[2010] HCATrans 269
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P29 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
ALAN JOHN STUBLEY
Appellant
and
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON WEDNESDAY, 20 OCTOBER 2010, AT 10.06 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR D. GRACE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR S. VANDONGEN for the appellant. (instructed by Michael Tudori & Associates)
MR J. McGRATH: May it please the Court, I appear with MR D.A. LIMA on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (WA))
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Grace.
MR GRACE: Your Honours, this appeal concerns the admissibility of the evidence of three propensity witnesses so‑called who gave evidence in the trial of the appellant. The question of admissibility is governed by the terms of section 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).
GUMMOW J: We see that from your written submissions and your opponents that there seems an acceptance of the construction by President Steytler in Dair, is that right?
MR GRACE: As to the meaning of the phrase “significant probative value”?
GUMMOW J: Yes.
MR GRACE: Yes. If I could firstly just take your Honours to the section, I will take your Honours to that relevant passage in Dair.....section 31A is headed “Propensity and relationship evidence”:
(1)In this section –
propensity evidence means –
(a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or
(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;
relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.
(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers –
(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and
(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.
(3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion.
This section was introduced into the Evidence Act by Act No 46 of 2004 of Western Australia and was said at the time to significantly amend the admissibility of so‑called similar fact evidence and, in effect, adopt, in part, some relevant and significant aspects of the dissenting judgment in Pfennig of Justice McHugh.
GUMMOW J: Does the language of the section in any way track Justice…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 269
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant's claim was barred by the provisions of the *Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981* (WA) (the Act), specifically section 175(1), which generally precludes a worker from bringing a common law claim for damages for personal injury against their employer if they have received or are entitled to receive weekly payments under the Act. The High Court was required to determine the proper construction of section 175(1) and its application to the appellant's circumstances, particularly in light of the appellant's receipt of weekly payments.
The High Court held that section 175(1) of the Act did not bar the appellant's common law claim. The Court reasoned that the appellant's entitlement to weekly payments under the Act had ceased prior to the commencement of his common law proceedings. Therefore, he was not in receipt of, nor entitled to receive, weekly payments at the time his claim was filed, which meant the statutory bar did not apply. The Court affirmed the principle that the operation of section 175(1) is contingent on the worker's status regarding weekly payments at the time the common law action is instituted.
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for determination of the appellant's claim for damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi