Subramaniam v The Queen - [2004] HCATrans 257

[2004] HCATrans 257

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S588 of 2003

B e t w e e n -
KALA SUBRAMANIAM
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 5 AUGUST 2004, AT 10.06 AM

(Continued from 29/4/04)

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Cogswell.

MR COGSWELL: May it please the Court, there are two preliminary matters which I just was not clear from a reading of the transcript whether we had cleared up: first, that there was a chronology of the history of mental health in the State of New South Wales to which I made reference, I think in answer to your Honour the Chief Justice’s question about the Richmond Report. It is a document that look likes that. Some of us think we may have handed it up, but others think maybe not.

GLEESON CJ: I think you had better hand up another copy.

MR COGSWELL: We have copies, your Honours.

GLEESON CJ: Thank you.

MR COGSWELL: The second preliminary matter was in response to Justice Kirby’s questions about having the correct version of the Act, so to speak, that we are talking about. We have extracted from the relevant website, the New South Wales Government legislation website, a version of the Act covering a period 1 January 2000 to 23 February 2003, which we say is the relevant period. We have copies of that as well.

KIRBY J: Why was the arrival of the First Fleet part of the history of mental health law in New South Wales? Are you suggesting that His Britannic Majesty’s Government had taken leave of their senses?

MR COGSWELL: I am not going to make any submission based upon that entry in the chronology, your Honour. My learned friend says it puts it in perspective. Your Honours, there remain the three grounds for me to address, and what I propose to do, subject to your Honours’ convenience, is to address first the question of the directions to the jury, which, I apprehended from reading the transcript and my recollection, was an issue which concerned at least some of your Honours; that is, a specific question as to whether or not his Honour the late Judge Luland had in fact complied in his directions with section 21(4) of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990. That subsection is relatively short but important, and I will read it.

KIRBY J: Which is the subsection, I am sorry?

MR COGSWELL: Section 21(4). It reads:

At the commencement of a special hearing, the Court must explain to the jury –

and I add here, five things –

the fact that the accused person is unfit to be tried in accordance with the normal procedures, the meaning of unfitness to be tried, the purpose of the special hearing, the verdicts which are available and the legal and practical consequences of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Subramaniam v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Subramaniam v The Queen [2004] HCATrans 257
Case: [2004] HCATrans 257
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Subramaniam appealed his conviction for murder to the High Court of Australia. The prosecution's case was that the appellant, Subramaniam, had intentionally caused the death of his wife by stabbing her. The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had acted with the necessary intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.

The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in law by failing to adequately direct the jury on the issue of intent, particularly in relation to the defence of provocation. The appellant argued that the jury should have been instructed that if they found provocation, they should consider whether it negated the specific intent required for murder, potentially leading to a verdict of manslaughter.

The Court held that the defence of provocation, if established, operates to reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter by negating the element of malice aforethought. However, it does not negate the specific intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. Rather, provocation provides a partial defence that excuses the unlawful killing. The jury's attention must be directed to whether the provocation was such as to cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and act as the accused did, and whether the accused did in fact lose self-control. The Court found that the trial judge's directions, when read as a whole, adequately conveyed the relevant principles to the jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders