Succar, Magug v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[1998] FCA 1222
•19 AUGUST 1998
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 284 of 1998
BETWEEN:
MAGUG SUCCAR
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
TAMBERLIN J
DATE:
19 AUGUST 1998
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex-tempore Judgment)
In this matter I have heard the submissions made by Ms Succar (“the applicant”). It is accepted that the applicant has a subjective fear of persecution if returned to Lebanon. The question which arose before the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”) was whether there was a “well-founded fear of persecution” in existence.
The Tribunal has referred, in its reasons for decision, to a number of sources of information about the circumstances in Lebanon. The applicant has contested this information. One of her concerns related to not being able to understand the numbering, which was referred to in the reasons of the RRT. This is not a matter of great importance, provided that the substance of that material has been put before the applicant.
It was argued by the applicant that the material was not put to her. In the course of its decision, the Tribunal states that it did put to the applicant the independent material furnished under Relevant Country Information. This material shows that ordinary members of the Lebanese Forces live undisturbed by the authorities as long as they refrained from illegal activities. I am satisfied, I should say, that the Tribunal did put the substance of the material to the applicant. There is no citation of the material in the reasons for decision, but there is a reference to the substance of it.
It appears to me that the applicant has advanced to the Court, in order to demonstrate an error of a reviewable kind in the decision, that the material referred to under the heading of Relevant Country Information is wrong in substance. She has outlined particular paragraphs in relation to which she has made assertions as to their incorrectness.
This matter is really a question of fact, in which case this Court has a limited jurisdiction to review the decision. The determination of a question of fact, provided there is some evidence of a reasonable nature before the Tribunal, is a matter for the Tribunal. It is not a base for reviewing a decision with a view to setting it aside.
In addition there was a suggestion that further investigations should have been carried out by the Tribunal in relation to the situation in Lebanon. However, there has been no factual evidence put before me that any further investigation would be required on the ground of information furnished by the applicant. In some circumstances, as counsel for the Minister has pointed out, it may be incumbent on the decision-maker to make further inquiries, which may well yield relevant information. In order for this requirement to operate, it is necessary to establish some reason for making those investigations. In the present case, I am not satisfied that such a reason has been made out.
A further submission made by the applicant was that she was not furnished with a tape or transcript of the proceeding before the Tribunal. She also referred to some incidents which have taken place since the hearing before the Tribunal.
In relation to the alleged non-furnishing of the tape of the proceedings before the RRT, the applicant has not said that any prejudice arises or that there is a difficulty in relation to the presentation of the case put by her as a result of not having available the transcript. In those circumstances and having regard to the fact that the tape of the proceedings before the RRT was requested after the date of the decision and I assume for the purposes of this application before me, I do not consider that this is of any direct relevance to the accuracy or substance of the reasons for decision of the Tribunal.
Furthermore, it is a circumstance which has arisen after the Tribunal decision has been made and therefore, cannot be said to be a procedural error in respect of the way proceedings were conducted before the Tribunal. I should point out to the applicant that the function of this Court is to review the decision of the RRT with a view to determining whether there has been an error of law in relation to procedure or the way in which the matter was conducted before the RRT. This is not a re-hearing on the merits of the case and it is not for this court, except in exceptional circumstances, to consider the conclusions which have been reached by the RRT on questions of fact. That, as I have indicated earlier, is purely within the province of the RRT.
I am not satisfied that there are any grounds for examining the evidence of circumstances after the date of the Tribunal decision. The Tribunal decision date under the legislation is clearly the relevant date for making a determination about whether the definition of “refugee” under the International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as Amended by the 1967 Protocol.
Accordingly, I order that the application be dismissed because no reviewable ground has been made out in relation to procedure, law or any other relevant matter.
I do not think that this is an appropriate case in which costs should be awarded in the matter and, accordingly, I make no order as to costs.
I certify that this and the preceding two (2) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Tamberlin
Associate:
Dated: 19 August 1998
Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Henderson Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 19 August 1998 Date of Judgment: 19 August 1998
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