Stephenson and National Disability Insurance Agency

Link copied
Case Copied 29 min read

Stephenson and National Disability Insurance Agency [2019] AATA 4059 (1 October 2019)

Division:National Disability Insurance Scheme Division

File Number(s):      2018/3160

Re:Setten Stephenson

APPLICANT

AndNational Disability Insurance Agency

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member

Date:1 October 2019

Place:Sydney

The decision under review is set aside and the matter is remitted for reconsideration with the recommendations that the Agency:

·fund a survey including the area of proposed Option 1 and the area where the grounding occurs at the top of the driveway, and

·do what is necessary to determine the cost of work required for Option 1 and to remedy the grounding problem at the top of the driveway (the work) and whether the work can be carried out according to law, and, if,

·the cost of the work is determined to be less than $60,000 and the work can be carried out according to law,

·decide to fund the work because it meets all the criteria in section 34 of the Act. 

………………………[SGD]…………………………..

Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME – reasonable and necessary supports – Applicant seeks funding for driveway modifications – whether supports relate to the Applicant’s disability –  Applicant able to walk and drive up and down driveway prior to stroke - lost mobility and independence as result of stroke - dependent on carers and family to access community – limited type of vehicles can access driveway because of grounding at the top and/or bottom of the driveway - driveway modifications relate to Applicant’s disability - whether proposed drive way modifications represent value for money – no survey available – Tribunal not able to be satisfied as to feasibility or cost of proposed modifications – proposed modification did not include all necessary modifications to the driveway - decision set aside and remitted with recommendations made      

LEGISLATION

Administrative AppealsTribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43(1)(c)(ii)

National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 100(6), 33(2), 34(1)(c)

National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013 rr 2.5, 3.1(a), 5.1(b), 5.1(d)

CASES

Commonwealth of Australia v Beale (1993) 30 ALD 68

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Australian/New Zealand Standard Parking facilities 2890.1:2004

Driveway and Vehicle Crossings Northern Beaches Council

NDIS Operational Guideline – Including specific types of supports in plans Part 5

REASONS FOR DECISION

Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member

1 October 2019

Background

  1. Before 25 July 2016, Mr Stephenson went camping, cycling, mountain biking, scuba diving, was a scout leader, and worked for a marine insurance company. He cycled to and from work.  On that day Mr Stephenson suffered a stroke which caused right-sided hemiplegia. He was 45 years old.  He was discharged from Royal Ryde Rehabilitation in December 2016 to outpatient rehabilitation at Mt Wilga. On 14 May 2017, he fell and fractured the neck of his right femur. He was hospitalised and underwent further rehabilitation.  His mobility was reduced.  He was home for Christmas 2017.  

  2. Mr Stephenson generally uses a manual wheelchair for mobility but can walk indoors…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Stephenson and National Disability Insurance Agency and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] AATA 4059
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Stephenson for funding from the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) for driveway modifications. The dispute centred on whether these modifications constituted "reasonable and necessary supports" under the National Disability Insurance Scheme. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was required to determine the application.

The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the proposed driveway modifications related to Mr Stephenson's disability, and whether they represented value for money. The NDIA argued that the modifications were to address a pre-existing design flaw in the driveway, independent of Mr Stephenson's disability, and that he had alternative vehicles available that did not ground on the driveway. Mr Stephenson contended that the modifications were necessary due to his loss of mobility and independence following a stroke, which made him reliant on others for transport and limited his ability to access community services.

The Tribunal accepted the evidence that Mr Stephenson could not negotiate the driveway unassisted due to his stroke-related impairments, including reduced strength, instability, balance issues, and a high fall risk. It found that the proposed modifications were directly related to his disability, aiming to provide a safe transfer area and overcome the grounding problem, thereby enhancing his independence and ability to access transport. While acknowledging the NDIA's concerns about value for money and the lack of precise costings and feasibility studies for the proposed modifications, the Tribunal noted that if the modifications could be completed at a reasonable cost (estimated at $60,000), they would likely represent value for money given the significant long-term benefits to Mr Stephenson's independence and potential cost savings compared to alternative supports.

Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the NDIA's decision. However, due to insufficient evidence regarding the precise cost and feasibility of the proposed modifications, the Tribunal remitted the matter for reconsideration with recommendations, rather than making a substituted decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Agency argued:·The driveway modifications were not required due to Mr Stephenson’s disability but were independent of it. ·They were to resolve a longstanding design deficiency in the driveway which had been constructed about 40 years ago. ·The design of the driveway did not decrease Mr Stephenson’s independence because he has other vehicles available to him which do not ground on the driveway. Therefore, proposed modifications are not necessary for Mr Stephenson’s mobility because he can work around the grounding by using the type of car that does not suffer that problem. The evidence The parties accepted the evidence of Mr Wheen, physiotherapist, that Mr Stephenson cannot negotiate the driveway unassisted, on foot or in his wheelchair. The Agency did not press the options where Ms Dinley, the occupational therapist it had engaged, had included a balustrade beside the driveway for Mr Stephenson to use. The Agency also did not press Ms Dinley’s option that Mr Stephenson use a scooter. Mr Wheen expressed the opinion that the driveway modifications were related to Mr Stephenson’s disability. He described Mr Stephenson’s impairments. They are related to reduced strength in the right hip, knee and ankle causing instability. He has a right ankle prosthesis with no flexibility. He has challenges overall with balance and a high fall risk. He suffers overall endurance fatigue and resulting cognitive fatigue. Concentration is required to manage a challenging situation, such as transferring to and from a vehicle on a slope. He suffers visual disturbance which can make him unsteady and distracted when trying to address it. There is greater safety by allowing him to transfer to and from cars on a level surface rather than a slope, particularly if it were slippery, it was dark, or he was tired. Ms Dinley reported discussions with Silver Service Taxis, Uber and the New South Wales Ambulance about accessing the property to argue that vehicles can be arranged that can access the property. It appears from her report of those conversations that she only raised with Silver Service and NSW Ambulance the issue of a driveway gradient of ¼, but not the grounding problems. She did not indicate the questions she asked when she spoke to Uber. She only recorded that they have a disability app that can be customised. In response to that evidence, Mr Stephenson arranged for various taxis and Uber vehicles to try to access the property from 9.10 am to12.20 pm on 31 January 2019. The garage had been emptied, as Ms Dinley had suggested, to allow a car to park in it while Mr Stephenson got into the vehicle on a flat surface. Video evidence of those attempts was shown. The results were:·All the drivers who tried, reversed down the driveway and drove out forward. None of the vehicles was able to drive into the garage and drive back onto the street with Mr Stephenson and his wheelchair on board, without hitting the driveway.·Two Silver Service taxis were unable to drive over the top section of the driveway. The driver of a Silver Service, Toyota Camry vehicle, came close to hitting the top of the driveway and refused to proceed. The driver of another Silver Service Toyota Camry hit the underneath of the vehicle and was very annoyed.·The third Silver Service taxi driver refused to even try because he thought it was impossible to negotiate the transition to the garage without hitting the underside of his vehicle. It was a Silver Service accessible taxi, a Toyota Tarago van. ·Two Uber drivers managed to get down into the garage, but both hit the underside of their vehicles at the top of the driveway. The vehicles were a Honda Jazz and a Honda Odyssey. ·The third Uber driver reversed down the driveway but had to stop because the underneath of his car would have hit the driveway if he had kept driving towards the garage. The vehicle was a Skoda station wagon.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ms Boettcher’s argument that the grounding problem at the top of the driveway is not related to Mr Stephenson’s disability is not accepted. Conclusion The implementation of Option 1 and remedying the grounding problem at the top of the driveway would have significant long term benefits for Mr Stephenson. While Mr Wheen is not a psychologist, his opinion about the positive psychological impact from improved independence is relevant. It accords with Mr Stephenson’s evidence. Carers have to be booked for a block of two or three hours. If Mr Stephenson could use Uber vehicles and taxis to pick him up and drop him off at the gym or if he wants to walk along a path near the beach, that would probably be at a lower cost than booking a carer for three hour blocks. If friends could transport him, that would be at no cost to the taxpayer. If he could drive himself at some time in the future, the modifications would benefit him as discussed above. The evidence is not sufficiently precise to allow the Tribunal to be satisfied as to the cost of Option 1 or that it can be carried out in the area available or according to law. The work required and costs involved to remedy the grounding problem at the top of the driveway are not known. However, the evidence leads to the conclusion that if both can be carried out in accordance with the law and at a reasonable cost, they would represent value for money in that the cost of the support is reasonable relative to the benefits achieved and the costs of alternative support. In this case, a cost of $60,000 would be reasonable. It is less than one third of the Core Support funding that was approved and would provide significant long term benefits. The Tribunal must make the correct or preferable decision. Neaves J in Commonwealth of Australia v Beale (1993) 30 ALD 68 at [70] said the following in relation to subsection 43(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth):There is, thus, an express power in the tribunal to set aside a decision under review and to remit the matter for reconsideration. However, it may only do so where, in order to give effect to the conclusions to which the tribunal has come, it is appropriate to set aside the decision under review but the tribunal is not in a position to formulate a decision in substitution for the decision set aside. That was not the situation in the present case. The tribunal had reached a firm conclusion that each of the documents which the tribunal had to consider was an exempt document so that the appropriate order for the tribunal to have made was to affirm the decision under review subject, of course to the variation of that decision effected by the decision of the tribunal made on 9 June 1992. In this case, to give effect the conclusions which the Tribunal has reached, it is appropriate to set aside the decision under review but the Tribunal is not in a position on the evidence, to formulate a decision in substitution. There has been significant expenditure of taxpayer money on this case with no result. It seems that a relatively small additional expenditure may bring about a just result for Mr Stephenson.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Stephenson told the first carer he had in January 2017 not to come back after the carer ran into the garage door on the second day, having scraped the bottom of his Toyota Corolla on the driveway and having trouble reversing up the driveway on the first day. The next carer drove well, but his Mazda 3 scraped the driveway and was damaged. His two carers at the time of the hearing had a Jeep Compass and a Subaru Forester which could negotiate the driveway without grounding at the top or bottom. Mr Stephenson was concerned if they left or were sick, he would again be dependent on his wife and family members whose cars can negotiate the driveway. Consideration The objects of the Act in section 3 and the general principles set out in section 4 emphasise that the legislative regime is directed to support the independence and social and economic participation of people with disability and provide reasonable and necessary supports that achieve that result.[4] The Rules repeat the substance of those objects and principles.[5] [4] See ss 3(c), (d), (g) and ss 4 (2), (5), and ss (11)(a), (b) and (c).[5] See Part 1, Rules 1.2(a) and (c) 1.4(a), (b), (e)(i), (ii) and (iii), 2.3(a) and (b). Before his stroke, Mr Stephenson could walk up and down the driveway to get into a vehicle which was parked on the road, and leave the house. He could also drive up and down the driveway, and take his bike out and go for a ride. Because of his stroke and consequential hemiplegia, he cannot do those activities. He has lost his mobility and independence. To leave the house for appointments and to go into the community, Mr Stephenson is dependent on carers, as well as family members, to take him in a motor vehicle and pick him up at the bottom of the driveway. His wife works 40 hours. His sister-in-law and brother-in-law work and have children. His older son works casually and is studying. His younger son and daughter go to school. The motor vehicle has to be of a type that can negotiate the driveway without damage. He would like to be able to be picked up by friends or get a taxi or Uber to take him out. He would like to go to the gym, go out to get the bread and milk and go back to scouting. Ultimately, he would like to get his licence back and drive himself. While it may be possible to get some taxis or Uber vehicles that can negotiate the driveway, the practical test carried out shows that that it is not that easy. No Uber SUV was requested. The web-page print outs from Uber only indicate the type of vehicles that Uber allows. Whether UberBLACK luxury SUVs or Uber SUVs include an appropriate type of vehicle is not apparent. None is the kind of vehicle the evidence shows can access the property. The information does not indicate the availability of any mid-size SUV’s in the area where Mr Stephenson lives. The proposed driveway modifications are related to Mr Stephenson’s disability. They are designed to provide a flat surface on which he can transfer in and out of a vehicle safely and to overcome the grounding problem at the bottom of the driveway.