Street v Queensland Bar Association & Ors; In the matter of an application by Robertson
[1988] HCATrans 335
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B32 of 1988
B e t w e e n -
ALEXANDER WHISTLER STREET
Applicant
and
QUEENSLAND BAR ASSOCIATION
AND ORS
Respondent
Directions hearing with
respect to case stated
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S58 of 1987 In the matter of - The Rules relating to the
admission of Barristers of the
Supreme Court of Queensland
And in the matter of -
Street TIMOTHY FRANK ROBERTSON
Directions hearing with
respect to case stated
MASON CJ
(In Chambers)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 DECEMBER 1988, AT 11.43 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
SlT6/l/RB 1 16/12/88
MR D. M. J. BENNETT , QC : In the matter of Street, Your Honour, I appear for the plaintiff, with my learned friend, MS M. WALKER.
(instructed by instructed by M.G. Lyons & Co)
MASON CJ: Yes. You are complaining about inability to get admission as well, are you, Mr Bennett.
MR BENNETT: Yes, Your Honour, definitely. MR G.L. DAVIES, QC: I appear with my learned friend, MR J. McGILL, for all of the defendants. (instructed by
W.R. Tutt & Co)
MR G. GRIFFITH, QC, Soli~itor-General for the. Commonwealth:
Your Honour, I appear with MR D. ROSE for the - _: - _ Attorney-General of the Connnonwealth intervening,
Your Honour. (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor.
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Solicitor.
MR GRIFFITH: Our intervention is limited to an interest to see appropriate questions stated, Your Honour.
MR BENNETT: May I just take Your Honour first to the statement of claim to show Your Honour how the problem has arisen?
MASON CJ: Yes.
MR BENNETT: Now, Your Honour, the statement of claim has
seven paragraphs; 1 to 4 are admitted by all defendants; 1 sets jurisdiction, 2 recites the plaintiff's residence and domicile that he is practising as a barrister in -he
is currently prapt±~ing as a barrister of the Supreme
Court ot New South Wales; he has been refused permission
as a barrister to the Supreme Court of Queensland.Defendants intervened and opposed it: and by Order in Council
the rules were amended which now imposed requirements upon
an application for admission relating to practice principally
in Queensland, and that was one day before the special leaveapplication in the appeal from that decision.
Those matters were all admitted. Paragraph 5 is
not admitted. That states:
The plaintiff carries on practice as a barrister
principally in the State of New South Wales; he
is admitted to practice in ACT, Victoria and South
Australia and is desirous of admission to practice
as a barrister in Queensland whilst remaining
resident and intending to practice principally in New South Wales.
Although that is not admitted, we cannot believe that it
is seriously in issue in any real sense. If it were considered to be a problem, it could be dealt with by an
affidavit but they are, of course, matters within the
plaintiff's knowledge.
SlT6/ 2/PLC 2 16/12/88 Street HIS HONOUR: Is there any serious issue about that, Mr Davies?
MR DAVIES: No, Your Honour. HIS HONOUR: Are you prepared to admit that? MR DAVIES: If my learned friend say it is correct,
then yes, we would.
HIS HONOUR: All right. We can proceed on the footing that that is admitted - it will be admitted, Mr Bennett.
MR BENNETT: Yes, if Your Honour pleases. Your Honour, paragraphs 6 and 7 are then allegations of law which
strictly, under the High Court Rules, ought not to have
been put in a statement of claim for that reason. On one view there may be mixed law and fact but really we put
them as allegations of law, and they are put simply as
consequential from 1 to 5. Paragraph 6 says that the
said amendments are in breach of section 92; 7 says that the amendments are in breach of section 117. While
they use verbs and nouns to achieve that result, thatis, we would submit, all they say.
The defendants denied those two paragraphs and did
not demur. We demurred to the traverse.
HIS HONOUR: Technically, you are in difficulty, are you not?
MR BENNETT: Yes, Your Honour, and I fully concede that
difficulty. The purpose of this application is to solve that problem. Now, we suggest that it be solved - there are a
number of ways of solving it. One way is for Your Honour,
under Order 35 rule 2 to state a case. We have prepared a draft stated case. I apologize Your Honour has not had this before today. The stated ~ase simply - and with only
consequential gramratical alterations- - states, 1 to 5
as the facts and 6 to 7 as the questions.
HIS HONOUR: Have you shown this to Mr Davies?
MR BENNETT: About five minutes ago, Your Honour. HIS HONOUR: Was he able to express some response to it? MR BENNETT:
He did not, Your Honour. I did not ask him for one.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. MR BENNETT: Your Honour, that is one way of achieving the result. A second way of achieving the result is for Your Honour - a slightly more cumbersome way - to use the provisions
of section 77J of the JUDICIARY ACT.
HIS HONOUR: What does that section say?
SlT6/3/PLC 3 16/12/88 Street
MR BENNETT: It enables Your Honour to cure defects and errors and Your Honour could then set the demurrer down
for hearing on the basis that any defect arising
out of the fact that the demurrer is to a traverse
rather than to the allegation would be cured and
the Court would make an order that it be heard as
if it were a demurrer to paragraphs 6 and 7. It is
a slightly more cumbersome way of achieving the
result.
We have put it in the sununons under section 77J and under section 77K in the alternative but the
simple way, we would submit, is for Your Honour to
state that case. There is no longer any issue of
fact and it is a straight simple question of law.
If Your Honour pleases.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, it seems all so simple. Yes, Mr Davies? I
am sure it is not quite so simple.
MR DAVIES: We submit it is not, Your Honour. Our concern is really as to the absence of relevant facts upon
which we submit any relevant question of law could
be determined but the two questions of law seem to
be section 117 and section 92. With respect to
section 117, as we understand it, our learned friends
would have to show that the rules discriminated against
the plaintiff as a resident in a State other than
Queensland in a way which was not equally applicable
to a resident in Queensland. Now, it does not appear
from either the statement of claim or the draft stated
case how it is said that the rules do that.
Now, it may be that Mr Street, as Mr Robertson
certainly does - it appears from Mr Robertson's
affidavit - seeks to do this by asserting that he
cannot have his principal place of practice in
Queensland which is the requirement of the rule
whilst he resides in Sydney. Now, if that is what he is saying, our first complaint is that has not
been said, and our second concern is that that
really is a question of fact which we would dispute and we would submit with respect -
HIS HONOUR: Now, what is the question of fact you would dispute? MR DAVIES: Whether, in fact, he can have his principal place of practice in Queensland whilst residing in Sydney. We say that a barrister - just as, for example, a member of this Court can reside in Perth and sit in Canberra - could have his principal place of practice, if he chose, in Queensland whilst residing in Sydney. So, our complaints are, with respect to 117 too,_really.
The first is that it has not been - if that is what is raised - - - HIS HONOUR: It really seems a nonsense, does it not, that somebody
who is resident in Sydney is going to have his principal
place of practice in Queensland?
SlT6/4/PLC 4 16/12/88 Street MR DAVIES: Not necessarily. I mean, one could, for example, quite easily practice before, for example, the
Full Court of Queensland and the Federal Court of
Queensland whilst residing in Sydney. That would
not, in our respectful submission, pose difficulty
or come up for each sittings - - -
HIS HONOUR: Flying back to Sydney every night.
MR DAVIES: No, not at all. One can do it whilst one has one's main residence in Sydney in the same way as many
of the Justices of this Court do
with respect to Canberra and Perth, or Melbourne,or Sydney.
HIS HONOUR: Anyhow that is the issue of fact that you say needs to be tried?
MR DAVIES: That is the issue of fact and the first point really is it first of all has to be raised if that is it. I am not saying that that is it. It certainly seems to be Mr Robertson's point because he has stated that in his affidavit but I cannot say it is Mr Street's point because it has never been stated. With respect to section 92, it would seem that
the plaintiff would need to identify some interstate
transaction or activity against which it is said
the rules discriminate. Now, no such interstatetransaction or activity has been identified in either
the statement of claim or the case stated and we have
some difficulty in seeing what that interstate activity
or transaction could be. There is nothing interstate,
we would say in the end - and this is, no doubt, an
argument for the Court when the facts have emerged
but there is nothing interstate about actual appearance
before the Supreme Court or any other court in Queensland
and the other things that might arguably be interstate
which are giving opinions across State borders or
conferring across borders or even drawing pleadingsacross State borders and sending them across State
borders can be done now, whether you are admitted in
Queensland or not. So, that is the first question under section 92 which does not seem to have been
stated - identified. The second is it is not shown how any such rule would operate to discriminate against
that activity. So neither of those statements or allegations have been made in the case stated or the
statement of claim, as the case may be.
In the absence of those facts, Your Honour,
in our respectful submission neither of those
questions can really be asked. They are our submissions.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Solicitor, do you wish to say anything about this issue?
MR GRIFFITH: Your Honour, really, we just submit that the matter should be resolved one way or the other today so as
the case may go to the Full Court.
SlT6/5/PLC 5 16/12/88 Street HIS HONOUR: Yes. Yes, Mr Bennett?
MR BENNETT: In relation to the first matter, we would submit that the issue of fact is really a colourable issue
of fact. There is nothing in relation to that so-called
issue which could not be dealt with in argument beforethe Full Court as a matter of cormnon sense and judicial
notice.
The statement now admitted is that the plaintiff
carries on practice as a barrister principally in
New South Wales and that he is desirous of admission
to practice as a barrister in Queensland whilst
remaining resident in and intending to principallypractice in New South Wales. In my respectfully,
while obviously, as my learned friend says, it would
be theoretically possible to reside in Sydney or,
for that matter, in Tweed Heads and have one'sprincipal place of practice in Brisbane, the obvious
inconveniences in relation to that can be stated
just as clearly to a Full Court as to a single Justice
through a witness and the inferences in relation to
the application of section 117, we would submit,
can be argued quite satisfactorily without any issue
being determined. We do not seek to raise any issue of fact other than those in the stated case and
those which follow as inferences and matters of
judicial notice from it.
So far as section 92 is concerned, my friend
really seems to want the outline of submissions prior
to the stating of the case. The interstate activity is stated quite clearly in the documents, it is
carrying on practice as a barrister and if there is
one matter of fact with which the Court, we would
submit, is familiar, it is the nature of the practice
of a barrister.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, but I must confess to some difficulty of the kind experienced by Mr Davies in divining
how carrying on business or practice as a barrister
involves interstate trade.
MR BENNETT: That will be the secondary submission. The primary submission will be that it inhibits intercourse
and we will be putting some lengthy submissions
based on the intercourse cases. We would say that if a person is prevented from carrying on his activity
when he crosses a State boundary to carry it on, that
is an inhibition on his right of intercourse and we
will be putting that on the basis of - - -
HIS HONOUR: That is your primary submission on section 92?
MR BENNETT: Yes, Your Honour. HIS HONOUR: That is the interference that - - MR BENNETT: Yes, in differential intercourse; the intercourse
being the crossing of the State line which a
SlT6/6/PLC 6 16/12/88 Street person carrying on the practice as a member of what
we like to call the Australian Bar would incur if
he is resident, has his principal place of practice
in Sydney, but wishes to go to Queensland to
conduct a case. We submit it is no answer to an inhibition of intercourse that he is permitted to
cross the border but not permitted to do something
which is the purpose of him crossing it and we
will be giving examples such as a
Queensland law which prohibited New South Wales'
residents from attending theatres in Queensland,
matters of that sort. We would submit they would
go to interstate intercourse.
The second aspect of the submission, the
alternative aspect, will be that the nature of the
practice of a barrister is such that it involves
interstate trade and commerce in one of two ways;
either by reference to the transaction even though
strictly non-contractual by which he is briefed to appear and part of what he is paid for is crossing the border because, of course, that is the essential
nature of a loading in this case and secondlyt
that in the sense in which the banks were involved
in interstate trade in the BANKING case, the nature
of interstate commercial litigation and Australia-wide
commercial litigation is such that we will be
submitting that the business activities which are
involved in litigation as a whole, like banking -
we say litigation is an essential part under oursystem of the conduct of - - -
HIS HONOUR: It is a very long bow, is it not? :MR BENNETT: It is a long bow, Your Honour, but that is the other way in which the argument can be put. There
will also, of course, be arguments about the
relationship between section 117 and section 92 and
the extent to which one fills in gaps in the other
and that is a matter which will have to be dealt
with. This, I think, will be the first time in which
the Court has considered the two side by side, a case where elements of both arise.
But, Your Honour, we would submit that - I
would not like what I have said today to be taken
as a considered final expression of exactly what
the submissions are but -
HIS HONOUR: There is a problem about that, is there not,
Mr Bennett? In order to determine how the case is
to proceed henceforth, I need to know with some
precision what your submissions are going to be.
:MR BENNETT: Yes. Your Honour, certainly, the basic submissions are those which I have just put to Your Honour. There
is, of course, the compendious expression of - - -
SlT6/7/PLC 7 16/12/88 Street HIS HONOUR: We have had unfortunate experience in the last three years, particularly, of stating cases for a
Full Court in an endeavour to procure a decision that
will be dispositive of the controversy between the
parties and on a number of occasions we have
ascertained that it has not been possible to achieve
that because the facts agreed upon between the parties
or the facts stated have been inadequate. Now, as
a result of that the Court is particularly astute to
ensure as far as possible that any stated case
contains all the facts that may be necessary to
enable the Court to arrive at a dispositive decision.
So, we need to know precisely what your submissions
are.
MR BENNETT: Yes. Your Honour, I have given that outline. Apart from stressing the - there is perhaps a third way of
looking at it: the nature of the compendious
expression, "trade, commerce and intercourse" and
the extent to which that picks up matters that might
not be strictly trade and commerce in their own right.Subject to that, there - - -
HIS HONOUR: In combination, the words may have a denotation that amounts to something more than trade and connnerce, on the one hand, plus intercourse considered separately on the other?
MR BENNETT: Yes, Your Honour. I think the word used in this Court on other occasions was hendiadys
which I may be mispronouncing.
HIS HONOUR:
Yes. Well, that seems to be an even longer bow; a bow without any string attached to it.
MR BENNETT: Yes. Your Honour, that, as presently advised,
would certainly not be the major submission. The major submission is section 117 - - -
HIS HONOUR: Would.it be a submission at all? MR BENNETT: Yes, well - Your Honour, the major submission is
that the Court should overrule HENRY V BAUME and section 117 in our favour. That is the major
submission.
HIS HONOUR: That is what I would have thought.
| I: | MR BENNETT: | Yes. | The next major submission is intercourse |
under section 92 and the trade aPd commerce submissions
would not take very long and the combined one would
take even less time.
HISIDNOUR: I must confess I would have thought that the case really depends on the challenge to BAUME's case.
MR BENNETT: That is certainly the major matter, Your Honour.
The other matter, Your Honour, is I should formally
SlT6/8/PLC 8 16/12/88 Street "notionally" perhaps is a more accurate word, read
the affidavit which I did not read in-chief in
support of the sUIIllilons.
HIS HONOUR: What affidavit is that, Mr Bennett? MR BENNETT: It is the affidavit of Dennis John Cronin sworn 7 December.
HIS HONOUR: I think I have read that. The most significant thing that I noticed in that affidavit was in the
correspondence that was annexed where your
instructing solicitors were addressed as "gentlemen"
by the Crown Solicitor of Queensland.
MR BENNETT: Yes. HIS HONOUR: It goes to show that Queensland is after all a repository of old world courtesies.
MR BENNETT: Yes. Maybe, Your Honour, that will be an argument justifying the discrimination in this case. If
Your Honour pleases.
| :6 | HIS HONOUR: | Mr Davies, in the light of the additional illumination |
that Mr Bennett has provided about the way in which he
is proposing to present this case before the Full
Court, do you wish to make any connnent or does it
alter your attitude in any respect?
MR DAVIES: No, in this sense, Your Honour, that some of what he would describe as submissions relate to what he
says are the factshe is going to rely on. If they
are facts he is going to rely on and the case is
going to go forward by way of case stated or by
some other means, then the facts should really
appear in the stated case. I mean, such as with respectto section 92, the activities which are said to have
interstate characteristics and the way in which it is
said the rule affects those activities. And, again,
with respect to section 117, what it is said bringssection 117 into operation; what facts bring it into
operation? Those facts really do not appear to be anywhere in the statement of claim or the stated
case.
HIS HONOUR: No. I should say at this stage I propose to state
a case in this matter. I am not satisfied at the present time that the draft stated case that has been
presented by Mr Bennett is adequate. I think it should be expanded to include the particulars that
Mr Bennett has given in the submissions that he has
made to me in reply this morning. Perhaps all I need
to do today is to say that I propose to state a case
and to direct Mr Bennett to amend his current draft so
as to include the particulars of his argument that he
has given today and to direct him to serve upon
SlT 7/ 1/PLC 9 16/12/88 Street the respondents in the next three days an amended
draft of the stated case, and then if you could
respond to that by lodging with the Court your
comments or objections in relation to that draft.
Is it possible that you could do that before the
end of next week, assuming that Mr Bennett gets an
amended draft to you within three days of today's date?
MR DAVIES: Yes, if the three days include the weekend, that would certainly be so.
HIS HONOUR: When could you get it to him, Mr Bennett? MR BENNETT: About 5 pm Monday, Your Honour. HIS HONOUR: If you could do that and then if you could, say, by Thursday - and it may even be possible for me
to state the case on Friday.
MR DAVIES: If Your Honour pleases.
MR BENNETT: If Your Honour pleases.
AT 12.09 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED
TO A DATE TO BE FIXED
SlT7/2/PLC 10 16/12/88 Street MR T. ROBERTSON: --In tl;;i,e matter of R~rt..son, Your Honour, I
am the applicant in the matter.
MR G.L. DAVIES, QC: I appear with MR J. McGILL for each of the respondents in this matter, if Your Honour
pleases. (instructed by W.R. Tutt & Co)
MR ROBERTSON: Your Honour, I think my matter is before Your Honour on a direction from the Registrar, not under surrnnons
from us, but it was no doubt thought appropriate
because of the similarity in the issues, except for
section 92 which does not raise its head in my case,
and the additional issue which involves an inconsistencywith the JUDICIARY ACT.
May I say, Your Honour, I will not be arguing
the question of inconsistency at the hearing of the
matter, so it is purely a question as to whether
section 117 applies. Now, that, as I understand it, limits the question of fact in dispute between the
parties to my case to the one which I was given notice
of on Monday by letter that my assertion that I cannot
practice principally in the State of Queensland without
foregoing my residence in New South Wales~ That assertion, I suppose I could call it, appears at paragraph 4 of my affidavit.
I should say, Your Honour, that section 117
speaks of disabilities and discriminations and, of
course, a forced alteration of residence is not the
only disability that flows from a requirement to
practice principally in another State. There are
disabilities in terms of time and cost and family
matters also intrude. Those are matters, as Mr Bennett
has put, of inference, as one would have thought
is the allegation of fact made in paragraph 4 of my
affidavit, a matter of inference flowing from judicial
notice, and there is, of course, a stream of authority
in all States of Australia on taking judicial notice of distances and as Mr Bennett has also suggested,
the habits of a profession with which the Court is
familiar,which habits are notorious and therefore
fall within the strict doctrine of judicially noticed facts. Your Honour, my matter comes to the Court as the whole of a cause removed from the Supreme Court
of Queensland so there is no technical difficulty such
as might arise in Mr Street's case.
HIS HONOUR: But still I have tended to regard you perhaps a little unfairly as a "Johnny come lately" upon the scene.
MR ROBERTSON: Yes. I think the facts disclose that Mr Street and I made our applications at much the same time and
surprisingly without knowledge one of the other but - - -
HIS HONOUR: But certainly he had his case litigated in the Supreme Court of Queensland.
SlT7/4/PLC 11 16/12/88 Robertson
MR ROBER1SON: Yes, ~hat is so, Your Honour, and it was by reason of that litigation that I took the step of asking the
Court to remove it, it being a waste of judicial
resources to litigate it in Queensland.
That single question of fact apparently being
in contention, I gave my friend's instructing
solicitor notice on Monday that I was making myself
available today for cross-examination on my affidavit
if he wished to contest the fact and I am here,
Your Honour, if my friend wants to put me in the box.
It is a single question of fact. He can, of course, put on some affidavit material contesting it if he
wishes but he has had my affidavit since about
7 November and has taken no steps to do so. This
matter has been before the Court now for, I think at
least a year - 18 months.
HIS HONOUR: I would be surprised, actually, if Mr Davies wants to cross-examine you but I suppose I should ask
him. Mr Davies, do you want Mr Robertson to remove himself from the rostrum and venture into the
witness box?
MR DAVIES: No, Your Honour. What we were suggesting in that respect is that if there is a question to be
determined, it is a question of fact on which evidence
might be adduced by people other than Mr Robertson
and therefore it is not appropriate to be determined -
certainly not today and probably not by this Court.
HIS HONOUR: I was going to ask you, Mr Davies: now, having regard to the form in which Mr Robertson's case has
come to the Court, what do you submit ought to be done
in his case? After all, in the case in which
Mr Bennett is appearing, I have indicated that I will
state a case.
MR DAVIES: Your Honour, in that case, one would assume that Mr Robertson's case would follow and really it
should be left to abide the result of the STREET case in which you are stating a case. There seems
to be little point in having them both go forwardin the sense that the second would now seem to follow
from the first. Now that there is only one - - -
HIS HONOUR: That is true but, on the other hand, Mr Robertson has got himself here, therefore, I would be inclined to
take the view that he is entitled to be heard upon the
point. To say that his case should merely await the outcome of Mr Street's case is effectively to deny
him the opportunity of presenting his submissions and
for all I know, although perhaps it is quite unlikely,
he may shed a vast illumination upon the legal pointthat I will not obtain from you or from Mr Bennett or
from the Solicitor for the Commonwealth. As I say, I
SlT7/5/PLC 12 ROBERTSON 16/12/88 Robertson think that is quite unlikely but I cannot exclude
the possibility.
MR DAVIES: Very kind of Your Honour. Your Honour, we certainly have no objection to that course. It may be that
formally, for the matter to come before this Court,
that there could be a case stated in, so far as
section 117 is concerned, identical terms to that
which is stated in STREET.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. Well, that is what I had in mind and I would suggest that Mr Bennett and Mr Robertson
co-operate and that we use Mr Bennett's case, in the
light of any objections you may make to it, as amodel for adoption in Mr Robertson's case.
MR DAVIES: That seems appropriate, Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Very well. I do not think the same time limits
need apply to Mr Robertson. I can state a case in January that will reflect, so far as it is necessary,
the case that is stated in Mr Street's case.
MR DAVIES: Yes. HIS HONOUR: Very well. Now, have you any objection to that course, Mr Robertson?
MR ROBERTSON: No, Your Honour, except that there is an outstanding issue of fact and I just wonder how
it will be resolved. That is my principal concern.
HIS HONOUR: What I suggest to you is that you consult with Mr Bennett The same issue of fact arises with
Mr Street as it arises in your case.
MR ROBERTSON: Yes, but I am on notice that that issue of fact is contested.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Bennett, in a sense, is on notice that that issue of fact is contested as well. There is no
difference between the two cases.
MR ROBERTSON: I know, Your Honour, but I wonder how the contest is to be resolved.
HIS HONOUR: You will find that out at the end of next week.
MR ROBERTSON: If there is still a contest on it by the end of next week, Your Honour, I would, for myself, wish to
have the contest resolved before the matter goes tothe Full Court.
HIS HONOUR: If there is an outstanding issue of fact that I cannot resolve on the materials put to me in the course of
next week, obviously it will have to be resolved beforethe matter gets to the Full Court.
SlT7/6/PLC 13 16/12/88 Robertson
MR ROBERTSON: Yes, very well. The other matter, Your Honour, is that my argument will depart from Mr Bennett's,
as I understand it, on section 117. It is part of
my argument that section 92 is inapplicable and
that is an argument as to construction. So, there will be a difference.
HIS HONOUR: Well now, what is the difference?
MR ROBERTSON: I suppose it is this: that it is part of my argument section 117 has a wider scope than has
been given to it because the notion of intercourse
in section 92 was directed to a different subject-matter
than section 117, put briefly, the passing and
repassing across State borders rather than some more
expansive notion and I would be seeking to persuade
the Court that one can give section 117 an operation
much wider than the operation given to it in HENRY V
BAUME, for that, amongst other reasons.
HIS HONOUR: But that submission will not reflect in any particular issue of fact that is different.
MR ROBERTSON: No. HIS HONOUR: So that from the point of view of stating a case,
we need not be over much concerned about the
difference in the submissions.
MR ROBERTSON: Correct.
HIS HONOUR: Unless the case is to be drawn in such a way as to reflect the submissions that are to be presented
by the parties.
MR ROBERTSON: Yes. I was just going to suggest that perhaps it might be a joint stated case, if the matters
could be joined, but that might be - because I am
not a party to the facts in relation to the
92 question, that might have - - -
HIS HONOUR:
Why joint stated cases? What is the advantage of joint stated cases as against two separate stated
cases?
MR ROBERTSON: I suppose there is none. HIS HONOUR:
Particularly if you say there is a difference in the submission that you will be presenting on section 117.
MR ROBERTSON: That is so, yes. HIS HONOUR: I would have thought that that point is in favour of separate stated cases.
MR ROBERTSON: Yes. I have nothing further to add, Your Honour. SlT7/7/PLC 14 16/12/88 Robertson HIS HONOUR: Very well. The matter will proceed on the basis that I have outlined.
Yes, Mr Bennett?
MR BENNETT: The only other formal matter, Your Honour, concerns - I do not think there is any need for an
order but Your Honour appreciates there is an appeal
pending in relation to which - - -
HIS HONOUR: In your case?
MR BENNETT: Yes, independently of the High Court proceedings and that the two should be heard together.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. I had proposed to list the appeal along with whatever arose out of the independent action
that you had instituted. At that stage I think
we had envisaged a demurrer but it looks as if the
demurrer will fall by the wayside and be
replaced by a stated case.
MR BENNETT: Yes. That is my application, Your Honour. HIS HONOUR: But certainly the appeal would be listed at the
same time because it would be necessary to dispose
of the appeal even though the action looks as if
it is going to be the vehicle for the principal
determination.
MR BENNETT: Yes, if Your Honour pleases. HIS HONOUR: The Court will now adjourn. AT 12.18 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED
TO A DATE TO BE FIXED
SlT7/8/PLC 15 16/12/88 Robertson
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Constitutional Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Jurisdiction
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Standing
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Statutory Construction
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Abuse of Process
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Procedural Fairness
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