on 10 June 1997, the period of lost earnings without the benefit of sick leave was thirty-eight weeks, but for part of this time she would have been working only half-time in any case. Her salary varied over this period, and the compensation must be related to the net figure after tax. This produces a result of about $14,000.00 net upon which there should be interest of $3,500.00. In addition, during the school vacation between 21 December 1992 and 26 January 1993, she lost some holiday pay because of her absence on special leave without leave. The amount so lost was $1,227.59 gross or about $900.00 net, and it attracts interest of about $300.00.
In the period from the commencement of the 1994 academic year to the commencement of her maternity leave in June, her loss of half of her wages amounted to about $8,000.00 gross or $6,000.00 net, on which interest should be $1,300.00 This was omitted from the list of economic loss in the written submissions made on her behalf but that is not surprising in the light of its many other deficiencies, including double counting and several failures to explain the basis of calculation.
For her lost sick leave of ninety-three days, assuming that it was all due to this cause, she is still entitled only to its value to her. It was cumulative but not commutable into cash on retirement, and consequently it is necessary to commence the assessment with the present value of the leave which she has lost and which she might have called upon in the future had she not been injured in this accident. This loss will occur only if she would have used up all other sick leave and would then have been deprived of the opportunity of using the lost leave as a last resort. The question would not have arisen for some years in the future until, at the earliest, she would have returned to work after the last of her children attained school age. The lost leave has a salary equivalent of $14,700.00 gross or about $10,300.00 net. After discounting this and allowing for the contingency referred to and for acceleration but including her lost chance of accumulating sick leave during her total periods of absence from employment, a suitable figure for this component is $5,000.00. As this represents a possible loss only in the future, it attracts no award of interest.
The assessment of superannuation lost is very difficulty since not only was it not pleaded but there is no evidence as to detail. There can be judicial knowledge that the benefit is available to teachers employed by the Education Department, and the rate of employer contribution is fixed by the statute. If this is applied to her estimated loss of income to date and for the relevant future, a global figure of $2,000.00 should be adequate to compensate her in this respect. If necessary, she should be given leave to amend her pleading to include this item since it should have been foreseeable by the defence, and it has canvased all possible controversial aspects in its contest of other items.
Her future loss of earning capacity is limited to the loss she will probably sustain for the next six months at the most. Although her full recovery may take two years, she would probably be disabled for half-time teaching for longer than six months beyond this litigation. There is also reason to suspect that she would prefer to continue with her business even when she is fully fit to return to teaching, and that it might soon also be financially advantageous to her to do so. In the interim, her loss will be the difference between the income and benefits she would have earned as a half-time teacher, as compared with her income from her business and the benefits she derives from that. A global figure of $1,500.00 is the best estimate that can be made of that.
She should have the psychiatric assistance recommended by Dr Nothling at a cost of $6,000.00. Any discount for acceleration of receipt of this sum should be offset by the probable cost of medication.
It is agreed that special damages are $2,662.71 and the value of gratuitous care and assistance, including interest, is $381.00.\
INTEREST
Although the defendant has argued for a reduction of the allowance of interest because of the delay in bringing this matter on, this was not raised in the evidence, and it is not shown that there has been undue delay. The length of time involved does not support such an implication for it was desirable to allow the plaintiff’s condition to stabilise, and the issues have had some difficulty that justified full investigation. Interest has been allowed for the full periods for which it would ordinarily be allowable.
GENERAL DAMAGES
While the plaintiff’s physical injuries were very limited both in extent and duration, her distress must have been quite painful to her, particularly at its worst periods. However, her depression was no worse than mild and when it was diagnosed it responded rapidly to medication. From that time until April 1996, her distress was at worst intermittent and minor, and probably insignificant when she was not under stress. With the recurrence of her symptoms in April 1996, she would probably have suffered the same degree distress as on the first occasion and this probably abated substantially when she ceased work and received medication. However, there were again intermittent occasions of minor distress, with slow improvement of her general state, advancing more rapidly when her medication was enlarged.
She suffered a loss of some recreational activities, but these have been replaced or recovered to the extent that she would have continued to pursue them. For example her capacity to ride horses and to play the piano has returned; and as might be expected, as she has become older, she has replaced some activities from which she was originally disabled with others that are within her capacity. She leads a generally happy life. There does not appear to be a great loss here.
For the future, the outlook is even brighter. With the termination of litigation and suitable treatment, what is left of her disorder caused by this accident and its residual effects should diminish or disappear without much further distress to her. For all of this, a suitable figure is $30,000.00 of which $25,00.00 should be attributed to the past, producing interest of $3,625.00.
SUMMARY
Special damages  $2,662.71
Interest thereon  $433.00
Gratuitous care and assistance (including interest)  $381.00
Future treatment  $6,000.00
Loss of sick leave entitlements  $5,000.00
Loss of superannuation entitlement  $2,000.00
Loss of other pre-trial earning capacity and interest  $31,500.00
Loss of post-trial earning capacity  $1,500.00
General damages  $30,000.00
Interest thereon    $3,625.00
Total  $83,101.71
The trial did not proceed smoothly and submissions have left much to be desired as to detail. However, the plaintiff should feel assured that particular care has been taken to ensure that this did not reflect adversely on the merits of her case.
There will be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of Eighty-three thousand, one hundred and one dollars and seventy-one cents ($83,601.71).