[2006] HCATrans 435
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A5 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
STCB
Appellant
and
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
First Respondent
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT ADELAIDE ON WEDNESDAY, 9 AUGUST 2006, AT 3.22 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR S.D. OWER: If it pleases the Court, I appear for the appellant in this matter. (instructed by McDonald Steed McGrath)
MR C. GUNST, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.J. RODER, on behalf of the first respondent. (instructed by Sparke Helmore)
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Ower.
MR OWER: If it pleases the Court, the issues which arise in this matter are twofold: first, what is the proper construction and application of section 91S of the Migration Act, in particular in the facts and circumstances giving rise to the appellant’s claim; and secondly, a subsidiary issue, namely, whether the Full Court below and the Tribunal in turn properly understood and applied the concept of particular social group as explained by the decision of this Court in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Underlying these two issues is perhaps the wider issue of whether Australian refugee law offers asylum to those who seek protection obligations in circumstances where that claim arises due to customary law or blood feuds.
The matters which I propose to cover in argument are, first, an overview of the appellant’s claims and in particular the way in way in which we say section 91S is engaged and the way in which the alternate social group was put both to the Tribunal and the Full Court below. Secondly, I propose to address the text, context and legislative history of section 91S, including the mischief to which the supplementary material put forward suggests it was enacted to correct. Thirdly, the manner in which the Tribunal and the Full Court considered the proper application of section 91S and the manner in which we submit both the Tribunal and then the Full Court for separate reasons erred in both the construction and application of that provision.
I will then turn to the question of the alternate social group, that is to say, the posited group of people who are subject to the Kanun, the Code of Lekë Dukagjini, which is the customary law applicable in the present case. Finally, I will address the Court in relation to the question of state protection and, in particular, the significance or otherwise of the finding which appears in the Tribunal’s reasons at page 135, lines 24 to 26.
If I can turn to the first issue, namely, the nature of the claims put forward by the appellant, those claims appear in the appeal book at pages 125 through to 133 of the Tribunal’s decision. In a…
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- Case
- [2006] HCATrans 435
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the protection visa was vitiated by a failure to provide STCB with procedural fairness. Specifically, the court had to determine if STCB was afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case and to respond to adverse information that was before the Minister when making the decision. This involved an examination of the requirements of procedural fairness in the context of administrative decision-making concerning protection visas.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the Minister's decision was invalid due to a breach of procedural fairness. Their Honours reasoned that the Minister had relied on adverse information that had not been disclosed to STCB, thereby denying STCB the opportunity to address and refute that information. The court affirmed the principle that procedural fairness requires an applicant to be informed of adverse material that might influence the decision and to be given a reasonable opportunity to respond. The failure to do so rendered the decision unlawful.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Minister, and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi