Stephanie Cobb v Estia Investments Pty Ltd
[2023] FWC 1878
•1 AUGUST 2023
| [2023] FWC 1878 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections
Stephanie Cobb
v
Estia Investments Pty Ltd
(C2023/3278)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT ANDERSON | ADELAIDE, 1 AUGUST 2023 |
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal – extension of time – dismissal advised but not date dismissal took effect – requested information not provided for two months – employer on notice of potential prejudice to the exercise of legal rights – exceptional circumstances – time extended
On 7 June 2023 Stephanie Cobb (Ms Cobb or the applicant) made a general protections application to the Commission under s 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) alleging contraventions of the FW Act associated with her dismissal.
Ms Cobb’s application is against her former employer Estia Investments Pty Ltd trading as Estia Health (Estia Health, the respondent or the employer), which she alleges committed the contraventions.
The respondent opposes the application. It filed a response on 27 June 2023 raising a jurisdictional issue. It claims that the application is out of time and that time should not be extended.
The decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v Milford[1] requires applications under s 365 to be within jurisdiction before the Commission can exercise powers conferred by s 368. It is thus necessary to determine the jurisdictional issue if Ms Cobb’s application is to proceed further.
I issued directions on 4 July 2023.
I heard the jurisdictional matter on 28 July 2023.
Ms Cobb was represented by her husband Mr O’Malley. Estia Health was represented by its Head of Industrial Relations and Employee Relations Mr Gold.
I heard evidence from Ms Cobb, Mr O’Malley and Estia Health’s People and Culture Business Partner (SA) Ms Styles.
The facts are largely not in dispute. One relevant factual dispute is whether, at a telephone meeting on 29 May 2023, Ms Cobb was advised of a specific date that her dismissal had taken effect. I deal with this below. All witnesses gave evidence to the best of their recall. Mr O’Malley in particular was direct and generally plausible.
Facts
Estia Health operates in the residential aged care industry.
After initially working a few months as a casual at Estia Health Craigmore (in suburban Adelaide) in mid 2017 Ms Cobb became a permanent employee. She went on maternity leave in October 2021.
At Ms Cobb’s request, her period of maternity leave was twice extended. She returned on 12 May 2022 on an agreed pattern of work.
By notice given on 28 July 2022 Ms Cobb resigned from her permanent position. Accrued leave entitlements were paid out. She and Estia Health immediately discussed more flexible casual work options that might suit the business and Ms Cobb.
Ms Cobb was placed ‘on the books’ as a casual employee in August 2022. She was unable to work shifts due to her circumstances.
Ms Cobb remained absent from the workplace between August 2022 and April 2023.
Intermittent communication occurred between Ms Cobb and her line manager (Ms Simpson) about Ms Cobb’s circumstances and availability to work (by text and phone[2]). In February 2023 Ms Cobb expressed interest in doing weekend work. Ms Simpson indicated that she would speak to “Hardeep’ (Mr Hardeep Chandi, Executive Director of Estia Health Craigmore). The last message from Ms Simpson was on 1 March 2023 stating that Mr Chandri had been on leave but that she would “look when I do and forward you the dates in advance”. Ms Cobb followed up with texts to Ms Simpson on 15 and 28 March but received no reply.
On 3 April 2023 Ms Cobb emailed Mr Chandi asking about “the process to be able to get back to work” as a casual and also whether permanent work was available.
Mr Chandi replied later that day:[3]
“It is good to know that you are willing to pick up shifts at Estia Health Craigmore. However you will have to go through our recruitment process again as your casual employment with Estia Health ceased due to you not picking up any shifts for a long period of time.”
Ms Cobb replied that evening:[4]
“Considering that I was not informed in writing of this requirement, or that my employment had ceased, I find this completely unreasonable, especially seeing as though not notifying me of my employment terminating prevents me from disputing the termination within the 21 day period.”
On 5 April 2023 Mr Chandi responded, advising Ms Cobb that:[5]
“To clarify, casual employees are engaged in a shift by shift basis and there is no minimum employment period or expectation that regular or systematic work is guaranteed. As such, each separate engagement/shift amounts to a separate contract of employment. Your employment ends each time you complete an agreed shift.
As you did not engage in any shifts since 19/08/2022, your employment was terminated on our systems.
If you would like to apply for any current vacant positions please review our website.”
Ms Cobb was actively assisted by her husband Mr O’Malley in providing advice to her and in communicating with Estia Health. Mr O’Malley researched Ms Cobb’s rights. He identified the right to dispute a dismissal in the Commission within twenty-one days of a dismissal taking effect. He considered a breach of general protections to have occurred. In the first week of April 2023, Mr O’Malley populated the general protections application form F8. However neither he nor Ms Cobb had an answer to question 1.3 (‘What date did your dismissal take effect?’). The application remained in his possession and incomplete for the following two months.
Ms Cobb sent a lengthy reply email that evening (5 April 2023) protesting her treatment. It included:[6]
“I am still unaware of the date of my supposed termination…It was also represented to me as recently as two days ago that I was still eligible for casual shifts and still employed at Estia…it meets the criteria for dismissal as per the Fair Work Act…that dismissal would be considered unreasonable, unjust and/or harsh…I request that you reconsider your position on this matter in keeping with the requirements of the Fair Work Act.”
Ms Cobb did not hear back from Estia Health for a fortnight. On 19 April 2023 Mr Chandri replied:[7]
“Estia is comfortable that we have met our obligations with regards to the Fair Work Act...It is noted that you did not make any attempts to contact us about your availability or show any interest in picking up casual shifts until 3 April 2023. If you would like to apply for any current vacant positions please review our website.”
Ms Cobb replied that day (19 April) including:[8]
“Furthermore, I have still not been informed of the date of my termination which impedes on my right to dispute the dismissal under general protections or for unfair dismissal within the 21 days, which I certainly would have done under the circumstances…I would like to escalate the matter to someone at Estia more equipped to address my concerns…please provide a prompt response…as quickly as possible”
Ms Cobb heard nothing more.
On 22 May 2023 Ms Cobb herself escalated the dispute to a national level and sought a meeting. She directly emailed Estia Health’s Chief People Officer, Ms Gillard. She advised Ms Gillard that she was invoking step 3 of the dispute resolution procedure in the relevant enterprise agreement as the dispute had not been resolved at a local level. She sought a time to meet and discuss.
Ms Gillard replied on 23 May, advising that Ms Styles would become involved.
On 26 May 2023 Ms Styles provided a report by email to Ms Gillard which she copied to Ms Cobb. In it Ms Styles stated:[9]
“Her employment was terminated in the system in February 2023 following a payroll sweep of ‘casuals not worked in 3 months’. The ED approved the termination, however it appears that a letter was never issued to Stephanie advising her of the termination…I can also offer [to Stephanie] an apology for our failing to advise her of the termination in the system”
A telephone discussion between Ms Styles and Ms Cobb (with Mr O’Malley) occurred on 29 May 2023. Ms Cobb again protested her treatment. She requested that her permanent contract be reinstated. Ms Cobb declined the suggestion of working at a different location. Mr O’Malley stated that Ms Cobb still did not know the date of termination. Ms Styles’ evidence was that she then looked up the date and advised it was 1 March 2023. Mr O’Malley’s evidence was that Ms Styles advised it was in February or March but that she would confirm after the meeting. Both Mr O’Malley and Ms Styles referred to notes they had taken of the meeting. On the balance of probabilities I prefer the evidence of Ms Styles on this point, though it is entirely plausible that it was also agreed that the date would be confirmed in writing. The meeting concluded on the basis that Ms Styles would report on Estia Health’s considered position by the following Friday (2 June).
No response arrived on 2 June. On 5 June 2023 Ms Styles apologised for the delay and advised that she was still seeking information.
On 6 June 2023, Ms Styles confirmed the termination by email. She advised:[10]
“As confirmed with you at the meeting, your casual employment was terminated in our systems following a review of casual employees who have not worked in the past 3 months. The termination date was 1 March 2023. As a business we undertake these reviews regularly…We do apologise that you were not formally informed of the change at the time…We now consider the matters you have raised to be closed.”
Ms Cobb responded by email the following day (7 June 2023).[11] She advised that “you have made no mention of the lack of notification of termination until 3 months after the date of termination (beyond a simple apology) and how it has impacted on my workplace rights to dispute the conduct or the dismissal properly within the required 21 day period…I would like to escalate the matter to the Fair Work Commission.”
Ms Cobb, having been advised in writing the day prior of the date dismissal took effect and assisted by Mr O’Malley then completed question 1.3 of the form F8, updated its contents to reflect events since April 2023, and filed these proceedings that day, 7 June 2023.
Submissions
Ms Cobb
Ms Cobb submits that an extension of time should be granted because:
she made the general protections application the day after she was told when her dismissal had taken effect;
she had, though her husband, prepared a general protections claim on 3 April 2023 but was unable to lodge a complete application without knowing when her dismissal had taken effect;
she asked for details of the date her dismissal took effect and put Estia Health on notice that its non-provision was prejudicing her ability to file a claim on time, yet Estia Health still took two months to provide that detail;
when she was told that she had been dismissed on 3 April 2023, she had no forewarning and was not told the day it had taken effect;
as soon as she was told that she had been dismissed on 3 April 2023 she protested to Estia Health the fact of dismissal and then engaged actively in correspondence with Estia Health over the following two months in order to have the decision explained and reversed and a dispute resolution process invoked; and
Estia Health’s conduct caused the delay.
Estia Health
Estia Health submit that the application is out of time and that time should not be extended because the circumstances are not exceptional
Estia Health submit that Ms Cobb was aware of her dismissal on 3 April 2023 and that it had taken effect, and could have challenged the dismissal at that time.
Estia Health submit that Ms Cobb was aware of the twenty-one day statutory time limit during April 2023 given the terms of her correspondence to the employer, but still elected not to commence proceedings, causing the delay in filing to be a lengthy period.
It was not necessary for Ms Cobb to wait until 7 June 2023 to have commenced proceedings.
Consideration
Section 365 of the FW Act provides:
“365 Application for the FWC to deal with a dismissal dispute
If:
(a)a person has been dismissed; and
(b)the person, or an industrial association that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the person, alleges that the person was dismissed in contravention of this Part;
the person, or the industrial association, may apply to the FWC for the FWC to deal with the dispute.”
Section 366 provides a time limit for the filing applications:
“366 Time for application
(1) An application under section 365 must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (2).
(2) The FWC may allow a further period if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(d) the merits of the application; and
(e) fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.”
It is not in dispute that the employment relationship was ended by Estia Health taking Ms Cobb off the books as a casual such that Ms Cobb was dismissed within the meaning of s 386(1)(a) of the FW Act.
Date dismissal took effect
It is well established that a dismissal does not take effect until communicated to the person dismissed in plain and unambiguous terms[12] or where communication in those terms is reasonably accessible to the person dismissed.[13]
It is also well established that determining whether a person has been dismissed and the date a dismissal took effect is to be assessed objectively. It is not dependent upon the intention or opinions of either party.
It is not in dispute that Ms Cobb was first notified of the fact of dismissal on 3 April 2023 when sent an email by Mr Chandri.
Estia Health did not advise Ms Cobb until 29 May 2023 (orally) and 6 June 2023 (in writing) of the date it considered her dismissal to have taken effect, being 1 March 2023.
In other words, this is a matter where the employer accepts that it did not advise the employee that it had ended the employment relationship until a month after it had apparently done so, and only did so when Ms Cobb enquired about the availability of casual shifts.
As Ms Cobb was not notified of the fact of dismissal until 3 April 2023, that is the date the dismissal took effect. That the employer two months later advised Ms Cobb that its records indicate that it had taken effect a month earlier (1 March 2023) is immaterial. It is the date Ms Cobb was notified of her employment ending that matters, not the date the employer made that decision or altered its records.
I find that Ms Cobb’s dismissal took effect on 3 April 2023 when she was told (via two separate emails from Mr Chandi) that her employment had ended due to no rosters having been worked for a lengthy period of time, and that if she wanted to make herself available for casual work she would have to “go through the recruitment process”.
That being so, the application was filed sixty-five days later. It is forty-four days out of time (the period 25 April to 7 June inclusive).
Extension of time
I now consider whether an extension of time should be granted for the late lodgement.
An applicant for an extension of time has an onus to adduce evidence in support of matters which that applicant asserts constitute exceptional circumstances.[14]
The test of “exceptional circumstances” establishes a “high hurdle” for an applicant.[15] A decision whether to extend time under s 366(2) involves the exercise of a discretion.[16]
I apply s 366(2) in the context of the Full Bench decision in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one-off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.”[17]
The principles of Nulty have been cited with approval by subsequent full benches of the Commission.[18]
I now consider each of the factors in s 366(2).
Reason for delay (s 366(2)(a))
The reason for the delay in lodging an application is a factor that must be considered. The FW Act does not specify what reason or reasons for delay might favour granting an extension, although decisions of the Commission have referred to an acceptable or reasonable explanation.[19] The absence of an explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an applicant in such an assessment. Similarly, a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in an applicant’s favour, though it is ultimately a question of degree and insight.[20]
However, a reasonable explanation for the delay is not needed for the whole of the period of delay, or may in fact not be required at all, if the circumstances are otherwise exceptional.[21] The period of the delay requiring explanation is the period commencing immediately after the time for lodging an application has expired, ending on the day on which an application is ultimately lodged. That said, regard may be had to any circumstances from the date the dismissal took effect when assessing whether an explanation for the delay is acceptable or credible.[22]
The reason advanced by Ms Cobb is that it was Estia Health’s conduct between 3 April and 6 June 2023 that caused the delay. In particular:
Estia Health failed for two months to provide details of the date her dismissal took effect despite requests that it do so and the employer being put on notice that its failure was prejudicing her ability to file a claim on time;
when told that she had been dismissed on 3 April 2023, Ms Cobb had no forewarning and was not told the day it had taken effect; and
as soon as she was told that she had been dismissed on 3 April 2023 Ms Cobb protested to Estia Health the fact of dismissal and then engaged actively in correspondence with Estia Health over the following two months in order to have the decision explained and reversed and a dispute resolution process invoked.
These explanations are supported by the evidence.
Estia Health’s conduct in not telling Ms Cobb the date her dismissal took effect until 29 May 2023 (orally) and 6 June 2023 (in writing) was objectively unreasonable. This weighs in Ms Cobb’s favour. It was conduct during the delay period. Ms Cobb had, since mid-April 2023, justifiably asked for details of the date her dismissal had taken effect, and was not provided that until many weeks later.
Adding weight to this consideration is the fact that Ms Cobb put Estia Health on specific notice that its failure to provide this information was prejudicing her rights to file a claim within time, and still yet the information was not provided.
Adding further weight is the fact that the information sought was readily accessible to Estia Health.
Further, the conduct of Estia Health ending the employment relationship on 1 March 2023 but not advising Ms Cobb until a month later (3 April) was also objectively unreasonable. While this was not conduct during the delay period, it is conduct relevant to the delay in that it helps explain Ms Cobb’s decision to seek explanations from the employer in the weeks that followed 3 April. As such, it also weighs in favour of Ms Cobb.
However, whilst this objectively unreasonable conduct by Estia Health contributed to the delay it does not wholly explain it. The delay was also occasioned by Ms Cobb deciding to negotiate the dispute about her dismissal (firstly at a local level and then at a national level) before initiating proceedings. That was not of itself an unreasonable decision in that the dismissal took Ms Cobb by surprise because, at the time of dismissal, she had understood herself to still being a casual ‘on the books’. Further, her decision to escalate the matter to a national level was not unreasonable given that she had reasonable grounds to consider the views expressed by Mr Chandi (about her not having asked about casual employment until 3 April 2023) to be at odds with the content of her earlier communications with Ms Simpson.
I note that Ms Cobb considered that she had invoked the dispute resolution clause in the enterprise agreement. Whether she had in fact formally done so need not be determined. The relevant fact is that an internal process of dispute and review had been initiated by the persistence of Ms Cobb. Estia Health were well aware from 3 April 2023 that it had a disputed employment issue on its hands.
Whilst trying to negotiate the matter internally and seeking details of the dismissal date was not unreasonable, Ms Cobb did so knowing that there was a twenty-one day period in which to file an application to the Commission. This was known to her from at least the first week of April 2023. Indeed the application form had been populated by Mr O’Malley at that time. Thus Ms Cobb delayed filing her claim believing that she was out of time.
However the explanation for not filing the claim as drafted in the first week of April 2023 (and therefore contributing to the length of the delay) is reasonable. The Commission’s application form F8 requires an applicant to answer question 1.3 “What date did your dismissal take effect?”. Estia Health failed to provide that information on 3 April 2023 and for the two months following. Ms Cobb was fully transparent in telling Estia Health that this information gap was prejudicing her rights to file legal proceedings within twenty-one days.
An application to the Commission which fails to provide the required information is incomplete. An incomplete application is not made in accordance with the FW Act. It is likely not a valid application[23] or at the very least, at risk of being dismissed under s 587(1)(a) of the FW Act for being incomplete.
Whilst Ms Cobb could have completed question 1.3 with a speculative answer, her conduct in seeking the factual answer as to from when had the employer made the dismissal effective was not unreasonable. Further, whilst Ms Cobb would have been correct, as a matter of law, in stating 3 April 2023 in answer to question 1.3 (see above), given that question 1.2 itself asks for the notification date, Ms Cobb could be excused for not answering the different question in 1.3 with that same answer.
I take into account that a week passed from 29 May 2023 when Ms Cobb was orally advised of the 1 March 2023 date of effect until the application was filed. However, the explanation for this delay period is also reasonable. Ms Styles promised to report back on Estia Health’s considered position by the end of that week. Ms Styles’ response was not received until 6 June. The date dismissal took effect was only put in writing on 6 June 2023.
Ms Cobb acted quickly to file her application (the next day) once Ms Styles advised this information and that Estia Health’s response represented its final position on the dispute.
Considered overall, the explanations for the delay weigh materially in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Action taken to dispute dismissal (s 366(2)(b))
The evidence clearly establishes that Ms Cobb immediately upon being advised of dismissal (3 April) and continuously over the following two months communicated with Estia Health concerning her dismissal. She put Estia Health, at both a local and national level, on notice that she disputed the reasonableness and lawfulness of its decision. She responded promptly to communication from Estia Health. She left the employer in no doubt that she was dissatisfied with the decision and with what she was seeking. She was fully transparent in referring to her rights under the Fair Work Act and her belief that she had invoked and was applying the dispute resolution processes of the enterprise agreement.
Estia Health was fully aware from 3 April 2023 that it had a substantive disagreement concerning an employment issue on its hands.
This weighs in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Prejudice to the employer (s 366(2)(c))
As a general principle, an employer is entitled to arrange its affairs and organise its resources on the basis that claims can no longer be made beyond the lodgement period, except in exceptional circumstances.[24]
If time is extended, a claim would have to be further responded to by the employer, involving time and cost. However, that prejudice, whilst real, is not unique.
This notwithstanding, the absence of prejudice would not of itself be a reason to grant an extension.[25]
This is a neutral consideration.
Merits of the application (s 366(2)(d))
Conciliation proceedings or a hearing would concern whether the employer dismissed Ms Cobb for an unlawful reason.
Further evidence on these matters would be required to make relevant findings. Noting the reverse onus of proof in the FW Act, it is premature to do so.
This is a neutral consideration.
Fairness between persons in similar position (s 366(2)(e))
In this matter, this is not a relevant factor.
Conclusion
The period of delay being forty-four days, in the context of a statutory twenty-one day time frame, is significant.
However, the explanations for the delay weigh materially in favour of Ms Cobb. The action she took to try to resolve the dispute internally and her transparency in communication and seeking relevant information weighs significantly so.
That Ms Cobb allowed the internal processes of dialogue to exhaust despite knowing that a 21-day deadline applied weighs somewhat against her. However, she was throughout that period also waiting for Estia Health to provide details of the date dismissal took effect. Those details were not only justifiably sought but also relevant to the filing of a validly made claim. There was no logical basis on which Estia Health failed to provide that detail until when it did (29 May 2023 and 6 June 2023).
The failure by the employer to advise for two months the date when the relationship had actually ended was an unusual circumstance. It was a circumstance directly relevant to the exercise of legal rights and the ability to file a valid application which was all but completed. Its urgency and its relevance to the exercise of legal rights within the 21-day period was expressly stated by Ms Cobb to the employer within forty-eight hours of being told she had been dismissed.
Considered overall, and notwithstanding that Ms Cobb could have applied earlier with a speculative date in form F8 as to when the dismissal took effect, I conclude that the circumstances were exceptional.
The time for late lodgement is extended such that application C2023/3278 can proceed further. The application will be listed for conciliation.
An order giving effect to this decision will be issued in conjunction with its publication.[26]
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Ms S Cobb on her own behalf with Mr M O’Malley
Mr N Gold with Ms J Styles of Estia Investments Pty Ltd
Hearing details:
Adelaide (video)
28 July
[1] [2020] FCAFC 152
[2] A2 Attachments 1 and 2
[3] A2 Attachment 3
[4] Ibid
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid
[9] A2 Attachment 4
[10] A2 Attachment 6
[11] A2 Attachment 7
[12] Mihajlovic v Lifeline Macarthur[2013] FWC 9804; Goodenough v CXN Transport Pty Ltd[2023] FWC 715, [32] and [34]
[13]Ayub v NSW Trains [2016] FWBFC 5500, [50]
[14] Smith v Canning Division of General Practice[2009] AIRC 959
[15] Lombardo v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations[2014] FWCFB 2288 at [21]
[16] Halls v AR & MA McCardle & Sons Pty Ltd and Ors [2014] FCCA 316
[17] [2011] FWAFB 975 “Nulty” at [13]. See also Cheval Properties Pty Ltd t/as Penrith Hotel Motel v Smithers[2010] FWAFB 7251 at [5]
[18] John Mamur v Coles Group Supply Chain Pty Ltd[2020] FWCFB 4954 at [7] and [19]; Dennis Obel v Central Desert Regional Council[2021] FWCFB 167 at [6]
[19] Manoj Ellikuttige v Moonee Valley Racing Club Inc[2018] FWCFB 4988 at [30] and [36]
[20] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters[2018] FWCFB 901 at [35]-[45]
[21] Stogiannidis (Ibid); Elliott v LEAP Legal Software Pty Ltd t/a LEAP Legal Software[2018] FWCFB 3288
[22] Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited[2015] FWCFB 287 at [12]; Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd[2014] FWCFB 2149 at [31] – [33]; Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd T/A Rio Tinto Marine[2016] FWCFB 6963; Czoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149
[23] Atanaskovic Hartnell Corporate Services Pty Limited t/a Atanaskovic Hartnell v Elizabeth Maree Kelly[2017] FWCFB 763, [29]
[24] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25
[25] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at 299-300
[26] PR764721
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