Strahan & Strahan

[2007] FamCA 139

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

STRAHAN & STRAHAN [2007] FamCA 139

FAMILY LAW - COSTS – INTERIM PROPERTY SETTLEMENT - Between parties

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

HARRIS v HARRIS(1993) FLC 92-378
PARIS KING INVESTMENTS v RAYHILL AND ORS(2006) NSWSC 578
ZSCHOKKE and ZSCHOKKE (1996) FLC 92-693

APPLICANT: Mr Strahan

RESPONDENT: Mrs Strahan

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mrs West

FILE NUMBER: ADF 228 of 2005

DATE DELIVERED: 23 January 2007

PLACE DELIVERED: Adelaide

JUDGMENT OF: STRICKLAND J

HEARING DATES: 22 & 23 January 2007

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Ackman QC

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Robinson & Mason

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Pyke QC
Mr Kirk QC

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Watts McCray

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER COUNSEL: Mrs West

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER SOLICITOR: Ann Bills & Associates

IT IS NOTED IN CONNECTION WITH THESE ORDERS that the judgment of the Honourable Justice Strickland delivered this day will for all publication and reporting purposes be referred to as Strahan and Strahan.

Orders

1. That within 21 days of the date hereof, the husband pay to the wife, or the wife's solicitors on behalf of the wife, the sum of THREE MILLION DOLLARS [$3,000,000.00] by way of interim property settlement.

2. Save and except in relation to those parts of the applications filed by the parties since 1 September 2006, which I have adjourned, those applications and responses be dismissed and removed from the active pending list.

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE

FILE NUMBER: ADF 228 of 2005

Mr Strahan

Applicant

And

Mrs Strahan

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The formal application before me is the wife's Form 2 Application filed on 1 September 2006 and, in particular, the orders sought in paragraphs 8 to 13 of that application.

2. At the commencement of the hearing, though, the wife's counsel indicated that the application that was being made in this regard was not precisely as per paragraphs 8 to 13 of the Form 2 Application.  In the outline of argument presented by the applicant wife, the order sought is now identified and it is an interim costs order (by way of interim property settlement) in the sum of $5 million.

3. Why I need to mention that is because there are a number of bases on which an interim costs order can be made and the original application left it open as to on which basis the order was being sought.  Mr Kirk QC has crystallised his client's position in that regard, and to repeat, I am being asked to make an order by way of an interim property settlement to provide funds for the wife for preparation for trial and the ongoing legal work required in this matter.  The sum sought is $5 million.

4. The husband's position is contained in his Form 2 Application filed on 28 November 2006 and particularly in paragraph 14 of that application, wherein the order the husband seeks is - and summarising - that he pay to the wife the sum of $1.25 million by way of interim property settlement.

Background

1. The husband was born in March 1962 and is now aged 44 years.

2. The wife was born in October 1962 and is now aged 44 years.

3. The parties married in January 1994.

4. The child S was born in June 1996 and is now aged 10 years.  He is autistic, he lives with the wife, and he spends time with the husband.

5. The parties lived in Switzerland from 1999 until 2002 and then returned to live in Australia.

6. In August 2003 the wife lent the husband $2,000,000.00 to purchase a property at W in South Australia.

7. In September 2004 the husband paid the wife $3,599,700.00 in repayment of the said loan.

8. The parties separated in January 2005 when the husband moved to Hong Kong.  The husband continues to live there and the wife and child remain living in Adelaide.

9. At the time of separation the wife had a total of $6,723,695.00 in bank accounts.

10. The husband commenced proceedings in Hong Kong on 1 February 2005.  These proceedings were dismissed with costs on 26 August 2005 and a subsequent appeal was also dismissed.

11. The wife filed a Form 1 Application for final orders in this court on 15 February 2005.

12. The wife filed an Amended Form 1 Application seeking final orders on 9 June 2005.

13. The husband filed a Form 1A Response on 19 July 2005.

14. The husband filed a Form 13 Financial Statement on 10 October 2005 in which he deposed to having weekly income of $282,030.00, total personal weekly expenditure of $60,570.00, property of $35,504,700.00, liabilities of $852,800.00 and financial resources of $21,205,771.00.

15. The husband filed an Amended Form 1A Response seeking final orders on 22 December 2005.

16. The marriage between the parties was dissolved in February 2006.

17. The wife filed a Further Amended Form 1 Application seeking final orders on 6 December 2006.

18. The husband filed a Further Amended Form 1A Response on 21 December 2006.

19. At the date of the hearing the wife had between $16,000.00 and $20,000.00 in a CBA cash investment account, $1,000,000.00 in bonds, and $50,000.00 in a savings account with UBS-AG Zurich.  She was indebted to her commercial solicitors DW in the sum of $970,000.00 and to her family law solicitors Watts McCray in the sum of $143,000.00.

20. No evidence was presented as to the husband’s current financial position.  However, it was conceded by the husband’s counsel that the husband would be able to meet the amount sought by the wife if that was ordered.

The current state of the proceedings

1. The current state of the proceedings is that the trial in relation to the children’s issues is listed to commence before Justice Bell on 5 March 2007 with a time estimate of 5 days and the trial in relation to the financial issues is listed to commence before me on 3 September 2007 with a time estimate of 4 weeks.

The evidence

1. For the purposes of this application the wife relied upon the following documents:

   26.1Form 2 Application filed 1 September 2006.

   26.2Affidavit of the wife filed 1 September 2006.

   26.3Form 13 Financial Statement of the wife filed 11 September 2006.

   26.4Affidavit of Mr B filed 11 September 2006.

   26.5Affidavit of Mr D filed 20 September 2006.

   26.6Affidavit of Mr B filed 26 September 2006.

   26.7Affidavit of the wife filed 25 October 2006.

   26.8Amended application for final orders filed 6 December 2006.

   26.9The husband’s further amended response seeking final orders filed 21 December 2006.

   26.10The Form 13 Financial Statement of the husband filed 10 October 2005.

   26.11Affidavit of the husband filed 28 September 2006.

   In addition to the above the wife relied on a letter of 28 September 2006 and a letter dated 14 September 2006 which documents were tendered and marked respectively Exhibits W1 and W2.

2. For the purposes of this application the husband relied upon the following:

   27.1Affidavit of Mr H filed 1 September 2006.

   27.2Affidavit of Mr H filed 28 September 2006.

   27.3Affidavit of Mr H filed 28 September 2006.

   27.4Form 2 Application filed 25 October 2006.

   27.5The husband’s affidavit filed 25 October 2006.

   27.6Affidavit of Mr H filed 25 October 2006.

   27.7Form 2 Application filed 28 November 2006.

   27.8Affidavit of Mr H filed 30 November 2006.

The law

1. This is an application for interim property settlement, and the relevant authority is the Full Court decision of HARRIS v HARRIS (1993) FLC 92-378. There the Full Court said this (at p.79,929 to p.79,930):

   “We do not doubt that the Court has power in a proper case in s.79 proceedings to make what may be conveniently described as an interim order, that is an order dealing with some of the property of the parties prior to the final hearing.  We do not consider that it is necessary to draw a distinction in terminology between an “interim” order and a “Partial” order.

   But in the exercise of that power the following matters need to be considered:-

   (1)  The exercise of the power should be confined to cases where the circumstances presented at that time are compelling.  As a generality, the interests of the parties and the Court are better served by there being one final hearing of s.79 proceedings.  However, circumstances may arise before there can be a final hearing which dictate that some part of the property of the parties should be the subject of orders.  A common example is where both parties agree to the disposal of some assets pending the trial.  However, we do not consider that it is confined to cases where the parties consent.  Urgent situations may arise where it is necessary to exercise this power if injustice is to be avoided.  Examples include cases where it is necessary to do so to avoid an asset being eroded or lost in the intervening period, and cases (beyond the maintenance Power) where an order in favour of one party is necessary to preserve or obtain a home for or is otherwise necessary for the welfare of the children.

   As to the position in England under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in relation to an interim property order in opposed proceedings and as to the matters to be taken into consideration in the exercise of that discretion including the “overriding grounds of individual or family welfare” – see the discussion in Barry v Barry [1992] 3 All E.R. 405.

   (2)  It is an exercise of the x.79 power.  Consequently it must be performed within those parameters.  Since it is not the final hearing the Judge is unlikely to have the final findings, but the exercise must fall within that general framework and the material available at that time.

   (3)  Of necessity it is likely to be a somewhat imprecise exercise.  Consequently, it must be exercised conservatively and the Judge must be satisfied that the remaining property will be adequate to meet the legitimate expectations of both parties at the final hearing, or that the order which is contemplated is capable of being reversed or adjusted if it is subsequently considered necessary to do so.  It is for this reason that we doubt whether the distinction which Nygh J drew between interim and partial orders is necessary or desirable.”

Discussion

1. The primary focus of the dispute here is whether the circumstances presented by the wife are compelling.  The wife says in effect that what is compelling is that unless she receives $5 million by way of interim property settlement she will not be able to secure the legal representation that she needs for the purpose of “achieving justice” in these proceedings.  In this regard the wife refers to a decision of Brereton J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in PARIS KING INVESTMENTS v RAYHILL AND ORS (2006) NSWSC 578, where His Honour said this (paragraph 37):

   “It appears probable that the parties in these proceedings will require a determination of the Court, following a lengthy, complex and expensive contested hearing to resolve their disputes.  They are entitled to no less, and in order for each of them to achieve justice and for the court best to afford them it, it is highly desirable that they have the benefit of competent legal representation.  That necessarily comes at a cost but it is a cost that has to be incurred if justice is to be done.”

2. The wife says that she needs the funds to meet her outstanding and anticipated legal costs to the conclusion of these proceedings.  She says she has now spent, or committed, almost all of her available funds and yet there is a substantial amount of work still to be done.

3. The husband says in response that these circumstances are not compelling, within the meaning of HARRIS.  He says that the wife has spent or committed approximately $5.5 million on legal and other costs in this case to date and there is no requirement for her to spend another $5 million.  He says that the wife has spent a significant proportion of that $5.5 million unnecessarily, for example, as a result of frequent changes to her representation, but mostly by incurring costs with commercial solicitors, DW, in relation to the assessment, coding and collation of documents.  However, the husband says that in the interests of ensuring that this case is able to proceed to trial as planned, he is prepared to pay the wife the sum of $1.25 million by way of interim property settlement. 

4. The wife's costs are divided between those paid and payable to her commercial solicitors and to her family law solicitors, Watts McCray.  With the former, she has been billed just over $2 million of which just over $1.1 million has been paid.  There is also an amount of approximately $65,000.00 that has not yet been billed, and the estimate of the costs for this hearing is $22,000.00.  The estimate of her commercial solicitors’ further costs, as at 11 September 2006, was $3.6 million, but some of that may be included in the amount billed to date. 

5. With Watts McCray, they were instructed in this matter in late July 2006.  They have billed the wife just over $470,000.00, all of which has been paid.  In addition, there is currently work in progress of just over $30,000.00 and the estimate of costs for this hearing is $74,000.00.  The estimate of Watts McCray's total future costs, as at 20 September 2006, was $2,340,000.00 to the nearest thousand dollars, but again I would expect that some of that is included in the amount billed to date. 

6. Immediately one can see that there is in fact more than $5 million required to meet the wife's future costs in this case.

7. The wife's case is that it has been, and continues to be necessary to incur a significant proportion of the costs of her commercial solicitors because of her belief that there is "substantial undisclosed property". 

8. The husband is a member of what is known as the P Club.  The husband says, though, that his only entitlement in that Club is to a percentage of the Club's betting floats.  He says he has no interest that has any commercial value.  However, the wife says otherwise and she says otherwise on the basis of comments made by the husband to her, the movement of substantial amounts of money, and what she says has been the husband's failure to provide information and documentation which she believes he has and which she believes indicates that the husband has an interest in the P Club and that it could be worth as much as $150 million.

9. Through her commercial solicitors the wife has been investigating and wants to continue to investigate the P Club and the husband's interest in the same.  She says her belief is reasonably held in the circumstances and the issue warrants the expenditure of the sort of money that has been referred to.  However, the question still is whether this is a compelling circumstance.

10. I consider that the need to investigate the P Club as part of the wife's case is necessary, but on the evidence before me currently I am not satisfied that it is necessary to expend the amount of money that the wife has expended to date and anticipates to expend in the future.  It seems that there is very little to show for all the work that has been undertaken to date.  There is no evidence before me as to the relevance of the documents collated by the wife’s commercial solicitors or the necessity to process each and every one of those documents.  There is also no evidence that money spent on surveillance, through private detectives, has been justified in some way.

11. It is instructive to note, as well, that the husband requested discovery in relation to the documents being collated by the wife’s commercial solicitors and also sought information in relation to the cost being expended in relation to that exercise, but that discovery and that information has not been forthcoming.  Objections have been raised, primarily on the ground of privilege.  Whether that is a proper basis for objection or not, I am not in a position to say, but it strikes me as odd that such a stance has been taken.

12. In any event, Mr Kirk QC put it that the wife's solicitors are still searching for the key which will unlock the door and provide the answers that the wife seeks in relation to the P Club.  I imply from that that, to date, there has been little if anything found in relation to that matter.

13. Thus, there has to be a serious question over the value of the work being undertaken by the wife’s commercial solicitors, on the evidence currently before me.  Apart from the fact that apparently there is still nothing to show for the work that has been done, it does not even seem to have lessened the wife's costs generally.  For example, it was suggested that the work being done in relation to the collation, the coding and the assessment of the documents, would save costs in the preparation of this matter for trial.  However, when I look at the future work and anticipated costs of Watts McCray, there is no suggestion of any saving of costs in the area of discovery and production.

14. In a sense, the wife has taken the right approach in seeking to fund her costs by applying for an order for interim property settlement. Whereas she may not have been able to satisfy the court that an interim costs order pursuant to Section 117(2) of the Family Law Act should be paid by the husband, if she receives an interim property settlement, that clearly will be part of her entitlement to property settlement in the assets of the parties and she can spend that how she likes, and neither the husband nor this court need have any concern about that. However, the catch is that to achieve an interim property settlement order she still needs to establish that the circumstances are compelling, and here that entails a consideration of why she needs the funds. The inquiry, though, is not the same as would be required if the application was pursuant to Section 117(2) of the Act; in other words, for an order for interim costs.

15. According to the Full Court decision of ZSCHOKKE and ZSCHOKKE (1996) FLC 92-693 the relevant considerations on an interim costs application are: the respondent being in a position of relative financial strength, a capacity on the part of the respondent to meet his own litigation costs, an inability on the part of the applicant to meet her costs, complexity in the financial affairs and a need for expert investigations into those affairs. Although the Full Court indicated that the latter two considerations are not always required their presence or otherwise carries weight, or should carry weight, in determining the issue at hand.

16. Although in my view - and I accept Mr Kirk's submission about this - those considerations are satisfied in this case, it has been recognised that whilst they are not irrelevant, or entirely irrelevant, they are less important when considering an interim property settlement application.  For example Brereton J said this in PARIS KING INVESTMENTS (at paragraph 33):

    "Many of the foregoing considerations - referring to the considerations set out in ZSCHOKKE - are less important, though not necessarily irrelevant where what is relied upon as a source of power is not s.117 or s.74 but an interim property order under s.79 and s.80(1)(h).  In that respect the Full Family Court said, in ZSCHOKKE (780-781) that while the requirements of section 79(2) and (4) must be observed in the same manner as for any interim property order, if it appeared that the applicant would likely receive by way of property settlement a sum sufficient to cover the advance then an interim order may be made.”

17. Thus, in summary, I am not satisfied that the wife's alleged need for funds to meet the outstanding and anticipated costs of the wife’s commercial solicitors, at the level sought, is a compelling circumstance.  However, that is not to say that a need for some funds to further investigate the P Club cannot be a compelling circumstance, and nor does it say anything about a need for funds to meet the anticipated costs of Watts McCray, the wife's family law solicitors.

18. Mr Ackman QC for the husband has suggested that if a compelling circumstance can be the need for funds to meet anticipated legal costs, then that will open the floodgates and there will never need to be an argument about interim costs again.  However, I do not agree.  An obvious and common source of funds to meet legal costs is the asset pool of the parties.  Indeed, in many cases there is agreement between the parties and orders are made for an interim property settlement to specifically provide access to funds to meet legal costs.  Why, then, is it not open to find in a contested case that the need for funds to meet legal costs can be a compelling circumstance within the meaning of HARRIS?  It is an exercise of discretion and will depend on the particular circumstances of each case.

1. As the Full Court in HARRIS said (at page 79-929):

   “(1)  The exercise of the power should be confined to cases where the circumstances presented at that time are compelling.  As a generality, the interests of the parties and the Court are better served by there being one final hearing of s.79 proceedings.  However, circumstances may arise before there can be a final hearing which dictate that some part of the property of the parties should be the subject of orders.  A common example is where both parties agree to the disposal of some assets pending the trial.  However, we do not consider that it is confined to cases where the parties consent.  Urgent situations may arise where it is necessary to exercise this power if injustice is to be avoided.  Examples include cases where it is necessary to do so to avoid an asset being eroded or lost in the intervening period, and cases (beyond the maintenance Power) where an order in favour of one party is necessary to preserve or obtain a home for or is otherwise necessary for the welfare of the children.”

2. It is significant to note that the Full Court there specifically refers to the “common example” of “when both parties agree to the disposition of some asset pending trial”.  It is also necessary, in my view, to consider why the Full Court says that the circumstances need to be compelling, and the reason for that is apparent from the quotation above, namely that the interests of the parties and the court are better served by there being one final hearing of Section 79 proceedings.  However, a clear need for two hearings arises if costs are required to prepare for the final hearing.

3. Here, the wife needs funds to continue her investigations of the P Club and to secure continuing legal representation, and without being able to do that she may be severely disadvantaged, given the control that the husband has over the business affairs of the parties.  This provides the compelling circumstance. 

4. It is also highly significant in this case that the husband offers to pay to the wife, by way of interim property settlement, the sum of $1.25 million.  Whatever Mr Ackman QC may say about the husband's reasons for that, it can be regarded as a concession that an order for an interim property settlement is appropriate.  In other words, a concession that all the requirements set out in HARRIS have been satisfied, including the presence of compelling circumstances.  Thus, in fact, I do not need to make a finding that there is a compelling circumstance for the wife to receive $1.25 million by way of interim property settlement.  However, the wife seeks more than that, namely, $5 million.  To repeat, though, I am not satisfied of the compelling nature of the need for funds to meet all of the costs of the wife’s commercial solicitors.  I am satisfied, though, of the need for funds to meet the costs of Watts McCray. 

5. There was no direct challenge to the reasonableness of the costs of Watts McCray, but the husband made the following points:

   51.1In the context of the wife's need for funds to meet legal costs, she has maintained her high level of expenditure on such items as shoes and clothing, she has continued to employ her brother and her sister and she transferred her interest in a property at [K] to her sister for no consideration.

   51.2The husband queries transactions that the wife conducted in relation to the bank account of the [the wife’s] Investment Trust.

   51.3The husband refers to the circumstance, in this context, that the wife has spent a considerable amount of her available funds on what at this stage appears to be an unproductive pursuit involving the employment of a private detective to undertake surveillance, and in having her commercial solicitors undertake the work that they have done in relation to documents.

   51.4The husband says there is no need for the wife to have the funds now to meet the entire cost of her solicitors up to the conclusion of the matter.

   51.5The husband says there is no requirement that fees be paid up front and there is no evidence that there is no other solicitor who will act for the wife without payment up front.

6. Dealing with those matters seriatim:

   52.1That would be a valid criticism of the wife if what was being sought was the husband meeting the wife's costs out of his own funds.  The wife, to repeat, is seeking an interim property settlement which will comprise part of her entitlement to property settlement out of the assets of the parties.  What she does with the funds that she has already had, and what she does with the amount she receives by way of interim property settlement, again should be of no concern to the husband.

   52.2In relation to the transactions on the bank account of the [the wife’s] Investment Trust, I am satisfied that the wife has explained that in her affidavit material and it was no more or no less than moving the available funds around different accounts.

   52.3That too can be considered a valid criticism, but again if the wife wishes to spend all of her property settlement entitlement on legal costs which leads to nothing then that is her prerogative.

   52.4Again that is correct but, to repeat, it is her property settlement entitlement that she will receive and that cannot be of any concern of the husband.

   52.5In my view the wife is entitled to have the solicitors of her choice, as is the husband, and those solicitors have filed an affidavit where they say categorically that they are not prepared to continue to act unless they are put in funds by the wife.

7. Thus I find that there are compelling circumstances here but not such as to justify the full extent of what the wife seeks.

8. Turning to the other requirements from HARRIS.  It is still "an exercise of the Section 79 power" and "it must be performed within those parameters."  However, no issue has been raised by the husband about that aspect of this matter, and in any event I again refer to what the Full Court said in ZSCHOKKE (at p.83,216), namely:

   “If the order is to be made under s.80(i)(h) it would seem that regard should be had to the requirement in s.79 that the orders be just and equitable and this would require the Court to undertake at least some brief consideration of the matters in s.79(4) including those referred to in s.75(2).  If, on a brief consideration of those matters, it seems likely to the Court that the party who is the applicant for the interim order for an advance of funds from the other party will be likely to receive by way of property settlement a sum sufficient to cover the advance that would seem to be sufficient to enable the order sought to be made.”

9. Here, there is on doubt that the wife is "likely to receive by way of property settlement a sum sufficient to cover the advance."  Indeed, that can be seen from the orders sought by the wife in her form 1 application, but more importantly by the orders sought by the husband in his form 1A response.  There is of course no agreement as to the extent of the asset pool here, but taking the husband's position, he puts the value of the same at $56 million.  (See his Form 13 Financial Statement filed on 10 October 2005 and Annexure “E” to the wife's affidavit filed on 1 September 2006, being the husband's financial statement filed in the Hong Kong proceedings.)

10. That of course does not include any amount for any interest that the husband may have in the P Club, save and except for his share of the betting floats.  It also does not include the wife's bank accounts which at separation contained in excess of $6 million but which are now down to something just in excess of $1 million, as a result of the wife meeting her living expenses and paying legal and other costs, including employing her brother and her sister.  The wife of course says that the asset pool should be far greater because of the husband's nondisclosure.

11. In any event, the orders that the husband seeks are for the wife to have real estate with an estimated value of $7,720,000, for her to keep what assets she has including money that she has, and including money that she has had and spent, and that an adjustment be made, as may be necessary, to ensure that the net assets of the parties are divided 30% to the wife and 70% to the husband.  Now, 30% of $56 million is approximately $17 million, and although I cannot be precise at this stage about the figures it seems to me that with the wife getting the real estate and retaining what she has that would be close to the $17 million, but there may be a need for a relatively small additional payment to be made, by the husband to the wife, to achieve that result.

12. Thus, even on the husband's case, it is apparent that a payment of even $5 million by way of interim property settlement would be less than what she might ultimately receive by way of final property settlement, although, of course, she would be receiving the interim property settlement in cash rather than by way of real estate and she could not then expect to have all of the real estate she seeks if that payment is made.

13. Of course, it must be borne in mind that these calculations are on the basis of the asset pool turning out to be as the husband suggests, as well as the property settlement division being as the husband proposes.  The wife, of course, puts different figures and a different division.

14. I note that there is no issue about the ability of the husband to make a payment of even $5 million. 

15. It can also be seen from the figures that I have referred to that the third requirement in HARRIS can easily be satisfied.  In other words, with a payment of even $5 million by way of interim property settlement the court can be "satisfied that the remaining property will be adequate to meet the legitimate expectations of both parties at the final hearing." 

16. However, to repeat, I am not satisfied on the evidence currently before me that there are compelling circumstances such that the wife should receive $5 million; I am satisfied that she should have sufficient to cover the costs of Watts McCray, namely, say $2 million, after deducting some of the amount billed to date.  In addition, I accept that she should have some further funds to continue to instruct her commercial solicitors to investigate the P Club and to provide her with any necessary commercial advice.  Doing the best I can on the evidence before me, and taking into account the nature of the work involved, the amounts paid to date, the apparent lack of progress to date and what may be required in the future, I consider that an amount of $1 million is appropriate in this regard.

17. Ironically, though, as I have remarked already, because it will be paid by way of interim property settlement the wife can spend the money she receives how she likes.  I trust, though, that if she spends it on legal costs she does so wisely.  I say that because it seems to me that some of the costs incurred by the wife, as a result of having two sets of solicitors are unnecessary.  For example, I am told that for the two-day hearing on 22 and 23 January the wife's costs are approximately $100,000.00.  She has a partner and a senior associate present at court from her commercial solicitors as well as a partner and senior associate present from Watts McCray.  How there is a need for that, given the issues before the court, is a mystery to me.

I certify that the preceding
63 numbered paragraphs are
a true copy of the reasons herein of the
Honourable Justice Strickland.
The 23^rd day of January 2007.

……………………………………….
Associate