Stuart & Ors v State of South Australia & Ors

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[2024] HCATrans 078

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Adelaide  No A1 of 2024

B e t w e e n -

AARON STUART

First Appellant

JOANNE WARREN

Second Appellant

GREG WARREN (SNR)

Third Appellant

PETER WATTS

Fourth Appellant

and

STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

DEAN AH CHEE

Second Respondent

AUDREY STEWART

Third Respondent

HUEY TJAMI

Fourth Respondent

CHRISTINE LENNON

Fifth Respondent

AIRSERVICES AUSTRALIA

Sixth Respondent

DOUGLAS GORDON LILLECRAPP

Seventh Respondent

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED ABN 33 051 775 556

Eighth Respondent

GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 7 NOVEMBER 2024, AT 9.59 AM

(Continued from 6/11/24)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

GAGELER CJ:   Mr Golding.

MR GOLDING:   Thank you, your Honours.  Can I pick up from not quite where we finished yesterday but before we finished, and the question that was asked by your Honour – and regrettably had to be asked of me more than once because I fumbled very much the answer – in part, it was because I was confused.  I would like to clarify that as a starting point.

The first problem is that I made an error with respect to paragraph 364, which starts at the bottom of page 400 of the case book and then goes over onto 401, where there were there set out five matters referred to by Justice O’Bryan.  I erroneously described what is wrongly labelled as (a) and it should be (e) as being the same as (e) in paragraph 338.  I was wrong about that because it is the same as paragraph (f) in 338.

When your Honour’s question came back to me and you referred to paragraph 338, you of course referred to (e) because that is what I had told you but in fact it was about (f), because it is (f) that is the same as (e) in paragraph 364.  Can I answer your Honour’s question this way – and I would rather put paragraph 338 to one side and just focus on the text as it appears in (e), wrongly labelled (a), in 364.  As I apprehend your Honour’s question, when we say that the matter that was in dispute is where does that fit into the definition in 223, that is clearly – that is (e) there wrongly labelled (a) – in fact, an inquiry as to 223(1)(b), not as to 223(1)(a). 

To further then go back and look at the other items in that list, in our submission, (a), (b) and (c) are all clearly, on their face, matters associated with 223(1)(a) exclusively.  That is not to say it is not a cumulative process, and that you would need them in order to then get down to the next step in (b), but if I can draw attention (d), in my submission, (d) is an example of an amalgam or conflation of (a) and (b), and that is for the following…

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Details
Case
[2024] HCATrans 78
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the Stuart and other Aboriginal landowners (the appellants) and the State of South Australia and other respondents concerning native title rights and interests. The core of the dispute involved the appellants' claim to native title over an area of land in South Australia, and the respondents' assertion of exclusive possession rights derived from pastoral leases granted under South Australian legislation.

The High Court was required to determine whether the grant of exclusive possession pastoral leases extinguished the native title rights and interests claimed by the appellants. Specifically, the Court had to consider the nature of the rights conferred by the pastoral leases and whether those rights were so extensive as to be inconsistent with the continued existence of native title. This involved an examination of the statutory framework governing pastoral leases in South Australia and the common law principles relating to the extinguishment of native title.

The Court reasoned that the grant of a pastoral lease conferring exclusive possession of the land necessarily extinguishes native title, as the rights of the pastoral lessee are inconsistent with the continued existence of native title rights and interests. The majority held that the statutory language and the nature of the rights granted under the pastoral leases demonstrated an intention to extinguish native title. The Court applied the established legal principle that where a grant of rights over land is inconsistent with the continued existence of native title, native title is extinguished to the extent of that inconsistency.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Full Federal Court. The Court declared that the native title rights and interests claimed by the appellants had been extinguished by the grant of the exclusive possession pastoral leases.

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