Such v Police

Case [2011] SASCFC 4


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

SUCH v POLICE

[2011] SASCFC 4

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice Vanstone)

28 February 2011

TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - EVIDENCE - PROOF OF SPEED

EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - PRESUMPTIONS - AS TO SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS

Application for permission to appeal against speeding conviction on grounds that suggested failures in testing laser speed gun undermined admissibility of statutory certificate going to gun's accuracy and alleging failures of process associated with testing laser speed gun - allegations that magistrate reversed onus of proof in relation to matters beyond ambit of statutory certificate.

Held:  application for permission to appeal refused.

Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 175(3)(ba), referred to.

SUCH v POLICE
[2011] SASCFC 4

Full Court:  Gray, Sulan and Vanstone JJ

  1. GRAY J:               I would refuse permission to appeal.  I agree with the reasons of Vanstone J.

  2. SULAN J: I would extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal.  I would refuse the application for permission to appeal.  I agree with the reasons of Vanstone J.

    VANSTONE J:

    Introduction

  3. In the afternoon of 2 January 2008, Constable Thompson, an officer of the Southern Traffic Enforcement Section conducting speed detection duties, positioned himself on the footpath of Oakridge Road, Aberfoyle Park.  He was equipped with an LTI Ultralite 100 LR laser traffic speed analyser (speed gun).  At about 1.40 he used that device to target the applicant’s vehicle, which to his eye, was travelling at a rate greater than the applicable speed limit of 50 kilometres per hour.  A speed of 69 kilometres per hour was recorded.  The officer stopped and spoke to the applicant and then issued an expiation notice.

  4. After a trial in the Magistrates Court the applicant was convicted.  An appeal to a single judge of this Court was unsuccessful.  The applicant now applies for permission to appeal and an extension of time within which to appeal against the decision of the single judge dismissing his appeal.

    The arguments on appeal

  5. The application for permission to appeal was argued as an appeal. Two grounds of appeal were agitated. First it was said that both the magistrate and the single judge erred in finding admissible a certificate signed by Inspector White and purporting to comply with s 175(3)(ba) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) to prove the accuracy of the speed gun. As an aspect of that ground it was argued that, in any event, the magistrate and the single judge erred in concluding that the assertions of fact contained within the certificate had not been rebutted by other evidence. Secondly, it was argued that the magistrate had erred in reversing the onus of proof.

  6. In support of the first ground, Mr Borick QC who appeared in this court for the applicant (though not previously) pointed to what he said were deficiencies in the testing carried out by Constable Thompson prior…

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Such v Police [2011] SASCFC 4
Case
[2011] SASCFC 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Such, sought leave to appeal against a decision of a magistrate concerning a traffic offence. The dispute centred on the proof of the applicant's speed, specifically the accuracy and operation of a speed detection device. The appeal was heard by Gray, Sulan and Vanstone JJ.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the magistrate had erred in her approach to the onus of proof regarding the accuracy of the speed detection instrument. The court was required to consider the evidentiary weight and sufficiency of the presumption of accuracy afforded to scientific instruments used in proving traffic offences.

The court found that the magistrate had not erred in her application of the onus of proof. Her Honour correctly understood that the relevant legislative provision operated to establish, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the speed detection device was accurate. Crucially, the magistrate also found that the prosecution had discharged the criminal onus of proof in relation to the operation of the device and the reading of the speed.

The application for permission to appeal was deemed unmeritorious. While the court granted an extension of time for filing the Notice of Appeal due to circumstances outside the applicant's control, it ultimately refused the application for permission to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not agree that the magistrate erred in her approach to questions of onus of proof in this matter. The paragraphs which I have set out do not disclose any such error. In [49] the magistrate did not purport to attribute to the section any role beyond its work in proving, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the speed gun was accurate. The magistrate went on to find, in relation to the operation and reading of the result, that the criminal onus of proof had been discharged by the prosecution.Conclusion In my view this application for permission to appeal is unmeritorious. There was no objection to the application to extend time within which to appeal. It appears that the delay in filing the Notice of Appeal was related to matters outside the applicant’s control. I would extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal to 11 October 2010 but I would refuse the application for permission to appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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