SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL Not Restricted
No. 7728 of 1999
| STATE OF VICTORIA | Appellant |
| v. | |
| ELAINE LORRAINE FRANCES ROBERTSON and W.B. & E. ROBERTSON PTY. LTD. | First Respondent Second Respondent |
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JUDGES: | CALLAWAY, BATT and BUCHANAN, JJ.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 5 June 2000 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 23 June 2000 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2000] VSCA 113 | |
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ACCIDENT COMPENSATION – Common law proceeding commenced after 11 November 1997 – Subsequently enacted amendment prohibiting commencement unless additional steps taken – Amendment “deemed to have come into operation on 12 November 1997” – No room for presumption against retrospectivity – Amendment applicable to existing proceeding – Proceeding incompetent – Accident Compensation Act 1985, ss.135A(2DE), (6A), (18A) and (18B) and 138A; Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996, s.32(2); Accident Compensation (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 1997, s.2(2); Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984, ss.14(2) and 45(1) and (3).
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant For the First Respondent For the Second Respondent | Mr M.J. Corrigan Mr M. O'Loghlen, Q.C. Mr M.A. Scarfo | Minter Ellison Mills Oakley Lawyers Warren Graham & Murphy |
CALLAWAY, J. A.:
I agree with Batt, J.A. that the words of s.2(2) of the Accident Compensation (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 1997 mean what they say: the amendments made, by s.47, to s.135A of the Principal Act are deemed to have come into operation on 12th November 1997. Accordingly the law on that date must be taken to have included a provision that a worker "must not commence proceedings" unless certain conditions are satisfied. It is not as if an obligation were imposed on the worker to satisfy those conditions, as one of the parties submitted. Their satisfaction was simply a condition precedent to the valid institution of proceedings. As they were not satisfied, the proceedings in fact instituted must now be taken to have been invalid.
It is unnecessary to consider what the position would have been in the absence of sub-s.(6A), which was inserted in s.135A at the same time. Although it confers a discretion on the Authority[1], that provision provided a remedy against the apparent injustice of which the first respondent complains. It may be, however, that the result would be the same even in the absence of sub-s.(6A). As counsel for the appellant pointed out, Parliament retrospectively abolished common law rights arising on or after 12th November 1997. It would not have availed a worker injured on or after that date to have commenced proceedings before the 1997 Act received the Royal Assent.
[1]Section 45(1) and (3) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 probably excludes a Finance Facilities construction (Finance Facilities Pty. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 127 C.L.R. 106) of sub-s.(6A) but not the argument that the discretion could often be exercised only in one way.
There is, without disrespect to counsel's arguments, nothing in the contentions sought to be built on sub-ss.(18A) and (18B) and on s.32(2) of the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996. The argument from inconvenience,…
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- Case
- [2000] VSCA 113
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legislative history and the specific wording of the statutes in question, including the Accident Compensation Act 1985 and subsequent amending legislation. The court held that the amendments were deemed to have come into operation on the specified date, and there was no room for the presumption against retrospectivity in this context. As a result, the amendments applied to the existing proceeding, rendering it incompetent. The court's decision was based on the plain meaning of the legislation and the absence of any language indicating a contrary intent. The court concluded that the proceeding was not validly commenced and, therefore, the plaintiff's action was dismissed.
The final orders of the court were that the proceeding was deemed incompetent due to the legislative amendments, and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed. The court's decision highlighted the importance of adhering to statutory requirements and the potential consequences of failing to do so.
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