Stiglec and Stiglec (Child support)

Stiglec and Stiglec (Child support) [2020] AATA 4287 (19 August 2020)

DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division
REVIEW NUMBER:  2020/BC018702
APPLICANT:  Ms Stiglec
OTHER PARTIES:  Child Support Registrar
Mr Stiglec

TRIBUNAL:Member M Baulch
DECISION DATE: 19 August 2020
DECISION:

The tribunal set aside the decision under review, and in substitution, decided that there are to be determinations departing from the administrative assessment of child support, such that:

For the period 17 May 2019 to 30 June 2019, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Stiglec is varied to be $237,694 per annum; and
For the period 1 July 2019 to 31 December 2021, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Stiglec is varied to be $210,165 per annum.

CATCHWORDS

CHILD SUPPORT – departure determination – income, property and financial resources of the liable parent – benefits derived from business – decision under review set aside and substituted

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

REASONS FOR DECISION

BACKGROUND

This application for review is about the child support assessment applying to Mr Stiglec and Ms Stiglec.
The Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act) provides for an administrative assessment of the child support payable by one parent to the other. It uses a statutory formula which contains variables such as the parents’ adjusted taxable incomes, the number and ages of the children and their percentages of care.
Mr Stiglec and Ms Stiglec are the separated parents of two children, born in 2005 and 2007. Since 23 February 2016 the Department of Human Services (now known as Services Australia) – Child Support (Child Support) has made child support assessments in respect of those children.
From 26 March 2019 the child support assessment required Mr Stiglec to pay child support of $4,580 per annum to Ms Stiglec, based upon Mr Stiglec’s estimate of his adjusted taxable income of $57,357 and Ms Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income of $44,590, determined by reference to her 2017-18 taxable income.
The Act also provides for a departure from the administrative assessment of child support in certain circumstances. On 17 May 2019, Ms Stiglec applied to Child Support seeking a determination to depart from the administrative assessment of child support on the basis that:
· The child(ren) has special needs; and
· The child support assessment did not correctly reflect one or both of the parents’ income, property or financial resources.
On 5 August 2019, a Child Support decision maker considered the application and decided that there should be a departure from the administrative assessment of child support, such that:
· For the period 26 March 2019 to 30 June 2019, Mr Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income was set at $184,377; and
· For the period 1 July 2019 to 31 December 2020, Mr Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income was set at $180,000.
Mr Stiglec objected to that decision and, on 25 February 2020, that objection was partly allowed. The objections officer decided that there should be a departure from the administrative assessment of child support such that for the period 1 July 2019 to 31 December 2020, Mr Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income was set at $105,357 (the decision under review).
On 23 March 2020, Ms Stiglec applied to this tribunal seeking an independent review of Child Support’s decision.
A hearing into the application for review was held by the tribunal on 19 August 2020. Mr Stiglec and Ms Stiglec both participated in the hearing by conference telephone and both gave evidence under affirmation during the hearing. A representative of the Child Support Registrar (the Registrar) did not participate in the hearing.
The tribunal had before it relevant documents provided to it, and the parties to the review, by the Registrar pursuant to sections 37 and 38AA of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (509 pages). The tribunal also had before it additional documents and material provided by Mr Stiglec (labelled folios A1 to A106) and Ms Stiglec (labelled folios B1 to B305). The tribunal also considered additional information obtained by the tribunal, exercising it statutory powers, from [Accounting firm 1] (folios D1 to D47).

ISSUES

The statutory provisions relevant to this review application are found within the child support law, in particular the Act.
Pursuant to section 98C of the Act a determination to depart from the administrative assessment of child support may be made if the following three requirements are met:
(i) that one, or more than one, of the grounds for departure referred to in subsection [117(2) of the Act] exists; and
(ii) that it would be:
(A) just and equitable as regards the child, the liable parent, and the carer entitled to child support; and
(B) otherwise proper;
to make a particular determination under this Part;

CONSIDERATION

On 17 May 2019, when Ms Stiglec made her application for a departure determination, the administrative assessment of child support required Mr Stiglec to pay child support to Ms Stiglec in the amount of $4,580 per annum, based upon Mr Stiglec’s estimated adjusted taxable income of $57,357 and Ms Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income of $44,590, determined by reference to her 2017-18 taxable income.
On 22 July 2019, Child Support accepted an estimate election made by Mr Stiglec for the 2018-19 financial year of $78,428. From 1 July 2019 the administrative assessment of child support required Mr Stiglec to pay child support of $8,432 per annum, based upon that estimate of his adjusted taxable income and Ms Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income of $44,490.
From 9 September 2019, a new care percentage for Mr Stiglec applied to the child support assessment. Had Child Support not made a departure determination on 5 August 2019, I estimated that the administrative assessment of child support would have required Mr Stiglec to pay child support of $9,392 per annum, based upon his estimated adjusted taxable income of $78,428 and Ms Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income of $44,590.
A new child support period commenced on 1 October 2019. Had the administrative assessment applied, I estimated that Mr Stiglec would have been liable to pay child support of $9,634 per annum, based upon his estimated adjusted taxable income of $78,428 and Ms Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income of $40,000, determined by reference to her 2018-19 taxable income. A new care percentage applied for Ms Stiglec from 10 December 2019, but this did not impact on the assessment.
The care percentages for both parents changed again on 28 January 2020. I estimated that had the administrative assessment applied, Mr Stiglec would have been liable to pay child support of $8,388 per annum, based upon his estimated adjusted taxable income of $78,428 and Ms Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income of $40,000.
These, therefore, are the administrative assessments from which I am considering departing.

Is there a ground, or grounds, for departure?

At the commencement of the hearing, Ms Stiglec indicated that she was not seeking a departure determination on the basis of a child’s special needs, but only in regard to Mr Stiglec’s income, property and financial resources. As a consequence, the ground for departure referred to as “Reason 2” was not considered in this decision.
All the grounds for departing from the administrative assessment of child support are prefaced by the term “… in the special circumstances of the case …”. As noted by the Full Court of the Family Court:[1]
Whilst it is not possible to define with precision the meaning of that term, as a generality it is intended to emphasise that the facts of the case must establish something which is special or out of the ordinary. That is, the intention of the Legislature is that the court will not interfere with the administrative formula result in the ordinary run of cases. In Savery’s case (at Fam LR 815 FLC 77,897), Kay J, adopting the view in In the Marriage of Philippe (1977) 4 Fam LR 153; [1978] FLC 90-433 at Fam LR 155 FLC 77,202 in a different context, said that “special circumstances” were “facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases” . The approach to the interpretation and application of the particular grounds in s 117(2) must be guided by that qualification.
My consideration will be guided by these principles.
[1] See Gyselman and Gyselman [1991] FamCA 93

The income, property and financial resources of either parent

Ms Stiglec’s application for a departure determination relied upon the ground for departure set out in subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ia) of the Act.
This provision – commonly referred to as “Reason 8A” by Child Support – provides that a ground to depart from the statutory formula may be established if, in the special circumstances of the case, the child support assessment results in an “… unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent …” due to the income, property and financial resources of either parent.
At the time Ms Stiglec made her application for a departure determination, the child support assessment was based upon Mr Stiglec’s estimated adjusted taxable income of $57,357. From 1 July 2019, a new estimate of Mr Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income applied, which was $78,428.
Mr Stiglec describes himself as self-employed and works as a subcontractor for [Company 1] Pty Ltd ([Company 1]). He invoices [Company 1] for $1,500 each week for work undertaken, which equates to approximately $78,000 per annum. The only director and sole shareholder of [Company 1] is Mr Stiglec’s partner, Ms [A]. Mr Stiglec himself has never been a director or shareholder of [Company 1]. [Company 1] has only had one customer at any one time, from November 2018 that customer was [Company 2] Pty Ltd ([Company 2]) and from August 2019 the company’s customer was [Company 3]. All the income received by [Company 1] from [Company 2] and [Company 3] is generated by Mr Stiglec’s personal exertion alone.
Mr Stiglec’s evidence was that [Company 1] is engaged in designing and developing systems for [Work 1]. Mr Stiglec stated that the tasks he performed on behalf of [Company 1] for [Company 2] and [Company 3] involved operating [equipment]. None of the services provided by [Company 1] to [Company 2] involved [Work 1]. Mr Stiglec stated that [Company 3] is looking into [specified] operations.
I formed the view that all of [Company 1]’s income relates to Mr Stiglec operating [equipment]. The company’s attempts to develop [systems] has yet to come to fruition; the company has no current customers for its [systems] nor does it generate any income from [Work 1].
[Company 1] subcontracts the services of an engineer to assist in designing and developing systems for [Work 1]. During the 2018-19 financial year that person was paid $60,550. [Company 1]’s accountant has advised that the contractor payments for 2019-20 have yet to be finalised. Ms [A] also works for [Company 1]; Mr Stiglec stated that she helps develop the business and assists him find work. During the 2018-19 financial year, Ms [A] did not take a wage from [Company 1] but in the 2019-20 year she was paid wages totalling $17,100, plus $1,368 in superannuation.
It was Mr Stiglec’s evidence that [Company 1] owned no motor vehicle until one was purchased a couple of months ago. However, [Company 1] claimed motor vehicle expenses of $6,464.70 for the 2018-19 financial year. Mr Stiglec explained that these expenses related to another vehicle which was owned by him, that he used for activities to build the business. His evidence was that [Company 2] and [Company 3] both provided him with a work vehicle for him to use. I formed the view that the motor vehicle expenses claimed by [Company 1] are unrelated to the work it performed for [Company 2] or [Company 3].
Mr Stiglec’s evidence was that [Company 1] has no business premises. He explained that the rent ($6,185) and telephone expenses ($3,467.21) claimed by [Company 1] in its 2018-19 financial statements relate to a portion of rent that relates to a room in his home that he and Ms [A] use as an office. Mr Stiglec claims to make no, or very few, personal telephone calls and did not dispute that the amount claimed by [Company 1] for telephone expenses (approximately $289 per month) probably represents the entirety of the costs of his and Ms [A]’s telephone plans. I formed the view that the rent and telephone expenses claimed by [Company 1] are unrelated to the work it performed for [Company 2] or [Company 3].
During the 2018-19 financial year, [Company 1] claimed travel and accommodation expenses of $7,471.92. Mr Stiglec explained that these costs were for he and Ms [A] to travel to [various places for work purpose], attempting to generate business. Mr Stiglec did not dispute that these expenses included a trip he and Ms [A] took to Victoria with the two Stiglec children and Ms [A]’s two children. Mr Stiglec explained that [Company 1] paid for his and Ms [A]’s travel expenses and Ms [A] paid for the four children. Mr Stiglec explained that he and Ms [A] engaged in business activities while on that trip. I formed the view that the travel and accommodation expenses claimed by [Company 1] are unrelated to the work it performed for [Company 2] or [Company 3].
Having regard to the other expenses claimed by [Company 1] in the 2018-19 financial year, and noting the evidence that both [Company 2] and [Company 3] provided Mr Stiglec with a vehicle and [Company 3] provided Mr Stiglec with work branded clothing, I formed the view that only a small portion of the expenses claimed by [Company 1] relate to its income generating activities that involve Mr Stiglec’s services being provided to [Company 2] or [Company 3]. Instead, all the expenses seem to relate to Mr Stiglec’s attempt to generate business [for Work 1].
Mr Stiglec’s bank account statements disclose significant cash deposits into his [Bank 1] account. From 1 January 2019 to 30 June 2019 a total of approximately $13,150 was deposited into that [BANK 1] account. From 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 a total of approximately $13,000 was deposited into that account. Mr Stiglec claimed he has always maintained a box of cash, and those funds came from such a box and were deposited into his account to pay his credit card, but cash was now all gone. Mr Stiglec denied that those deposits represent cash payments for work he has done.
Mr Stiglec did not dispute that the business operated by [Company 1] was essentially his business, but he did dispute that his working arrangements were an attempt to alienate him from his income or to reduce his taxable income.
I did not find Mr Stiglec a convincing witness. Some of his responses to questioning were evasive and vague on pertinent details. I did not find his explanation for the cash deposits into his bank account to be convincing. I did not accept his denials that his business arrangements were an attempt to alienate him from his income.
Essentially, renumeration for work being undertaken by Mr Stiglec, and Mr Stiglec alone, for [Company 2] and [Company 3] is being channelled through [Company 1] and used to meet part of his and his partner’s living costs (rent, motor vehicle, telephone and travel expenses), and provide his partner with an income, under the guise of developing a business engaged in [Work 1] – an aspect of Mr Stiglec’s business that currently has no customers and no income of its own.
While it is open to Mr Stiglec to use any financial resource available to him to develop any new business opportunities he wishes to develop, I was not persuaded that this should have priority over Mr Stiglec’s obligation to financially support his children. While Mr Stiglec claims the manner in which he is conducting his business is not an attempt to divert his income elsewhere and reduce his child support liability, that is the practical effect of what is occurring and I was not persuaded that this result was unintended.
In considering the income, property and financial resources of a parent, subsection 117(7B) of the Act says that I must disregard the income, property or financial resources of any person who does not have a duty to maintain the children unless, in the special circumstances of the base, I consider that it is appropriate to have regard to them. [Company 1] has legal personhood and is a person to which 117(7B) of the Act potentially relates.
Mr Stiglec’s personal exertion on behalf of [Company 1] generated a gross income for the company of $141,572 for the period November 2018 to June 2019 (equivalent to $242,694 per annum) and $215,165 for the period July 2019 to June 2020. In spite of Mr Stiglec’s labour earning [Company 1] at least $215,000 per annum, [Company 1] pays Mr Stiglec only $78,000 per annum. I identified none of the expenses being incurred by [Company 1] in the provision of Mr Stiglec’s services to [Company 2] and [Company 3] which would justify such a discrepancy. The degree of discrepancy, and my view that there is an element of intent to these arrangements, are sufficient for me to be satisfied that there are special circumstances that justify my considering [Company 1]’s income, property and financial resources in light of the ground for departure being considered.
Accordingly, I decided that Mr Stiglec should be attributed with the income paid to [Company 1] by [Company 2] and [Company 3]. I identified most of the expenses being incurred by [Company 1] in the 2018-19 financial year as being unrelated to the income earned from [Company 2] that year. I considered most of these expenses related to Mr Stiglec’s attempt to generate business for [Work 1]. I did however accept that Mr Stiglec, or [Company 1], would incur some expenses on things like tax advice, safety equipment and laundering of compulsory work uniforms. I decided an amount of $5,000 per annum would be sufficient to cover such work-related expenses pertaining to the work undertaken for [Company 2] or [Company 3].
I therefore decided that for the period November 2018 to June 2019 Mr Stiglec should be attributed with an income of $237,694 per annum ($242,694 less $5,000) for the work he did for [Company 2] via [Company 1]. For the 2019-20 financial year Mr Stiglec should be attributed with an income of $210,165 ($215,165 less $5,000) for the work he did for [Company 2] and [Company 3] via [Company 1].
Under the administrative assessment of child support a liability determined on the basis of Mr Stiglec’s estimated income of $57,357 for part of 2018-19 and $78,428 for 2019-20 varies between $4,580 per annum and $9,634 per annum. If an income of $237,694 was used for the 2018-19 financial year and $210,165 was used for the 2019-20 financial year, the child support assessment would be in the order of $24,000 to $27,000 per annum. I was satisfied that this difference is sufficient to render the administrative assessment of child support unjust and inequitable if Mr Stiglec’s actual income, property and financial resources are considered.
There is a view that a person who uses an entity such as a private company or trust sometimes obtains an advantage in comparison to a wage or salary earner. In Voss & Child Support Registrar & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2009] FMCAfam 1296, the Federal Magistrates Court commented on the common situation of a person's taxable income not corresponding with their income or financial resources for child support purposes:
There is a body of cases where simple reference to a person's tax return does not provide an appropriate quantification of their capacity to provide financial support. Most commonly this occurs in cases involving the self-employed, where it is well accepted that legal structures and arrangements may generate taxable income that doesn't properly reflect the realistic capacity of the person to provide financial support for their children.
I was satisfied that the use of a corporate intermediary, being [Company 1], which has the effect of reducing Mr Stiglec’s income is sufficient to make this case outside the usual case and satisfy the requirements of special circumstances.

I was therefore satisfied that the ground for departure set out in subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ia) of the Act has been satisfied.
Having found a ground for departure made out, I proceeded to consider whether it would be just and equitable to make a departure determination. I will consider Ms Stiglec’s income, property and financial resources when doing so.

Just and equitable

The requirement to consider whether a departure would be just and equitable directs that my attention is turned to what is fair to the parents and their children. Regard must be had to a variety of factors, set out in subsection 117(4) of the Act, such as the needs of the children, the parents’ commitments and any hardships that would be caused by departing, or not departing, from the statutory formula.

The children

Child Support has recorded the children as being in Mr Stiglec’s care for 136 nights per year from 22 February 2019, 127 nights per year from 9 September 2019 and 139 nights per year from 28 January 2020. For the remaining nights, the children are recorded as being in Ms Stiglec’s care.
Under the administrative assessment of child support that applied as at 17 May 2019, the costs of the children used in the statutory formula was $13,852 per annum. From the commencement of a new child support period on 1 October 2019, the costs of the children under the statutory formula were $17,806 per annum.
The children attend Catholic schools and Ms Stiglec pays the fees for them doing so. Ms Stiglec’s evidence was that the annual costs of the children’s school fees is $7,000. While both parents chose a Catholic education for the children in primary school, the evidence was that Mr Stiglec refused to sign the enrolment forms for the children’s high school enrolment.
There is no evidence that the children have any special needs or income, property, financial resources or earning capacity of their own that are relevant to my consideration.

Mr Stiglec

The administrative assessment of child support is based upon Mr Stiglec’s estimated income of $57,357 for part of the 2018-19 income year and $78,428 for the 2019-20 year. Mr Stiglec’s actual taxable income for the 2018-19 income year was $104,457. There is no evidence to indicate that Child Support have reconciled Mr Stiglec’s estimates of income for the 2018-19 year with his actual taxable income.
I have found that Mr Stiglec’s income is $237,694 for the 2018-19 financial year and $210,165 for the 2019-20 financial year. I did not identify that Mr Stiglec had any other property or financial resources that are not reflected in these sums.
I was satisfied that Mr Stiglec has no unutilised earning capacity that is relevant to my consideration (see subsection 117(7B) of the Act).
Mr Stiglec’s necessary costs for his own self-support were discussed during the hearing. Under the administrative assessment of child support, Mr Stiglec had the benefit of a self-support amount of $24,535 per annum as at 17 May 2019. A new child support period commenced on 1 October 2019, which is when the self-support amount under the statutory formula increased to $25,038 per annum. I identified no evidence to persuade me that Mr Stiglec’s necessary commitments to support himself are not adequately represented by this amount.
Mr Stiglec submitted that he has a duty to support Ms [A]. However, I identified no evidence that Ms [A] is unable to earn an income sufficient to meet her own necessary costs and, in any case, did not consider that Mr Stiglec’s duty to support his partner should take precedence over his duty to support his children.
Mr Stiglec did not dispute that he should pay more child support then the amount of $4,580 per annum that applied as at 17 May 2019, when Ms Stiglec made her application for a departure determination. He submitted that the original decision made on 5 August 2019, which required him to pay approximately $22,846 per annum, was unaffordable. Mr Stiglec’s evidence was that he is currently paying $405 per week in child support to meet the ongoing liability and his child support arrears, and this is being met on his behalf by [Company 1], but it means that he is not paying off his other debts as quickly as he could.

Ms Stiglec

Ms Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income used in the child support assessment as at 17 May 2019 was $44,590 based upon her 2017-18 taxable income. A new child support period commenced on 1 October 2019, in which Ms Stiglec’s adjusted taxable income is $40,000, based upon her 2018-19 taxable income. Ms Stiglec’s evidence was that she does not engage in salary sacrifice or other income reduction strategies.
Ms Stiglec is in part-time employment and her payslips revealed gross earnings varying between $1,500 per fortnight (which included a jobkeeper payment top-up) and $1,707.75 per fortnight, depending on the number of hours worked. Ms Stiglec also received the jobseeker payment at an amount determined on the basis of her earnings from employment.
I received no submission, nor identified any evidence, that Ms Stiglec’s income, property and financial resources are not adequately reflected by her adjusted taxable income.
I was satisfied that Ms Stiglec does not have any unutilised earning capacity that is relevant to my consideration.
Under the administrative assessment of child support, Ms Stiglec had the benefit of a self-support amount of $24,535 per annum as at 17 May 2019. When the new child support period commenced on 1 October 2019, this amount increased to $25,038 per annum. I identified no evidence to persuade me that Ms Stiglec’s necessary commitments to support herself are not adequately represented by this amount.
Ms Stiglec does not have a duty to support any other person or child.
Ms Stiglec advised me that if I were not to make a departure determination, she would find it a real struggle. While Ms Stiglec’s Statement of Financial Circumstances disclosed over $52,000 held in bank funds, she submitted that being required to draw on those funds to ameliorate any hardship would require her to delay her goal of purchasing a home. Nevertheless, I was satisfied that Ms Stiglec has access to funds she can draw on to mitigate any financial hardship.

Conclusion

Having considered those matters set out in subsection 117(4) of the Act, I was satisfied that it would be just and equitable to make a departure determination.

Otherwise proper

The requirement to consider whether a departure would be otherwise proper, is set out in subsection 117(5) of the Act, which directs my attention to what is fair to the community. It is necessary to consider the effect, if any, that a departure from the administrative assessment would have on entitlements to income tested pensions, allowances or benefits. Parents, rather than the community, have the primary duty to maintain their children.
The evidence shows that Ms Stiglec receives family tax benefit for the children. The rate of family tax benefit paid at more than the minimum rate is determined subject to a maintenance income test. It is likely that any departure determination that increases the amount of child support payable by Mr Stiglec would decrease the amount of family tax benefit payable to Ms Stiglec.
I was satisfied that it is otherwise proper to make a departure determination in this case.

Conclusion

Section 4 of the Act sets out the objectives of the Act. These objectives include:
·      Parents of a child have a primary duty to maintain that child;
·      That duty has a priority over all commitments of the parent other than commitments necessary for self-support;
·      The level of financial support to be provided by parents to their children should be determined in accordance with the legislatively fixed standards; and
·      The level of financial support is to be determined according to the capacity to provide financial support and noting that parents with a like capacity to provide financial support should provide like amounts.
I have found that there is a ground for departure in this case, and it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper for me to make a departure determination. Section 98S of the Act describes the determinations that I may make if a decision is made to depart from the administrative assessment of child support.
I have found that Mr Stiglec’s actual income for the 2018-19 financial year was $237,694 and for the 2019-20 financial year it was $210,165. I decided to make departure determinations that replaced Mr Stiglec’s estimated income with the amounts I have determined.
Ms Stiglec made her application for a departure determination on 17 May 2019 and I decided that my departure determination should start from that date. I therefore decided that from 17 May 2019 to 30 June 2019, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Stiglec should be set at $237,694.
I further decided that from 1 July 2019, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Stiglec should be set at $210,165. I noted Mr Stiglec’s evidence that the lower income for the 2019-20 financial year represents the impact of Covid-19 and him being unable to work for a period of time. I decided that the lower income it should continue to apply until 31 December 2021 to reflect the poorer economic outlook going forward when compared to the 2018-19 year.
I noted that the impact of my departure determination would be to increase the amount of arrears owed by Mr Stiglec by approximately $16,700. All other things being equal, the ongoing liability as at the date of this decision will be approximately $27,022 per annum, increasing to approximately $29,594 per annum when the youngest child turns 13 in December 2020.
I noted Mr Stiglec’s evidence that he found an annual liability of $22,000 per annum too burdensome. However, I noted that [Company 1] is currently meeting Mr Stiglec’s arrears and ongoing liability. Mr Stiglec does not dispute that [Company 1] is essentially his business, despite the arrangement of its shareholding and directorship. I was satisfied that Mr Stiglec would be able to arrange his affairs to meet the arrears and the increased child support liability arising from my decision without suffering from undue financial hardship.
Accordingly, I concluded that the appropriate departure determinations to apply in this case, pursuant to paragraph 98S(1)(g) of the Act, are such that:
· For the period 17 May 2019 to 30 June 2019, the adjusted taxable income is varied to be $237,694 per annum; and
· For the period 1 July 2019 to 31 December 2021, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Stiglec is varied to be $210,165 per annum.
Therefore, and for these reasons, I set aside the decision under review and substituted my own.

DECISION

The tribunal set aside the decision under review, and in substitution, decided that there are to be determinations departing from the administrative assessment of child support, such that:

For the period 17 May 2019 to 30 June 2019, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Stiglec is varied to be $237,694 per annum; and
For the period 1 July 2019 to 31 December 2021, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Stiglec is varied to be $210,165 per annum.

[2020] AATA 4287

19 August 2020

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Jurisdiction

Judicial Review

Statutory Construction

Remedies