Stradbroke Island Management Organisation Inc IA6856& Ors v Redland Shire Council
[2001] QPEC 74
•21 November, 2001
PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Stradbroke Island Management Organisation Inc IA6856 & Ors v. Redland Shire Council & Ors [2001] QPEC 074 PARTIES: STRADBROKE ISLAND MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION INC IA6856, FRIENDS OF STRADBROKE ISLAND ASSOCIATION INC IA9583, HAIG BECK AND JACKIE COOPER, JANI HAENKE, BRUCE AND JAN JOHNMAN, PATRICIA LAKE AND BEN HAWKE, P JOE LAKE, ROBERT WHITE, JD & VR WHITEHEAD AND BRONWYN ZUTTION
Appellants
And
REDLAND SHIRE COUNCIL Respondent
And
S. MUNDAY, BELT COLLINS AUSTRALIA LTD
Co-RespondentsFILE NO/S: 4859 of 2000 DIVISION: Planning and Environment PROCEEDING: Appeal ORIGINATING COURT: Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 21 November, 2001 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 3 – 7 & 12 September, 2001 JUDGE: Judge Quirk ORDER: Appeal dismissed CATCHWORDS: Integrated Planning Act; ss 3.1.4(2), 4.1.52(2)(b), 6.1.1, 6.1.30(3)(b)
Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act; ss 4.13(5)&(5A)
Carillon Development Pty Ltd v. Maroochy Shire Council (2000) QPELR 216;
Returned and Services League of Australia (Victorian Branch) Inc, Glenroy Sub-Branch v. Moreland City Council & Anor (1998) 2 VR 406;
Byrne Bros. Pty Ltd v. Maryborough City Council (1984-86) 57 LGRA 419);
Stradbroke Island Management Organisation & Ors v. Redland Shire Council & Anor (1998) QPELR 495;
Vynotas Pty Ltd v. Brisbane City Council (2001), 112 LGERA 206;
Mount Marrow Blue Metal Quarries Pty Ltd v. Moreton Shire Council (1996) 1 Qd.R 347;
McBain v. Clifton Shire Council (1996) 1 Qd.R. 493);
Scott v. Woollongong City Council (1992) 72 LGRA 112 at 118;
Oshlac v. Richmond River Shire Council (1993) 82 LGERA 222 at 230;
Misson v. Randwick Municipal Council (1991) 23 NSWLR 734 at 738.COUNSEL: Mr T. Quinn for the appellants
Mr S. Ure for the respondent
Mr D. Gore QC & Mr M. Rackemann for the co-respondentsSOLICITORS: Carew McKimmie for the appellants
King & Co. for the respondent
Phillips Fox for the co-respondents
This appeal, by adverse submitters, is against the respondent’s approval of an application for a material change of use of land at Point Lookout, a coastal township in the north-eastern part of North Stradbroke Island. The land occupies an area of just over 8,000m² and is located on a headland. It is, and has been for many years, the site of the attractive and popular, Stradbroke Island Beach Hotel. This complex comprises conventional licensed hotel premises and 66 serviced accommodation units in a unique and highly scenic location.
The existing building form is elongated, having an unbroken length of approximately 100 metres. The structure is a mix of varying heights and architectural form and some of it is beginning to show its age. What can now be seen on the ground is the result of continued additions and adaptations and there is no dispute at all that a re-development of the site to provide a new attractive and integrated facility would be in the interests of the community as well as those of the proprietor. The named co-respondents to the appeal are professional consultants to the proprietor but, for the sake of convenience a reference to the co-respondent may be taken as being to the latter.
The site is on and has access from the East Coast Road. It has no adjoining neighbours. Detached housing is found on the southern side of East Coast Road. The subject land is included in the Special Development zone in the respondent’s planning scheme and the Strategic Plan has it designated as Tourist Business and Accommodation. In Development Control Plan No. 3 the site is included in the Tourist Accommodation and Facilities Precinct (No. 3).
The proposal is for a comprehensive re-development of the site. After extensive negotiations with council officers some modifications were made to the proposal in response to concerns raised. These changes are described by Mr Edmonds (a senior planner with the respondent council) at pages 8 – 10 of his report (Exhibit 16). The physical nature of the site and the detailed design of the proposal are described in the material placed before the court. A concise account of the site’s history is usefully set out in paragraph 2.4 of Mr Edmond’s report.
Since the respondent’s conditional approval of the application, further modifications to the development have been proposed. Some of these changes involve responses to conditions imposed by the council. These (and their effect) are set out in tabular form at page 4 of the report of Mr Mills (the co-respondent’s architect) which is Exhibit 7. Other changes were made in response to concerns expressed by the appellants. These are set out at page 5 of Exhibit 7. A third category involved revisions made in response to general design development of the project and are dealt with in page 6 of the exhibit.
In relation to these matters the point was taken by the appellants that the changes to the proposal did not constitute a “minor change” and should not be permitted. Section 4.1.52(2)(b) of the Integrated Planning Act provides:-
“The court –
…..(b)must not consider a change to the application on which the decision being appealed was made unless the change is only a minor change”.
For the purpose of this section the term “minor change” is not defined but a definition of “minor change” is given in Schedule 10 of the Act (in respect of a
development approval) in this way.
“…. a change to the approval that would not, if the application for the approval were re-made including the change –
(c)…. be likely … to cause a person to make a properly made submission objecting to the proposal, if the circumstances allowed’
This court has taken the view in the past (Carillon Development Pty Ltd v. Maroochy Shire Council (2000) QPELR 216) that it would be a sensible reading of the act to interpret “minor change” in a similar way for the purpose of s.4.1.52(2)(b).
The majority of matters that are involved in these modifications involve relatively insignificant changes in design and materials used for the re-location of such facilities as transformers and gas cylinders. As I appreciate the evidence, these matters present no difficulty at all in this context. The matters which should be mentioned specifically relate to changes to the roof terraces of the accommodation unit block, the deletion of pergolas and metal-sheeted skillion roofing at the rear of the terrace. The addition of acoustic and visual screening to roof terraces was also involved.
Complaint was also made about changes made to the mode of entry to the lower level of the hotel building to facilitate access to disadvantaged persons. All of these changes were made to bring about improvements to the proposal in terms of its appearance and utility and to better manage potential noise nuisance. As I understand the evidence, these changes were successful in that respect. I am satisfied that these changes would not have brought about adverse submission of a kind not provoked by the earlier proposal.
Before leaving this aspect of the matter, I should also refer to complaint that was made about the more elaborate arrangements intended for the disposal of stormwater which are described in detail in the evidence of the co-respondent’s consulting engineer, Mr Collins. The purpose of these arrangements, put very simply, is to avoid the discharge of collected (and untreated) stormwater directly onto the beach and to re-direct it over public land through a series of swales established at the appellant’s expense so that its quality and destination is far more acceptable from the community’s point of view. The appellant’s, through their legal representatives, were prepared to say that this involved not only an impermissible change to the proposal, but also gave rise to a “Pioneer” point, in that it broadened the scope of what was proposed to land which is not part of the land subject to the application.
The submission betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of what this part of the case was about. What it did involve was a demonstration that the council’s condition 28 (which required that stormwater be treated appropriately) could be complied with in an effective and advantageous manner. It did not in fact constitute any modification of the substance of the development proposed and considered by the council (and the court) and certainly did not involve withholding, from the application, anything integral to the proposal (see Returned and Services League of Australia (Victorian Branch) Inc, Glenroy Sub-Branch v. Moreland City Council & Anor (1998) 2 VR 406 in the judgment of Hayne JA. at 417-418.) I am satisfied that there is nothing in this point.
Before turning to the major thrust of the appellant’s case I will dispose of another rather technical point taken by them. Apparently when steps were taken to have the property converted to freehold title in about 1995, the Department of Lands required that an area of 342m² of the now disused road reserve (which passes around the ocean side of the land), into which the hotel use had encroached, be purchased and included with the property. The Certificate of Title to Lot 164 on CP894832 (the subject land) now includes that small area.
When the Town Planning Scheme was gazetted that area, being road reserve, was not included in any zoning or planning control. Although the DCP (on one view of the relevant map) later purported to include the land in a landscape preservation precinct, it is doubtful whether that designation was effective.
Pursuant to s.3.1.4(2) of the Integrated Planning Act the development permit is required only where development is assessable. Because the relevant scheme is a “transitional planning scheme”, what constitutes assessable development is defined by s.6.1.1 of the Act. The effect of the provision is that development is assessable if it would have required an application to be made under the repealed Act and the planning scheme. The road reserve (and the 342m² of it that was closed) was not zoned and accordingly the table of zones had no application to it (see Byrne Bros. Pty Ltd v. Maryborough City Council (1984-86) 57 LGRA 419).
Because the relevant town planning scheme is a “transitional planning scheme” within the meaning of chapter 6 of the Integrated Planning Act, s.6.1.30(3)(b) of that Act requires that the application (being one for which town planning consent would have been required under the repealed legislation, must be decided under s.4.13(5) and (5A) of that legislation.
Section 4.13(5A) of the repealed legislation provides:-
“The local government must refuse to approve the application if:-
(a)the application conflicts with any relevant strategic plan or development control plan and
(b)there are not sufficient planning ground to justify approving the application despite the conflict.”
If some conflict with the DCP3 could be indentified in regard to this aspect of the appeal (and s.4.13.(5A) of the repealed Act enlivened) this is a case where there are ample planning reasons for disregarding any such conflict in that, for all practical planning purposes, this small area should be treated as part of the whole site and one would anticipate that, at some stage, the planning instruments will be amended to reflect this.
The major thrust of the case against the proposed development was alleged conflict in various respects with DCP3. There was a threshold question whether the proposal (in particular the accommodation unit component of it) was one to which consent could be given in the Tourist Accommodation and Facilities precinct. In the table of development for that precinct permitted and permissible development is identified in columns 1, 2 and 3. Other purposes fall into column 4 which indicates:-
“Purposes for which buildings or other structures may not be erected or for which land may not be used”.
Attention was drawn to the definition of “accommodation unit” which expressly excludes the use of “multiple dwelling” ( a Column 4 use) and that part of the DCP (s.6.3) which indicates:-
“For sites identified to tourist accommodation uses are intended to be developed as integrated tourist facilities consisting of predominantly accommodation units with attendant facilities to cater for the needs of short staying guests."
The appellants’ contention was that the self-contained units intended as part of this proposal would be likely to be used for permanent occupancy. There was no real evidence to support this suggestion, and the facts, as they were established, are quite to the contrary. The evidence of Mr Lally, the principal of the entity that has conducted this hotel and will continue to do so, is that the facility will be operated as an integrated tourist resort. I accept his evidence.
That the units are intended to be self-contained is not to the point. Such units are a regular feature of accommodation offered at locations popular with tourists. Nor is it in any way determinative that the units may be offered for a sale on a “Strata Title” basis. This is a matter relating to investment and ownership rather than mode of use, and is not at all uncommon where tourist resort developments are concerned.
It was conveniently overlooked that column 3 also includes “tourist resort” the definition of which is found in s.2 of the DCP. On the evidence given, what is here proposed is within that definition. The case for the co-respondent in this respect is a stronger one than it was in Stradbroke Island Management Organisation & Ors v. Redland Shire Council & Anor (1998) QPELR 495 where a similar point was unsuccessfully raised.
There was a series of complaints made about the proposal and it was submitted that the matters raised involved a level of non-compliance with the DCP (and the development standards set out in s.6) which was unacceptable. Before embarking upon any detailed consideration of these matters it has to be said, at once, that any demonstrated non-compliance with these development standards is not necessarily fatal to the proposal and there are a number of important reasons for this.
1.Section 14 of the DCP, by necessary implication, provides to the
assessing authority a discretion to allow departure from the
development standards where it can be shown that a proposal
represents:-
“A desirable solution to a specific site which achieves compliance with the objectives of the DCP but fails to comply with the development standards.”
2.Section 4.13(5A) of the Local Government Planning and Environment Act accepts the possibility of departure from the DCP when sufficient planning grounds exist to justify that departure.
3. As was recently explained by the Court of Appeal in Vynotas Pty Ltd v. Brisbane City Council (2001), 112 LGERA 206, a transitional planning scheme may not, as a matter of law, prohibit any particular form of development.
By way of introduction s.6.3 provides under the heading “Preferred Development Form”:-
“The built form is to be low to medium rise, and is to respect the topographical features of each individual site. Where an established native vegetative cover exists, development should be designed to integrate with this cover.”
In this context it must be remember that this is a fairly unique location. The site is elevated and somewhat isolated in that no other developed land adjoins it. On the other hand it is visually prominent and appropriate attention to the impact of the proposal in this sense is called for.
It has also to be kept in mind that we are here not dealing with a completely new development, but a re-development of use that has been in place for some considerable time and served the community well. It is important that it be able to continue to do so and, as a consequence, functionality is an issue along with visual impact.
The evidence of the co-respondent’s architect, Mr Mills, made it clear that, while the appearance of the project has always been a concern, so also has its ability to serve effectively as a commercial entity. I am satisfied that he has succeeded in achieving an appropriate balance in that sense. I am satisfied that the proposal will not compromise the character of Point Lookout and that the built form will be of a scale and character which will comfortably take its place on this unique site while continuing to provide what the community expects from such a facility.
Professor Beck, who gave evidence for the appellant, and who is eminently qualified in his field, would have preferred that the building form be broken up into a number of smaller structures. I respect his entitlement to this opinion but fear that it might not sufficiently have taken into account the question of functionality.
Section 6.4.1 provides for vegetation retention and calls for a level of 35% retention in Tourist Accommodation and Facilities Precinct No. 3. The intended landscaping arrangements were explained in detail in the evidence of Mr Pate (consultant to the co-respondent) with whose work I was impressed. There was considerable effort expended in quantifying the on-site landscaping coverage, but it has to be accepted that it is less than the 35% mentioned in the relevant standard
As it was pointed out however, when one bears in mind the purposes of the landscaping standards (which are identified in s.6.4.1) the ability of on site landscaping to fulfil those purposes is reinforced to a substantial extent by the vegetation surrounding the site, (which is intended to be augmented). I am of the opinion that the essential objectives of the DCP in this respect will be achieved. I find the suggestion that in dealing with this aspect of the case one should ignore off site vegetation and screening as unrealistic.
Certain site works requirements are set out in s.6.4.2. This gave rise to a discussion about what was, in reality, the natural ground level at certain parts of the site. Old photographs were brought to court, but, in the end result nothing of any real importance emerged. When one has regard to the stated purpose of the site works controls, it could not be seriously suggested in this case that any of those purposes would be frustrated by this proposal.
Section 6.4.3 deals with height limitation and the purpose of these controls is :
· “To prevent the domination of the natural landscape by the built form of the development;
· To protect views of neighbouring properties.”
It cannot be denied that, in this case, these matters are potentially of consequence. However in reality, on the hotel building component , exceedence over the prescribed height limit is minor. With the apartment building the exceedence, which is not great, has largely resulted from the attention given to the on roof terraces.
The likely visual impact of the proposal received an inordinate amount of attention in the evidence. The extent to which it will be visible from every conceivable aspect was closely scrutinized. Again it has to be accepted that this is not a development that is being introduced into an otherwise pristine area. The site is developed and has been for some considerable time. How it will present visually will certainly not, in my view of the evidence, involve a worsening in appearance from what can now be seen and could not seriously be suggested to be unduly offensive.
To be fair it must also be accepted that this is not an area where the visible evidence of development is minimal. This is particularly so in respect of some of the more elevated parts of the locality. Vegetative screening of the development will be substantial and, in the overall result, the relatively minor exceedences in respect of building height should not, in my view of the evidence be held to be contrary to the objectives of the DCP and can count against approval.
Section 6.4.4 deals with site coverage and identifies the purpose of the standards. Drawn into this discussion was the question of the number of storeys that the development comprises. While on one reading of it, s. 6.4.4, in specifying relevant site coverage limits, does not seem to contemplate buildings of more than two storeys height in this precinct, as was pointed out by the co-respondent, the height limits identified in s. 6.4.3 would seem to open the way for buildings of at least three storeys in height. Section 6.3 contemplates buildings being from low to medium rise and common planning experience would suggest that to include a three storied building.
If it is relevant, recent development in tourist accommodation and facilities Precinct No. 4 (which is dealt with similarly in respect of the matter of storeys) attains four stories in height. I would not, on the evidence given, rule against the proposal on the matter of the number of stories which is involved. Any dispute in relation to site coverage appears largely to be resolved, as it would seem that the achieved site coverage is fairly close to the 35 per cent mentioned in s. 6.4.4.
Section 6.4.5 raises the matter of boundary clearances and building form. In considering these matters one must remember the justification for controls of this kind and the relevant features of the subject land. The complaints made against the proposal relied to a large extent on an interpretation of the words “street boundary”.
The appellants took the position that the now unused road reserve which passes around the site to the west, north and east should be regarded as a street for the purposes of these controls and that the boundary setbacks were accordingly demonstrably insufficient.
Although the eastern and some of the northern part of the road reserve is used for parking (mainly for the hotel) the reserve has long ceased to function as a thoroughfare for vehicles and is unlikely to do so again. The possibility of the reserve’s being the location of a public pedestrian pathway in the future was mentioned. If this proves to be the case, the fact that the development (at the area where setbacks are an issue) is substantially above the level of the pathway and that the attention of pedestrians is more likely to be turned towards the ocean are very relevant factors. In my view these complaints are ill founded and are not such as to warrant the proposal’s rejection.
Building form has already been mentioned but something should be said about a requirement of s. 6.4.5 concerning maximum building length. The purpose of such a control obviously relates to the avoidance of excessive building bulk. Other stated purposes include achieving a character sympathetic to that existing, the control of relationships between detached buildings on a site and the maintenance of privacy. In my view of the evidence none of these objectives are offended by the proposal.
As mentioned the existing structure is of a length of approximately one hundred metres. The length of the accommodation building has been reduced to a little over fifty metres. As previously indicated and explained in the evidence the design represents a compromise between functionality and appearance. Physical site constraints also come into play. I accept the evidence that the result achieved though possibly not the optimum visual outcome to an overly critical eye is by no means an unattractive development and is not unacceptable in the circumstances.
Section 6.4.6 and section 6.4.7 deal with materials and colour. Although the appellants made some reference to these matters, nothing of any serious consequence emerged from the evidence.
Section 6.4.8 is concerned with car parking. This was a matter about which there was some discussion in the case. The matter is somewhat complicated by the traditional use by hotel patrons of part of the former road reserve which is outside the subject land for car parking. It is difficult to see anything unusual or unreasonable in that and it is noted that the co-respondent has undertaken to improve and augment parking provision in this area as part of the approval.
It is noted that both Mr Camilleri (the co-respondents’ consultant) and Mr Bramald (who was engaged by the Council) assessed likely demand for parking (for traffic planning purposes) at 130 spaces or less. The evidence indicates that this can be accommodated comfortably. Mr Henwood (for the appellants) assuming greater floor areas and taking a more rigid approach to the coincidence of peak usage of hotel facilities believed that 172 spaces might be required. I accept the lower assessment (made by two experienced traffic engineers) as a realistic reflection of what is here proposed.
It is quite pointless to draw attention to times of extraordinary parking demand (e.g. the Easter period and times of uncommon special promotions at the hotel such as the annual angling tournament) as indicators of parking demand. As Mr Bramald pointed out it is universally accepted that to do so would be poor planning, a waste of community resources and result in an attractive, unused (at most times) areas of hard standing.
Again an air of unreality intruded into the appellant’s case when it was suggested that parking demands for the accommodation units component of the proposal should be assessed on a “stand alone basis” assuming the possibility that this component of the development might proceed and the hotel component might not. Such fanciful supposition does little to advance the credibility of a party’s case. Some questions were raised regarding internal parking layout but, as the evidence unfolded, these questions appeared to be resolved when it was accepted that the design was consistent with relevant Australian standards.
I have spent considerable time in working through the Development Standards found in s. 6 of the DCP. I must repeat that these matters must be examined against the background of the opportunities for departure from the standards that exist. In summing up on these topics I can do no better than adopt what was said in the report of the Technical Assessment Group of Council officers who recommended approval of the proposal:
“The particular architectural presentation of the development has been assessed by Council’s technical officers and there is considered to be considerable merit in what is intended. The proposal seeks to update the existing hotel and accommodation built form to the high standard of presentation using material and colours that are aesthetically pleasing and enable the development to become a landmark feature of the Shire. The proposal has been scaled back from what was initially intended in response to the concerns of submitters and Council ......
In terms of the nature of the development as an integrated tourist resort hotel and accommodation units, it is not considered practical to meet all of the DCP controls. The proposal as revised is an acceptable solution to the constraints of the land and enables the opportunity for a high standard development that is consistent with Council’s planning intent.”
On my view of the evidence, this represents a fair appraisal and if any conflict with the DCP could be said to exist, which is not my view, then more than adequate planning grounds exist to justify approval nevertheless.
Much was made of the intended treatment of stormwater. Concerns were raised regarding the potential for harmful impact upon the Home Beach wetland. However it was established that the subject land represents a very small part of the catchment feeding this wetland and Mr Moffitt (an environmental scientist consulted by the co-respondent) found the environmental quality of the wetland to have been degraded considerably presumably as a result of untreated inflow from the greater part of the catchment area.
I am satisfied on the evidence of Mr Moffitt and Mr Collins (an engineer with considerable experience in these matters) that what is here intended will not have any negative environmental effect on the wetland. As mentioned earlier at the present time stormwater from the site flows directly to the beach or, by overland flow or by the east coast road, to a western drainage gully and eventually to the wetland.
The intended arrangements involve considerable improvement to the existing regime. Stormwater will be diverted away from the beach. A treatment train (in the form of vegetated swales) will be established along the line of the old road reserve and an overall management and monitoring programme will be adopted to ensure its efficiency. The benefits of these arrangements were explained in the evidence and they have the support of relevant statutory authorities. I am also satisfied on the evidence of Mr Collins that the construction of the treatment train will not adversely affect any opportunity to establish a pedestrian walkway along the road reserve.
Some evidence in respect of the potential for noise nuisance was given and, as the evidence went, concerns were limited to the possibility of nearby residents being disturbed by noise from the roof terraces particularly at times of social activity in those areas. Bearing in mind that the land is in the Tourist Accommodation and Facilities Precinct, the possibility of visitors enjoying their leisure in this way could hardly be discounted. Mr Hillock (the co-respondents’ consultant) concluded, for reasons which he explained that noise levels so generated would not be beyond acceptable limits. I accept his evidence.
There was some complaint about impedance of view. Only a very small proportion of the intended buildings exceed the height limits contemplated by the DCP and then not to any great extent. The surrounding vegetation will soften the appearance of the development and the more elevated areas of Point Lookout the structures will occupy a very small part of the available panorama.
Finally, (and perhaps appropriately) I will deal with the complaints that were made in respect of a number of the conditions of approval which, it was said, lacked necessary finality. The principles that should be adopted in dealing with such a question are discussed in the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Mount Marrow Blue Metal Quarries Pty Ltd v. Moreton Shire Council (1996) 1 Qd.R 347; McBain v. Clifton Shire Council (1996) 1 Qd.R. 493).
As was pointed out in Scott v. Woollongong City Council (1992) 72 LGRA 112 at 118:-
“It is common to find that development consent is subject to conditions which provide for some aspects of the matter to be left for later and final decision by the consent authority or by some delegate officer to whose satisfaction, for example, specified work is to be performed. Such provisions are inevitable since it cannot be supposed that a development application can contain ultimate detail or that a consent can finally resolve all aspects of the proposal with absolute precision.”
That case and the decision of Oshlac v. Richmond River Shire Council (1993) 82 LGERA 222 at 230 established that conditions which can be described as “ancillary to the core purpose” of a development application “which leave final details to be settled, should be approached with a degree of flexibility”.
In Misson v. Randwick Municipal Council (1991) 23 NSWLR 734 at 738 Edward said:-
“What are finality and certainty for consent purposes must be judged by a substance approach rather than the strict kind of approach which requires absolute precision”.
It would be pointless to set out at length and in detail the conditions in respect of which complaint was made in this context and the reasons for those complaints. They can be found conveniently in volume 1 of the Appeal Book (Exhibit 2) at pages 33-36.
It was accepted by the co-respondent that, now that the evidence has been given, some tidying of some of the conditions before they are finally settled will be appropriate. Fundamentally however, a sensible examination of all of the conditions identified by the appellants can lead only to a conclusion that they do not offend the principles established by the relevant authorities.
While I have been unable to find in their favour of the appeal, I understand the position of the appellants, some of whom gave evidence. It is clear that they have a strong and conservative idea as to how this part of North Stradbroke Island should develop. Their concerns and the vigour with which they have pursued these concerns has contributed to a substantial extent to the form of the Development Control Plan.
As was also clear on the evidence given by supporters of the project, their views are not co-extensive with those of the entire community and the planning authority has been faced, in framing its planning instruments, with the difficulty of achieving the best possible compromise between the various competing attitudes. I believe that this Development Control Plan has achieved this objective well. It will lead generally to a form of development at Point Lookout which is controlled to a very important extent with a view to maintaining the area’s character. However, it embodies a level of flexibility that will enable it to deal with special cases of which this is one.
On the whole of the evidence I am satisfied that the onus of showing that the application is one that should be approved has been discharged. The appeal will accordingly be dismissed but I will adjourn the matter further to enable whatever tidying up of conditions is called for having regard to the evidence given.
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