Stunning Enterprises Pty Ltd v QIE Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stunning Enterprises Pty Ltd (ACN 103  354 767) v QIE Pty Ltd (ACN 003 327 071) [2004] FCA 786

COSTS – rule as to costs where a proceeding terminates without a hearing – terms of settlement involving capitulation of respondents to applicants – no evidence of unreasonable conduct on the part of the applicants – costs follow event

Trade Marks Act 1995  (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1), s 43(2)

Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622 cited
ONE.TEL Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548 cited

STUNNING ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 103 354 767), KEPENG CORPORATION PTY LTD (ACN 094 161 618) v QIE PTY LTD (ACN 003 327 071), PETER THOMAS McDOUGALL and ROTORWAY HELICOPTERS VICTORIA PTY LTD (ACN 103 862 513)
W69 OF 2004

FRENCH J
21 JUNE 2004
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W69 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

STUNNING ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
(ACN 103 354 767)
FIRST APPLICANT

KEPENG CORPORATION PTY LTD
(ACN 094 161 618)
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

QIE PTY LTD
(ACN 003 327 071)
FIRST RESPONDENT

PETER THOMAS McDOUGALL
SECOND RESPONDENT

ROTORWAY HELICOPTERS VICTORIA PTY LTD
(ACN 103 862 513)
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 JUNE 2004

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the application to be taxed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W69 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

STUNNING ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
(ACN 103 354 767)
FIRST APPLICANT

KEPENG CORPORATION PTY LTD
(ACN 094 161 618)
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

QIE PTY LTD
(ACN 003 327 071)
FIRST RESPONDENT

PETER THOMAS McDOUGALL
SECOND RESPONDENT

ROTORWAY HELICOPTERS VICTORIA PTY LTD
(ACN 103 862 513)
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE:

21 JUNE 2004

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ON COSTS FOLLOWING CONSENT ORDERS

Introduction

  1. The applicants in these proceedings claim against the respondents alleging causes of action arising under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) and for passing off at common law. The application did not go to a hearing as the matter has been settled. The basis of the settlement is reflected in consent orders which represent a substantial capitulation by the respondents to the claims of the applicants. The question of costs has been reserved for judgment. For the reasons that follow the respondents, in my opinion, should pay the applicants’ costs of the application.

    Procedural History

  2. On 29 March 2004, Stunning Enterprises Pty Ltd (‘SEP’) and Kepeng Corporation Pty Ltd  (‘Kepeng’) commenced proceedings in this Court against QIE Pty Ltd (‘QIE’), Peter Thomas McDougall and RotorWay Helicopters Victoria Pty Ltd (‘RHV’). 

  3. In a statement of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Stunning Enterprises Pty Ltd v QIE Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] FCA 786
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Stunning Enterprises Pty Ltd v QIE Pty Ltd involved the applicants, who sought to enforce their intellectual property rights against the respondents, who were accused of infringing these rights by using the term "ROTORWAY" in relation to their business. The Federal Court of Australia was the forum for this dispute, as it had jurisdiction over matters involving intellectual property law, specifically trade marks and domain names. The legal issues before the court included whether the respondents had infringed the applicants' intellectual property rights and whether the respondents' conduct warranted an award of costs to the applicants.

The court examined the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, taking into account the settlement reached between them. It considered the respondents' contention that the applicants' actions were based on a misconception of urgency and that the respondents had genuinely attempted to negotiate a settlement. The court also evaluated the applicants' success in achieving four out of ten claims for relief in the application. The court found that the proceedings had been settled, and as such, there was a basis to exercise its discretion in favour of the successful party.

In rendering its decision, the court applied the principles of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and relevant case law. The court acknowledged that while proceedings had terminated before a hearing, the settlement allowed for a determination of which party had been successful. The court found that the applicants had achieved success on four of their claims and were therefore entitled to an award of costs.

The final orders of the court were that the respondents would pay the applicants' costs of the application to be taxed. This decision underscored the importance of intellectual property rights and the court's role in protecting these rights while also considering the conduct of the parties in the resolution of the dispute.

Orders

Orders of the court

The respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the application to be taxed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

By 7 May 2004 the proceedings had been settled save as to costs and the following orders were made by consent: ‘1.The First, Second and Third Respondents and each of them, whether by themselves or by their directors, agents or employees: (a)are hereby restrained, after 31 May 2004, from making use of the word ROTORWAY as a trade mark in connection with any business involving the sale or servicing of helicopters without the licence of the Applicants or RotorWay International of 4140 West Mercury Way, Chandler, Arizona, USA (‘RotorWay International’); (b)are hereby restrained, after 31 May 2004, from using the word ROTORWAY in such a way as to imply or represent in trade or commerce, without the prior licence or written approval of RotorWay International, that the First and/or Second and/or Third Respondents, any business carried on by any of them and/or services offered by any of them have the sponsorship, approval or affiliation of RotorWay International, or are in any way associated with the business, products or services of the First and/or Second Applicant and/or RotorWay International; (c)are hereby restrained, after 31 May 2004, from using the word ROTORWAY in such a way as to constitute a passing off of any business of the First and/or Second and/or Third Respondents as that of the First and/or Second Applicant.2.By 31 May 2004, the First Respondent shall assign the Australian Trade Mark 945547, ROTORWAY, to RotorWay International. The Applicants shall prepare the assignment documentation and deliver the same to the First Respondent by 21 May 2004, record the assignment at IP Australia and bear all cost associated with the assignment. 3.By 31 May 2004, the Third Respondent shall take all steps necessary to change its company name to a name not including the word ‘ROTORWAY’.4.By 31 May 2004, the Third Respondent shall transfer the domain name to the Second Applicant, subject to the Second Applicant being eligible to hold the domain name in accordance with .au Domain Administration Ltd’s (‘auDA’) eligibility and allocation rules. The Second Applicant shall prepare the necessary transfer documentation and deliver the same by 21 May 2004 to the Third Respondent for execution and shall thereafter attend to the recording of same by the Registrar of auDA, and shall bear all costs associated with the transfer. In the event that the Second Applicant is not eligible to hold the domain name in accordance with auDA’s eligibility and allocation rules, the Third Respondent shall forthwith take the necessary steps to alter the domain name to one which does not include any reference to the word ‘ROTORWAY’.5.The directions hearing in these proceedings be adjourned to 1 June 2004 at 2.30pm.6.The issue of costs be reserved to the directions hearing at which time the parties are invited to make submissions on that issue.’Evidence Relating to Costs Question Affidavits and written submissions relevant to the question of costs were filed and oral argument heard on 1 June 2004.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH J
According to the respondents, the applicants’ conduct was based upon the misconception that the matter was one of extreme urgency. The lack of urgency they said was demonstrated by: (a)the fact that the trade mark application was filed on 2 March 2003; (b)the fact that RHV was registered on 3 March 2003; (c)the fact that the domain name was registered on 24 April 2003;(d)the fact that Mr McDougall’s dealership was terminated on 2 March 2004; (e)the fact that it was Mr McDougall who alerted the applicants to the existence of the registration of the trade mark in Australia and to the existence of RotorWay Helicopters Victoria Pty Ltd on 16 March 2004. In addition, according to the respondents, the applicants’ conduct caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily given the genuine efforts of the respondents to negotiate settlement. Since at least 15 April 2004 the respondents had been prepared to give up the trade mark. They said that in terms of the settlement the applicants had achieved success on only four out of the ten claims for relief set out in the application.Conclusions Section 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides in the relevant part: ‘(1) Subject to subsection (1A), the Court or a Judge has jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before the Court (including proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction) other than proceedings in respect of which any other Act provides that costs shall not be awarded. ...(2) Except as provided by any other Act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the Court or Judge.’ As a general rule, in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order costs will follow the event. The general principles were discussed by the Full Court in Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229. When proceedings terminate before a hearing there may be no basis upon which to determine what the event would have been if the matter had proceeded. The Court cannot, in such a case, conduct an hypothetical action between the parties. If both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled, the Court will usually make no order as to the costs of the proceedings – Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 624 (McHugh J). Where, however, the proceedings have been terminated in a way that leads to one side being clearly successful then there is a basis upon which the Court can exercise its discretion in favour of the successful party. As Burchett J said in ONE.TEL Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548 at [6]:‘... it is important to draw a distinction between cases in which one party, after litigating for some time, effectively surrenders to the other, and cases where some supervening event or settlement so removes or modifies the subject of the dispute that, although it could not be said that one side has simply won, no issue remains between the parties except that of costs. In the former type of case, there will commonly be lacking any basis for an exercise of the Court’s discretion otherwise than by an ward of costs to the successful party.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH J

Full text does not contain this section.