Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources
[1997] QLC 165
•17 October 1997
LAND COURT,
BRISBANE
17 October 1997
Re: Appeal against Valuation Valuation of Land Act 1944 Valuation Roll No: 20509 Local Government: GCCC-Albert (V97-19; V97-18; V97-17). Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources
D E C I S I O N
partially allowed the objection and issued an amended valuation at $14,700,000 on 25 November 1996. The appellant subsequently appealed that amended figure claiming the valuation should more properly be $8,950,000.
Mr R Needham, Counsel, appeared for the appellant, calling evidence from Mr RL Brett, a Registered Valuer. Mr R Paterson, Principal Legal Officer, appeared for the respondent.
| Grazing | 549.872ha | $ 1,500 | $ 824,808 |
| Total Unimproved Value | $8,954,808 |
In order to understand the relevant facts of the matter it is necessary to review the history of acquisition and development of the property. By agreement of sale on 24 July 1992, Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd purchased certain land from Development Equity Corporation Limited (DEC). The purchase excluded land denoted as:
• Parcel A (to go to Hymix Industries Pty Ltd) • Parcel B (to go to Hymix Industries Pty Ltd) • Parcel D (to go to Sunland Homes).
The purchased land included:
• Parcel C (additional land to Hymix)
| and | • | Balance of the subject. |
Parcels A and B are lands along the southern boundary of the subject area fronting Coombabah Creek, and previously sold by DEC to Hymix Industries Pty Ltd (Hymix) as a buffer for a nearby quarry operated by Hymix. The terms of the contract of sale to Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd (Stockland) specified at Clause 51.1 that agreement had been reached for the "buffer areas" to be subdivided in order to obtain a separate Certificate of Title for the buffer area land. Clause 51.2 went on to explain that the contract with Hymix was a "conditional contract" which may possibly occur at a date subsequent to the sale to Stockland. Clause 51.3 set out the obligations of Stockland to ensure that the transfers of the buffer areas to Hymix were brought to completion.
Parcel C was a strip of land to the west of the public road through Lot 691 on RP 850134 in the south-west corner of the subject. Lot 691 included an area of 6070 square metres of unallocated road reserve. Because of the legal requirement to close that road reserve, Parcel C could not be excised from Parcel 691 and sold to Hymix at the same time as Parcels A and B. The "buffer areas" Parcels A, B and C were designated under Schedule 2 of the Buffer Agreement, Pacific City, of 24 July 1992, between DEC, Hymix and Stockland. The boundaries of Parcels A, B and C had been amended as part of that agreement to include additional areas of land (up to 35 metres wide) to extend the Hymix buffer over the top of the ridge line presumably to ensure against future potential claims against visual intrusion by the Hymix quarries. Hymix insisted that unless those extra buffers were agreed to the extended areas, they would not agree to release certain Hymix land to the Council for extensions to Smith Street.
The additional area C was also part of those Hymix demands which were therefore part of the intention of the contract of sale by DEC to Stockland, and is marked E in Schedule 2 of the Buffer Agreement. In the end, Parcel C had to be excised by subdivision from Lot 691 (later designated as Lot 692 once the road reserve had been allocated and closed). Plan of Survey RP 850134 shows the balance area of Lot 691 at 79.0087 hectares, and the subsequently compiled, Crown Plan 852813 shows the balance area compiled by the Department of Natural Resources at 79.6157 hectares. The Crown Plan 852813 was endorsed on 14 April 1993, subsequent to the contract of sale for the subject on 24 July 1992. The Plan of Survey subdividing Parcel C (Lot 693 on RP 855098) from Lot 692 was registered on 26 August 1994. The appropriate area of Lot 692 for valuation purposes is 78.4717 ha.
At the time of sale to Stockland, an area designated as Parcel D was also excluded from the land purchased by Stockland. This is an area to the north of the subject which had been contracted to Sunland Homes Pty Ltd (Sunland) in order to provide access to the balance of Sunland's property to the north, and was also excluded from the contract under S.44.1. Parcel D is an area of 6.07 hectares fronting Universal Street, and covered under the Fourth Schedule of page 53 of the agreement, but also completed subsequent to 24 July 1992.
Having then completed the formal subdivisional requirements of the contract of sale, Stockland proceeded to formalise a management strategy for the land they had acquired. The major areas of the subject included Lot 1 on RP 835811, Lot 2 on RP 168334, and Lot 692 on RP 855098. Stockland moved to subdivide Lot 1 on RP 835811 into new Lot 500 on RP 852811 and new Lot 501 on RP 852812. The purpose of those subdivisions was to identify for management purposes Lot 500 as a pool of in globo land which would be developed into residential lots over a period of 7 or 8 years. The remaining Lot 501 was earmarked for future development, and was the subject of a timber agreement for the harvesting of a former pine plantation. This was subsequently found to be non-viable, and an agistment agreement was entered into on 28 June 1996 with Mr Carl Piggott for the grazing of cattle.
The area of Lot 500 basically follows the watershed of the catchment of the eastern part of the subject, which provides a natural division for water supply and sewerage purposes, and includes a high-level water reservoir along the watershed between Lots 500 and 501.
In seeking to understand the quantum of the agisted area for grazing purposes, it is noted that the area that was subsequently fenced just prior to the agistment agreement on 24 June 1996, varied in several places from the Plan of Survey of Lots 501 and 500. In the south-western part of Lot 500, an area was separately fenced to include a dam site which is valuable for watering of cattle. In this area, the boundary between Lots 500 and 501 was also fenced with a gate to allow the movement of cattle into the fenced part of Lot 500 with the dam. The appellant agrees that the dam in Lot 500 provides additional water for cattle, but water is also available elsewhere on Lots 501, 2 and 692 within the agistment areas, as Saltwater Creek is really a freshwater stream in that area.
To the northern part of Lot 501, the fenced area for cattle has stopped short of the northern boundary of Lot 501 fronting Universal Street, in view of difficulties in fencing off the public road. The fenced area stops short of the southern boundary of the surveyed road which separates the northern parts of both Lot 501 and Lot 2, and the fence follows the southern side of the constructed access track along the transmission line power easement through Lot 500.
In applying those principles to the current matter he concludes that it would be an inappropriate exercise of the Chief Executive's discretion to allow for the "subdivision" of the notional single parcel by the agistment agreement with Piggott.
In seeking to apply s.17 of the Act to the subject, Mr Patersons argues that it must apply to the whole of the land or not at all. He argues that s.17 does not contemplate the "notional" subdivision of the subject into areas which reflect the agistment agreement. He draws support for his case from the Land Appeal Court decision in IP Scougall v. The Valuer-General (1980- 81) 7 QLCR 51. In that matter the Land Appeal Court dealt with the application of s.11(1)(vii) (now s.17) to subdivided land awaiting sale, part of which was used for primary production.
The Court found at p.54:
" The surveying of an in globo parcel into subdivisions does not realise `a potential for subdivision', the value of which the sub- section prohibits from being included in unimproved value. In our opinion the surveying of subdivisions in anticipation of future sale does not place the subdivided land in a category which necessarily exempts it from the protection of the sub-section nor does the physical act of survey constitutes a `use of the land'. The only actual use to which the appellant put the subject parcel was as part of an aggregation on which he ran cattle on such a scale that his operations constituted a business. If he had ceased to make use of the subdivided land after survey for the purposes of primary production so that it lay idle pending sale, the sub-section would not have applied and the value of whatever subdivisional potential the land possessed in the marketplace would properly have been included in its unimproved value. We do not think that dealings with land in the nature of a subdivisional survey or the earmarking of land for future sale in residential subdivision necessarily destroys the exclusive nature of an actual use of the land for the business of primary production. We know of no decided authority, nor have we been referred to any supporting any such view. "
That principal was also followed in Clevedon Properties Pty Ltd v. The Valuer-General (V81-159), 10 March 1982, unreported. In the light of those cases Mr Paterson argues that to notionally create a single parcel for the purposes of a "farming" valuation is in conflict with s.25 for use as in globo land for subdivision.
The case for the appellant, as argued by Mr Needham, is that, were it not for the application of s.25, there is no dispute between the parties that the land within the agistment area would come within the definition of "farming" under s.17 of the Act. However, he argues that s.25 has come into existence in 1985, after the Scougall and Clevedon cases, and its application is best understood in the context of matters determined since 1985.
The purpose of s.25 he argues is to afford the developers of land some relief from the payment of rates and other charges upon lands which have been increased in value as a consequence of expenditure by the developer on development works, thus increasing holding charges. In the end those costs are passed on to the purchasers of the newly created lots. In seeking to further understand the intentions of s.25, Mr Needham draws support from s.14(A)(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1991 which says:
" 14.(A)(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation. "
He also argues that under s.14(B) of that Act, it is appropriate in interpreting the provisions of an act, to use "extrinsic material" if the provision is "ambiguous or obscure" or "if in the normal meaning of the provision leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable". He argues that "part of the extrinsic material defined in the Acts Interpretation Act includes the Second Reading Speech of the Minister in introducing the Bill". In this regard Mr Needham draws reference to "Hansard" of 7 March 1985, where the Honourable Minister Tenni said at page 3849:
" The principal Act is also amended in relation to the method of valuing larger subdivided estates which remain in the hands of the original subdivider. Under the present Act, from the time of registration of a plan of subdivision, each allotment is valued separately and the total value of the allotments discounted for multiple holding. The developer is therefore required to pay rates on the increase in value which follows his own expenditure on development works, thus increasing his holding charges. The provisions of the Bill will require the Valuer-General to value estates of six or more allotments as a single parcel, provided they continue to be owned by the original developer. Any enhancement in value by reason of the development works carried out by the developer on the subdivided land will be excluded from that valuation. Small estates of five allotments or fewer will be valued in the normal manner. However, where estates are valued under the new provisions, the valuation shall not be less than five times the average unimproved value of the parts continuing to be owned by the original developer. This latter safeguard is necessary to prevent estates containing more than five allotments having lower valuations than estates containing five allotments or fewer. "
Mr Needham argues that the "ordinary meaning" of s.25, is required under s.14(B)(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act to refer to the "ordinary meaning conveyed by a provision having regard to its context in the Act and to the purpose in the Act".
He argues that it is obvious that s.25 was included as an amendment to the Act in 1985 to provide that developers, in the normal course of their activities, were not unduly impacted by increases in value of unsold lots which have only been created by the expenditure and endeavours of the developer. The purpose of the Act can be seen to ensure that charges for rates and other purposes, only become applicable once the new lots are sold to purchasers.
In seeking to further understand the meaning of the respondent's interpretation under s.8 of the Valuation of Land Act, in respect of the "subdivision" of the land by the erection of the fencing under the agistment agreement, Mr Needham has again drawn on the ordinary meaning as defined under s.14(B)(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act. He argues that the respondent has applied an "extended meaning" to the notion of what constitutes the word "subdivide". He argues that within the context and purpose of the Act, s.25 is meant to deal with the normally understood meaning of subdividing where new lots are created for onforwarding either by sale or agreements to future owners. He argues that in accordance with procedures well established in the community the process of subdividing is for the conveyancing of land to parties. He argues that the meaning of the word "subdivide" under s.8(2)(a) should be considered in light of the above ordinary meaning and that the word "partition" should not be construed as defined by the respondent. He also notes the wording of s.8(2)(b) which says:
"8.(2) (b) an agreement, conveyance or instrument between living persons under which a part of the land becomes immediately available for separate disposition or occupation. "
Mr Needham argues that the word "person" under the Acts Interpretation Act includes a body corporate but acknowledges that a body corporate such as "Stockland" is not a living person and can offer no reason for the specific wording of s.8(2)(b).
In seeking to understand the "extended meaning" of the word "subdivide", Mr Needham submits that he believes that flows from the intentions of s.28(1) of the Act which says:
"28.(1) No alteration shall be made in the valuation of any parcel of land during the period during which any general valuation or annual valuation relating to the area in question is in force or, in the case of a general valuation or any annual valuation which has not come into force, during the period between the issuing of notice of valuation to the owner pursuant to Part 6 or as the case may be, the making available of particulars of the annual valuation pursuant to Part 4 and the date of the valuation coming into force -
(a) unless such land is subdivided during such period; or (b)
unless where 2 or more parcels of unoccupied land adjoining each other valued as 1 portion of land and 1 or more parcels of such land is or are sold or occupied during such period; "
He notes that under s.2 of the Act, the words "parcel of land" mean:
" every part of an area of land which is separately held by any owner or any part of an area of land which the chief executive directs should be valued as a separate parcel. "
By applying the wording of s.2 and 28(1) the Chief Executive can issue separate valuations as separate parcels whether or not the land is held under one title, or has not been subdivided under its ordinary meaning. Mr Needham drew reference to the common practice of separate valuation for houses for workmen on land belonging to cane mills where the land is unsubdivided and is held as one title. Mr Needham argues that in line with the intentions of the Act, it is reasonable to only consider the word "subdivide" within the terms of s.25, when one is looking to see if s.25 should apply. For that purpose, the ordinary meaning of the word should be used. He argues that S.25 should not be applied to the original creation of Lots 500, 501, 2 and 692, which were for establishing a management structure prior to the development of the residential estate. This he notes is in view of the intentions of s.25, which is aimed at providing concessional valuations for subdivisions of six or more parcels. As noted in the Honourable Minister Tenni's speech "all estates of five allotments or fewer will be valued in the normal manner."
| Mr Needham summarised that matter by noting that in his opinion only the the aggregate area of Lot 1 from which Lot 500 was previously subdivided. He argues that any subdivision of Lot 500 does not affect in any way Lots 501, 2, or 692. He claims that as Lot 500 is further subdivided there is a "continuous subdivision process" out of what was originally Lot 500, leaving progressively a smaller balance area of Lot 500. To introduce into that subdivisional process, the suggestion that the agistment area was also a subdivision, is introducing an arbitrary concept not related to the intention of s.25. "management" Lot 500 should be subject to the provisions of s.25. | In the matter of whether the erection of a fence under the agistment agreement constitutes |
| Decision: In respect of the general application of s.17 to the grazing operations on parts of the subject lands, it is agreed by the parties that the Agistment Agreement satisfies those requirements for application under the Act. Mr Piggott runs a "farming" business associated with his home property a few kilometres from the subject and also in conjunction with another property of his near Beaudesert. The question of eligibility for s.17 concession is proven to have a significant commercial purpose. In considering the various subdivisions that occurred after the date of the agreement of sale of 24 July 1992, I note that certain lands (Parcels A, B and C) were specifically excluded from the sale. I note also in s.44.1(a) of the contract of sale to Stockland, DEC assigned to Stockland the obligation to complete the transfer of area D to Sunland, and under s.51.3(a) to complete the transfer of the buffer areas A and B to Hymix. I note also that, because of the need to clarify the area of unallocated road reserve in Lot 691 (later Lot 692), the subdivision of Parcel C had of necessity to occur after the date of the contract of sale. In seeking to understand the responsibilities of Stockland under the contract, I note that "Halsbury's Laws of England" Fourth Edition, Volume 9, at para 201 defines a "contract" as having three components: |
"
(i)
That series of promises or acts themselves constituting the contract;
(ii)
The document or documents constituting or evidencing that series of promises or acts;
(iii) The legal relations resulting from that series. "
In the current matter, the evidence of the documents supplied to the Court clearly place responsibility for the delivering of Parcels A, B, C and D with Stockland as part of the sale. In respect of the legal relations between Stockland and DEC under the contract, the evidence supplied would infer that the parties have every intention to create legal relations. The test of that intention was a submission of the contract document to the Court to support their responsibilities to complete the subdivisions of parcels A, B, C and D. (See "Laws of Contract" by Cheshire and Fifoots, Australian Edition, (1966) p. 194. As a consequence of those facts I believe the subdivision of parcels A, B, C, and D do not impact the application of s.25 of the Act. This then leads to the matter of the subdivision for management purposes by Stockland of Lot 1 on RP 835811 into new Lot 500 on RP 852811, and Lot 501 on RP 853812. The evidence of Mr Needham was that those subdivisions were not part of the actual residential development process, but were undertaken in order to clearly designate effective management areas for the staging of development over many years. The boundary between Lots 500 and 501 was surveyed along the watershed which separated the eastern part (Lot 500) to be developed as residential lots during a seven to eight year period, and the western part (Lot 501) which was earmarked for future development. Lot 500 was seen to include all land impacting the supply of water, storm water and sewerage reticulation for the new lots. That management process was primarily undertaken to facilitate dealings with the local council.
In seeking to understand whether s.25 of the Act should be applied to those subdivisions, I look to the wording of s.25:
"Valuation of subdivided land
25.(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act except subsection (3), where an owner subdivides land into 6 or more parts the parts that continue to be owned by the owner (being not less than 6) shall be deemed to form a single parcel and shall be valued as such pursuant to this Act (notwithstanding that the same may not adjoin) and in valuing that parcel any enhancement in the value by reason of works carried out by that owner on the land so subdivided shall be disregarded.
(2) However, the unimproved value of that parcel shall be not less than 5 times the average unimproved value of the parts continuing to be so owned and for the purpose of determining the unimproved value of each such part it shall be taken to be a part to which this section does not apply.
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) shall affect the operation of section 17. "
I note Mr Paterson's interpretation of the opening words of s.25(1) which states "notwithstanding any other provision of this Act except subsection (3)". His submission is that those words virtually inhibit the Chief Executive from using his discretionary powers in respect of s.(2) for definitions, s.35(1)(a) for a single valuation for several parcels owned by the same person but let to different persons, and section 35(1)(b) where lands do not adjoin, are separated by a public road, and are owned separately. I also note that in seeking support for his contention, Mr Paterson has sought to follow the decision of the Land Appeal Court in Beanland v. The Valuer-General supra, which examined the exercise of discretion by the Valuer-General in deciding whether several parcels that do not adjoin but are worked as one holding, should be valued as a single valuation. The Land Appeal Court in coming to its majority decision considered that a proper application of the Act showed that a rational approach to the Valuer- General's direction would have concluded that the provision under the then s.14 of the Act (now s.34) would have considered the scope and purpose of the statute. In applying that conclusion, the Land Appeal Court allowed the two separate parcels to be valued as one parcel.
In seeking to follow that principle, Mr Paterson argues that it would not be appropriate for the Chief Executive to exercise his discretion in the current case, in order to allow the further "notional" subdivision by the agistment fencing, nor the separate valuation of Lots 500, 501 and 692. However, in declining to exercise his discretion in the current matter, the Chief Executive would appear to have not taken significant notice of the advice of the Land Appeal Court in
Beanland v. The Valuer-General at page 122 supra which said:
"
There is no basis afforded by the final statement that the valuer could not see any additional positive case (over and above satisfaction of the statutory requirements) to say why the Valuer- General should put them together. This seems to show a reversal of the statutory benefit without any actual basis. "
The inference in that statement is that in exercising his discretion the Chief Executive should have considered the intentions of the Legislation. The then s.14(b) (now 34) was introduced to provide for a mechanism to value several parcels as one valuation where they are used for a single purpose. It should have been a reasonable discretionary decision to recognise that single purpose.
In seeking now to translate that decision into the current matter before us and conclude that all the land owned by Stockland (except for Lot 2) should be valued for one purpose, that is for in globo land for future subdivision, the respondent would appear to be misconstruing the intentions of s.25 as they relate to Lots 501 and 692.
In following the decision of the Land Appeal Court in IP Scougall v. The Valuer-General supra, Mr Paterson concludes that the application of s.17 to the subject should be on the basis that the "exclusive use" provision of the section would require the land to be dealt with as a whole parcel either for "farming" purposes or as in globo land. Because the primary business of Stockland is for the development of residential lots, he concluded that the exclusive use provisions of the land must be for in globo subdivisional purposes.
In respect of whether the subdivision for "management purposes" of Lot 1 on RP 835811 into Lots 500 and 501 constitutes an action under s.25(1), and should therefore be valued accordingly, I believe such a conclusion would tend to be in conflict with the wording of s.25(1). Section 25(1) comes into operation only when an owner subdivides his land into six or more lots, and it is used as a mechanism to modify the valuation of the subject such that it results in deferring the payment of rates and other charges until such time as the land is sold. As noted previously, the subdivision of Parcels A, B, C and D were not subdivisions in the meaning of s.25(1) as they occurred entirely as a condition of the contract of sale.
The key issue for resolution in this matter would appear to revolve around whether the application of s.25 operates to prevent the "notional subdivision" of the subject land into an agistment area for use for farming purposes under s.17.
I am persuaded by Mr Needham's argument that the ordinary meaning of the word "subdivide" is the appropriate interpretation of s.25(1), particularly in view of the intentions of the Legislative Amendment as outlined by the Honourable Minister in his Second Reading Speech to Parliament. It would have been clear to the Parliament when passing the legislation, that the purpose of the new section 25 was to resolve a current anomaly where parcels of land are subdivided into separate lots for sale to new owners. I believe an action such as a "notional subdivision" by fencing for agistment purposes was unlikely to have been contemplated by the Parliament at that time.
The question as to whether it is necessary to satisfy s.25 first before concluding what area can satisfy s.17, in my opinion, should not arise. S.25(3) is clear that the application of s.25(1) has no impact upon the operation of s.17.
Further, in considering the decision of Scougall v. The Valuer-General supra I note that the Land Appeal Court concluded that the physical act of subdivision does not constitute `a use' of the land.
I am persuaded by Mr Needham's argument that the fencing of the agistment area was more in the nature of defining the area to be used for grazing, rather than to "subdivide" the area.
In considering then each of the parcels within the subject, I believe they can be summaried as follows:
• Lot 500. The whole of Lot 500 (195.1 ha) is clearly to be treated as subdivision or in globo land under s.25. The area that has been fenced around the dam (23.8ha), and included within the agistment contract area, should be treated also as part of the balance area of the in globo land, and not for use under s.17. That area is noted on the Concept Development Plan at Appendix A of the contract of sale as Future Golfcourse. The dam site would not be inconsistent with that future use. As Lot 500 was subdivided as a "management lot" for residential development purposes, the logic of that subdivision supports its valuation as in globo land.
It is acknowledged that, as discussed later for Lot 501, the Chief Executive has the discretion under s.34(1) to choose to determine the fenced area surrounding the dam in Lot 500 as a separate parcel for valuation purposes. That would be consistent with the determination for the northern part of Lot 2 and 500 discussed later. However, in exercising that discretion he would, as discussed previously, be conscious of the intentions of the management strategy of Stockland in respect of Lot 500. If Stockland is to be afforded consideration of their management strategy in establishing Lots 500 and 501, prior to seeking recognition under s.25, then it would be inconsistent to consider that fenced area around the dam in Lot 500 as other than part of the balance area of Lot 500.
• Lot 501 In view of the decision of Beanland v. The Valuer-General the whole of the area of Lot 501 (316.782 ha) could be considered under s.17 where the dominant use is grazing. The northern part of Lot 501 across the road could also be included in that single use for the lot. While the northern part of Lot 501 is not included within the agistment area, it could be considered inappropriate to assume a "notional" subdivision of Lot 501 in order to treat the land as in globo together with Lot 500.
However, while it is noted that the northern part of Lot 501 is not part of the agistment area, it is part of the one title which is owned by Stockland. I seek guidance from s.35(1) of the Act, and note:
" Separate valuation 35.(1) Unless the chief executive otherwise directs -
(a)
several parcels of land which are owned by the same person, but which are separately let to different persons, shall be separately valued; "
In understanding the meaning of the word "owner" I note that is defined in s.7(1)(a) and s.7(2)(a), and it is clear that Stockland is the registered proprietor of the freehold title. In seeking understanding of the word "parcel" I note in s.2 that it means:
" Every part of an area of land which is separately held by any owner, or any part of an area of land which the chief executive directs should be valued as a separate parcel. "
Under that definition it would be an appropriate exercise of discretion by the Chief Executive to direct that part of Lot 501 to the north of the agistment fence, including the part to the north of the dedicated road, to be defined as a separate parcel. I note that this scenario was contemplated by the parties in their Method B where the northern areas of Lots 2 and 501 outside the fence are noted as separate parcels with a combined area of 68.537 hectares.
Further, as noted in Scougall v. The Valuer-General supra at page 54, if the land ceases to be used "for the purposes of primary production so that it lay idle pending sale, the subsection would not have applied and the value of whatever subdivisional potential the land possessed in the market place would properly have been included in its unimproved value".
In the context of the current matter the northern parts of Lot 501 and Lot 2 being outside the fenced area for grazing are clearly not being used for grazing purposes, and should be valued as having potential for subdivision as inglobo land.
On balance I can see no reason why the area of 68.537 hectares should not be considered as a separate parcel for valuation purposes, although to do so would appear to be inconsistent with the management strategy to subdivide Lot 501 for the future. It is noted, however, that the development of new lots is creeping towards the northern parts of Lots 500 and 501 which may influence the rate of future development of the northern part of Lot 501.
| Summary: After considered the whole of the evidence I find I do not agree fully with either Methods A or B supplied by the parties. I accept the unit rates of valuation supplied, but believe that the appropriate method of valuation is as follows: Conclusion: The appeal is allowed, the valuation of the Chief Executive is set aside and the valuation of the subject (V97-19) is determined at ten million, one hundred and eight thousand dollars ($10,108,000). | • | subdivided lots | = 11.7996 hectares @ $76,500 = | $ 902,670 |
| • | in globo land |
balance Lot 500 = 127.2051ha @ $50,000 = $6,360,255 part of Lot 2 = 15.155 ha @ $30,000 = $ 454,650 part of Lot 501 = 53.382 ha @ $30,000 = $1,601,460
• Grazing
balance of Lot 501 = 263.4ha @ $ 1,500 = $ 395,100 balance of Lot 2 = 184.2ha @ $ 1,500 = $ 276,300 all of Lot 692 = 78.4717ha @ $ 1,500 = $ 117,708
$10,108,143
Adopt $10,108,000
(NG Divett)
Member of the Land Court
| The property, the subject of this appeal, relates to an area of 730 hectares (Pacific Pines | Background: given that, depending upon the extent of application of section 17 to the subject, the property should be valued as follows: | |||||||
| • Method A - If the subject land (except for Lot 2 on RP 168334 which is used for grazing), is valued as in globo land for subdivisional purposes, the unimproved value should be | ||||||||
| ||||||||
| Developed | ||||||||
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
|
TOTAL $14,383,277
Adopt $14,400,000
Grazing S.17
| Lot 2 RP 168334 | 199.355ha | $1,500 | $300,000 |
$14,700,000
| • | Method B |
If the total part of the subject currently agisted by Mr Piggott, is valued for grazing purposes under S.17 of the Act, and the balance to be valued as in globo land for subdivisional purposes, the unimproved value should be determined as:
| Use | Area | Unit Rate | Value |
| Developed Lots | 11.7996 ha | $76,500 | $ 902,670 |
| Balance Lot 500 | 103.405 ha | $50,000 | $5,170,500 |
| Balance (Lots 2 | |||
| and 501) | 68.537 ha | $30,000 | $2,056,110 |
The appellants argue that, in their view, the whole of the area within the agistment fence
lines should be valued under s.17 as grazing land. The remaining area comprising the balance of
Lot 500 should be valued as in globo subdivision land. The respondent argues that only Lot 2 on
RP 168334 should be treated as grazing land under s.17 of the Act, and the balance of the subject
as in globo land.
The key to understanding the respondent's argument lies in interpreting the intentions of
s.25 of the Act. Mr Paterson argues that at the relevant date of 1 January 1996, Stockland had
subdivided its lands into a number of lots as shown on Plan PP-G-01-1A/NMK (Exhibit 2),
excluding Lot 2 on RP 168334 which had not been subdivided by Stockland, but which formed
part of the original contract of sale. Mr Paterson argues that in applying s.25 of the Act to the
subject, it must be related to all of the lots subdivided by Stockland, other than Lot 2 which
already existed. He claims that the effect of s.25(1) is to create a "notional single parcel of the
subject land (other than Lot 2) for the purposes of valuing the land.
Mr Paterson also argues that the erection of a fence along the boundaries of the agistment
area pursuant to Clause 2.4 of the Agistment Agreement creates a further partition of the land,
and is therefore "subdivided" within the meaning of s.8(2)(a) of the Act. He argues that s.25
prohibits a valuation being made which reflects that "subdivision" of the notional single parcel as
a consequence of the agistment agreement between Stockland and Piggott. He also argues that
s.25 also does not permit that the notional single parcel be "classified" into areas which reflect
the agistment agreement. He claims that the opening words of s.25(1) preclude the application of
ss. 2, 35(1)(a) and 35(1)(b), in respect of the discretionary powers of the Chief Executive to
create and value "parcels" in certain circumstances.
The position of the parties: Beanland v. Valuer-General (1990-91) (LAC)13 QLCR 113. He notes that the exercise of discretion by the Chief Executive is "unconfined, except insofar as may be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute". (Per Mason J. in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v. Peko Wallsend Ltd (1985-86) 162 CLR 24.) He notes also that the Land Appeal Court found at page 121 that in exercising his discretion:
" ... there must be an aversion to the particular case, and some positive rational basis that relates to the subject matter of the Act (and in particularly section 14) before the discretion is validly exercised. "
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