Stocks v Retirement Benefits Fund Board

Link copied
Case Copied 13 min read

[2003] TASSC 98

CITATION:       Stocks & Anor v Retirement Benefits Fund Board & Ors [2003] TASSC 98

PARTIES:  STOCKS, Terrence Ian

STOCKS, Gail Maree

v

RETIREMENT BENEFITS FUND BOARD
EDWARDS, Andrew Harold
ELLWOOD, David George
FITZGERALD, Douglas Parker

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  1051/1992
DELIVERED ON:  7 October 2003
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  23 September 2003
JUDGMENT OF:  Slicer J

CATCHWORDS:

Bankruptcy - Administration of property - Realisation of property - Powers of trustee to deal with property - Power to sell - Chose in action - Evidence of date of assignment of equitable instrument.

Hodgson v Sidney [1866] LR 1 Ex 313; Timmings v Treadgold [1923] NZLR 73; Grady v Prison Service [2003] 3 All ER 745; Nyssen v Minerva Centre Ltd [1940] NSW WN 112, referred to.
Aust Dig Bankruptcy [421]

Equity - General principles - Assignments in equity - What amounts to an equitable assignment - In general.

Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, followed.
Aust Dig Equity [20]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Plaintiffs:  In Person
             Defendant:  R G Brewer
             Third Parties:  J A Campton

Solicitors:
             Plaintiffs:  In Person
             Defendant:  Hand Ogilvie & Breheney
             Third Parties:  Murdoch Clarke

Judgment Number:  [2003] TASSC 98
Number of Paragraphs:  16

Serial No 98/2003
File No 1051/1992

TERRENCE IAN STOCKS and GAIL MAREE STOCKS
v RETIREMENT BENEFITS FUND BOARD
and ANDREW HAROLD EDWARDS, DAVID GEORGE ELLWOOD
and DOUGLAS PARKER FITZGERALD

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  SLICER J

7 October 2003

  1. The plaintiffs had conducted a business in 1986 at the Northgate Shopping Centre owned by the defendant.  They left the premises in 1987 following which they commenced proceedings by writ dated 7 September 1992 claiming damages for misrepresentation, breach of contract and deceptive conduct.  The defendant raised in its pleadings that the status of the plaintiffs, as of the date of the writ, precluded them from bringing the action.  On 15 May 2003, this Court ordered the hearing and determination as preliminary issues:

(a)whether, on the commencement of this action by the plaintiffs, there were vested in the plaintiffs, the causes of action relied upon by them; and

(b)if the said causes of action were not so vested, whether the defendant should have judgment in its favour.

  1. The relevant pleadings comprised in the amended statement of claim and defence, respectively, are:

"12 On the 15th day of December 1988 by Order of the Federal Court of Australia a Sequestration Order pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 was made against the estate of each of the plaintiffs. 13  The defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the further amended statement of claim.
13  The Official Receiver in Bankruptcy in the State of New South Wales Mr George Caddy from the 15th day of December 1988 became the Trustee of the bankrupt estate of each of the plaintiffs. 14  The defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the further amended statement of claim.
14  On or…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Stocks v Retirement Benefits Fund Board and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2003] TASSC 98
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of Tasmania was tasked with resolving a dispute between Terrence Ian Stocks and Gail Maree Stocks, who were the plaintiffs, and the Retirement Benefits Fund Board, Andrew Harold Edwards, David George Ellwood, and Douglas Parker Fitzgerald, who were the defendants. The plaintiffs sought damages for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and deceptive conduct in relation to a business they had operated at the Northgate Shopping Centre, which was owned by the defendants. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' status as bankrupts precluded them from bringing the action. The court was required to determine whether the plaintiffs had vested causes of action upon the commencement of the action, and if not, whether the defendants were entitled to judgment. The central legal issues revolved around the vesting of property in the Official Receiver upon the plaintiffs' bankruptcy, the power of the trustee to assign choses in action, and the validity of the assignment agreement.

The court began by examining the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, which vests the property of a bankrupt in the Official Trustee or a registered trustee. This property includes causes of action, which vest in the trustee upon the sequestration order. However, the Act also allows the trustee to assign his interest in the property to another, including the bankrupt. The court found that the property of the plaintiffs vested in the Official Receiver upon their sequestration on 15 December 1988. Despite the plaintiffs being discharged from bankruptcy on 15 December 1991, the court determined that their right of action remained vested in the Official Receiver until it was assigned to them. The court scrutinised the agreement between the plaintiffs and the trustee, noting that while an initial agreement was made on 29 July 1992, it was not honoured. A subsequent agreement on 30 August 1992, evidenced in writing, constituted a valid assignment of the chose in action to the plaintiffs. This assignment was deemed effective on 4 September 1992, when the plaintiffs paid the agreed amount of $500. The court found that the deed, despite being dated 29 September 1992, reflected the terms agreed upon on 30 August 1992.

Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had vested causes of action upon the commencement of the action. Therefore, the determinations of the preliminary issues were that the plaintiffs had the vested causes of action at the commencement of the action, and the defendants were not entitled to judgment.

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiffs, Terrence Ian Stocks and Gail Maree Stocks, had operated a business at the Northgate Shopping Centre in 1986. They ceased operations in 1987 and subsequently commenced proceedings against the defendant, Retirement Benefits Fund Board, and others, seeking damages for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and deceptive conduct. The defendant challenged the plaintiffs' capacity to bring the action, arguing that their status as bankrupts precluded them from doing so. The case reached the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which ordered a preliminary hearing to determine whether the plaintiffs had vested causes of action at the time the proceedings were commenced.

On 15 December 1988, a sequestration order was made against the plaintiffs under the Bankruptcy Act 1966, leading to the vesting of their property, including any causes of action, in the Official Receiver, who became the trustee of their estates. The plaintiffs were discharged from bankruptcy on 15 December 1991. In early 1992, Terrence Ian Stocks began negotiating with the trustee, Mr. George Caddy, to purchase the right to bring the current proceedings as a chose in action. Initially, Mr. Caddy declined the proposal, but after further discussions, he agreed on 29 July 1992 to sell the property for $2,000 and 25 per cent of the net proceeds if successful. This agreement, however, was later altered by the plaintiffs, who reduced the purchase price to $500 with no percentage of the net proceeds. The amended terms were accepted by the trustee, and a deed was executed on 30 August 1992.

The deed provided that the trustee transferred all rights, title, and interest in the chose in action to the plaintiffs, enabling them to claim all proceeds, profits, damages, interest, or other monies arising from the action. The deed specified the chose in action as the right to bring an action for damages against the Retirement Benefits Fund Investment Trust for alleged misrepresentations and financial loss resulting from the operation of the business at Northgate Shopping Centre. The plaintiffs initiated their action by writ on 7 September 1992. The defendant argued that the assignment did not occur until 29 September 1992, a contention that the Court rejected, finding that the assignment was valid as of 30 August 1992.

The matter before the Supreme Court of Tasmania in Stocks v Retirement Benefits Fund Board originated from a writ dated 7 September 1992, filed by Terrence Ian Stocks and Gail Maree Stocks against the Retirement Benefits Fund Board and others. The plaintiffs alleged misrepresentation, breach of contract, and deceptive conduct arising from their business dealings at the Northgate Shopping Centre in 1986. The defendants contested the plaintiffs' standing to bring the action, asserting that their status as bankrupts precluded them from doing so. This led to the Supreme Court ordering a preliminary hearing on 15 May 2003 to determine if the plaintiffs had vested causes of action at the time they commenced the proceedings and, if not, whether the defendants should prevail. The court's decision focused on whether the plaintiffs' causes of action had vested in them before the commencement of the action, considering the assignment of these actions from the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy following the plaintiffs' discharge from bankruptcy. This intricate procedural history involves the interplay of bankruptcy law and equitable principles in determining the validity of the assignment of the cause of action.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether, on the commencement of the action by the plaintiffs, there were vested in the plaintiffs the causes of action relied upon by them.
2. If the causes of action were not vested in the plaintiffs at the commencement of the action, whether the defendant should have judgment in its favour.
3. Whether the assignment of the chose in action from the Official Trustee to the plaintiffs was valid and effective on or before the commencement of the action on 7 September 1992.
4. Whether the assignment deed executed on 30 August 1992 was a valid and effective transfer of the chose in action from the Official Trustee to the plaintiffs.
5. Whether the Official Trustee was required to affix a seal to the assignment deed for it to be valid and effective.

Held
1. Whether, on the commencement of the action by the plaintiffs, there were vested in the plaintiffs the causes of action relied upon by them.
The Court concluded that the causes of action were vested in the plaintiffs on the commencement of the action. Result: Issue resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.

2. If the causes of action were not vested in the plaintiffs at the commencement of the action, whether the defendant should have judgment in its favour.
The Court found it was not necessary to answer this issue as the first issue had already been resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.

3. Whether the assignment of the chose in action from the Official Trustee to the plaintiffs was valid and effective on or before the commencement of the action on 7 September 1992.
The Court concluded that the assignment was not valid and effective on or before 7 September 1992. Result: Issue resolved against the plaintiffs.

4. Whether the assignment deed executed on 30 August 1992 was a valid and effective transfer of the chose in action from the Official Trustee to the plaintiffs.
The Court concluded that the assignment deed executed on 30 August 1992 was a valid and effective transfer of the chose in action. Result: Issue resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.

5. Whether the Official Trustee was required to affix a seal to the assignment deed for it to be valid and effective.
The Court concluded that the Official Trustee was not required to affix a seal to the assignment deed for it to be valid and effective. Result: Issue resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court first addressed whether, at the commencement of the action on 7 September 1992, the causes of action were vested in the plaintiffs. Upon the sequestration order on 15 December 1988, the plaintiffs' property, including their causes of action, vested in the Official Trustee as the trustee of their bankrupt estates. This is in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s58(1)(a). The Court held that property includes any rights and powers in relation to property that would have been exercisable by the bankrupt if they had not become bankrupt (Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s1). Therefore, the causes of action vested in the Official Trustee on the date of the sequestration order. However, the plaintiffs were discharged from bankruptcy on 15 December 1991, and subsequently, the Official Trustee agreed to sell the chose in action to the plaintiffs. The Court found that the assignment of the chose in action to the plaintiffs was valid and effective on 30 August 1992.

The Court also considered whether the defendant should have judgment in its favour if the causes of action were not vested in the plaintiffs at the commencement of the action. The Court held that since the assignment of the chose in action to the plaintiffs was valid and effective on 30 August 1992, the plaintiffs were vested with the causes of action at the commencement of the action. Consequently, the defendant was not entitled to judgment in its favour.

Furthermore, the Court examined whether the assignment of the chose in action from the Official Trustee to the plaintiffs was valid and effective on or before the commencement of the action on 7 September 1992. The Court held that the assignment deed executed on 30 August 1992 was a valid and effective transfer of the chose in action from the Official Trustee to the plaintiffs. The assignment was evidenced in writing and the Official Trustee regarded himself as being bound by the agreement. The Court concluded that the assignment was valid and effective on 30 August 1992.

In relation to whether the Official Trustee was required to affix a seal to the assignment deed for it to be valid and effective, the Court held that the official trustee is not under any statutory requirement to affix a seal. The seal is merely evidentiary and not substantive. The validity of the assignment deed does not depend on the affixing of a seal. The Court referred to the case of Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, in which Windeyer J concluded that an assignment of an equitable interest does not require any formality beyond a clear expression of an intention to make an immediate disposition.

In summary, the Court found that the assignment of the chose in action from the Official Trustee to the plaintiffs was valid and effective on 30 August 1992, and therefore, the plaintiffs were vested with the causes of action at the commencement of the action. The Court also held that the official trustee was not required to affix a seal to the assignment deed for it to be valid and effective.