State of Victoria v Robertson

Link copied
Case Copied 23 min read

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

  COURT OF APPEAL Not Restricted

No. 7728 of 1999

STATE OF VICTORIA Appellant
v.

ELAINE LORRAINE FRANCES ROBERTSON

and

W.B. & E. ROBERTSON PTY. LTD.

First Respondent

Second Respondent

---

JUDGES:

CALLAWAY, BATT and BUCHANAN, JJ.A.

WHERE HELD:

MELBOURNE

DATE OF HEARING:

5 June 2000

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

23 June 2000

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2000] VSCA 113

---

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION – Common law proceeding commenced after 11 November 1997 – Subsequently enacted amendment prohibiting commencement unless additional steps taken – Amendment “deemed to have come into operation on 12 November 1997” – No room for presumption against retrospectivity – Amendment applicable to existing proceeding – Proceeding incompetent – Accident Compensation Act 1985, ss.135A(2DE), (6A), (18A) and (18B) and 138A; Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996, s.32(2); Accident Compensation (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 1997, s.2(2); Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984, ss.14(2) and 45(1) and (3).

---

APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors

For the Appellant

For the First Respondent

For the Second Respondent

Mr M.J. Corrigan

Mr M. O'Loghlen, Q.C.
Mr M.J.G. Gorton

Mr M.A. Scarfo

Minter Ellison

Mills Oakley Lawyers

Warren Graham & Murphy

CALLAWAY, J. A.:

  1. I agree with Batt, J.A. that the words of s.2(2) of the Accident Compensation (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 1997 mean what they say: the amendments made, by s.47, to s.135A of the Principal Act are deemed to have come into operation on 12th November 1997. Accordingly the law on that date must be taken to have included a provision that a worker "must not commence proceedings" unless certain conditions are satisfied. It is not as if an obligation were imposed on the worker to satisfy those conditions, as one of the parties submitted. Their satisfaction was simply a condition precedent to the valid institution of proceedings. As they were not satisfied, the proceedings in fact instituted must now be taken to have been invalid.

  1. It is unnecessary to consider what the position would have been in the absence of sub-s.(6A), which was inserted in s.135A at the same time. Although it confers a discretion on the Authority[1], that provision provided a remedy against the apparent injustice of which the first respondent complains.  It may be, however, that the result would be the same even in the absence of sub-s.(6A).  As counsel for the appellant pointed out, Parliament retrospectively abolished common law rights arising on or after 12th November 1997.  It would not have availed a worker injured on or after that date to have commenced proceedings before the 1997 Act received the Royal Assent.

    [1]Section 45(1) and (3) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 probably excludes a Finance Facilities construction (Finance Facilities Pty. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 127 C.L.R. 106) of sub-s.(6A) but not the argument that the discretion could often be exercised only in one way.

  1. There is, without disrespect to counsel's arguments, nothing in the contentions sought to be built on sub-ss.(18A) and (18B) and on s.32(2) of the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996. The argument from inconvenience,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read State of Victoria v Robertson and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] VSCA 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of State of Victoria versus Robertson, the dispute involved the interpretation of legislative amendments in the context of a common law proceeding initiated after a specified date, and whether these amendments applied retroactively. The case was heard in a relevant Australian court. The primary issue before the court was whether the legislative amendments, which imposed additional steps for the commencement of common law proceedings, could be applied retroactively to a proceeding that had already been initiated prior to the amendments' enactment. This required an analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and the principles of statutory interpretation, particularly the presumption against retrospectivity.

The court examined the legislative history and the specific wording of the statutes in question, including the Accident Compensation Act 1985 and subsequent amending legislation. The court held that the amendments were deemed to have come into operation on the specified date, and there was no room for the presumption against retrospectivity in this context. As a result, the amendments applied to the existing proceeding, rendering it incompetent. The court's decision was based on the plain meaning of the legislation and the absence of any language indicating a contrary intent. The court concluded that the proceeding was not validly commenced and, therefore, the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the proceeding was deemed incompetent due to the legislative amendments, and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed. The court's decision highlighted the importance of adhering to statutory requirements and the potential consequences of failing to do so.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.