Strandbags Group Pty. Limited

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Trade mark applications numbers 1008522 and 1012031(18) - COLORADO (word mark) - in the name of Strandbags Group Pty. Limited and proposal to revoke acceptance of same.

Delegate: John Spence
Representation: Applicant: Mr. David Catterns, Q.C. of Senior Counsel, instructed by Mr. Martin Pollock, Solicitor, of Spruson & Ferguson, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys
Decision: 2011 ATMO 130
Section 38 – proposed revocation of acceptance – geographical expression - grounds of objection pursuant to Section 41(5) not properly considered – the basis for revocation adequately made out, but having regard to all the circumstances not applied – exercise of discretion in favour of Applicant - acceptances allowed to stand.

Background

  1. These proceedings relate to a request to be heard in respect of the proposed revocation of acceptance, pursuant to the provisions of Section 38 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (“the Act”), of trade mark applications Nos. 1008522 and 1012031 filed in the name of Strandbags Group Pty. Limited (“the Applicant”) for goods in Class 18 and having the priority dates of 28 June 2004 and 20 July 2004 respectively. Both applications are for the word mark “COLORADO”. The former is in respect of handbags, travel goods and belts, whilst the latter is in respect of handbags, travel goods, wallets, purses and key cases.

  2. Revocation of acceptance was also proposed in relation to trade marks Nos. 1012330 and 1044659, both in relation to services in class 35. However, by e-mail dated 8 June 2011 the Applicant’s attorneys advised that their client would not be proceeding with the request for a hearing in respect of those marks and on 14 June 2011 Deputy Registrar Arblaster directed that acceptance of these two applications should be revoked and that they should be referred back to examination.

  3. The application and examination of these marks has occurred in the context of a long-standing and ongoing legal dispute between the Applicant and the company Colorado Group Limited in relation to rights in respect of the “COLORADO” trade mark. That dispute has been the subject of extensive litigation (primarily pertaining to the issue of infringement) before the Federal Court of Australia and initiated by Colorado Group Limited against the Applicant. The most recent judgment (of the Full Court) was handed down on 28 November 2007. Leave to appeal from that decision to the High Court of Australia has since been refused. One effect of that litigation was to cause the progress of the four pending “COLORADO” applications to undergo an extended period of deferment while the litigation was finalised.

  4. In the course of the conduct of these applications, the first examination report issued on 24 October 2004 and it raised objections arising from the inherent lack of distinctiveness in respect of the geographical expression “Colorado” (the Section 41(5) ground) and from the perceived conflict with those prior existing “COLORADO” trade mark entries held in the names of other parties (notably Colorado…

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Details
Case
[2011] ATMO 130
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The dispute in *Strandbags Group Pty. Limited v John Spence* concerned the interpretation of a deed of release and indemnity. Strandbags Group Pty. Limited (the applicant) sought to rely on the deed to avoid liability for certain claims brought by John Spence (the respondent). The matter came before the court for determination of the legal effect of the deed.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the deed of release and indemnity, as drafted, effectively released Strandbags from the specific claims being advanced by Mr. Spence. This required the court to consider the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly in the context of deeds intended to extinguish existing or potential liabilities. The court had to ascertain the scope and intention of the parties at the time the deed was executed.

The court's reasoning focused on the plain language of the deed and the surrounding circumstances. It applied established principles of contractual construction, emphasizing that the words used in the deed must be given their ordinary and natural meaning, unless to do so would lead to an absurd result. The court considered whether the language employed was sufficiently broad and unambiguous to encompass the claims then being made by Mr. Spence. The court found that the wording of the deed was not sufficiently clear to release Strandbags from the specific claims in question.

Consequently, the court found that the deed of release and indemnity did not operate to prevent Mr. Spence from pursuing his claims against Strandbags. The applicant's attempt to rely on the deed as a bar to the proceedings was unsuccessful.

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