Sumich and Sumich

[2017] FCCA 3263

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SUMICH & SUMICH [2017] FCCA 3263

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Enforcement.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975, ss.79, 79A, 106A, 114

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, pt.25B, Division 25B.2, rr.25B.07, 25B.10, 25B.13

Applicant: MS SUMICH

Respondent: MR SUMICH

File Number: PAC 1758 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Harman

Hearing date: 22 November 2017

Date of Last Submission: 22 November 2017

Delivered at: Parramatta

Delivered on: 22 November 2017

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Ms Sbrizzi on a duty basis

The Respondent appeared in person

ORDERS

1. Discharge all prior Orders made in these proceedings save and except Orders 2b, 2c, 3 and 4 of the Orders made on 28 May 2015 (being orders for the sale of the property Property A, distribution of the proceeds of sale, for each party to retain all other property in their respective possession, and, an order pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act1975) and the Order for costs (Order 7) made on 29 May 2017.

2. Appoint the Applicant wife, Ms Sumich, as sole Trustee for sale on behalf of Ms Sumich and Mr Sumich, of the property situate at and known as, Property A, in the State of New South Wales, being all that parcel contained in Certificate of Title (omitted) and the Applicant wife shall, in that capacity, do all things, sign all documents and give all consents, authorities and instructions as may be necessary to effect the sale of that property, by such means and upon such terms and conditions as the wife may determine, and to thereafter cause the distribution of the net proceeds of sale of the property in accordance with the Orders made on 28 May 2015, and as hereinafter provided.

3. Pursuant to section 114 of the Family Law Act1975 and within 14 days of today’s date, the husband Mr Sumich, shall vacate the premises at Property A, and shall thereafter remain away from that property, not attend upon it or enter into it and the wife shall have sole use and exclusive occupation of that property pending its sale.

4. The husband shall be entitled, at the time he vacates the Property A property, to remove his items of personalty and personal possession and such other items as were declared to be his property pursuant to Orders made on 28 May 2015.

5. The wife shall forthwith and within 24 hours, provide to the husband the sum of $4,000 to be applied by the husband towards meeting a bond and rent in advance in respect to rental premises and so as to facilitate his vacation of the Property A property in accordance with the above Order, and provided further, that the sum of $4,000 shall be paid to the wife from the husband’s share of the proceeds of sale of the Property A property (to be divided in accordance with the Orders of 28 May 2015), and provided further that the wife shall be entitled to also pay to herself from the husband’s share of the proceeds of sale the sum of $1,181 being the amount of costs awarded in the wife’s favour by Orders made on 29 May 2017.

6. IT IS NOTED the sale of the Property A property is not subject to any Order with respect to the agent or agents to be instructed by Ms Sumich as Trustee for sale of the home, nor solicitor or conveyancer to be retained, nor listing price or sale price as might be accepted on sale. 

7. Dismiss all outstanding Applications and Responses and remove all issues from list of matters awaiting hearing.

8. Any further Application with respect to suggested enforcement, implementation or variation of Orders made in these proceedings are to be listed before Judge Harman and not otherwise.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Sumich & Sumich is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PARRAMATTA

PAC 1758 of 2015

MS SUMICH

Applicant

And

MR SUMICH

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. These proceedings come before the Court with respect to a number of Applications in a Case and Responses thereto. 

2. The proceedings have a most unfortunate history, having consumed a quantity of this Court's resources out of all proportion with any issue in dispute in this case. 

3. The most recent Applications comprise:

   a)An Application in a Case filed by Mr Sumich on 17 October 2017, and amended by him on 16 November 2017;

   b)A Response thereto filed by Ms Sumich on 15 November 2017 and, consequent upon the immediate amendment of Mr Sumich's Application in a Case upon the filing of that Response, a further Amended Response filed 16 November 2017. 

4. I will return to those Applications shortly. 

5. This is the most recent tranche of litigation. The proceedings have been before the Court, on a relatively continuous basis, for nearly three years.  Those circumstances will be explored in a discussion of the history of proceedings and Orders made in this case.  Sadly, the address of earlier Applications is necessary to understand what is occurring in this matter. 

6. These proceedings were commenced by an Application Initiating Proceedings filed on 20 April 2015. That Application, filed by Ms Sumich, had sought that the husband pay to her a modest sum of money – $84,250 in – return for which she would vacate the property at Property A of which these parties are joint registered proprietors and Ms Sumich would transfer to Mr Sumich the whole of her right, title and interest in that property.

7. The matrimonial home at Property A was suggested by Ms Sumich, at the time that the Application was filed, to have a value of approximately $850,000 and to be encumbered by a mortgage with an outstanding balance of approximately $600,000. Thus, Ms Sumich alleged that the parties had equity in the vicinity of $250,000.  Each had some superannuation, it would seem, although it must be observed that Mr Sumich has never filed a Statement of Financial circumstances in these proceedings, and did not, prior to the conclusion of the substantive proceedings commenced by the Initiating Application filed 20 April 2015, or ever, file a Response.

8. On the first return date of the substantive proceedings 28 May 2015, the matter was concluded by Orders made by consent which provided that the parties would each do all things necessary to list for sale, and sell the property at Property A.  The Order is in the following specific terms:

   the Wife and Husband must do all acts and things and must execute all documents, instruments and writings necessary to “sell” (emphasis added) the former matrimonial home.

9. The proceeds of sale were to be distributed as to 55 per cent to the wife, and as to 45 per cent to the husband. 

10. An Order was included at subparagraph (d), “Any offer in excess of $950,000 will be accepted by the parties”.

11. The provision was included with the consent of both parties, notwithstanding that there was (and it is not suggested to be otherwise) no evidence of the value of the property at that or at any point in time.  The provision is also included notwithstanding the wife's then assertion that the property had a value of at least $100,000 less.

12. One would think that the making of final property adjustment Orders might conclude the issues between the parties. However, the parties have continued, to this date, to live separately and apart under the one roof.  The parties have continued, to this date, to litigate with respect to the interpretation and implementation of that straightforward Order. 

13. Absent any specific provision, the Order might be taken as providing for a sale of the property by private treaty. That is not a position Mr Sumich has taken. He asserts that the Order inherently infers that the property must be auctioned. The parties have litigated somewhat continuously with respect to that issue.

14. Following the making of that final Order, an Application in a Case was filed, it would seem, within moments. The matter came back before the Court on 24 June 2015, 3 weeks after the final Order was made, and the Order was varied to provide that any offer in excess of $1.2 million would be accepted by the parties.

15. I am not called upon to construe the above Order as to the sale price of the property that might be accepted.  Of course, one way of interpreting the Orders – framed as they are that any offer in excess of a particular price will be accepted – is to inherently accept that it does not preclude an offer that is less from being accepted. The Order might simply direct that the parties must accept an offer if it is over a particular amount but that they may, in their discretion, accept offers at a lower amount. As indicated, that is not particularly pressed as an interpretation that requires address. 

16. The matter was again before the Court on 11 September 2015 in response to a third Application filed within a period of 6 months. That listing was in response to an Application in a Case that had been filed by the wife on 21 July 2015. That Application sought, for the first, but not last time, that the wife be appointed as trustee for sale of the property such that she could, on behalf of both parties, offer the property for sale and accept offers for purchase. The wife proposed specific real estate agents and conveyancers.

17. On 11 September 2015, a number of Orders were made, including that the parties would, within four days, sign a listing agreement with (omitted).  To that end, the present Application in a Case before this Court seeks to cavil with the appointment of (omitted) as real estate agents to advertise and market the property, notwithstanding that now, for some two years and three months, those agents have been, pursuant to an Order of this Court, appointed as the listing agent.

18. A further Order was made that to give effect to the balance of Orders previously made, that the parties would do all things necessary to list the property for sale at $1.2 million, and accept any offer in excess of that price. The Application in a Case was otherwise dismissed, save as to costs and the Application for costs was further adjourned. 

19. The matter was, again, before the Court on 30 November 2015. On that date, when the proceedings were listed it would seem purely to deal with the issue of costs, a number of Orders were made. They included dismissal of all previous Applications, a requirement that the husband pay the wife's costs in the sum of $1500 to be paid within 30 days of the Order and providing that interest would accrue thereafter.

20. One would think that these Orders might have ended the litigation between the parties, but no.  

21. On 19 April 2016, there was an attendance before a Registrar seeking to shortlist a further Application in a Case relating to enforcement of Orders made by the Court. That Application in a Case, filed that date, ultimately came before the Court on 17 June 2016. 

22. On 17 June 2016, a number of Orders and Notations were made by consent, being Orders as to the filing of an Initiating Application by the husband, together with an Affidavit in support and a Financial Statement, and the filing of a Response by the wife.  Why that was necessary is not entirely clear from the terms of the Order itself.

23. The wife's Application, filed 19 April 2016, had sought Orders discharging the prior property adjustment Orders. Thus, one might infer, to the extent that it sought discharge of any Order – and that which was specifically sought to be discharged was the Order for sale of the property – that it was an Application pursuant to section 79A of the Family Law Act 1975. The wife, again, sought appointment as sole trustee for the sale of the property, injunctions to compel the husband to vacate the property and to remain away from it and Orders granting the wife exclusive use and occupation.

24. The matter was again before the Court on 12 August 2016. On that date, both parties appeared and were legally represented, at least briefly.  The solicitors for the Applicant, then the husband, withdrew. How the husband came to be treated as the Applicant in those proceedings is unclear as no Application Initiating Proceedings was ever filed as directed. On 12 August, 2016 orders (1) and (2) of Orders that had been made on 11 September 2015, they being Orders regarding, inter alia, the appointment of (omitted) as agents, and the listing price of the property at $1.4 million were discharged.

25. The above Orders returned the parties to their prior position whereby the property was simply to be sold. There is, on that basis and as at that date, no minimum sale price for the property as the earlier minimum sale price, if it might be so interpreted, of $950,000 had already been discharged. 

26. The Affidavit of the husband, which had been filed 17 June 2016, was withdrawn. The Application in a Case filed by the wife, seeking appointment as trustee for sale, amongst other Orders, together with the Response thereto, which had apparently been filed by the husband on 14 June 2016, were adjourned for a two-day hearing. Further directions were made as to the filing of material.

27. It was noted that the husband had been provided by the Court with a copy of section 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 to assist him in understanding that which he would be required to prove should he persist in his Application, then made, to discharge the existing property Orders. That arose as the husband's Response to an Application in a Case filed 14 June 2016 had sought that the prior Orders be discharged, that the wife be compelled to pay the husband the sum of $338,660 – the calculation of which sum is not explained in any document – and that the husband thereafter, and upon payment of that sum, transfer to the wife his interest in the property. 

28. The husband sought, notwithstanding such Orders as were sought above, that the wife pay the husband monies, and that the husband transfer the property to her, that the wife vacate the property and remain away from it. The husband sought an Order for $30,000 per year spouse maintenance. 

29. Those Applications came before a Judge of the Court on 9 March 2017, being a further date to which the proceedings had been listed at the request of the wife. The Orders that had issued on 12 August 2016, it should also be noted, contained a typographical error in that they refer to the matter being listed for hearing on dates in May 2016, whereas clearly they were intended to be dates in May 2017.

30. On 9 March 2017, an Application was made by the wife to summarily dismiss the husband's section 79A Application. That Application was adjourned and effectively consolidated with the proceedings already on foot. Further Orders and directions were made with respect to the filing of material.

31. When the proceedings came before the Court for the two-day scheduled trial to commence 29 May 2017, the husband's Response to the Application in a Case filed, being the Response to the Application in a Case filed 23 May 2017 already referred to, was dismissed. Thus, the husband's claim, pursuant to section 79A of the Act, was terminated.

32. Order (2) of the Orders made on 11 September 2015 was discharged, although in reality, that Order would have already been discharged by Orders made on 12 August 2016. Paragraph (2)(d) of the original primary Order made 28 May 2016, was varied to provide that the parties would accept any offer for sale of the property at or over $1 million. However, without intending any criticism at all of the Judge who pronounced such Order, the Order that is purported to be varied had already been discharged.

33. Yet a further Order was made that (omitted), be appointed as the listing agents for the sale of the property, with the property to be sold by auction on a date agreed between the parties or, failing agreement, on a date nominated by the agent, no more than 10 weeks from the date of that Order. That would be a date, one would think, no later than the end of July 2017. 

34. The parties have referred in submissions today, although their evidence filed by Affidavit is somewhat deficient, that the property had been offered for sale at auction at one point, but the highest offer fell short of $1 million, to wit, $900,000.

35. The case was, otherwise, removed from the pending cases list. 

36. Yet another Order was made that the husband pay the wife's costs with respect to the determination of those proceedings. 

37. It is not apparent, from the face of the Order, whether the balance of the Orders sought by the wife in her Application in a Case were dealt with. They were certainly not refused, nor the wife's Application in a Case dismissed. I am satisfied the Application in a Case remains on foot.  And, thus, the wife – in addition to the relief that she seeks in the Responses that she has filed to the husband's Application in a Case at this time and as amended – includes her plea for relief that she be appointed as trustee for sale of the property and that the husband vacate the property.

38. The proceedings, again, came before the Court on 4 October 2017. On that date, there was an appearance before a Registrar in Chambers. The wife had sought to have certain documents signed on behalf of the husband pursuant to a section 106A Order which was incorporated within the first and primary Order made 28 May 2015. The good Registrar spent, no doubt, some little time following the chain of Orders, as I have in these reasons, to note each of the changes that occurred and were effected by subsequent Orders. It was noted that the husband had not taken any action to approach the Court with respect to any issue.

39. The Registrar was satisfied that the husband had failed to sign a reserve price letter addressed to the auctioneer being a letter prepared by (omitted) real estate setting out a reserve price in accordance with the Orders made 29 May 2017, and that the husband had been notified of the wife's intention to approach the Registrar. That all has some significance in light of the husband's protestations today that he is more than happy to co-operate with any agent the wife may desire to use, notwithstanding that clearly findings have already been made that the husband has failed to co-operate with the agent that was appointed not by the wife, but by Order of this Court.

40. The documents were signed by the Registrar and, it would seem, that the auction already referred to may then have proceeded without success in the sale of this property. That brings us to the present Applications in a Case that are before the Court. 

41. On this occasion, it is the husband who initiates action. By his Application in a Case filed 17 October 2017, the husband has sought that within 28 days that the home be put up for sale by auction. The Order is completely unnecessary. The Order had already been made in May of 2017.

42. The Application was amended on 16 November 2017, such that the husband sought to discharge all prior Orders with respect to the property, including the sale of the property and that the wife be required to pay to the husband the sum certain of $338,660, pay to the husband maintenance of $600 per week and that the husband would then transfer to the wife the property at Property A. 

43. That Application is not properly before the Court. It has already been heard and determined by a Judge of this Court and dismissed with costs.  Accordingly, it is incompetent and I am satisfied requires no further consideration.

44. The wife has filed several Responses to the husband’s several Applications and they comprise the Applications by the wife. She seeks that the home be sold by private treaty utilising (omitted) as the agents. Their Contract to advertise and sell the property expires on 18 December 2017. The wife proposes that any offer at or over $1 million be accepted and the property be sold by private treaty and that a Registrar sign any document that the husband might fail to sign. In addition, the wife seeks that the husband be:

    ...labelled as vexatious litigant and restricted from making further applications.

45. In her Amended Response, the wife seeks, in effect, the same relief, save and except that she adds a further plea for relief that the Application of the husband be dismissed. For reasons that are already articulated, the Application made by the husband – and as comprised within the Application in a Case as amended – must fail it is incompetent. The very same relief that is sought by the husband on this occasion was sought on 14 June 2016. That Application was determined by the Court and dismissed with costs. 

1. Thus, I am left with the wife's pleas for relief which, I am satisfied, comprise:

   a)An Order that she be appointed trustee for sale of the property;

   b)An Order that the husband be required to vacate the property;

   c)An Order that the wife have sole and exclusive occupation of the property;  and

   d)An Order that the property be sold by the wife, subject to the terms and conditions she proposed in her own Response.

2. It is those Applications that I propose to determine today.

3. It is well known that the delays before this Court and, in particular, this Registry, are severe with great disadvantage, particularly in parenting proceedings, occasioned to parties who wait three years or more for a determination of their business. Some part of that delay may well be connected with an absence of resources. Certainly, the number of Judges in this Registry depleted between 2014 and 2015. The Registry, in 2014, was staffed by five Judges. The Registry now has four Judges although having dropped, at one point, to effectively two Judges. The absence of resources, however, is one part only of the difficulty.

4. There are a number of other contributors to delay, not the least of which are proceedings such as this, conducted by self-represented litigants. Without intending any offence to Ms Sumich, who has, at times with legal representatives, but even when not, conducted her affairs effectively and with focus upon issues in dispute, a failure to obtain advice and representation simply passes the cost of the litigants’ legal representation, the advice that they might obtain to tell them how doomed to failure their repeated Applications with respect to issues already ventilated and addressed, on to this Court all the other litigants who are delayed whilst this matter, having consumed nearly two hours of the duty list today at the expense of other cases, is heard and determined.

5. The material that the parties have filed in support of their respective Applications comprise an Affidavit of Mr Sumich, sworn or affirmed 17 October 2017 together with a further Affidavit, 16 November 2017.  There is also an Affidavit of Ms Sumich, sworn or affirmed 15 November 2017. 

6. One issue that must also be commented upon is the plea by Mr Sumich that Ms Sumich has misled the Court by failing to disclose a property owned by her in (country omitted). It is suggested that the non-disclosure occurred at the time the proceedings were commenced and to date. There are a number of difficulties with that proposition, not the least of which is the fact that Mr Sumich had clear opportunity to raise any matter he desired when the proceedings were initially before the Court but, through failure to file any document, deprived himself of that opportunity.

7. The matter has been stood in the list today on several occasions.  Indeed, assistance from the publicly funded duty solicitor service has been made available to Mr Sumich so that he might better articulate his view with respect to the wife's suggested “perjury”. Ultimately, the duty solicitor was able to identify an Affidavit by Ms Sumich (paragraph 74 thereof) in which Ms Sumich conceded ownership of a property in (country omitted), a property suggested to have been purchased for a little under $8000. The wife sets out great detail as to the purchase of that property and the involvement of both parties in its purchase.

8. That property, of itself, might cause some difficulties with defence of an Application pursuant to section 79A of the Act. In any event, I need not be troubled. The issue is determined on the basis that I have no jurisdiction. An Application pursuant to section 79A of the Act was already heard and determined by another Judge. The application was dismissed. Accordingly, the application cannot be renewed before me at least not on exactly the same evidence. That connects with the Affidavits, two, filed by the husband. Each seeks to re-open, re-ventilate, and re-agitate the entirety of the property dispute between the parties.

9. There are some aspects of the husband’s evidence that have some relevance to the proceedings. For example, at paragraph 44 of the earlier Affidavit, the husband asserts that the wife was “very rude to the real estate agent” and, as a consequence of which, the husband asserts that the real estate agent had stopped showing the house.  Whether that is so or not need not be determined at this time. The husband suggested that he has a number of medical problems. He suggests that he is undergoing counselling, and would appear to raise those issues to suggest that he was unable to provide proper consent at the time that the primary Order was made in May 2015.

10. The efficacy of that Order was, again, already addressed by the earlier Orders determined by another Judge. The husband, otherwise, suggests that he has permanent back, shoulder and neck pain. He does not give any greater detail, other than to indicate that he has a special bed. The wife has made clear that she has no desire for the bed and, in fact, desires that the husband take it with him upon vacation of the property, whenever that may be. It is agreed it must occur once the property is sold. The balance of the husband's evidence is irrelevant to the issues that this Court must determine.

11. The husband’s evidence is simply a catalogue of complaint with respect to the wife and using inflammatory headings such as “Perjury, Fraud and False Statements by Ms Sumich” and the like. The husband does not indicate anything with respect to the sale of the home, what he has done, what he proposes to or what might, otherwise, occur. The husband curiously, appears insistent that there be a minimum sale price, and asserts – in his Affidavit, sworn only a few days ago on 16 November 2017 – that the property has, as best as he is aware, a value of $950,000 accepting that which the wife alleges. To the earlier Affidavit, the husband annexes a number of documents he has obtained from estate agents different to the agent appointed by this Court following the hearing of the earlier Applications.

12. It is suggested by the annexed listing agreements, although it is not admissible evidence as to value, that the property should be listed based upon the agent’s created expectation that the parties might sell the property for values of 1.26 million to 1.4 million, and 1.25 to 1.35 million. 

13. The husband asserts that the wife should not be appointed as trustee for sale as she has less experience than him in selling properties. It would appear, on the basis of the manifest failure of these parties to successfully negotiate any sale of the property in two and a half years (notwithstanding, if one accepts Mr Sumich's assertion that he desired that it be so) that they have been doing all within their power to sell the property.

14. There is simply no evidence that Mr Sumich is more experienced or more capable of doing anything with respect to the sale than Ms Sumich.  All there is, is clear evidence that these parties have agitated pointless and meaningless positions – more so in the case of Mr Sumich, perhaps –since the matter was first before the Court now nearly three years ago, and which has achieved absolutely nothing in resolving the dispute between these parties. 

15. In dealing with the Application, I am conscious that the relief that is sought by the wife is, in effect, relief under section 114 of the Act.

16. The wife seeks injunctions with respect to the husband, requiring him to vacate the property so that she can sell it, seeking exclusive occupation of the property until it can be sold. The wife seeks Orders to appoint herself as trustee for sale as, clearly, the parties jointly have been unable to achieve anything regarding the sale of this property, as evidenced by the history of proceedings related above. The basis for the invocation and enlivenment of such a jurisdiction is appropriateness. The Court may make such injunctions under section 114 of the Act, and exercise its general powers with respect to enforcement under the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001[1] when it is considered proper to do so.  I am so satisfied in this case. 

    [1] Part 25B of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.

17. This case simply consumes the resources of the Court and the parties.  There are no longer issues of justice to be determined in this case.  Justice was determined by the making of the primary Order which effected an adjustment of interests in property between these parties.  Since that time, the parties have simply wasted their own time and the Court's – perhaps more so Mr Sumich – but, in any event, it has achieved no positive good. 

18. The enforcement of financial Orders is dealt with by Division 25B.2 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001. I am satisfied that the sale of the home is an enforceable obligation by reference to rule 25B.07 of the rules.

19. I am satisfied that the wife is a person entitled to enforce an obligation under rule 25B.10 of the rules.

20. I am satisfied that the general powers of enforcement in rule 25B.13 of the rules permit the appointment of the wife as a trustee for sale and that an enforcement Order can and should be made. 

21. By reference to any relevant provision in the legislation, something must be done to break the deadlock that exists between these parties living separately and apart under the one roof, in continuous dispute with each other about every aspect of the sale of the property. 

22. As already indicated, it beggars belief that the husband would expect that the Court would accept his protestation that he will in the future and that he has, in the past, always co-operated with any agent appointed for the sale of the property when only a month ago, the wife required an Application to this Court to have a simple letter of instruction signed to enable an auction to proceed. In all of those circumstances, I am satisfied that the primary Order will not be given force or effect until such time as it is within the domain of one party to advertise the property for sale and sell it. I am satisfied that party should be Ms Sumich.

23. Ms Sumich has indicated that she has modest savings, approximately $8000, and that she is prepared to provide to Mr Sumich funds to enable him to meet a bond, and rent in advance upon vacation of the property.  Mr Sumich protests that he is not in employment. Mr Sumich indicates that he is a casual (occupation omitted) but is not receiving regular work. It is unclear which proposition is expected to be accepted as accurate but, in any event, the husband has some capacity to meet his needs. 

24. The husband’s Application for spouse maintenance, as previously made, has already been determined and dismissed, and the quick sale of the property is the best that can be achieved to ensure that both of these parties receive their entitlements:  55 per cent of the net proceeds in the case of the wife, 45 per cent in the case of the husband.

25. For those reasons, I am satisfied that Orders must be made to break this deadlock and to enable the sale of this property. 

26. Accordingly, Orders are made as set out above (see Orders).

27. The effect of those Orders is that, Ms Sumich, is responsible for selling this home with whatever agent she wishes, using whatever solicitor or conveyancer she wishes, and selling at whatever price she can obtain.  Mr Sumich will receive, within 24 hours, $4,000 so that he can pay a bond and rent in advance and move out.  Mr Sumich will need to move out by next Thursday so that the property can be sold by Ms Sumich, who will then instruct the solicitors or conveyancers acting on the sale to distribute the money: 55 per cent to Ms Sumich together with reimbursing her $4,000, and paying her the costs that Mr Sumich was ordered to pay previously and to then receive the balance.

I certify that the preceding seventy-two (72) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Harman

Date: 20 December 2017