Suleski v Sons of Gwalia Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE FULL COURT (WA)

CITATION:   SULESKI -v- SONS OF GWALIA LTD [2004] WASCA 2

CORAM:   STEYTLER J

MILLER J
WALLWORK AJ

HEARD:   10 NOVEMBER 2003

DELIVERED          :   22 JANUARY 2004

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2403 of 2002

BETWEEN:   BORIS SULESKI

Applicant

AND

SONS OF GWALIA LTD
Intervener

Catchwords:

Workers' compensation - Medical Assessment Panel - Determination to be made within 28 days of medical examination - Earlier determination quashed - Second determination made - Whether fresh medical examination necessary - Comments on functions of Panel

Legislation:

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981, s 145E(2)

Result:

Order nisi made absolute

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr M D Cole

Intervener:     Mr D W Williams

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Terrace Law

Intervener:     Mullins Handcock

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Ex parte Ansett Australia Ltd v Medical Assessment Panel (1998) 19 WAR 395

Re A Medical Assessment Panel; ex parte Hays; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 980575; 5 October 1998

Re Bannan; Ex parte Suleski [2001] WASCA 289

Re Croser; Ex parte Rutherford & Anor [2001] WASCA 422

Re Croser; ex parte Rutherford & Anor [2003] WASCA 8

Re Hales; Ex parte Barr [2001] WASCA 89

Re Monger; Ex parte Welsby [2003] WASCA 191

Re Skirving; Ex parte Forward, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 980737; 18 December 1998

Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Suleski [2003] WASCA 289

Case(s) also cited:

Ex parte Barr [2001] WASCA 89

Ex parte Rusich [2001] WASCA 111

Re Anastas Ex parte Welsby [2002] WASCA 83

Re Bannan Ex parte Suleski [2001] WASCA 289

  1. STEYTLER J:  I have had the advantage of reading, in draft, the judgments of Wallwork AJ and Miller J.  I agree with what each has said, and with their conclusion that the order nisi should be made absolute on ground (f) of the grounds upon which the order nisi was made.

  2. I also agree with Wallwork AJ that, given that the Panel will have to undertake a fresh examination of the applicant, and consequently give a new set of reasons for the determination which is must now make, little will be achieved by dealing with those grounds which attack the adequacy of the existing reasons.  However, like Wallwork AJ, I would respectfully urge the Panel, in the course of its reconsideration of the matter, to consider what has been said as to the adequacy of reasons by Kennedy J in the prior proceedings involving this applicant and by Rolfe AJ in the extract from his Honour's judgment quoted by Wallwork AJ in his judgment.

  3. I should also add a brief comment as regards the applicant's contention that the Panel, in its last determination, decided "issues of causation".

  4. Under s 84ZH of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981 a Review Officer may, if permitted by s 145A to do so:

    "… refer a question as to -

    (a)the nature or extent of a disability;

    (b)whether a disability is permanent or temporary; or

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Details
Case
[2004] WASCA 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Suleski v Sons of Gwalia Ltd, the applicant, Suleski, sought a review of a decision made by the Medical Assessment Panel regarding his workers' compensation claim. The intervener, Sons of Gwalia Ltd, had previously intervened in an earlier application concerning the Panel's first determination, and was now being asked to pay half of the applicant's costs for the current proceedings, on the basis that the intervener's submissions had significantly increased the complexity and duration of the case.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the intervener should be ordered to pay half of the applicant's costs incurred due to the intervention. The court had to consider the principles governing costs in cases involving interveners, specifically whether the intervener's involvement had substantially increased the costs incurred by the applicant.

The court ruled that it was appropriate to order the intervener to pay half of the applicant's costs, as the intervener's submissions had indeed increased the complexity and duration of the proceedings. The court noted that the intervener's submissions were more extensive than those of the applicant and took up a significant portion of the argument time. The court also acknowledged that while the intervener's submissions had increased the applicant's costs, the amount awarded should not exceed the actual increase in costs due to the intervention.

The court's final order was that the intervener, Sons of Gwalia Ltd, should pay half of the applicant's costs for the current proceedings, but not to exceed the amount by which the applicant's costs had been increased due to the intervention.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MILLER J
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: The reasons for judgment in this matter were delivered on 22 January 2004. On 29 January 2004 the applicant filed an outline of submissions contending that the intervener should pay the applicant's costs to the extent that those costs were increased by reason of the intervention. The history of this matter is that there was an earlier dispute between the parties in which an intervener had intervened in an application for an order nisi for a writ of certiorari concerning the first determination of the Medical Assessment Panel - Re Bannan; Ex parte Suleski [2001] WASCA 289. On that occasion the intervener was ordered to pay one‑half of the applicant's costs in respect of the hearings for the order nisi and before the Full Court exclusive of disbursements. In this case, when judgment was pronounced on 22 January 2004, counsel for the applicant sought an order that the intervener pay half the costs incurred in the present matter. He then forwarded written submissions to the Court on 29 January 2004 in which it is contended that adopting a broad brush approach it is reasonable to assume that the intervention of the respondent intervener roughly doubled the applicant's costs. It is contended that the respondent's submissions in the matter covered ten pages as opposed to the applicant's nine and a half pages at a larger print size and that the submissions on behalf of the respondent occupied roughly half the time in argument. The applicant contends that on the first return date of the motion, being 15 October 2002, there was an appearance on behalf of the intervener and that on 12 November 2002 an order was made that the intervener be joined as a respondent. The matter was then adjourned for a further month to await developments in another jurisdiction with costs being reserved. Then on 12 December 2002 there was no appearance by the respondent. By agreement the matter was adjourned sine die to a special appointment with the costs reserved. Later there was some further correspondence between the parties. On 6 June 2003 there was an appearance to obtain the order nisi. There was further correspondence between the parties. The matter was then argued on 10 November 2003 when the decision was reserved. As stated above the reasons for decision were delivered on 22 January 2004. The intervener's submissions which were delivered in answer to the applicant's submissions agree that costs may be awarded against an unsuccessful intervener at least to the extent that the costs of the applicant are increased by reason of the intervention - City of Burnside v Attorney‑General of South Australia (1994) 63 SASR 65; Seaman par 18.6.20. It is contended that it is a question of fact and degree whether the intervener has caused the trial to be substantially longer - City of Burnside (supra). It is further contended that only in special circumstances will the Court will make an order which would have the result that an intervener pay to one of the parties a sum more than the amount by which the costs of that party have been increased by the intervention - O'Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232; Seaman par 18.6.20.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MILLER J