Stebner and Kreibich (Child support)

[2021] AATA 1982

Stebner and Kreibich (Child support) [2021] AATA 1982 (29 April 2021)

DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division

REVIEW NUMBER:  2020/CC020428

APPLICANT:  Mr Stebner

OTHER PARTIES:  Child Support Registrar

Ms Kreibich

TRIBUNAL:Member M Martellotta

DECISION DATE:  29 April 2021

DECISION:

The tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that:

·For the period 2 July 2020 to 30 September 2021 Ms Kreibich’s ATI is varied to $49,804.

·For the period 2 July 2020 to 31 December 2020 Ms Kreibich’s annual rate of child support is increased by $1,093.49.

·For the period 1 January 2021 to 21 March 2021 Ms Kreibich’s annual rate of child support is increased by $888.26

CATCHWORDS

CHILD SUPPORT – departure determination – costs of education - manner expected by both parents - cost of maintaining the children are significantly affected – financial resources of both parents - decision under review set aside and substituted

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

REASONS FOR DECISION

BACKGROUND

1. Mr Stebner and Ms Kreibich are the parents of three children. The two eldest children ([Child 1] and [Child 2]) are twins and were born [in] March 2003 and the youngest child ([Child 3]) was born [in] September 2005. The older children turned 18 years of age [in] March 2021 and the assessment terminates in relation to those children as of that date. All the children are in Mr Stebner’s 100% care.

2. The case was registered on 11 March 2020. Ms Kreibich is the parent liable to pay child support. On 2 July 2020 Mr Stebner applied for a change of assessment. He raised the following grounds in his application:

   ·     Reason 3 – costs of caring for, educating or training the children in a manner intended by the parents.

·     Reason 5 – a parent has provided money, goods or property for the children’s benefit.[1]

·     Reasons 8A and 8B – that the assessment does not reflect the parents’ income, property, financial resources and earning capacity.

[1] According to the Agency this ground was later withdrawn by Mr Stebner.

1. At the time of his application the following administrative assessment was in place – for the period 30 March 2020 to 21 March 2021 Ms Kreibich is assessed to pay the relevant minimal annual rate of child support of $443. This was based upon a 2018/19 adjusted taxable income (ATI) of $0 for Ms Kreibich and a 2018/19 ATI of $127,863 for Mr Stebner.

2. On 19 August 2020 a Services Australia (the Agency) decision maker decided to depart from the administrative assessment having found Reasons 3 and 8A established so that for the period 2 July 2020 to 30 September 2021 Ms Kreibich’s ATI was varied to $49,804 and the annual rate of child support was increased by $15,558 from 1 October 2020 to 30 September 2021.

3. Both parties lodged objections to that decision and on 25 November 2020 the Agency made a new decision as follows:

   ·For the period 2 July 2020 to 30 September 2021 Ms Kreibich’s ATI was varied to $49,804.

   ·For the period 2 July 2020 to 30 September 2021 the annual rate payable by Ms Kreibich was increased by $5,040.

4. Mr Stebner lodged an application seeking review of that decision with the tribunal on 10 December 2020. The tribunal convened a telephone directions hearing on 3 March 2021 and issued directions. On 29 April 2021 the tribunal convened a hearing.

5. Mr Stebner and Ms Kreibich participated by telephone directions and each provided evidence under affirmation. Documents relevant to their decision had been provided by the Agency (245 pages). Mr Stebner provided documents (A1-333). Ms Kreibich provided documents (B1- B30). The tribunal requested additional information from the Agency (C1).

ISSUES

1. The statutory provisions relevant to this review are contained in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act).

2. Child support legislation is interpreted by the Agency with the aid of the Child Support Guide (the Guide). The tribunal is not bound by law to apply the policy as set out in the Guide but provided the policy is consistent with the legislation, it is required to have regard to it and in the ordinary course follow it.[2]

   [2] See Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.

3. The issues for the tribunal to determine in this case are:

   ·     Does a ground for departure exist? if so,

   ·     Would it be just and equitable as regards the child, the liable parent, and the carer entitled to child support to depart from the administrative assessment of child support?

   ·     Is it otherwise proper to make a particular departure determination?

CONSIDERATION

Issue 1 – Is there a ground to depart from the administrative assessment?

1. The rate of child support payable by a liable parent is usually based on an administrative assessment calculated using the relevant formula under Part 5 of the Act. This involves the application of a statutory formula, which takes into account factors such as the number of children, the age of each child, the level of care provided and the income of each parent. The income used in the calculation has a number of components making up the adjusted taxable income, which is worked out using section 43 of the Act. The general approach is that the Child Support Registrar (the Registrar) will utilise a parent’s ATI as assessed by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) for the last relevant year of income.

2. Part 6A of the Act allows for a departure from an administrative assessment (a process commonly known as a change of assessment). The liable parent or carer may apply to the Registrar for a determination to depart from the child support administrative assessment under Part 6A of the Act (section 98B). Section 98C of the Act provides that the Registrar may make a determination to depart from the formula assessment and as noted, establishes a three-step process.

3. The grounds for departure from the administrative assessment are set out in subsection 117(2) of the Act. Only one ground is required in the special circumstances of the case to depart from the administrative assessment and thereby satisfy the requirements of subsection 117(2) of the Act.[3]

Reason 3 – costs of caring for, educating or training the children in a manner intended by the parents

[3] The phrase “special circumstances of the case” is not defined in the Act. However, the Family Court has held that “it is intended to emphasise that the facts of the case must establish something special or out of the ordinary” (Gyselman and Gyselman (1992) FLC 92–279). Likewise, in Phillippe and Phillippe (1978) FLC 90-433 the Court held that “special circumstances” are “facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases”.

1. A ground for departure exists if, in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the children are significantly affected because the children are being cared for, educated or trained in the manner that was expected by their parents (subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ii)).

2. At hearing the parties agreed and the tribunal found as follows:

   a)Prior to separation the children were attending public school. Ms Kreibich initiated an enquiry regarding their daughter attending a private boarding school as she felt that this was something that [Child 2] would benefit from. Mr Stebner had no objection to this.

   b)[Child 2] was successful in securing a scholarship and commenced attending [School 1] in Term 3, 2018. Both parents signed the enrolment forms.

   c)Neither parent raised issue with the tuition and boarding school fees as documented by the Agency,[4] which were as follows:

   ·Year 11 (2020) $10,962.50

   ·Year 12 (2021) $20,517.94.

   d)[Child 1] was attending a vocational school. He completed Year 11 in 2020 and did not go on to Year 12. He is currently employed as an apprentice in [Industry 1].

   e)[Child 3] was attending a local school. Post separation Mr Stebner enrolled [Child 3] into a private boarding school [School 2] from Term 2, 2020. Ms Kreibich did not participate in the decision to enrol [Child 3] at [School 2] and did not sign the enrolment documents. [Child 3] still attends that school.

   f)According to a [School 2] fee schedule the combined tuition and residential fees for Year 9 in 2020 was $45,600. Documents show that [Child 3] was awarded a fees assistance award of $19,000 for 2020.[5]

   [4] Page 9.

   [5] Page 48.

3. Mr Stebner’s submission was as follows:

   a)Ms Kreibich should contribute 50% to both [Child 2]’s and [Child 3]’s tuition and boarding costs. Ms Kreibich claimed 50% of the matrimonial assets in their family court property settlement and as such she should meet these costs equally.

   b)Whilst it was his decision to enrol [Child 3] into the boarding school, it was always contemplated that this would occur. He did not discuss it with Ms Kreibich because she would not talk to him. He said the arrangement means that he is able to work in [Industry 2] knowing that [Child 3] and [Child 2] are being taken care of during the school term.

   c)Ms Kreibich had discussed [Child 3] attending a private school on a family trip when they had dropped off [Child 2] at her school and that she had also discussed it with his mother. Mr Stebner relied upon letters provided by his mother and children in support of his recollection.[6]

   [6] Pp. 333-335 of the papers.

4. Ms Kreibich stated in her evidence:

   a)She agrees that it was a mutual decision that [Child 2] attend boarding school, but no such agreement or intention had been formed in relation to [Child 3].

   b)There had been a family discussion on the day they dropped off [Child 2] at boarding school but this just part of a general conversation and was in the context of trying to keep things “light”. She did not have that discussion with Mr Stebner’s mother

   c)She had no idea that [Child 3] was being enrolled into a private boarding school; she receives no communication from that school and only found out when she was contacted by his old school advising he had left.

   d)It was by no means agreed or a mutual intention that [Child 3] would also attend boarding school.

5. In this matter, Mr Stebner relies upon letters provided by his mother, [Child 1] and [Child 2] which all reference a family discussion on the day that [Child 2] was being driven to boarding school as evidence of a mutual intention between himself and Ms Kreibich regarding [Child 3] attending a private boarding school.

6. The tribunal does not place any weight on those letters. In this regard the tribunal is generally reluctant to place any weight upon evidence provided by the children but also noted evidence suggesting a  significant breakdown in the relationship between Ms Kreibich and the children.[7]  In Reasons for Judgement by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia[8] Her Honour Judge Terry  found credible,  Ms Kreibich’s evidence, regarding verbal abuse received from Mr Stebner and that his behaviour had drawn the children into copying such behaviour. In such circumstances the tribunal is hesitant to attach any weight to the evidence provided by the children.

   [7] Paragraph 117 of the Reasons for Judgement page 151 of the papers

   [8] Page 131 of the papers – this relates to the division of the matrimonial assets

7. The Reasons for Judgement also notes in Mr Stebner’s evidence that:

   [Child 2]…and [Child 3]…are enrolled at private schools as boarder [sic]. The husband said that the private fees were expensive but having them attend those schools is his choice.[9]

   This would suggest that Mr Stebner has in other proceedings taken a position which differs from that put forward in relation to these current matters.

   [9] Paragraph 183 of Reasons for Judgement at page 161 of the papers. The tribunal asked Mr Stebner what his submissions were in relation to any reliance the tribunal should place on the conclusions in those Reasons for Judgment. Mr Stebner indicated that he did not accept those findings and later confirmed that he had lodged an appeal against that decision.

8. In deciding this matter, the tribunal needs to consider the type of education expected by both parents rather than any particular school intended by the parents (Wild and Ballard (1997) FLC 92-771). The tribunal will also need to consider and determine whether both parents expected that the child would be educated privately. The decision of one parent, in the absence of agreement, whether directly or indirectly, is not sufficient.

9. In this matter the tribunal was satisfied that the parents had an agreement that their daughter [Child 2] would attend private school; however, the tribunal was not satisfied that this agreement or intention extended to [Child 3].

10. Whilst there may have been some general family discussion regarding [Child 3], this was not in the context of Mr Stebner and Ms Kreibich coming to an agreement. At the time of separation, [Child 3] was attending a public school. Mr Stebner agreed he made the decision for [Child 3] to go to boarding school partly because it meant he was being cared for during the school term and this suited Mr Stebner’s circumstances. Mr Stebner chose the school and signed the enrolment documents. Ms Kreibich was unaware of those arrangements until after the fact.

11. In relation to the private education costs for [Child 2], child support legislation does not require both parents to be liable for the costs. The most that it requires is that the cost must be of an amount that significantly affects the costs of maintaining the children. The issue as to whether Ms Kreibich can afford to contribute towards those costs will be considered by the tribunal when determining what is a just and equitable determination.

12. The tribunal has found that the education costs for [Child 2] as follows: Year 11 (2020) $10,962.50 and in Year 12 (2021) $20,517.94. In this matter the tribunal concluded that in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected because the child is being educated in the manner that was expected by their parents. For this reason, the tribunal therefore finds that there is a ground for departure.

Issue 2 – What is a just and equitable determination?

1. As the tribunal is satisfied that there is a ground to depart from the administrative assessment of child support, the next step is to consider whether it is just and equitable as regards the children, the liable parent, and the carer entitled to child support to make a particular determination in accordance with sub-subparagraph 98C(1)(b)(ii)(A) of the Act. This in turn requires the tribunal to consider the matters discussed below,[10] which are as set out in subsection 117(4) of the Act.

Duty to maintain the children

[10] The tribunal is required to give “overt consideration” to relevant factors listed in subsection 117(4) of the Act; Tyagi & Meares (SSAT Appeal) [2008] FMCAfam 886.

1. Both parents have a duty to maintain the child and in this regard the tribunal notes the following relevant provisions of the Act:

   …that parents of a child have a primary duty to maintain the child. The duty has a priority over all commitments of the parent other than commitments necessary for self-support.[11]

Proper needs of the children

[11] Section 3 of the Act.

1. In determining the proper needs of the child it is necessary to have regard at a broad level to the manner in which the child is being, and in which the parents expect the child to be, cared for, educated or trained, and also any special needs of the children. It is apparent from authorities that the scope of matters to be taken into consideration are broader than the costs of education or their health.

2. At hearing it was not in contention that up until about March 2020 the costs for the children were still being paid from joint partnership funds and it was from about that date that Mr Stebner has been meeting costs from his own funds.

3. The tribunal has already made findings in relation to [Child 2]’s education costs. In relation to those costs the tribunal is satisfied that an adjustment to the administrative formula is warranted.

4. Mr Stebner told the tribunal that he incurs costs for the children which includes mobile phones and data; he bought tools for [Child 1]’s apprenticeship as well as a car; he also bought a car for [Child 2] at a cost of just under $30,000; and he has been told that [Child 3] will need orthodontic work when he gets older. Mr Stebner provided receipts for these expenses and says that Ms Kreibich should contribute 50% to those costs. The tribunal is satisfied and finds that decisions to make these purchases were made solely by Mr Stebner.

5. The tribunal was not satisfied that the costs identified by Mr Stebner are costs that would warrant a departure from the usual administrative formula that provides for the relevant costs of the children. In terms of some of purchase of items such a car for [Child 2] and [Child 1], and tools for [Child 1],  the tribunal concluded that such expenditure items have been made at Mr Stebner’s sole discretion and as such does not warrant an adjustment to the administrative formula.

6. There was no evidence regarding any special needs. Whilst Mr Stebner refers to an orthodontic treatment plan for [Child 3], that is yet to be implemented.

7. The tribunal concluded that the only relevant costs pertaining to the proper needs of the children which warrants a variation to the administrative assessment are [Child 2]’s school fees.

Income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the children

1. In having regard to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the children, the tribunal must disregard any entitlement of the children or the carer entitled to child support to an income-tested pension, allowance or benefit (subparagraph 117(7)(b)(ii) of the Act).

2. There was no evidence presented to the tribunal that [Child 2] or [Child 3] have any income or unused earning capacity that needs to be taken into account in the child support assessment. [Child 1] commenced an apprenticeship about the same time he turned 18 years old and according to Mr Stebner, he earns about $1,062 a fortnight. As noted, [Child 1] as of his 18th birthday, is no longer a child relevant to the assessment and as such, the tribunal concludes that there is no basis for any adjustment pursuant to this consideration.

Other party receiving money, goods and property for the benefit of the children

1. As noted, Mr Stebner did not pursue this ground. The tribunal concludes that there is no basis for any adjustment pursuant to this consideration.

The income, property and financial resources of each parent who is a party to the proceeding

1. Mr Stebner’s submissions mainly considered Ms Kreibich’s financial circumstances. He says that he believes she receives cash in hand payments from the work she undertakes at a friend’s [business] and he produced extracts from the [business]’s Facebook account which mentions Ms Kreibich. Ms Kreibich says that she has always loved working with cattle and does not earn an income from the stud but spends time there because it is something she enjoys doing. On the basis of the presented evidence the tribunal is satisfied and finds that Ms Kreibich does not derive a cash income from the  cattle stud.

2. Prior to separation Mr Stebner and Ms Kreibich owned a farming property which they operated in partnership. Mr Stebner also worked in [Industry 2] and continues to do so. Ms Kreibich did some work on the property and in 2014 started working in a local [shop]. The farm was sold after separation in April 2020.

3. Property settlement matters between the parties were resolved through a trial and orders made by the Federal Circuit Court resulting in a percentage division of the overall asset pool of 56.5% ($1.2 million) to Mr Stebner and 43.5% ($928,000) to Ms Kreibich. As noted, Mr Stebner says he is appealing that decision.[12]

   [12] Page 164 of the papers.

1. Payslips provided by Mr Stebner show total payments of $5,771 a fortnight from his employment at the [workplace].

2. According to his Statement of Financial Circumstances, the tribunal finds that Mr Stebner:

   a)Receives total average weekly income of $2,944 from his employment at a [workplace]. He states that this is his sole source of income as a PAYE employee.

   b)The matrimonial assets have been sold and divided as noted above.

   c)He holds savings of about $920,000; shares valued at about $140,000 and holds about $149,000 in an industry superannuation fund.

   d)He owns two vehicles and plant equipment and machinery valued at about $150,000.

3. Ms Kreibich told the tribunal that post separation she moved interstate. She secured employment which ended with the COVID-19 pandemic but has now secured employment as a [Occupation 1]. She earns her income also as a PAYE employee. Ms Kreibich provided income statements downloaded from the ATO portal. These show that in 2019/20 she had income of $49,911 and her year to date 200/21 income is $35,339.

4. According to her Statement of Financial Circumstances, the tribunal finds that in relation to Ms Kreibich:

   a)Her average weekly income is $975.

   b)She has savings of about $590,000.

   c)Her superannuation balance is about $154,000.

   d)She has personal assets of about $6,000.

5. In this matter the tribunal finds that both parents earn their income as PAYE employees. Mr Stebner has a gross pay of about $2,900 per week (annualised to about $150,000 gross) and Ms Kreibich has a gross pay of about $970 per week (annualised to about $50,000). The tribunal also finds that each of the parties received a share of the total assets pool from the marriage whereby Mr Stebner received 56.5% and Ms Kreibich 43.5% of the pool. Each party holds financial assets from that division.

Earning capacity

1. A ground for departure exists if, in the special circumstances of the case, the administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child because of the earning capacity of either parent (subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ib)).

2. Subsection 117(7B) of the Act provides:

   (7B)    In having regard to the earning capacity of a parent of the child, the court may determine that the parent’s earning capacity is greater than is reflected in his or her income for the purposes of this Act only if the court is satisfied that:

   (a)    one or more of the following applies:

   (i)       the parent does not work despite ample opportunity to do so;

   (ii)the parent has reduced the number of hours per week of his or her employment or other work below the normal number of hours per week that constitutes full-time work for the occupation or industry in which the parent is employed or otherwise engaged;

   (iii)      the parent has changed his or her occupation, industry or working pattern; and

   (b)the parent’s decision not to work, to reduce the number of hours, or to change his or her occupation, industry or working pattern, is not justified on the basis of:

   (i)       the parent’s caring responsibilities; or

   (ii)       the parent’s state of health; and

   (c)the parent has not demonstrated that it was not a major purpose of that decision to affect the administrative assessment of child support in relation to the child.

3. Mr Stebner submits that Ms Kreibich should be assessed on an earning capacity working as a farm manager. He referred to an affidavit filed in the property settlement proceedings in which Ms Kreibich described their working arrangements during the marriage whereby she managed the farm whilst Mr Stebner worked at the [workplace] until she commenced working on a casual basis with a [local shop] in 2014.

4. The tribunal notes that the evidence does not support a finding that Ms Kreibich should be assessed according to her earning capacity.

The commitments of each parent who is a party to the proceeding that are necessary to enable the parent to support themself, or any other child or another person that the person has a duty to maintain

1. Mr Stebner submits that his costs of self-support are affected by a loan he owes his mother to assist with legal costs. His main submissions as noted were directed at the costs he incurs in relation to the care of the children.  He estimates weekly personal costs of self-support as being about $998 (this includes the full cost of the rent $550).

2. Ms Kreibich says that she has also been impacted by legal costs and is concerned that her funds will be diminished due to appeal proceedings lodged by Mr Stebner regarding orders made in the Federal Circuit Court. Ms Kreibich says she owes her parents money (about $79,000) in relation to her legal costs. She has personal weekly costs of about $800 a week.

3. The tribunal is satisfied, taking into account the relevant costs of self-support utilised in the assessments and based upon evidence provided at hearing, that neither party has extraordinary costs of self-support that are relevant to the assessment.

Any hardship that would be caused

1. Mr Stebner’s submission mainly covered the issue of contributions to the children’s expenses. He says that despite the difference in their earnings from employment, Ms Kreibich should contribute from her share of the property settlement.

2. Ms Kreibich says that there is a significant disparity in her and Mr Stebner’s financial circumstances and it would cause her hardship to contribute to the level Mr Stebner insists upon. She says she faces some uncertainty given Mr Stebner is pursuing an appeal of the orders made regarding the division of the assets pool. She says she has no issue with contributing to [Child 2]’s school fess provided it is proportional to earnings.

3. In this matter the tribunal noted that both parties received not insignificant financial distributions from the total assets pool. In this regard Mr Stebner, according to the orders, received slightly more than half of the pool. Where the significant disparity lies, however, is in the relative earnings of each party. Mr Stebner earns an income significantly higher than Ms Kreibich’s. This conclusion is consistent with that observed in the Reasons for Judgment where Terry J observed that Mr Stebner emerged from the relationship with a strong earning capacity and continued to earn three times that of Ms Kreibich in the post-separation period and he was in a stronger position to financially support the children. The decision in that matter concluded that no adjustment in Mr Stebner’s favour was warranted due to his care of the children.[13]

Conclusions as to a particular departure determination

[13] Paragraph 130-131 of Reasons for Judgment at page 153 of the papers.

1. In this matter at the time of his application for a change of assessment, the administrative assessment was based upon a 2018/19 ATI of $nil for Ms Kreibich and Mr Stebner’s ATI of $127,863 for the period 30 March 2020 to 21 March 2021.

2. In terms of any contribution that Ms Kreibich should make towards [Child 2]’s costs of schooling, the tribunal concludes that given the overall comparative financial positions of the parties, particularly as they relate to the significant difference in incomes, a just and equitable determination is one which reflects this disparity.

3. In the tribunal’s view, the division of property assets has in effect given each party a similar level of financial resources; however, the difference in income is such that Mr Stebner on an annual income of $150,000, and Ms Kreibich on an income of about $49,000 result  in a relative income percentage of 8% to 20%.[14] The tribunal reaches the same conclusion as that arrived at by the Agency on objection that a contribution of 80% (Mr Stebner) and 20% (Ms Kreibich) in relation to [Child 2]’s school fees is just and equitable. This results in Ms Kreibich contributing  $2,193 towards the 2020 academic year and $4,104 towards the 2021 academic year. The tribunal concluded that those amounts should be apportioned to the relevant period of the departure determination.

   [14] Page 224 of the papers

4. In terms of the parties’ ATIs as noted, the administrative assessment applied a $nil 2018/19 ATI for Ms Kreibich. As noted, Ms Kreibich was working in 2020 and reported a gross income of $49,911 for the year ending 30 June 2020 and she is on track to earn a similar level of income to the year ending 30 June 2021. It is just and equitable that the administrative assessment reflects Ms Kreibich’s income. In this regard the tribunal notes that on objection the Agency utilised a figure of $49,804 which in effect arrives at the same result if applying a figure of $49,911. In terms of Mr Stebner, the assessment should reflect his ATI as assessed by the ATO and reflected in his tax returns.

5. In terms of the period of any determination, Mr Stebner says that any changes should be backdated to the commencement of the case rather from the date of the objection. In this matter the tribunal concluded that Ms Kreibich is entitled to rely upon the administrative assessment up until the date that Mr Stebner make his application. The tribunal concluded that any departure from the assessment should commence as of 2 July 2020.

6. In terms of an end date, the tribunal notes that [Child 1] is no longer a child relevant to the assessment as of his 18th birthday [in] March 2021. [Child 2] also turned 18 [in] March 2021. The tribunal notes that the Agency wrote to Mr Stebner inviting him to extend the assessment for [Child 2] beyond her 18th birthday. It was not clear from the evidence at hearing whether Mr Stebner had made such an application. The tribunal sought clarification form the Agency who confirmed that no application to extend the assessment in relation to [Child 2] beyond her 18th birthday had been received from Mr Stebner – this means any departure in relation to [Child 2] has effect until the date she turns 18 years of age.

7. The tribunal also concluded that otherwise concluding the departure to 30 September 2021 will allow time for Ms Kreibich’s 2020/21 tax returns to be lodged and applied to the assessment in accordance with the administrative formula.[15]

   [15] The tribunal’s decision n this matter varies from that made by the Agency on objection due to a different approach to the calculation of Ms Kreibich’s contribution to the school fees.

8. The tribunal considers the following departure determination to be just and equitable in the circumstances of this case.:

   ·For the period 2 July 2020 to 30 September 2021 Ms Kreibich’s ATI is varied to $49,804.

   ·For the period 2 July 2020 to 31 December 2020 Ms Kreibich’s annual rate of child support is increased by $1,093.49.[16]

   [16] $2,193/365 (daily rate) x182 days

   ·For the period 1 January 2021 to 21 March 2021 Ms Kreibich’s annual rate of child support is increased by $888.26[17]

   [17] $1,404/365 (daily rate)x79 days

DECISION

The tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that:

·For the period 2 July 2020 to 30 September 2021 Ms Kreibich’s ATI is varied to $49,804.

·For the period 2 July 2020 to 31 December 2020 Ms Kreibich’s annual rate of child support is increased by $1,093.49.

·For the period 1 January 2021 to 21 March 2021 Ms Kreibich’s annual rate of child support is increased by $888.26