Stewart v The Queen; Piper v The Queen

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M114 of 1993

B e t w e e n -

BRIAN JOHN STEWART

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M116 of 1993

B e t w e e n -

GARY EDWARD PIPER

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Stewart 1 10/6/94

Applications for special leave

to appeal

MASON CJ DAWSON J GAUDRON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 10 JUNE 1994, AT 11.47 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR H.J. KABLE. QC:  May it please the Court, together with

my learned friend, MR. D. GRACE, I appear for the

applicant Stewart, (instructed by Grace Partners)

and for the applicant Piper. (instructed by

Patrick w. Dwyer)

MR B.D BONGIORNO, QC:  I appear with MS C.D. DOUGLAS for
the Crown in each matter. (instructed by the

Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria))

MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Kahle.

MR KABLE:  May it please the Court, in order to emphasize

the point that we submit warrants the grant of

special leave, could I invite Your Honours'

attention to page 222 of volume 2, which is page 17

of the joint judgment of Their Honours

Justices Marks and Harper, and in particular to the

paragraph commencing "If necessary". Could I

invite Your Honours to read that paragraph to

yourselves.

GAUDRON J: That is not, of course, what the trial judge

did, is it?

MR KABLE:  We would say that the trial judge failed to

exercise the discretion relating to the weighing of

the prejudicial effect of the evidence against the

probative value and I would take Your Honours to

his ruling in a moment in order to support that

contention. But what we say is that the Full

Court, in the first and the third sentences in that

paragraph are, with respect to Their Honours,

demonstrably wrong and not in accordance with this

Court's judgment in Domican. And we say that error, and the importance of it, is highlighted by

the Crown's submission in this matter, and I take

Your Honours to page 284 of book 2 and to the

submission appearing under the words "Ground (c)"

which, so it would seem, we would say, from a

reading of that argument that the Crown's view of

what the Full Court held is equally wrong and that

becomes important when considering whether or not

the decision of the Full Court is in fact authority

for that erroneous proposition. I will come back

in a moment to deal with the ruling of the learned

trial judge.

We would say that in order to appreciate how

wrong the majority of the Full Court's judgment was

can I take Your Honours to page 226 and invite

Your Honours' attention to that page and, in

particular, beginning at line 3 to the bottom of

the page, where Their Honours seem to be saying,

with respect to them, that this Court's decision in

Domican was…

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Details
Case
[1994] HCATrans 377
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

These proceedings before the High Court of Australia concerned applications for special leave to appeal by the applicants, Stewart and Piper. The applicants sought to challenge decisions of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria.

The central legal issue was whether the Full Court had erred in its interpretation and application of the principles established by this Court in *Domican* regarding the admissibility of evidence. Specifically, the applicants contended that the trial judge failed to properly exercise discretion to exclude evidence where its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and that the Full Court's judgment was demonstrably wrong in its articulation of these principles.

The applicants argued that the trial judge did not adequately consider the discretion to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, or if the evidence was "irrationally impressive." They submitted that the Full Court's reasoning, particularly in certain sentences of its joint judgment, was contrary to the unambiguous statements in *Domican*. The applicants also pointed to the Crown's submissions as suggesting a misunderstanding of the Full Court's holding, further highlighting the potential for an erroneous proposition to be established as authority. The discretion to exclude evidence was sought to be activated on two bases: unfairness to the accused due to the circumstances surrounding the viewing of suspects, and the balancing of prejudicial effect against probative value.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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