Sullivan v Doherty

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeals to a Single Judge: Civil)

SULLIVAN v DOHERTY

[2020] SASC 13

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Blue

5 February 2020

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - STATUTORY APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES TO COURTS

LANDLORD AND TENANT - RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES LEGISLATION - RECOVERY OF POSSESSION

The appellant filed an application in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for return of goods treated by the respondent as abandoned goods. A Member dismissed the application. A Senior Member dismissed the appellant’s application for review of that dismissal.

The appellant was the tenant under a residential tenancy agreement for 12 months ending on 24 March 2018 at a rent of $600 per fortnight. The Member found, and the Senior Member affirmed, that the parties agreed to an early termination of the tenancy on 27 February 2018. On 2 March 2018 the appellant attended at the premises to collect his possessions and was asked to leave the premises.

The Member found that, by telephoning the appellant’s mobile phone which did not answer several times, the respondent complied with the obligation in subsection 97B(4)(a) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA) to make reasonable attempts as soon as practicable to notify him that valuable abandoned property had been found on the premises. The Senior Member reversed this finding, concluding that the respondent should have attempted to contact the appellant by email and text message.

The Senior Member however concluded that the respondent was not required to take those steps because the property was not “valuable abandoned property” within the meaning of the Act. The Senior Member said that on her assessment the likely value of the appellant’s items remaining at the premises would not have exceeded $5,800, which was the amount charged to the respondent by Northern Vehicle Recovery for removal and storage of various possessions of the appellant.

The appellant contends that the Senior Member erred in making her assessment of value, including on the ground that there was no evidence capable of supporting that assessment, and that he was denied procedural fairness because the contention that his possessions were not valuable property was never put to him by the respondent or the Tribunal. He also contends that the Senior Member erred in failing to find that he was entitled to recover his possessions remaining on the premises when he attended on 2 March 2018.

The respondent contends by way of alternative contention that the Senior Member erred in overturning the Member’s decision concerning compliance with section 97B(4)(a). She also contends that permission to appeal should be refused because the appeal is not reasonably arguable, her alternative contention cannot reasonably be resisted and the value of the appellant’s possessions being the subject matter of the appeal is not of sufficient substance to justify consideration.

Held:

1. Permission to appeal should be granted (at [70]).

2. The Senior Member erred in making a finding about the value…

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Details
Case
[2020] SASC 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sullivan v Doherty involved a dispute between a tenant, Mr Sullivan, and a landlord, Ms Doherty, concerning the recovery of possession of a residential tenancy. The matter was heard in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT), with a subsequent appeal to the court. The central issue was whether the landlord complied with statutory obligations concerning the treatment of the tenant’s abandoned possessions. Specifically, the appeal focused on whether the tribunal’s decision to overturn a previous finding that the landlord complied with the requirement to make reasonable attempts to notify the tenant about the abandoned possessions was correct. The court examined the evidence presented and the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions.

The key legal issue revolved around the interpretation of section 97B(4) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA), which imposes an obligation on a landlord to make reasonable attempts to notify a tenant about their intentions regarding abandoned possessions. The court needed to determine whether the evidence supported the tribunal’s finding that the landlord did not make reasonable attempts to notify the tenant, and whether the possessions were considered "valuable abandoned property" under the Act. This required an assessment of the value of the abandoned possessions and whether they exceeded a fair estimate of the cost of removal, storage, and sale, thereby triggering the landlord’s obligations under section 97B(4).

The court found that the tribunal’s decision to overturn the previous finding that the landlord complied with the notification obligation was flawed. The tribunal had incorrectly concluded that the value of the possessions did not exceed the cost of removal and storage, thereby excusing the landlord from the notification requirement. The court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the possessions were of little value and that the landlord's actions did not constitute reasonable attempts to notify the tenant. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside the tribunal’s decision, and remitted the matter back to the tribunal for reconsideration in light of the court’s findings.

In light of the above, the court ordered that the appeal be allowed, the decision of the tribunal be set aside, and the matter be remitted to the tribunal for reconsideration. The court also directed that the costs of the appeal be paid by Ms Doherty.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Doherty contends by way of alternative contention that the Senior Member erred in overturning the Member’s decision concerning compliance with section 97B(4)(a). She also contends that permission to appeal should be refused because the appeal is not reasonably arguable, her alternative contention cannot reasonably be resisted and the value of Mr Sullivan’s possessions, being the subject matter of the appeal, is not of sufficient substance to justify consideration.Background Mr Sullivan and Ms Doherty each gave evidence before the Member. A transcript of that evidence has not been produced. Certain documents were produced to the Member (analogous to exhibits). The Member made only limited primary factual findings. Mr Sullivan and Ms Doherty each gave evidence before the Senior Member. A transcript of that evidence was produced for this appeal. Certain documents were produced to the Senior Member (analogous to exhibits). The Senior Member made no primary factual findings beyond those made by the Member. The facts set out below are based on factual findings made by the Member, the documents produced to the Member or Senior Member, the transcript of the hearing before the Senior Member and matters that appear to be common ground based on the decisions of the Member or Senior Member or the transcript of the hearing before the Senior Member or the conduct of the appeal before me. In March 2017 Mr Sullivan and Ms Doherty entered into a written residential tenancy agreement relating to a property at Wasleys (the premises). The premises comprised a farming property including a house, sheds and grounds. The tenancy was for a fixed term of 12 months commencing on 25 March 2017 and ending on 24 March 2018. The rent was $300 per week payable in advance. However, the parties apparently acted on the basis that the rent was payable by fortnightly payments of $600 in advance. On 16 November 2017 a member of the Tribunal made orders on the application of Ms Doherty. Order 1 required payments totalling $1,857[1] by 4 December 2017. Order 2 required Mr Sullivan to make fortnightly payments of $700 commencing on 18 December 2017 until the rent was two weeks in advance (ie, $100 per fortnight was to go towards arrears). Order 3 provided that, if Mr Sullivan missed any payment required by order 2 before 27 February 2018, Ms Doherty may make a written request to the Tribunal for an urgent hearing to terminate the tenancy and evict Mr Sullivan. Order 5 provided that, if Mr Sullivan missed any payment required by order 2 after 27 February 2018, Ms Doherty may lodge an application seeking an order terminating the tenancy without first serving a notice of termination. Order 4 provided amongst other things that, if the term of the tenancy expired during the payment plan created by the order, the payments were to continue up until the date of the expiry of the tenancy.[1] Dollar figures are rounded down to the nearest whole dollar. In February 2018 Mr Sullivan decided to move out of the premises before the tenancy end date of 24 March 2018. He communicated that intention to Ms Doherty.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The context in which Ms Doherty gave evidence contended by her on appeal to be relevant to the value of Mr Sullivan’s possessions is important. Insofar as she gave any such evidence, it was not in the context of being relevant to value. It was in the context of the issue whether the presence of Mr Sullivan’s possessions at the premises on 27 February 2018 put her on notice that he had not given up possession of the premises.Capacity of evidence to support finding as to value The Senior Member appears to have made her impugned finding as to value on the basis that the reference in subsection 97B(3) to “the value of the property” is to the property’s actual objective value (as assessed if in dispute by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction) rather than to its prospective value reasonably assessed by the landlord at the relevant time. It is common ground on appeal that, whatever the precise meaning of the reference to “value”, it is essentially an objective concept and does not refer merely to the subjective opinion of the landlord about value. I address the construction of subsection 97B(3) in this respect below. However, on any view the answer to the question about the capacity of the evidence to support the Seniors Member’s finding must be the same. The evidence adduced before the Senior Member was incapable of supporting a finding that the value of Mr Sullivan’s possessions was less than $5,800 (or $7689) for determining whether they comprised valuable property. This is for several reasons. First, Ms Doherty did not purport to give objective evidence of the value of Mr Sullivan’s possessions. She gave evidence of her beliefs concerning value because that was relevant to the issue whether Mr Sullivan had given up possession of the premises. Secondly, the only evidence concerning the quantum of the value of any of Mr Sullivan’s possessions given by Ms Doherty was in relation to a ride-on mower, which she said had a value of $200. Ms Doherty did not purport to give evidence of the value of Mr Sullivan’s possessions other than the ride-on mower. Thirdly, Ms Doherty said that she had no knowledge of the value of Mr Sullivan’s possessions (apart from the ride-on mower) and did not identify any basis on which she could give evidence as to the value of those possessions. The laws of evidence do not apply to proceedings in the Tribunal and hence the common law rule that ordinarily only a person with relevant expertise can give opinion evidence of value does not apply. There is no rule in the Tribunal precluding a lay person giving opinion evidence. However, this does not permit a person merely to speculate about a matter of which they have no knowledge and in particular does not permit a person merely to speculate about the value of an item. Fourthly, some of Mr Sullivan’s possessions were, on the evidence given before the Senior Member, vintage or classic vehicles. Ms Doherty did not purport to have any knowledge on the basis of which she could have valued those items.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Member found that by 2 March 2018 Ms Doherty had decided to treat the goods as valuable abandoned property and so had incurred costs to remove and store the goods. He found that Ms Doherty complied with the obligation in subsection 97B(4) to make reasonable attempts to contact the tenant and take reasonable steps to keep the goods safe for 28 days. He did not give any reasons for concluding that Ms Doherty complied with the obligation in section 97B(4)(a).The Senior Member’s reasons for decision The Senior Member identified the first issue as “Was the landlord entitled to take back possession of the premises on 27 February 2018?” She concluded that the determination of the Member that Mr Sullivan had handed back possession of the premises to Ms Doherty on 27 February 2018 was correct and gave reasons for that conclusion. The Senior Member identified the second issue as “Has the landlord made reasonable attempts to notify the tenant within 2 days of recovering possession that valuable abandoned property had been found on the premises?” The Senior Member overturned the Member’s conclusion that Ms Doherty complied with subsection 97B(4)(a). She said:In the original Order the Tribunal found that the landlord had complied with Section 97B(4) of the Act and had made reasonable attempts to contact the tenant and she had also taken reasonable steps to keep the goods safe until at least 28 days after recovering possession of the property.I do not consider that the landlord made reasonable attempts to notify the tenant about her intentions in relation to the tenant’s possessions still remaining at the property. In circumstances where the tenant had previously communicated with her by email I consider that the landlord should have sent an email to the tenant. Further I note that the landlord did not attempt to communicate with the tenant by text message. I consider that she should have done that as well. However, the Senior Member went on to conclude that Ms Doherty was not required to comply with subsection 97B. She said:However, in my view the landlord was not required to make reasonable attempts to notify the tenant of her intentions in relation to the possessions still remaining at the property for the following reasons.The landlord’s obligation to make reasonable attempts to notify a tenant of their intentions in relation to abandoned possessions applies only if those possessions must be treated as “valuable abandoned property” within the meaning of the Act. Section 97B of the Act states that possessions are valuable abandoned property if their value is more than a fair estimate of the cost of removal, storage and sale.I accept the landlord’s evidence that she tried to arrange for a secondhand dealer to attend at the property to provide her with an appraisal but was unable to do so (due to the location of the property). I accept that the landlord has incurred costs of $5,800.00 for the removal and storage of the tenant’s possessions. I am not satisfied from the tenant’s evidence that the likely value of his possessions remaining at the property would have exceeded the amount of the removal and storage. I accept the landlord’s evidence that the possessions remaining at the property were of little value.On my assessment the likely value of the tenant’s items remaining at the property would not have exceeded $5,800.00.Therefore I conclude that the landlord was entitled to deal with the tenant’s possessions which remained at the property in accordance with Section 97B(3) of the Act and she was not required to comply with the requirements of Section 97B(4) of the Act in relation to valuable abandoned property, including the obligation to make reasonable attempts to notify the tenant of her intentions in relation to the items remaining there.Contentions on appeal and application for permission to appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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