Steven Peter Verrall v The Queen

[2013] HCASL 62

STEVEN PETER VERRALL

v

THE QUEEN

[2013] HCASL 62
B8/2013

1. On 11 November 2009 the applicant pleaded guilty on arraignment in the Supreme Court of Queensland (Mullins J) to one count of trafficking in cocaine[1], 14 counts of importing a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug[2] and one count of money laundering[3].

   [1]Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Q), s 5.

   [2]Criminal Code (Cth), s 307.2(i).

   [3]Criminal Code (Cth), s 400.4(1).

2. On 30 May 2011 Byrne SJA refused the applicant leave to withdraw his pleas of guilty.  The applicant and his solicitor gave evidence before Byrne SJA.  The applicant had signed instructions recording his understanding that it was open to him to put the Crown to proof and of his election to plead guilty "in an attempt to mitigate the penalty likely to follow my conviction"[4].  Byrne SJA rejected the applicant's evidence that he had been told that he had no option other than to plead guilty.  His Honour characterised aspects of the applicant's evidence of his understanding of the effect of a plea of guilty as "incredible".  His Honour refused to grant the applicant the leave sought. 

   [4]R v Verrall [2012] QCA 310 at [28].

3. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland[5] (Holmes JA, Philippides and Douglas JJ). There was a question as to whether the appeal was against Byrne SJA's refusal of leave or, pursuant to s 668D of the Criminal Code (Q), against conviction. The Court of Appeal treated it as the latter. Holmes JA, giving the leading judgment, said that the applicant's solicitor had given "strong advice" respecting his poor prospects of acquittal and that the advice appeared to be "well-founded"[6].  Her Honour noted that the charges had been read to the applicant at the committal proceedings and that he had sat through cross-examination on that occasion.  She was satisfied that he understood the charges to which he had pleaded guilty and that he had not been subject to pressure in entering his pleas.  She found that "there is no basis for supposing that the pleas of guilty were not properly and appropriately entered in the context of an overwhelming Crown case"[7].

   [5]R v Verrall [2012] QCA 310.

   [6]R v Verrall [2012] QCA 310 at [50].

   [7]R v Verrall [2012] QCA 310 at [51]-[52].

4. The applicant applies for special leave to appeal.  The application is out of time.  In an affidavit the applicant deposes to the limitations on his access to the prison library and to facilities in which to prepare the application.  Compliance with the time for filing the application should be dispensed with and the application considered on its merits[8].

   [8]High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), rr 2.02 and 41.02.1.

5. The applicant's first proposed ground asserts that it was an error to hold that Byrne SJA's determination was interlocutory and that no appeal lay from it.  This application does not provide an occasion to consider the merits of that contention.  The Court of Appeal permitted the applicant to appeal out of time against his conviction as the means of ventilating his challenge to the acceptance of his pleas of guilty.  It applied settled principles in the determination of that challenge[9].  Several proposed grounds complain of the applicant's compulsory examination before an unnamed authority after charge but before trial.  These complaints are new.  They are not further developed in the summary of argument and provide no basis for the grant of special leave.  Other grounds challenge concurrent factual findings below.  One ground wrongly asserts that the Court of Appeal stated that the applicant had to disclose a viable defence prior to the trial.  Nothing in the material filed in support of the application calls into question the correctness of the Court of Appeal's conclusion.  If special leave to appeal were granted the appeal would have no prospects of success. 

   [9]R v Verrall [2012] QCA 310 at [49] citing Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132 at 141 per Brennan, Toohey and McHugh JJ; [1995] HCA 41.

6. The application is dismissed.

7. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application. 

V.M. Bell
8 May 2013 S.J. Gageler