Stephanie Eaton v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service
[2025] FWC 2860
•25 SEPTEMBER 2025
| [2025] FWC 2860 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Stephanie Eaton
v
Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service
(U2025/12263)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT SAUNDERS | NEWCASTLE, 25 SEPTEMBER 2025 |
Unfair dismissal application filed out of time – circumstances not exceptional – application dismissed.
Introduction
This decision concerns an application by Ms Stephanie Eaton (Applicant) for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) against her former employer, Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service (Respondent).
The Applicant seeks an extension of time to lodge her unfair dismissal application in the Fair Work Commission (Commission).
The parties agree that the Applicant’s employment with the Respondent came to an end on 21 February 2025. The Applicant lodged her unfair dismissal application in the Commission on 28 July 2025.
Section 394(2) of the Act states that an application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be made ‘within 21 days after the dismissal took effect’, or within such further period as the Commission allows pursuant to s 394(3). The period of 21 days ended at midnight on 14 March 2025. The application was therefore filed 136 days outside the 21 day period. The Applicant asks the Commission to grant a further period for the application to be made under s 394(3).
The Act allows the Commission to extend the period within which an unfair dismissal application must be made only if it is satisfied that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’. Briefly, exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon but the circumstances themselves do not need to be unique nor unprecedented, nor even very rare.[1] Exceptional circumstances may include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors, or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together can be considered exceptional.[2]
The requirement that there be exceptional circumstances before time can be extended under s 394(3) contrasts with the broad discretion conferred on the Commission under s 185(3) to extend the 14 day period within which an enterprise agreement must be lodged, which is exercisable simply if in all the circumstances the Commission considers that it is ‘fair’ to do so.
Section 394(3) requires that, in considering whether to grant an extension of time, the Commission must take into account the following:
(a) the reason for the delay;
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect;
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal;
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay);
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.
The requirement that these matters be taken into account means that each matter must be considered and given appropriate weight in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances. I will now consider these matters.
Reasons for the delay
The delay required to be considered in s 394(3)(a) is the period after the prescribed 21 day period for lodging an application. It does not include the period from the date the dismissal took effect to the end of the 21 day period.[3] However, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered when assessing whether there is an acceptable reason for the delay, or any part of the delay, beyond the 21 day period.[4]
The Act does not specify what reason for delay might tell in favour of granting an extension however decisions of the Commission have referred to an acceptable or reasonable explanation. The absence of any explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an applicant in the assessment of whether there are exceptional circumstances, and a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in the applicant’s favour, however all of the circumstances must be considered.[5]
The Applicant worked in the office of the former Senator Gerard Rennick as an Electoral Officer. Senator Rennick was not endorsed by the Liberal National Party to run in the 2025 Federal election. At the beginning of August 2024, Senator Rennick decided to resign from the Liberal National Party and establish his own party. The Applicant says that she felt compelled to take on executive positions in Senator Rennick’s new political party even though she was a member of his staff. The Applicant says that she should not have been put in that position because her service with the Federal Government was cut short for the benefit of Senator Rennick’s career, not hers.
The Applicant says that she went to the office on Friday, 21 February 2025 with no intention of resigning. She was called in to the Senator’s office and he mentioned that there was a rumour that the Liberal National Party were going to target the Applicant in the media. Senator Rennick did not divulge the source of the rumour, but the Applicant says that she was left with the feeling that everything that had been achieved in establishing a new political party was about to be destroyed because of her. The Applicant says that she felt compelled to resign because of the negative rumour. The Applicant later discovered that her decision to resign cost her considerable monetary loss.
The Applicant says that she thought Senator Rennick would agree to the party eventually compensating her financially because she diligently spent her time doing party work until the election on 3 May 2025 and afterwards, for no money. After the election, the Applicant spoke to the Senator about the financial loss she had suffered as a result of resigning from her employment with the Respondent. The Applicant says that Senator Rennick eventually paid her 10.1 weeks’ pay at the rate of $4,000 including GST per week.
In about early June 2025, the Applicant contacted the Respondent for the purpose of discussing the financial loss she had suffered by reason of resigning from the Respondent and working for Senator Rennick’s new political party. The Respondent contacted the Applicant at about the end of June or beginning of July 2025, at which time she was told she would need to go to the Commission.
In her email to the Commission sent at 6:40pm on 24 August 2025, the Applicant provided the following explanation for the delay in bringing her unfair dismissal application:
“… the circumstances leading up to my constructive unfair dismissal were exceptional because the former Senator Gerard Rennick since August 2024 to after the Federal election in May 2025, deemed himself entitled to use me as a staffer to undertake the unpaid party roles of Federal Secretary, Registered Officer and acting Treasurer to establish his political party for his benefit and complicated by the fact that I was already a taxpayer funded electorate officer in his office.
These are exceptional circumstances and 3 (a) the reason for the delay in submitting my application was because it only became apparent in June 2025, that the former Senator Gerard Rennick was not prepared to reimburse me for the stress, time and effort in fulfilling the THREE Gerard Rennick People First party roles for the Federal election in May 2025. I incorrectly assumed he would reimburse me for my party work in lieu of the lost entitlements I would have been owed if I had not ‘taken one for the team’ (Whatsapp message 21.2.2025) and was compelled to ‘resign’ because of his fear of a potential media release from the Liberal National Party about the former Senator Gerard Rennick using his staff for his political party.”
I do not accept that the Applicant has provided a reasonable or acceptable explanation for the long (136 day) delay in filing an unfair dismissal application in the Commission. The Applicant had a belief that Senator Rennick would agree to his new political party eventually compensating her financially because she had resigned from the Respondent and thereafter worked for the Senator’s new political party for no money. The fact that the Applicant’s belief did not align with that of Senator Rennick amounts to a complaint about the basis on which the Applicant agreed to work for the Senator’s new political party after her resignation from the Respondent; it does not provide a reasonable or acceptable explanation for the long delay in lodging her unfair dismissal application in the Commission. Further, the Applicant says that it became apparent to her in June 2025 that Senator Rennick was not prepared to reimburse her for the stress, time and effort in fulfilling three party roles for the Gerard Rennick People First Party for the Federal election on 3 May 2025. This does not explain the delay in the period from the point in June 2025 when this became apparent to the Applicant and the filing of her application in the Commission on 28 July 2025. In addition, the Applicant was informed by the Respondent in late June or early July 2025 that she would need to go to the Commission. Notwithstanding this, the Applicant did not file her unfair dismissal application in the Commission until 28 July 2025.
The absence of an acceptable or reasonable explanation for the whole, or alternatively a substantial portion, of the delay weighs against a conclusion that there are exceptional circumstances.
Whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect
The Applicant was aware of her resignation, which she says was forced, on the day it took effect. Accordingly, this is a neutral consideration.
Action taken to dispute the dismissal
As I have already explained, the Applicant raised with Senator Rennick her concern about not being paid for her work for the Senator’s new political party. I do not consider this to be action taken by the Applicant to dispute her alleged dismissal by the Respondent. Even if it could be considered action taken by the Applicant to dispute her dismissal, I would not give it much weight.
The Applicant also contacted the Respondent in late June or early July 2025 about the financial loss she had suffered as a result of her forced resignation on 21 February 2025. This contact with the Respondent constitutes action by the Applicant to dispute her alleged dismissal, but it was well after the time of the alleged dismissal. I will give this matter a small amount of weight in considering whether there are exceptional circumstances.
Prejudice to the employer
The Respondent submits that there is prejudice arising from the long delay for the following reasons:
(a)as a result of the recent federal election, all the employees employed in former Senator Rennick’s office had their employment automatically terminated and none were redeployed in other parliamentary staffer roles, creating a degree of difficulty for the Commonwealth in considering and identifying the witnesses that it may need to defend the Applicant’s unfair dismissal application; and
(b)the passage of time means that the memory of witnesses has no doubt lessened, impacting on the ability of the Commonwealth to call witnesses to defend the Applicant’s unfair dismissal application.
I am not satisfied that granting an extension of time would cause any significant prejudice to the Respondent. Records identifying those who worked with the Applicant in Senator Rennick’s office should be readily available. Given the relatively small size of that workplace, it would not be unduly burdensome to identify and approach potential witnesses to determine who might be called to give evidence in response to the unfair dismissal application. Moreover, the alleged dismissal occurred on 21 February 2025—a relatively recent event—such that relevant witnesses are likely to retain a recollection of the key facts and circumstances. This is a neutral consideration.
Merits of the application
The Act requires me to take into account the merits of the application in considering whether there are exceptional circumstances.
In addition to the matters I have already set out above, the Applicant makes the following submissions about the merits of her unfair dismissal case against the Respondent:
“Unfortunately, since reading Form F3 pertaining to the former Senator Gerard Rennick’s response to my application, the former senator did not recount the purpose of the meeting on 21st February 2025 correctly thereby compromising the merits of my application 3 (e). He failed to mention the purpose was to inform me of a negative media rumour from the Liberal-National Party about me, NOT me, wanting to resign to run as a senate candidate for his party as he stated in his response. I maintain I had NO intention of resigning that day as an electorate officer of nearly nine years.
More to the point is that the former Senator Gerard Rennick was fearful of the media reporting that he was using a taxpayer funded staffer for the purposes of establishing his own party. He made me feel that the negative press about me would damage his party and his chances of retaining his senate seat. Feeling the pressure, I unwillingly ‘resigned’ from my electorate officer role of 9 years for his benefit not mine.
The former Senator Gerard Rennick should not have had the expectation that staffers would establish his own political party. It was extremely busy because I was the Constituent Manager funded by the taxpayer as well as going through the motions of establishing a party. It was stressful to be put in the position by the former Senator Gerard Rennick to only do party work at lunch time or before and after work because often the lines were blurred. For example, I was ‘told off’ by the former Senator Gerard Rennick for making some calls to the Australian Electoral Commission with whom I sought urgent advice to complete the party registration application. This was unfair as I was put under pressure by him to complete the application.
…3 (e) – I consider my Application U2025/ 12263 to be of merit and worthy of Deputy
President Easton’s positive assessment of my case to the Fair Work Commission. I consider the following points to be of merit.·In August 2024, when the former Senator Gerard Rennick without prior communication, announced that he was going to establish his own political party, and I left work that day finding myself in party executive roles. This was because I was a loyal staffer of the former Senator Gerard Rennick, and I felt I would appear disloyal if I didn’t accept the roles.
·The former Senator Gerard Rennick should not have had the expectation that staffers would establish his own political party. From August 2024 it was extremely busy because I was his Constituent Manager and more who was funded by the taxpayer as well as going through the motions of establishing a party. It was stressful to be put in the position by the former Senator Gerard Rennick to only do party work at lunch time or before and after work because often the lines were blurred. For example, I was ‘told off’ by the former Senator Gerard Rennick for making some calls to the Australian Electoral Commission with whom I sought urgent advice to complete the party registration application. This was unfair as I was put under pressure by him to complete the application. He put me in this stressful, exceptional circumstance often as my boss.
·The former Senator Gerard Rennick did not consider the ramifications of the two conflicting positions of party and electorate officer because he was intent on claiming his senate seat in the forthcoming election. He had little care for my position, and it was me who was financially compromised not him.”
The Respondent makes the following submissions in relation to the merits of the application:
“The merits of the Application are very poor. In particular:
a. Ms Eaton will need to overcome the jurisdictional issue of whether she was dismissed (within the meaning of the FW Act), which will be a significant challenge for her;
b. Ms Eaton’s version of events, if accepted by the Commission, are little more than a grievance with how circumstances played out when Ms Eaton pursued her political ambitions. While her disappointment is understandable, it does not mean that she had no choice but to resign nor that the circumstances under which her employment came to an end were unfair;
c. Ms Eaton’s case is essentially one of buyer’s remorse, being that when Ms Eaton’s run for political office was unsuccessful, Ms Eaton sought payment from (now) Mr Rennick for entitlements that she purports she would have received had she not resigned, which was declined (in part). It is at this moment Ms Eaton contends she concluded that she had been forced to resign from her employment (and therefore lodged the Application). Ms Eaton does not, in substance, suggest that she had no choice to resign. Instead, she says that she was given a choice between working for the Party or retaining her job, and she chose the former. She later regretted that choice. This is not a credible version of events that would support a finding that Ms Eaton had no choice but to resign her employment;
d. Ms Eaton’s grievances with Mr Rennick as an employer (via the Party) and a manager (while he was a Senator) do not advance the Application; and
e. Ms Eaton has had other employment since she resigned and appears to have earned some income during this period. This significantly limits the scope of any remedies she could hope to obtain.
Ms Eaton is primarily seeking the payment of entitlements under the Commonwealth Members of Parliament Staff Enterprise Agreement 2024-2027. This is not remedy Ms Eaton can obtain from the Commission, even if the Application were successful.
Ultimately, the Commonwealth accepts that, when considering exceptional circumstances, the
Commission cannot engage in a forensic examination of the facts, particularly when there are
factual disputes between the parties. However, the Commonwealth submits that, even on Ms Eaton’s version of events, there is no way for her to establish that she was dismissed (or
unfairly dismissed).This factor therefore weighs against exceptional circumstances.”
The Respondent’s Form F3 Response to the Applicant’s unfair dismissal application also includes the following contentions in relation to whether the Applicant was dismissed by the Respondent:
“As detailed below, the applicant voluntarily resigned from their employment effective
21 February 2025. There was no pressure for the applicant to do this.On 21 February 2025, there was a meeting between the applicant and former Senator Gerard Rennick (former Senator).
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the applicant’s position as the former Senator was concerned about the amount of work the applicant would need to do in their position with the former Senator’s political party, the People First Party (Party) in the lead up to the 2025 federal election. The former Senator was concerned as he did not think that the applicant could work in both jobs, particularly in the period leading up to the federal election (which, at the time of the discussion, was likely to be held in April 2025). Up until this time, any work the applicant performed for the Party was undertaken outside of work hours (ie. during lunchtime and after work).
The former Senator therefore gave the applicant the option to either remain in their role as an electorate officer or resign from that role to enable them to work for the Party and to run as the Party’s Senate candidate for Tasmania. The former Senator told the applicant that the Party would contribute $10,000 to fund the campaign (which is something most minor parties do not offer). The former Senator encouraged the applicant to discuss this decision with their husband before making the decision.
The applicant ultimately chose to resign as electorate officer as they were interested in running as a Senate candidate in Tasmania for the Party. The applicant had a family connection to Tasmania, and had previously expressed a desire to run as a Senate candidate in that state.
It was clear that the applicant wanted to run as Senate candidate for the Party in Tasmania. In light of this, the applicant needed to resign from their position as electorate officer, as it was not possible for them to continue to work in both positions.
The respondent denies that the applicant was ‘compelled’ to work for the Party. The applicant chose to resign from their role with the Commonwealth and was happy to do so.
In these circumstances, the applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of section 386
of the FW Act.”
Having regard to the material before the Commission, I consider the merits of the Applicant’s unfair dismissal application to be a neutral factor. Whether the Applicant was forced to resign because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by the Respondent will depend on findings of fact that could only be made after the Applicant, Mr Rennick and other relevant witnesses give evidence and are cross examined. Further, it is not possible at this early stage to reach a view as to the Applicant’s prospect of persuading the Commission that her resignation, if it was forced because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by the Respondent, was unfair.
Fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position
This consideration may relate to matters currently before the Commission or to matters previously decided by the Commission. It may also relate to the position of various employees of an employer responding to an unfair dismissal application. However, cases of this kind will generally turn on their own facts.
The Applicant makes the following submissions in relation to this factor:
“3 (f) – Firstly, even though I was reimbursed, it was unfair that I had to fight for monies because it is normal for Political Party Executives in similar positions to me to be paid. Furthermore, I worked THREE roles in the Gerard Rennick People First Party as Federal Secretary, Registered Officer and Acting Treasurer and should have been reimbursed accordingly. The former Senator Gerard Rennick strongly dictated the monies he thought I should be paid whereas I initially put forward a reimbursement fee of around $75,000.
Secondly, if I had NOT endured a constructive unfair dismissal, I would have been in a similar position to my office colleagues whose entitlements were paid up to around mid-July including 30% severance pay because the former Senator Gerard Rennick did not retain his seat, plus their years of public service according to the Commonwealth Members of Parliament Staff Enterprise Agreement 2024-2027. My final payout would have exceeded $40,000.”
I do not consider that the other persons to whom the Applicant refers in her submission were in a “similar position” to the Applicant. They did not resign and have not alleged that they were constructively dismissed.
In all the circumstances, I consider this factor to be a neutral consideration.
Conclusion
Taking into consideration the matters I am required to take into account under s 394(3) of the Act and all of the matters raised by the Applicant, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances in this case, either when the various circumstances are considered individually or together. The Applicant does not have a reasonable or acceptable explanation for the delay in lodging her unfair dismissal application in the Commission. The other relevant factors are neutral or of little weight. Having regard to all the material before the Commission, I do not consider the circumstances of this case to be out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.
Because I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, there is no basis for me to allow an extension of time. I decline to grant an extension of time under s 394(3). Accordingly, the application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be dismissed.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Ms M Eaton, appeared for herself
Mr A Sherr, solicitor, on behalf of the Respondent
Hearing details:
2025.
Newcastle (by telephone)
24 September
[1] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 975 at [13].
[2] Ibid.
[3] Long v Keolis Downer[2018] FWCFB 4109 at [40]
[4] Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank [2015] FWCFB 287 at [12]; Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149 at [31]; Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic [2016] FWCFB 349 at [29]-[31]
[5] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd[2018] FWCFB 901 at [39]
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