Stuart Pty Limited v Condor Commercial Insulation Pty Limited

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Stuart Pty Limited v Condor Commercial Insulation Pty Limited [2006]  NSWCA 334

FILE NUMBER(S):
40455/05

HEARING DATE(S):               19 & 20 June 2006

DECISION DATE:     28/11/2006

PARTIES:
Stuart Pty Limited (Appellant)
Condor Commercial Insulation Pty Limited (Respondent)

JUDGMENT OF:       Beazley JA Ipp JA Tobias JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          DC 7817/1999

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Murrell DCJ

COUNSEL:
J West QC;  J Stephenson (Appellant)
B Coles QC;  P Barham

SOLICITORS:
Watson Mangioni (Appellant)
Turnbull Bowles (Respondent)

CATCHWORDS:
CONTRACTS – appellant sub-contracted insulation work to respondent – breach of sub-contract by respondent – head contract terminated as a result – whether respondent liable for appellant’s loss of profits on head contract
REMOTENESS – second limb of Hadley v Baxendale – whether loss within reasonable contemplation of parties – whether respondent knew of special circumstances such that it would be within reasonable contemplation that breach of contract would cause loss – head contract as special circumstance
REMOTENESS – second limb of Hadley v Baxendale – whether event giving rise to loss (a fire due to faulty workmanship) was not unlikely to occur REMOTENESS – knowledge of special circumstances – whether appellant responsible for supervising works – contract price out of all proportion with risk of being liable for enhanced damages

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
1. Appeal dismissed
2. Direct that the parties are to provide written submissions in respect of costs within seven days of the date of judgment.

JUDGMENT:

- 40 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40455/05

BEAZLEY JA
IPP JA
TOBIAS JA

28 November 2006

STUART PTY LIMITED v
CONDOR COMMERCIAL INSULATION PTY LIMITED

Headnote

Facts

The appellant entered into a contract with the Commonwealth of Australia to replace wool insulation in residential properties as part of the Sydney Aircraft Noise Insulation Program (SANIP).  There were 932 properties in total that were due to be insulated, and the appellant had been allocated 71 pursuant to its contract with SANIP.  The appellant sub-contracted this work to the respondent, with each property being subject to a separate contract comprising of a purchase order together with a scope of works schedule particularising the requirements for that property.  This included, where relevant, the requirement that all down-lights be boxed before being covered with insulation.

On 28 January 1999, the appellant and respondent entered into a sub-contract for the installation of insulation at a property at 98 Newington Road, Marrickville.  That contract did not identify any down-lights that needed to be boxed, despite that there were in fact five down-lights.  On 27 July 1999, the insulated ignited, a fire broke out and damaged that property.  Subsequently SANIP, having conducted a quality assurance audit, terminated the appellant’s contract in part due to faulty workmanship by the respondent.

The appellant brought proceedings against the respondent, claiming damages for its loss of profits resulting from the termination of its contract with SANIP.

The trial judge found that the fire was…

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Details
Case
[2006] NSWCA 334
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stuart Pty Limited (the appellant) appealed a decision concerning its claim for loss of profits against Condor Commercial Insulation Pty Limited (the respondent). The dispute arose from a subcontract for insulation work, which the appellant alleged the respondent breached, leading to the termination of the appellant's head contract with SANIP. The appellant sought to recover its lost profits from the head contract.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the appellant's loss of profits on the head contract was recoverable from the respondent under the second limb of the rule in *Hadley v Baxendale*. This required the court to determine if the loss was within the reasonable contemplation of both parties at the time the subcontract was made, considering any special circumstances known to the respondent that would make such a loss a foreseeable consequence of a breach. The court also considered whether the specific event causing the loss, a fire due to faulty workmanship, was a type of event that the parties could reasonably have contemplated.

The court reasoned that for the loss to be within the reasonable contemplation of the parties under the second limb of *Hadley v Baxendale*, the respondent needed to have been aware of special circumstances that would render the loss of the head contract a foreseeable outcome of a breach. The court noted that while the parties contemplated that faulty workmanship could lead to rectification work or damage to property, the loss of the entire head contract was not necessarily within their reasonable contemplation unless specific knowledge of such a risk was communicated. The court found that the appellant had not established that the respondent was aware of circumstances that would make the loss of the SANIP contract a foreseeable consequence of the respondent's breach.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court ordering that the parties provide written submissions regarding costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed; 2. Direct that the parties are to provide written submissions in respect of costs within seven days of the date of judgment.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal raises the question whether the appellant is entitled to its loss under the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341.Background In late 1998, the appellant entered into negotiations with the respondent for the purposes of subcontracting the insulation work to the respondent. On 7 December 1998, Mr Brian Burden, the appellant's chief estimator, forwarded to the respondent a Wool Replacement Tender Schedule of Rates and requested the respondent to submit their tender rates for the Schedule. The Schedule contained an item whereby the tenderer was requested to specify its monthly capacity, that is, the number of houses in which it could each month carry out the work. Mr Burden had drawn a box around that item and made the notation "very important" underneath it. Included in the documentation that Mr Burden forwarded to the respondent was a copy of SANIP conditions for the carrying out of the work. Relevantly, cl 12 of those conditions provided:“Construct downlight boxes as detailed on Drawings 32380 & 32383 where existing cannot be reinstalled or where existing does not comply with the Standard Specification.” The Standard Specification required that if downlights were to be covered with insulation then they were to be boxed, the purpose being to prevent the insulation coming into contact with the downlight. It was acknowledged by all witnesses that it was bad building practice to put insulation directly over a downlight. The respondent provided its tender rates to the appellant on 8 December 1998. In doing so, it specified that it could undertake insulation work at the rate of 36 houses per month. On or about 16 December 1998, there was a meeting between the representatives of the appellant and respondent. At the meeting, Mr Rufus, one of the respondent’s representatives, stated that they were one of the biggest groups carrying out residential insulation and that they had sufficient labour to meet the appellant's requirements. Mr Burden, on behalf of the appellant, indicated that it was hoping to increase the number of houses they were allocated by SANIP. Mr Burden also advised that it was a government sponsored job and that the appellant required the works to be done properly and to a high standard. Mr Rufus said that the respondent could guarantee to have enough sufficiently skilled men to meet weekly and monthly deadlines to the standard required of the appellant under its contract. He also stated that the respondent would comply with the terms and conditions of the specifications, and with the subcontract and the appellant's head contract with SANIP. There was also discussion at this meeting as to the terms of payment, depending upon whether work was done on more or less than 30 houses per month. On 17 December 1998, under cover of a letter of that date headed: “RE: Replacement of Wool in the SANIP Projects”, the respondent forwarded its final quote for the work and confirmed that it was available to commence work on 20 houses from 18 January 1999. In its quote, the respondent specified its monthly capacity as being 64 houses.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

These submissions are directed to the additional finding sought in para (g). The finding so sought is not a factual finding as such, but a finding must be made in order for the conclusion to be reached that the appellant has made out its claim for damages. It is to that question that I now turn. Conclusion on remoteness In deciding whether the appellant has established an entitlement to damages under the second limb, the following matters require determination. The first is whether it could be said that the loss was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. In this case, that question is, for the most part, although not solely, determined by having regard to the question whether the respondent was aware of special circumstances such as to enable the court to conclude that it would have been in the reasonable contemplation of both parties that the appellant would lose the SANIP contract if the respondent breached its contract with the appellant: see Robophone at 1447-1448. The second relates to the event that gave rise to the loss: see Czarnikow v Koufos at 385, in the extract set out at [36] above. Was the loss in the reasonable contemplation of the parties? The respondent submitted that it was apparent that the damages in this case were too remote when regard was had to the rationale that underlay the second limb in Hadley v Baxendale, namely, the circumstances in which a party would be fairly held to have accepted the risk of the loss that is claimed. It contended that that the type of damage which occurred here, being the loss of the appellant's contract with SANIP, was such as would occur only in a small minority of cases, and thus was not in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time that they entered into the contract. Rather, the loss that the parties would reasonably have in their contemplation as a result of failing to perform the work in a good and workmanlike manner would be the carrying out of, or possibly the cost of carrying out, rectification work. In this case, there is no doubt that the appellant would have been liable to the homeowner for the loss caused by the fire and that loss would have been recoverable from the respondent under the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale notwithstanding the catastrophic result of the breach. But even if that loss was not recoverable under the first limb, it would have been recoverable under the second, because it would have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties that damage might be caused to a property where faulty work had been performed and that rectification work would have to be done. It is irrelevant that the parties had not contemplated that the damage to the property as a result of the faulty workmanship was a fire or that such damage was greater than the parties had contemplated. It was sufficient that the parties contemplated the general nature of the loss – on this example, namely, damage to property: see Alexander v Cambridge Credit at 336; Oxley County Council v Macdonald (see at [58] above).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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