IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P10 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
ALAN JOHN STUBLEY
Applicant
and
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM MELBOURNE BY VIDEO LINK TO PERTH
ON FRIDAY, 30 JULY 2010, AT 12.42 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR D. GRACE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by Michael Tudori and Associates)
MR J. McGRATH: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.A. LIMA, for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (WA))
HAYNE J: Mr Grace, as I understand the point you would seek to say where is the probative value.
MR GRACE: Yes.
HAYNE J: Is it larger than that?
MR GRACE: Not much larger, your Honour. There is a slim avenue in relation to the use of the word “significant” in section 31A – “significant probative value”, but other than what your Honour has stated, the answer is no.
HAYNE J: Is it a provision that is still in force?
MR GRACE: Yes, your Honour.
HAYNE J: And a provision that has been the subject, I think, of some consideration in the courts of Western Australia?
MR GRACE: Yes, quite often, your Honour.
HAYNE J: Does this decision stand within or without that stream of authority?
MR GRACE: It is at one side, I would venture to submit, your Honour.
HAYNE J: On the bank.
MR GRACE: Yes. There is a decision of the Court of Appeal in the matter of Osborne which is referred to in the submissions and the list of authorities. That seeks to distinguish Phillips in its application. Osborne’s Case was an interlocutory appeal against a trial judge’s decision to order separate trials. The question was the cross‑admissibility of evidence of two complainants. The Court overturned that decision in the end and had cause, in the course of that decision, to refer to Phillips’ Case and distinguish it in relation to its applicability in the circumstances of Osborne’s Case to section 31A. The application of Phillips’ Case in the context of section 31A is a live issue which this decision seeks to address.
HAYNE J: Yes. We might be assisted at this stage, Mr Grace, by hearing from Mr McGrath.
MR McGRATH: May it please the Court, what is said on behalf of the respondent is that the law was applied with certainty in this particular case. The issue before the court was simply whether or not the three propensity witnesses could fall within the provisions of section 31A. The majority determined that it quite clearly was for the reason that it was tendency evidence or relationship evidence.
HAYNE J: Can we take that in stages? Tendency evidence on the footing – what? This man has done this before.
MR McGRATH: No, your Honour.…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 190
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the sentencing judge had erred in law by failing to properly consider the mandatory minimum sentence provisions applicable to the offence for which Mr Stubley was convicted. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the sentencing judge had correctly applied the principles of statutory interpretation to the relevant legislative provisions and whether the sentence imposed was therefore lawful.
The High Court analysed the legislative framework governing sentencing for the offence in question, paying close attention to the interplay between the *Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913* (WA) and the *Sentencing Act 1995* (WA). Their Honours applied established principles of statutory interpretation to ascertain the intended meaning and effect of the mandatory minimum sentence provisions. The court concluded that the sentencing judge had misconstrued the relevant legislation, leading to an error in law in the imposition of the sentence.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the original sentence, and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court of Western Australia for resentencing in accordance with the correct interpretation of the law.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi