Stella v Griffith University - [2025] QCAT 469

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Stella v Griffith University [2025] QCAT 469

PARTIES:

RICHARD JOSEPH STELLA

(Applicant)

v

GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY

(First respondent)

CHRISTOPHER FLEMING

(Second respondent)

ANDREAS CHAI

(Third respondent)

APPLICATION NO:

REO011-25

ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO:

ADL074-24

MATTER TYPE:

Anti-discrimination matter

DELIVERED ON:

17 November 2025

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Senior Member Traves

ORDERS:

1. The application for reopening filed on 22 April 2025 is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – REOPENING – where application to reopen interlocutory decision directing the production of documents - whether reopening ground exists – whether final decision – where later Appeal Tribunal decision on which application based made under different statutory regime – whether application for reopening should be granted

Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld)

Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld)

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 62, s 129, s 136, s 137, s 138, s 138A, s 139, s 140, s 141, Schedule 3

AL Builders Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority & ors [2012] QCAT 559

DA Radic Pty Ltd v Colagrande & ors [2016] QCAT 357
Elks v Aitken Whyte Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] QCAT 123
Stella v Griffith University [2025] QCA 203
Stella v Griffith University [2025] QCATA 20
Toogood v Cassowary Coast Regional Council [2018] QCAT 319

Urquhart v Body Corporate for Circle on Cavill CTS 39918 [2013] QCAT 241

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2009 (Qld)

Applicant:

Self-represented

Respondent:

McCullough Robertson

REASONS FOR DECISION

The matter before me is an Application for reopening filed by the respondents on 22 April 2025.[1] The decision the application seeks to reopen was the making of orders for production of certain documents by Griffith University. I made the orders in the proceeding brought by Mr Stella against the respondents, which allege discrimination against him in the area of education on the basis of the protected attributes of political belief or activity and race (ADL074-24).
[1]A reopening file (REO011-25) was created by the registry. In REO011-25 the applicants are Griffith University, Christopher Fleming and Andreas Chai and the respondent is Richard Stella. I have adopted the file name designations of the original file (ADL074-24).
The decision to allow an Application for a notice to produce filed by Mr Stella was made on 26 March 2025 in the following terms:
1. The application for a notice to produce filed by Richard Stella on 21 August 2024 is allowed in the following terms:
(a) Griffith University produce the documents in the following categories, as described in Annexure A to this Order, to Richard Stella:
a.        incident one documents;
b.        incident two and three documents;
c.        incident four documents; and
d.        incident five documents, by:
4:00pm on 18 April 2025.
2. The application in respect of the category described as ‘race discrimination documents’ is refused.
The documents were not produced by 18 April 2025.
On 22 April 2025 Mr Stella filed an Application for miscellaneous matters (directions and other) seeking the following directions:
(1) That pursuant to s 58(1)(b) or s 62(1) of the QCAT Act, within 24 hours, the QCAT registry provide me with complete documents within the scope of the Tribunal’s order of 26 March 2025 previously submitted by the First Respondent, Griffith University, in connection with case APL013-24 in May 2024: Part B.1 nos 34, 35, and 36; Part B.2 nos 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41; and Part B.3 nos 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66 and 69.
(2) That, pursuant to s 62(3)(b) of the QCAT Act, within 24 hours, Griffith University produce all documents within the scope of the Tribunal’s order of 26 March 2025.
The Application of 22 April 2025 also sought an order that Griffith University be fined for a contravention of a Tribunal decision pursuant to s 213(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’) (the contempt provision).
This decision does not concern that Application.
On 22 April 2025 the respondents filed an Application for miscellaneous matters seeking an adjournment of the compulsory conference dated 29 April 2025 and an Application for reopening of the proceeding of 26 March 2025 in respect of the Application for a notice to produce filed by Mr Stella on 21 August 2024.
The Application for reopening was made, principally, on the basis that my earlier decision ordering disclosure of certain categories of documents in the ADL proceeding was inconsistent with the Appeal Tribunal decision of Judicial Member McGill in Stella v Griffith University [2025] QCATA 20.
On 3 June 2025 Mr Stella filed an Application seeking to vacate Tribunal Directions dated 26 May 2025 pending the resolution of outstanding interlocutory applications filed by Mr Stella on 15 March and 22 April 2025 and by the respondents for reopening on 22 April 2025.
On 23 June 2025 I made a decision to stay the decision of 26 March 2025 which required the production of documents, pending determination of CA 1851/25. CA 1851/25 was an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal brought by Mr Stella against a decision of the Appeal Tribunal[2] dismissing his appeal against a decision of the Information Commissioner made under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal in relation to each of the three proposed grounds of appeal argued by Mr Stella.
[2]Stella v Griffith University [2025] QCATA 20.
The application to reopen
Griffith University made the following submissions in support of the application to reopen the ‘disclosure decision’:
(a)The disclosure decision is prima facie inconsistent with the Appeal Tribunal decision.
(b)Given the matters dealt with in the Appeal Tribunal decision are substantially the same, or similar, the Tribunal, in these proceedings, is bound by the Appeal Tribunal decision.
(c)The University should not be required to provide Mr Stella with full unredacted copies of the ordered documents.
(d)The decision of the Appeal Tribunal confirmed a decision of the Office of the Information Commissioner (‘OIC’) of 7 December 2023.
(e)Further that Mr Stella, who is not a legal practitioner, is unlikely to comply with the Harman undertaking and should the documents be disclosed there is a real risk that Mr Stella would release such documents, which contain sensitive information, particularly in respect of the complainants and the University’s confidential complaints processes.
(f)In reply, that the Tribunal has the power to reopen the relevant decision by virtue of its inherent power to control its own proceedings as a court of record.
Mr Stella opposed the application and submitted:
(a)The disclosure decision is not a final decision and cannot be reopened under s 138 of the QCAT Act;
(b)The respondents have not shown how any of the ‘reopening grounds’ in Schedule 3 of the QCAT Act apply; and
(c)Accordingly, the reopening application should be refused.
(d)Further, that APL013-24 is of no significance to document production in these proceedings. The Appeal Tribunal did not consider whether any of the documents contained ‘relevant material’ or ‘relevant facts’ sufficient to enliven the Tribunal’s obligations pursuant to s 28(3)(e) in ADL074-24. Relying on Toogood v Cassowary Coast Regional Council,[3] ‘there is no reason why, if documents are properly disclosable, they should be exempt from disclosure because they have been the subject of a separate application under a different statutory regime’.[4]
(e)Moreover, even if the decision in APL013-24 was ‘evidence’ of anything, the overlap between the two proceedings was known when the Application for a notice to produce was first heard and decided and was not raised by the respondents at the time.
(f)The risk he might publish the documents were they to be disclosed, is not relevant to the reopening application.
[3][2018] QCAT 319.
[4]Ibid at [28].

Relevant statutory framework

The relevant provisions relating to reopening are set out in Chapter 2, Part 7 Decisions and Enforcement, Division 7 – Reopening.
Division 7 applies to a ‘proceeding’ that has been heard and decided, other than an appeal.[5] “Proceeding” is defined, relevantly, to mean a proceeding before the tribunal, including an appeal before the appeal tribunal and a proceeding relating to an application for leave to appeal to the appeal tribunal.[6]
[5]QCAT Act, s 136.
[6]QCAT Act, Schedule 3.
Section 138 provides that a party to a proceeding may apply for the proceeding to be reopened if the party considers a reopening ground exists for the party.[7]
[7]QCAT Act.
To succeed in a reopening application, the applicant must establish a ‘reopening ground’.[8]
[8]QCAT Act, s 139(4).
‘Reopening ground’ is defined:[9]
reopening ground, for a party to a proceeding, means—
(a) the party did not appear at the hearing of the proceeding and had a reasonable excuse for not attending the hearing; or
(b) the party would suffer a substantial injustice if the proceeding was not reopened because significant new evidence has arisen and that evidence was not reasonably available when the proceeding was first heard and decided.
[9]QCAT Act, Schedule 3.
A reopening application does not affect the operation of a decision made by the Tribunal in the proceeding[10] unless the Tribunal has made an order staying the operation of the decision made by the Tribunal in the proceeding until the application to reopen the proceeding is decided.[11]
[10]QCAT Act, s 138A(1).
[11]QCAT Act, s 138(2).
The Tribunal may act to stay the decision on the application of a party or on its own initiative.[12]
[12]QCAT Act, s 138A(3).
If a party makes an application under s 138, s 139 applies which provides:
139 Deciding whether to reopen
(1) This section applies if a party (the "applicant party") to a proceeding makes an application under section 138 for a proceeding to be reopened.
(2)     Each party to the proceeding must be given an opportunity to make, within the period stated in the rules, written submissions about the application.
(3)     The tribunal—
(a) must consider any written submissions made under subsection (2) about the application; and
(b) may decide whether or not to reopen the proceeding entirely on the basis of documents, without a hearing or meeting of any kind.
(4)     The tribunal may grant the application only if the tribunal considers—
(a) a reopening ground exists for the applicant party; and
(b) the ground could be effectively or conveniently dealt with by reopening the proceeding under this division, whether or not an appeal under part 8 relating to the ground may also be started.
(5) The tribunal’s decision on the application is final and can not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, set aside, or called in question in another way, under the Judicial Review Act 1991 or otherwise.
The effect of a decision to reopen is set out in s 140 which provides:
140 Effect of decision to reopen
(1) If, under section 139, the tribunal decides a proceeding should be reopened, the tribunal must decide the issues in the proceeding that must be heard and decided again.
(2)     The issues must be heard and decided by way of a fresh hearing on the merits, and subsection (1) does not prevent the tribunal from hearing and deciding other related issues in the proceeding.
(3)     The hearing and deciding of the issues and any related issues are taken to be a part of the original proceeding.
(4)     The tribunal may—
(a) confirm or amend the tribunal’s previous final decision in the proceeding; or
(b) set aside the tribunal’s previous final decision in the proceeding and substitute a new decision.
(5)     For this Act or an enabling Act, the decision of the tribunal as confirmed, amended or substituted under subsection (4) is the tribunal’s final decision in the proceeding.
(6)     The proceeding can not be reopened again under this division.
“Final decision”, of the Tribunal in a proceeding is defined, relevantly, to mean “the tribunal’s decision that finally decides the matters the subject of the proceeding.[13]
[13]Schedule 3.
Section 141 provides:
141 No appeal until application finally dealt with
(1) This section applies if a party to a proceeding has made an application under section 138 about the tribunal’s final decision in the proceeding.
(2) An appeal, or an application for leave to appeal, against the final decision can not be made until the application under section 138 is finally dealt with under this division.
If an application has been made for reopening pursuant to s 138 ‘about the tribunal’s final decision in the proceeding’, an application for leave to appeal or appeal cannot be made until the application for reopening is finally dealt with under Division 7.
Final decision relevantly ‘means the tribunal’s decision that finally decides the matters the subject of the proceeding’.[14]
[14]QCAT Act, sch 3 (definition of ‘final decision’).
Any appeal or application for leave to appeal must be made within the appeal period. By s 143(5)(b) the relevant day commencing the 28 day appeal period starts after the day the person applying for reopening is advised of the reopening decision. For present purposes, it is noted that s 143(5) does not limit the right of a person to appeal following a reopening application to a person whose reopening application was successful (and therefore, followed by a rehearing of relevant issues on the merits).
Therefore, if a reopening is granted, an application for leave to appeal or appeal may not be made until after rehearing of the relevant issues on the merits as provided for in s 140. If the reopening application is refused, the final decision of the Tribunal must be the decision made by it before the reopening application was made (and which was sought to be disturbed as a consequence of the reopening application).

Consideration

By s 139(4)(a) the Tribunal can only grant the application to reopen if it considers a reopening ground exists for the applicant party. There are only two reopening grounds and neither apply: this is not a situation where the applicant did not appear at a hearing with reasonable excuse, nor is it a case where ‘significant new evidence’ has arisen. A decision of the Appeal Tribunal is not ‘evidence’.
Further, in my view, the application to reopen a decision must (putting aside applications for leave to appeal and/or appeal) be in relation to a final decision, which is defined to mean the Tribunal’s decision that finally decides the matters the subject of the proceeding and, for Chapter 2, Part 7, Division 4, includes the decisions in s 129.[15]
[15]QCAT Act, Schedule 3.
This construction is supported by the plain meaning of the provisions in Chapter 2, Part 7, Division 7: s 136 provides that the division dealing with reopening applies to a proceeding that has been ‘heard and decided’; s 140(4) sets out the powers of the tribunal if the decision is reopened which are to confirm or amend the tribunal’s previous final decision in the proceeding; or to set aside the tribunal’s previous final decision in the proceeding and substitute a new decision; and s 140(5) provides that the decision substituted or amended under s 140(4) is the tribunal’s final decision in the proceeding. Further, s 139(5) provides that the tribunal’s decision on the application is final and can not be challenged or appealed against. This approach to the construction of the reopening provisions is also consistent with the interpretation applied in other decisions of the Tribunal.[16]
[16]DA Radic Pty Ltd v Colagrande & ors [2016] QCAT 357 at [7] and [8], Senior Member Brown; AL Builders Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority & ors [2012] QCAT 559, [6], Member Buxton.
Here, the decision sought to be reopened was an interlocutory decision that decided an application for a notice to produce. It did not finally determine the issues in the proceeding and, therefore, is not a decision to which the reopening provisions apply.
I reject the submissions of the respondent that the Tribunal can exercise inherent jurisdiction to reopen a matter applying the common law. QCAT is a creature of statute and, unlike superior courts, does not possess inherent jurisdiction.[17] In my view, s 139 exhaustively states the circumstances in which a proceeding may be reopened.
[17]Urquhart v Body Corporate for Circle on Cavill CTS 39918 [2013] QCAT 241 at [8], per Hon James Thomas, Judicial Member and Dr John Forbes.
The respondents’ submissions focus on the fact the documents relevant to each application, one a discrimination proceeding applying s 62 of the QCAT Act, and the other a decision of the Appeal Tribunal applying the provisions of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (‘IP Act’), are the same. With respect, the fact the documents may be the same is not the point. The issue is whether the issues relevant to the application were the same. It is clear they were not.
In my decision of 26 March 2025, the issue was whether the materials sought to be produced under s 62(3) of the QCAT Act were described with particularity and had demonstrated direct relevance to the issues in dispute.[18]
[18]Applying Elks v Aitken Whyte Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] QCAT 123, [10]-[11].
In the Appeal Tribunal Decision APL013-24 the issue was whether the OIC had erred in law in relation to three proposed grounds of appeal. The decision of the OIC was an external review of the decision the University had made to refuse production of the documents sought because disclosure would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest (s 67 of the IP Act and ss 47(3)(b) and 49 of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) (‘RTI Act’)) and that certain information could be deleted (s 88 IP Act); and, in relation to another category of documents, that disclosure be refused on the basis the information was not subject to the IP Act, having been created by the University in the exercise of a quasi judicial function related to the conduct of the OIC’s review (s 52(1)(b)(ii) of the IP Act) and that the remaining information may be deleted as it was irrelevant to the access application (s 88 IP Act).
The most relevant aspect of the Appeal Decision concerns the refusal of access to the documents on the basis access would be contrary to the public interest.
Section 40 of the IP Act gives effect to the Act’s primary object, by conferring a right on an individual to be given access to documents to the extent they contain the individual’s personal information. This right is subject to other provisions of the IP Act and RTI Act, including grounds on which access may be refused (s 67 IP Act) One of these grounds permits access to information to be refused where its disclosure would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.
The term ‘public interest’ refers to considerations affecting the good order and functioning of the community and government affairs for the well-being of citizens. This means that, in general, a public interest consideration is one which is common to all members of, or a substantial segment of the community, as distinct from matters that concern purely private or personal interests. However, there are some recognised public interest considerations that may apply for the benefit of an individual.

In determining whether disclosure of information would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest, the steps to be followed are prescribed in section 49 of the RTI Act. In summary, a decision-maker must:
(a)identify any irrelevant factors and disregard them;
(b)identify relevant public interest factors favouring disclosure and nondisclosure;
(c)balance the relevant factors favouring disclosure and nondisclosure; and
(d)decide whether disclosure of the CTPI Information would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.
Schedule 4 of the RTI Act contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be relevant in determining where the balance of the public interest lies in a particular case. Parliament’s intention that grounds for refusing access to information are to be interpreted narrowly (s 67(2) IP Act and s 47(2) of the RTI Act).
In my view, there is no overlap between the issue of “direct relevance” to the issues in the discrimination complaint and whether access to the documents applied for under the IP Act and RTI Act should, on balance, be refused on the basis of public interest. The tests to be applied in determining access to documents under the IP Act are different to those that apply when determining a production application under s 62 of the QCAT Act.
Accordingly, for the reasons above, the application to reopen the interlocutory disclosure decision of 26 March 2025 is refused.
I note that as the Tribunal’s decision of 26 March 2025 was stayed by the initiative of the Tribunal pending the Court of Appeal’s decision on Mr Stella’s Application for leave to appeal the relevant Appeal Decision, and the Court of Appeal decision refusing leave was given on 24 October 2025, the documents described in the Tribunal’s decision of 26 March 2025 must now be produced.