Steele v Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Board (No 2)

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94 CLR 91

With respect to the charge made under S. 209 (g), it has been made perfectly clear by the argument before us that the books which were in fact kept were not true accounts in certain respects in the period from 30th June 1952 to December 1952, and that they were kept in a way which would not enable anybody to see the true picture with respect to specific items. The motive for doing this may be a matter rather of speculation than of certainty but it cannot have been honest. Motive, however, is of no great materiality except for the purpose of punishment.

We shall not go into the figures which have been discussed before us, but the items through which we have been taken are quite convincing as showing that there was a definite course adopted to conceal from those who merely inspected the books the exact financial state of the business as it stood at that time.

We think that the conviction on the charge under S. 209 (g) must stand. The sentence imposed was one of four months' imprison- ment. The maximum sentence which the judge of the Bankruptcy Court could impose was six months' imprisonment. He took into consideration the circumstances and the admissions made by the bankrupt, which he could not but think were not ill-advisedly made, and he fixed the sentence at four months. This court could not, unless it were clearly of opinion that the learned judge erred in the exercise of his discretion, interfere with the sentence. The sentence must stand.

The charge which was made under S. 210 (2) (c), namely that the bankrupt had made omissions in books affecting or relating to his property or affairs, etc., seems clearly enough to have been made out and that conviction must stand. A concurrent sentence of one month's imprisonment was imposed upon the bankrupt in respect of that conviction and there is no reason for interfering with it.

The result is that an order will be made quashing the conviction and the sentence on the charge under S. 210 (1) (d) and confirming the convictions and sentences on the other two charges. Subject to quashing of the conviction under S. 210 (1) (d) the appeal will be dismissed with costs.

Conviction under S. 210 (1) (d) of the Bank-

ruptcy Act 1924-1950 quashed, other- wise appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors for the appellant, Abram Landa &Co. Solicitor for the respondent, D. D. Bell, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth.

94 CLR 92

[ ] STEELE

DEFENCE FORCES RETIREMENT BENE-

FITS BOARD AND ANOTHER

RESPONDENTS. [No. 2] High Court-Appeal-Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Board-Questions open

on appeal-Determination by board of "percentage of total incapacity of the member in relation to civil employment -Meaning-Reclassification-Board satisfied 'that the percentage of incapacity of a pensioner

because of the MELBOURNE, nature of his employment should be varied "--Considerations governing-Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Act 1948-1952 (No. 31 of 1948-No. 93 of 1952), ss. 51, 53 (1),…

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Details
Case
[1956] HCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal by William Kayle Steele against a decision of the Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Board. Mr. Steele had sustained an injury to his right arm and wrist while a member of the Permanent Air Force, resulting in permanent disability. Upon his retirement due to this incapacity, the Board initially determined his total incapacity in relation to civil employment to be such that he was classified as Class B, entitling him to a pension. However, the Board later purported to reclassify him as Class C, terminating his pension, on the basis that his subsequent employment indicated his incapacity was less than 30%.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the Board had acted correctly in reclassifying Mr. Steele under section 53(1) of the Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Act 1948-1952, and what the scope of an appeal to the High Court under section 83 of the Act entailed. Specifically, the Court had to consider the meaning of "percentage of total incapacity of the member in relation to civil employment" as contemplated by section 51, and whether a reclassification under section 53(1) could be based solely on the nature of a pensioner's subsequent employment, even if their physical disability had not altered.

The Court, referencing a prior decision of the Full Court, held that the determination of a pensioner's incapacity in relation to civil employment under section 51 was not concerned with their ability to perform a highly selective occupation, but rather their general capacity to engage in a range of suitable occupations. Consequently, a reclassification under section 53(1) could be justified if the nature and circumstances of a pensioner's employment demonstrated that the initial assessment of their incapacity was not correctly made or should be varied. This assessment required a broad consideration of the pensioner's capacity as evidenced by their employment, rather than merely their ability to perform a specific job.

The Court found that Mr. Steele's subsequent employment as a technician's assistant and then as a junior postal officer, and his subsequent move to sales staff, indicated a general capacity for civil employment that justified the Board's reclassification. The appeal was dismissed, confirming the Board's decision to reclassify Mr. Steele and terminate his pension.

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