| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCI 2025 0088 |
| CARINA STEWART | Applicant |
| v | |
| GOOD SHEPHERD AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND (ACN 135 641 217) & ORS (ACCORDING TO THE ATTACHED SCHEDULE) | Respondents |
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| JUDGES: | RICHARDS JA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | On the papers |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 29 August 2025 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSCA 206 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | Stewart v Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand [2025] VSC 351 (Finanzio J) |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Summary judgment – Applicant living in property provided by first respondent intended as temporary crisis accommodation – First respondent counterclaimed for possession – Associate judge gave summary judgment on counterclaim – Appeal dismissed by judge – Construction of ‘temporary crisis accommodation’ in s 22 of Residential Tenancies Act 1997 – Discretion under s 64 of Civil Procedure Act 2010 – Whether applicant denied procedural fairness – Whether applicant’s claims in equity and under Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 relevant to counterclaim for possession – Proposed grounds of appeal totally without merit – Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Residential Tenancies Act 1997 ss 3, 6(2), 22; Civil Procedure Act 2010 ss 61, 63–4; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 ss 13, 17, 24, 32.
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RICHARDS JA:
In September 2021, Carina Stewart was referred to Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (‘Good Shepherd’) as a victim of family violence. Good Shepherd, which is a charitable organisation that provides temporary crisis accommodation, placed Ms Stewart in a property that it leases from the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing (‘Department’). Ms Stewart signed an accommodation agreement stating that she understood that the accommodation was temporary crisis accommodation and that she could stay for a maximum of six to eight weeks.
Nearly four years later, Ms Stewart is still living in the property. She has refused all offers of alternative accommodation and has resisted all of Good Shepherd’s attempts to get her to leave the property. At no stage has Ms Stewart paid rent in respect of her occupation of the property.
On 17 January 2023, Ms Stewart commenced a proceeding against Good Shepherd and the Department in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court. In an amended statement of claim filed in September 2023, Ms Stewart alleged negligence on the part of both defendants, ‘detrimental reliance’, a constructive trust in respect of contributions she had made to the value of the property, and breach of statutory duties owed by the Department under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (‘Charter’). She sought orders for compensation, and the imposition of a constructive trust over the property in her favour. Against the Department, she sought an order that it provide secure, long-term housing for her and her children, and an order restraining it from any further action in breach of their Charter rights.
Both Good Shepherd and the Department denied any liability to Ms Stewart. Good Shepherd counterclaimed for an order for possession of the property, and in…
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- Case
- [2025] VSCA 206
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues were whether the associate judge erred in granting summary judgment on the counterclaim for possession, whether Stewart was denied procedural fairness, and whether Stewart's claims in equity and under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 were relevant to the counterclaim for possession. The court considered whether Stewart's arguments, which included the construction of 'temporary crisis accommodation' under section 22 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 and the exercise of discretion under section 64 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010, had merit.
The judge found that the associate judge did not err in granting summary judgment, as the terms of the accommodation provided by Good Shepherd clearly indicated it was intended to be temporary. The judge also found that Stewart was not denied procedural fairness and that his claims in equity and under the Charter were not relevant to the counterclaim for possession. The appeal was dismissed as the proposed grounds were totally without merit.
The judge dismissed the application for leave to appeal, affirming that the associate judge's decision to grant summary judgment on the counterclaim was correct and that Stewart's arguments lacked merit. The decision underscores the importance of clear contractual terms in defining the nature of accommodation provided in temporary crisis situations.
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