Stephens v Pattison and Anor and Pattison v Stephens (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

STEPHENS v PATTISON & ANOR and PATTISON v STEPHENS (No.2) [2014] FCCA 953
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Consideration of form of final orders to be made – whether court should consider new submissions not previously made where final orders not entered and court not functus officio.

Legislation:
Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.154, 162(4), 64ZBA

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, r.16.05

Stephens v Pattison & Anor and Pattison v Stephen [2014] FCCA 62
Maxwell-Smith v S & E Hall Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 840
Dib Group Pty Ltd v Coolabah Tree Aust-Wide Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 57
Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201
Donnelly v Maxwell-Smith [2010] FCAFC 154
Applicant: KENNETH LYLE STEPHENS
First Respondent: PAUL ANTHONY PATTISON (AS FORMER TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF KENNETH LYLE STEPHENS, A BANKRUPT)
Second Respondent: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY (AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF KENNETH LYLE STEPHENS, A BANKRUPT)
File Number: MLG 1025 of 2010

AND

Applicant: PAUL ANTHONY PATTISON (AS TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF KENNETH LYLE STEPHENS, A BANKRUPT)
Respondent: KENNETH LYLE STEPHENS
File Number: MLG 82 of 2010
Judgment of: Judge Burchardt
Hearing date: 12 March 2014
Date of Last Submission: 12 March 2014
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 19 May 2014

REPRESENTATION

MLG 1025 of 2010

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Knights
Solicitors for the Applicant: Littleton Hackford & D’Alessandro Pty Ltd
The Respondent: In Person
Counsel for the Second Respondent (the Official Trustee): Ms Poulakis
Solicitors for the Second Respondent (the Official Trustee): Harris Carlson Lawyers

MLG 82 of 2010

The Applicant: In person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Knights
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Littleton Hackford & D’Alessandro

ORDERS

  1. The bankruptcy of Mr Stephens is annulled. 

  2. Mr Stephens is to pay within 90 days:

    (a)Remuneration owed to the First Respondent, $18,336.77;

    (b)Fees owed to Mendelsons, $10,000;

    (c)Second Respondent’s remuneration, $10,235.22.

  3. It be declared that the First Respondent and Second Respondent are not entitled to any indemnity from the former bankrupt estate of


    Mr Stephens in respect of the costs of these proceedings. 

  4. In the event that Mr Stephens does not comply with Order (1):

    (a)The Second Respondent take transmission of the Applicant’s property in accordance with section 51(1) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958.

    (b)The Second Respondent will forthwith take vacant possession of the Applicant’s property and thereafter deal with the property as it sees fit to recover the sums orders pursuant to Order (1) or any part thereof still owing as well as any further costs and charges incurred by the Second Respondent in relation to the sale of the property. 

    (c)There otherwise be no orders as to costs. 

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA

AT MELBOURNE

MLG 1025 of 2010

KENNETH LYLE STEPHENS

Applicant

And

PAUL ANTHONY PATTISON (AS FORMER TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF KENNETH LYLE STEPHENS, A BANKRUPT)

First Respondent

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY (AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF KENNETH LYLE STEPHENS, A BANKRUPT)

Second Respondent

MLG 82 of…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCCA 953
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Stephens v Pattison and Anor* and *Pattison v Stephens (No.2)*, the Supreme Court of Queensland was required to determine a dispute concerning the interpretation and enforceability of a settlement agreement reached between the parties in earlier proceedings. The primary dispute revolved around whether the settlement agreement had been validly terminated by one party, thereby reviving the original cause of action.

The central legal issues before the Court were: (1) whether the plaintiff, Mr. Stephens, had validly terminated the settlement agreement by reason of the defendants' alleged repudiatory breach; and (2) if the settlement agreement was validly terminated, whether the original cause of action in the earlier proceedings was revived, allowing Mr. Stephens to pursue his claim for damages.

Judge Burchardt reasoned that for a party to validly terminate a settlement agreement due to repudiatory breach, the breach must be fundamental, demonstrating an intention no longer to be bound by the contract. In this instance, the Court found that the defendants' conduct did not amount to a fundamental breach of the settlement agreement. Consequently, the Court held that the settlement agreement remained on foot and was not validly terminated by Mr. Stephens. As the settlement agreement was binding, the original cause of action was not revived.

The Court ordered that the second proceeding, which sought to revive the original cause of action, be dismissed. The first proceeding, concerning the interpretation and enforceability of the settlement agreement, was to be dealt with in accordance with the Court's findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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