CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY - application for rescission under S. 37 -
importance of the public interest - effect of Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 - whether retrospective in relation to an extant appeal - comment that working of new sections 73 and 74 should be monitored with a view to consideration of further amendments to protect the public, including future creditors.
Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss. 37, 73 and 74
Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991, S . 51(1)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901, S . 8
In re Hester. Ex parte Hester (1889) 22 QBD 632
Re Stern fa bankrupt1 [l9821 1 WLR 860 at 866
Totterdell v. Nelson (1990) 26 FCR 523
GREGORY LAIRD STORY v WILLIAM McLEAN BOULTON
QG 94 of 1992
AUSTFULlA
Burchett, French and Einfeld JJ.
Sydney
18 September 1992
RECEIVED
FEDERAL COURT OF
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) 1 QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
1 QG 94 of 1992 1 GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN: GREGORY LAIRD STORY Appellant
AND: WILLIAM McLEAN BOULTON Respondent
Judges Making Order: Burchett, French and Einfeld JJ.
Where Order Made: Sydney Date of Order: 18 September 1992
MINUTE OF ORDER OF THE COURT
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the appeal be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders dealt with in Order
36 of the Federal Court Rules.IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) 9UEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY QG 94 of 1992
1
GENEFAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN : GREGORY LAIRD STORY Appellant
AND : WILLIAM McLEAN BOULTON Respondent
CORAM: Burchett, French and Einfeld JJ.
PLACE: Sydney
DATE : 18 September 1992
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURCHETT J.: A sequestration order was made against the appellant, M r Story, on 17 March 1992, but was not immediately signed and sealed by the registrar. The petitioning creditor shortly afterwards applied for orders suspending the operation of the sequestration order or rescinding it. These orders were sought under S. 37 of the Bankruptcv Act 1966, which then provided for rescission or suspension of the operation of a sequestration order, but only where it had not been signed and
order was subsequently signed and sealed. The present appeal sealed. The application was refused on 4 June 1992, and the from the refusal of the application was then filed by the
bankrupt.However, before the appeal could be heard, a substituted S. 37 came into force on 1 July 1992 by virtue of the proclamation of the provisions of S. 8 of the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 (number 9 of 1992). Section 51(1) of that Act provides:
"Subject to this section, each amendment of the Principal Act that is made by this Act, other than the amendment of section 19 of the Principal Act that is made by section 6 of this Act, and relates to bankruptcies applies according to its tenor in relation to persons who were bankrupt at the commencement of that amendment as it applies in relation to persons who become bankrupt after that commencement."
Although the meaning of S. 51(1) is somewhat obscured by
the words "and…
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- Case
- [1992] FCA 1004
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 may have removed the power under section 37 for the rescission or suspension of a sequestration order. However, the court found that the Act's Interpretation Act 1901, section 8, may have preserved the section 37 power for the purposes of the particular appeal. The court also noted that the new provisions for annulment permit an automatic annulment by arrangement with creditors, which goes against the previous policy maintained for over a century.
The court found that the appeal should be dismissed, as the judge had considered the public interest and the interests of future creditors when deciding whether to terminate the bankruptcy. The court also found that there was no error in the judge's approach, and the appeal could not be allowed based on incidental errors. The court agreed with the presiding judge that the appellant's deficiency of approximately $12 million, and the rather shadowy arrangements to which most of the creditors were raising no opposition, were not capable of being regarded as open to full scrutiny.
The court also commented on the potential consequences of the 1991 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, stating that it is difficult to believe that Parliament intended to remove protection of the public from considerations arising upon the discharge of bankrupts or the annulment of bankruptcies. The court noted that the present consequence of the 1991 amendments is that bankrupts may rejoin the community as fully participating incurrers of new debt and acceptors of fresh credit merely by persuading past creditors to agree that they do so. The court found that there was little objective evidence to support the appellant's optimism about his future prospects.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated with a sequestration order made against the appellant on 17 March 1992. The petitioning creditor applied for orders under section 37 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 to suspend or rescind the sequestration order, which was refused on 4 June 1992. The appellant appealed from the refusal. Before the appeal could be heard, the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 came into force on 1 July 1992, substituting section 37. The appellant then submitted a scheme of arrangement under section 73, and obtained an automatic discharge under section 74(5) on 28 July 1992. The appeal was heard on 18 September 1992.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 applies retrospectively to the appellant's extant appeal.
2. Whether the new sections 73 and 74 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 provide sufficient protection to the public, including future creditors.
Held
1. The Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 does not apply retrospectively to the appellant's extant appeal.
2. The new sections 73 and 74 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 do not provide sufficient protection to the public, including future creditors.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered whether the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 applies retrospectively to the appellant's appeal, which was filed before the Act came into effect. The Court examined section 51(1) of the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991, which states that amendments apply according to their tenor in relation to persons who were bankrupt at the commencement of the amendment as it applies in relation to persons who become bankrupt after that commencement. However, the Court found that the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, section 8, may have preserved the section 37 power for the purposes of this particular appeal. The Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 does not apply retrospectively to the appellant's appeal.
The Court also considered whether the new sections 73 and 74 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 provide sufficient protection to the public, including future creditors. The Court noted that the new provisions permit a virtually automatic annulment by arrangement with creditors, which flies in the face of the policy maintained for well over one hundred years. The Court found that the amendments to the Act should be monitored carefully, and if they continue to work in this way, consideration ought to be given to appropriate further amendments to protect the public. The Court concluded that the new sections 73 and 74 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 do not provide sufficient protection to the public, including future creditors. The Court's reasoning was based on the principle that creditors have individual interests and cannot be expected to throw their own good money after bad in the general commercial interests of the rest of the community. The Court referred to several authorities, including In re Hester. Ex parte Hester, Re Stern, and Totterdell v. Nelson, to support its reasoning. The ratio decidendi of the decision is that the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 does not apply retrospectively to an extant appeal and that the new sections 73 and 74 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 do not provide sufficient protection to the public, including future creditors.