STO v Queensland Police Service

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

STO v Queensland Police Service & Anor [2020] QDC 139

PARTIES:

STO

(Appellant)

v

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(First Respondent)

DEF

(Second Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

D79/20

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Domestic Violence Order Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court Southport

DELIVERED ON:

24 June 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Southport

HEARING DATE:

22 June 2020

JUDGE:

McGinness DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The appeal is allowed

2.   The protection order made by the Domestic Violence Court on 4 February 2020 is set aside;

3.   The proceeding is remitted to the Domestic Violence Court to be heard and determined according to law;

4.   The first respondent pay the costs of the Appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – APPEAL – where the appellant appeals a protection order – where the order was made in the absence of the appellant and the aggrieved – whether the Magistrate should have adjourned the application having regard to the matters known to the court – whether the Magistrate failed to comply with s 39 Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 – where the Magistrate failed to comply with s 37 Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 – where the Magistrate failed to give reasons.

LEGISLATION:

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), Sections 37, 39, 142, 164, 169, 187, 237

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), Rule 681

CASES:

Allensh v Maunz [2000] HCA 140

BAK v Gallagher and Anor [2018] QDC 32

Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW 48 NSWLR 430

Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 29

Kilvington v Grigg & Ors (No.2) [2011] QDC 37

North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435

Rajski v Bainton (Court of Appeal, 6 September 1991, unreported)

Selvanayagam v University of the West Indies [1983] 1 WLR 585; [1983] 1 All ER 824

Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd 10 NSWLR 247

Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489

COUNSEL:

J. McNab for the appellant

M. Vassilakos for the first respondent (sol.)

No appearance for the second respondent

SOLICITORS:

Reardon Family Lawyers for the appellant

Queensland Police Service for the first respondent

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against the decision of the Magistrates Court at Southport on 4 February 2020 to make a protection order against the appellant under s 37 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (“the Act”). The second respondent (the aggrieved) did not wish to be part of the appeal proceedings.

Summary of facts

  1. The appellant and his partner, the aggrieved, had been in a relationship for approximately six years.  They share two children and reside in New South Wales.  They arrived in Coomera on 9 September 2019 to house sit for 11 days.  At about 8.30pm, police were called.  A witness stated that a female and male were arguing.  After hearing a loud bang, the female called out for help.  The witness then observed the male standing over the female saying words similar to “I will kill you.”

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Details
Case
[2020] QDC 139
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal by the appellant against a protection order made by the Domestic Violence Court. The aggrieved party was not present at the hearing, and the appellant was absent due to a misunderstanding regarding the hearing date. The Queensland Police Service was the first respondent in the case. The central issue before the court was whether the Magistrate should have adjourned the application and if there was a failure to comply with the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012. The court also considered whether the Magistrate had failed to provide reasons for the decision.

The court found that the appellant had provided a satisfactory explanation for his absence and that it was due to an honest mistake regarding the hearing date. The court further held that the police prosecutor and the court failed to contact the appellant on the hearing date, despite a previous court order. The court held that the prosecutor should have been aware that the court needed to contact the appellant, and the Magistrate must not have read the file endorsement from the previous court date. The court concluded that the Magistrate failed to comply with sections 37 and 39 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 and did not give reasons for the decision.

As a result of the findings, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the protection order made by the Domestic Violence Court on 4 February 2020. The proceeding was remitted to the Domestic Violence Court to be heard and determined according to law. The first respondent, the Queensland Police Service, was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed

2. The protection order made by the Domestic Violence Court on 4 February 2020 is set aside;

3. The proceeding is remitted to the Domestic Violence Court to be heard and determined according to law;

4. The first respondent pay the costs of the Appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In Makita, their Honours also considered the propositions in Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW, citing Meagher JA at [63]:[12]“…there are three fundamental elements of a statement of reasons. First, a judge should refer to relevant evidence. There is no need to refer to the relevant evidence in detail, especially in circumstances where it is clear that the evidence has been considered. However, where certain evidence is important or critical to the proper determination of the matter and it is not referred to by the trial judge, an appellate court may infer that the trial judge overlooked the evidence or failed to give consideration to it: North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435. Where conflicting evidence of a significant nature is given, the existence of both sets of evidence should be referred to.Secondly, a judge should set out any material findings of fact and any conclusions or ultimate findings of fact reached. The obvious extension of the principle in North Sydney Council is that, where findings of fact are not referred to, an appellate court may infer that the trial judge considered that finding to be immaterial. Where one set of evidence is accepted over a conflicting set of significant evidence, the trial judge should set out his findings as to how he comes to accept the one over the other. But that is not to say that a judge must make explicit findings on each disputed piece of evidence, especially if the inference as to what is found is appropriately clear: Selvanayagam v University of the West Indies [1983] 1 WLR 585; [1983] 1 All ER 824. Further, it may not be necessary to make findings on every argument or destroy every submission, particularly where the arguments advanced are numerous and of varying significance: Rajski v Bainton (Court of Appeal, 6 September 1991, unreported).Thirdly, a judge should provide reasons for making the relevant findings of fact (and conclusions) and reasons in applying the law to the facts found. Those reasons or the process of reasoning should be understandable and preferably logical as well.” [12] 48 NSWLR 430.Conclusion: Grounds 1 and 2 I am satisfied that the appellant has provided an adequate explanation as to why he did not appear at the hearing on 4 February. His failure to appear was due to an honest mistake on his part as to the correct hearing date, but not due to a failure of the court to notify him of the hearing date. Each case depends on its own facts. In this case, the police prosecutor and the court failed to telephone the appellant on 4 February 2020 despite the previous court order. Ordinarily, busy courts cannot be expected to adjourn cases where parties have been served with the next court date, or are present when the date of adjournment is made and are aware of when they are next to appear. However, the present case is an example where the prosecutor should have been aware that the court needed to contact the appellant. Unfortunately, the Magistrate must not have read the file endorsement from the previous court date. Otherwise, he no doubt would have instructed the prosecutor to call the parties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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