Structureco Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Structureco Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2003] FCA 1290

TRADE MARKS – Application for removal for non‑use – Opposition – Applicant requests Registrar to summon declarant in removal proceedings to give evidence and to require registered owner to produce documents – Registrar issues summons and notice – Registered owner seeks review of Registrar’s decisions to issue summons and notice.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977
Trade Marks Act 1995 ss 92(4)(b), 153, 154, 202, 203
Trade Marks Office Manual of Practice and Procedure Part 54

Kidax Ltd’s Applications [1959] RPC 167 cited
Sixth Ravini Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1985) 6 FCR 356 considered
May v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 92 FCR 152 cited
Allen, Allen & Hemsley v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4734 considered
Minosea Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 14 ACSR 642 considered
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko‑Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 applied
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1998) ATR 435 considered
GS Technology Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (1997) 39 IPR 583 cited
Lucas Industries Ltd v Hewitt (1978) 18 ALR 555 applied

STRUCTURECO INC v THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS and STARITE DISTRIBUTORS PTY LTD
V 572 OF 2002

SUNDBERG J
12 NOVEMBER 2003
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 572 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

STRUCTURECO INC
APPLICANT

AND:

THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS
FIRST RESPONDENT

STARITE DISTRIBUTORS PTY LTD
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 NOVEMBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of the application other than the costs of the adjournment on 25 July 2003 as to which the Court makes no order.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 572 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

STRUCTURECO INC
APPLICANT

AND:

THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS
FIRST RESPONDENT

STARITE DISTRIBUTORS PTY LTD
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE:

12 NOVEMBER 2003

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. The applicant (Structureco) is registered proprietor of Australian trade mark STRUCTURE (No 681020) (the trade mark). On 28 December 2000 the second respondent (Starite) applied to remove the trade mark from the Register of Trade Marks pursuant to s 92(4)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (the Act). Section 92(4) sets out the grounds upon which application for removal may be made. The ground in par (b) is

    “that the trade mark has remained registered for a continuous period of 3 years ending one month before the day on which the non‑use application is filed, and, at no time during that period, the person who was then the registered owner:

    (i)used the trade mark in Australia; or

    (ii)used the trade mark in good faith in Australia;

    in relation to the goods and/or services to which the application relates.”

  2. On 15…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 1290
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Structureco Inc brought an action against the Registrar of Trade Marks, challenging the Registrar’s decision to issue a summons without contradictory evidence in relation to a section 92(4)(b) application. The central issue in the case was whether the Registrar erred in law by issuing the summons in the absence of contradictory evidence regarding the facts. The case required the court to consider the scope of the Registrar's discretion and the applicability of the Guidelines when deciding whether to issue a summons. The court was also tasked with determining whether the Registrar's decision was subject to judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.

The court found that the Registrar was not obligated to reach a particular factual conclusion about the absence of contradictory evidence. The obligation was to consider the Guidelines, which include the principle that a summons will usually not issue unless there is contradictory evidence. The court emphasised that whether there was contradictory evidence was a matter for the Registrar to decide, and not for the applicant to predetermine. The Registrar's decision to issue the summons was based on the conflict between the declarations of Mr Carmody and Mr Swersky, which the Registrar deemed necessary to resolve through further questioning. The court held that the Registrar properly applied the Guidelines and did not commit an error of law in issuing the summons.

In dismissing the application, the court concluded that the decisions sought to be reviewed were not final or determinative of the applicant’s rights, and thus did not need to be considered under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The court also addressed the issue of costs, deciding that the applicant should bear the costs of the application, except for the costs related to the adjournment on 25 July 2003, which were not to be ordered.

The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of the application, excluding the costs of the adjournment on 25 July 2003.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of the application other than the costs of the adjournment on 25 July 2003 as to which the Court makes no order.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The complaint Structureco makes here is that the Registrar failed to take into account “the absence of any contradictory evidence as to facts as opposed to opinions or conclusions of law in the evidence filed in relation to the section 92(4)(b) application”. While the Registrar is bound to take the Guidelines into account, including the guideline that it is “usually only when there is contradictory evidence” that the Registrar will issue a summons, she is not required to take into account a particular fact situation such as that propounded by Structureco. This ground appears to claim that the Registrar was bound to come to a particular conclusion of fact, namely that there was no contradictory evidence as to facts. The obligation is only to take the Guidelines into account. There is no obligation to apply them correctly, as Structureco sees the facts, so as to find that there was no contradictory evidence with the result that the summons should not issue. Whether there was such evidence was the task committed to the Registrar for decision. It is not for Structureco to make its own conclusion on that matter the starting point for a “relevant considerations” ground of review. As Goldberg J said in Deloitte at 451:“The applicability of the guidelines is not in issue. What is in issue is whether the respondent had proper regard to the relevant guidelines in deciding to issue the 31 July notices.”Ground (c)(ii) is not an available ground of review.ISSUE OF SUMMONS IN ABSENCE OF CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE AN ERROR OF LAW The error of law asserted is the Registrar’s decision to issue the summons when there was no contradictory evidence as to the facts in the material filed in the s 92(4)(b) application. Whether a summons should issue is a matter committed to the Registrar. She is required to have regard to the Guidelines, one of which is that usually a summons will not issue unless there is contradictory evidence. Again, whether there is such evidence is a matter for decision by the Registrar. She explained how she arrived at her decision. Mr Carmody’s declaration deposed to receipt by Stafford of the shipment of clothing from Structureco in the United States and the sale by Stafford to the retail outlets in Australia the subject of the Corporate Connection and Shearers invoices produced by Mr Ryder. Standing alone, that material would have suggested arm’s length sales, because no facts were disclosed that pointed in the other direction. Mr Swersky’s declaration claimed, without any supporting material, that the business name Shearers was owned by Stafford, and that he had been told by an unnamed person that Corporate Connection was owned by Stafford. The Registrar purported to apply the Guidelines. She described the conflict as whether the sales the subject of Mr Carmody’s declaration were bona fide sales to the public or merely transfers between related companies. She thought it appropriate that Mr Carmody be questioned in order to clarify or resolve the conflict. It is not surprising that she held this view because, as I have said, Mr Swersky did not support his assertion that Stafford owned the Shearers name by any evidence, and he did not disclose the identity of his source of information about the ownership of Corporate Connection. The Registrar considered it proper to provide Starite with the opportunity to ascertain whether the facts accorded with Mr Swersky’s unverified assertions, and that she regarded it as an evidentiary issue that could probably be resolved by questioning Mr Carmody. I do not think it inappropriate to describe the apparent difference between the two accounts of the sales as a conflict on the facts or as contradictory evidence. It is not appropriate to read the Guidelines as if they were a statute. They are only guidelines and, as I have said, do not purport to lay down a rule of general application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J
Starite submitted that the decisions sought to be reviewed were not “final, operative or determinative” and had no impact on the relevant “rights” of Structureco. In view of the fact that relief is sought under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903, it was common ground that I need not decide whether the decisions in question were “decisions” for the purposes of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.CONCLUSION The application must be dismissed. The Registrar does not seek costs against Structureco or Starite. Putting to one side the question of costs occasioned by the adjournment on 25 July 2003, Starite’s costs should follow the event and be paid by the applicant. I have considered the written submissions on behalf of Structureco and Starite in relation to the costs occasioned by the adjournment, and have concluded, for the reasons advanced by Starite, that there should be no order in relation to those costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG J