Sullivan and Tyler (No 4)
[2015] FamCAFC 251
•15 September 2015
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SULLIVAN & TYLER (NO. 4) | [2015] FamCAFC 251 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROCEDURE – Where the appellant sought leave to continue making oral submissions despite exceeding her allotted time – Leave granted. |
| Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) |
| APPELLANT: | Ms Sullivan |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Tyler |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 889 | of | 2008 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | EA | 47 | of | 2014 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 15 September 2015 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Thackray, Strickland & Austin JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 14-16 September 2015 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Family Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 26 March 2014 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2014] FamCA 178 [2014] FamCA 179 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPELLANT: | In person |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Holmes |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | KD Holmes Solicitors |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Mr Berry |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Christos Christaki |
Orders
Leave is granted to the appellant to continue her submissions until 4.00 pm today.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Sullivan & Tyler has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
Appeal Number: EA 47 of 2014
File Number: SYC 889 of 2008
| Ms Sullivan |
Appellant
And
| Mr Tyler |
Respondent
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
These are the reasons of the Full Court in relation to the oral application of the appellant, Ms Sullivan, for an extension of the time that has been allotted for her to complete her oral submissions in support of her appeal.
Yesterday the court outlined the history of the matter relating to the filing of preparatory documents for the appeal. The court drew attention to the fact that many indulgences have been given to the appellant, including the opportunity to file a Summary of Argument that is more than double the length permitted by the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth); and the opportunity to provide a table of evidence, which is not ordinarily permitted. The court also noted that this appeal has been set down for three days, which is an extended period by comparison to similar matters in this court. The court made it as clear as we could that the appellant was expected to complete her argument by noon today, allowing her a full day.
The appellant has been reminded of this time limit on numerous occasions during the hearing. She has elected to present her argument in an unnecessarily detailed fashion and without proper reference to her eight grounds of appeal. That said, it is recognised that the subject matter of the proceedings is of utmost importance to the appellant and the child; and that the appellant is a self-represented litigant, albeit one now quite well versed in the law.
When the court determined that the appellant should have a full day to present her oral submissions, it was of course understood that the respondent father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) would need to be heard. At a prior hearing, the ICL indicated that he anticipated his submissions might take half a day. The court is unsure whether the father’s counsel indicated a time limit.
Now that the father and the ICL have heard the way in which the appellant’s argument has unfolded, we have been informed that they do not anticipate taking very long in response. Mr Holmes thinks he might be about half an hour and Mr Berry anticipates that he might be a couple of hours. In light of those timetables, there is now greater scope to extend the time that the appellant has to advance her submissions.
We are cognisant of the argument put to us by Mr Holmes that if the appellant were held to the original ruling of finishing her oral submissions at noon today, then this matter might finish today. That is a material consideration, because if the matter proceeds into another day, that will cause increased expense and inconvenience to the parties and/or the taxpayer, and certainly to the court. However, on balance, we consider that it is appropriate that the appellant be given some further time in which to advance her argument. In any event, even if counsel kept to their suggested times, there would be no guarantee of the matter finishing today, given that the appellant will still be entitled to advance submissions in response.
It is therefore our intention to permit the appellant to continue her submissions up until the lunch adjournment at 1.00 pm. We will resume at 2.15 pm, and the appellant may continue to make her submissions until 4.00 pm, at which time no further extension will be granted.
In allowing this considerable indulgence to the appellant, the court is most concerned about the manner in which the appellant’s submissions have been presented thus far. At the end of more than a day, the mother is yet to complete dealing with three grounds of appeal. It will remain a matter for the appellant to determine how she presents the balance her argument, but the court strongly recommends that she touch upon all of the remaining grounds before 4.00 pm.
If she does not, then we still regard those grounds as being pressed, but we will deal with them by reference to her Summary of Argument and the table of evidence. As our duty requires, we will also conduct our own inquiry into the complaints, with a view to determining whether error is demonstrated, albeit within the confines of the eight grounds of appeal.
On that basis, leave is granted to the appellant to continue her submissions until 4.00 pm today.
I certify that the preceding ten (10) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (Thackray, Strickland & Austin JJ) delivered on 15 September 2015, edited to correct grammar and some infelicity of expression.
Associate:
Date: 7 October 2015
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