Sullivan v The Queen

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S110 of 1996

B e t w e e n -
THOMAS ROY SULLIVAN
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for order that solicitor has ceased to act

GUMMOW J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON MONDAY, 16 JUNE 1997, AT 9.33 AM

MR J.C. ALLEN: I appear for Mr Sullivan, your Honour. (instructed by T.A. Murphy, Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales)

The application is for an order pursuant to Order 7 rule 7(1) declaring that the Legal Aid Commission no longer acts for Mr Sullivan.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, that is right. I have a certificate from the Deputy Registrar dated 13 June 1997 stating, “I have been informed by the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions, solicitor for the respondent, that the respondent does not wish to be represented at the hearing of the summons on 16 June 1997 and will submit to any order of the Court.”

So the order you seek is pursuant to Order 7 rule 7(1), that is right, is it not?

MR ALLEN: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: The Court declares that - what is the full name of the solicitor?

MR ALLEN: The Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales, although Terence Anthony Murphy is technically, I suppose, the solicitor on the record.

HIS HONOUR: That is right, is it not, I think?

MR ALLEN: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: The Court declares that Terence Anthony Murphy has ceased to be the solicitor acting for the applicant in this proceeding.

That is all that is needed, I think.

MR ALLEN: Yes, thank you, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you, Mr Allen.

AT 9.37 AM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sullivan appealed to the High Court of Australia against his conviction for murder. The central issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant.

The High Court was required to determine whether the evidence, which included a confession and other admissions made by Sullivan, was improperly obtained and therefore inadmissible under the common law. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the police conduct in obtaining the evidence breached Sullivan's rights or amounted to an abuse of process, thereby necessitating its exclusion in the interests of a fair trial.

Gummow J, sitting in chambers, considered the principles governing the admissibility of evidence obtained in circumstances where the voluntariness of a confession is in doubt or where police conduct might be considered oppressive. The Court affirmed that the admissibility of such evidence is a matter for the trial judge, who must balance the probative value of the evidence against any prejudice it might cause to the accused and the fairness of the trial. The judge's role is to ensure that convictions are not secured by unfair means, even if the evidence is otherwise relevant.

The application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

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Legal Principle Established