State of Victoria v Davies

Link copied
Case Copied 41 min read

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 3767 of 2002

STATE OF VICTORIA

Appellant

v.

CAROLYN SUSAN DAVIES

Respondent

---

JUDGES:

CALLAWAY, BATT and CHERNOV, JJ.A.

WHERE HELD:

MELBOURNE

DATE OF HEARING:

27 March 2003

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

3 June 2003

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2003] VSCA 65

---

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Extension of time – Condition that privileged surveillance videotapes be disclosed before hearing improper .

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE – Whether privilege waived by listing documents in court book index – Surveillance videotapes of applicant for leave to bring proceedings against employer – Whether, in absence of authority of statute or of valid rule of court, power in judge to require pre-hearing disclosure of tapes to applicant or to prevent tender of tapes, not having been disclosed but being admissible evidence, or their use in cross-examination – Whether R.34A.29 of Ch.I of County Court Rules is such authorisation in event of non-compliance with R.34A.35(4)(d) – Whether Accident Compensation Act 1985, s.134(2DA) and (2DD) or Directions under s.135AB such authorisation.

---

APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant 

Mr J.H.L. Forrest, Q.C.
Mr M.F. Wheelahan

Deacons

For the Respondent Mr J.T. Rush, Q.C.
Mr S.B. Spittle

Maurice Blackburn Cashman

CALLAWAY, J.A.:

  1. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons for judgment prepared by Batt, J.A.  Subject to one qualification, I agree in them and in the orders that his Honour proposes.

  1. The qualification, which may be no more than a clarification, is that I should like to reserve the question whether, in some circumstances and to some extent, a power such as that conferred by Rule 34A.19 of Chapter I of the County Court Rules authorizes a direction precluding the tendering of admissible evidence.[1]  It is clear that that rule could not sustain the order made by the learned primary judge in the present case.  Similarly, even if the better view is as stated by Batt, J.A. at [35], there may be some circumstances where it is too late to permit an undiscovered document to be used.

    [1]Reasons of Batt, J.A. at [34].

  1. There is usually no occasion to set aside an interlocutory order that has been overtaken by a judgment given after trial or by an order like that made on 1 November 2002;  but in this case it is appropriate to set aside the order made on 15 October 2002 and to extend the time limited for compliance with paragraph 10 of Judge Harbison's directions because they will have continuing relevance for the rehearing.

BATT, J.A.:

  1. By originating motion filed on 23 April 2001 in the County Court at Melbourne the respondent as plaintiff sued the appellant for leave under s.135A(4)(b) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 to bring proceedings for damages for personal injuries claimed to have arisen out of or in the course of her employment with the appellant as a school teacher.

  1. At a directions hearing on 3 December 2001 Judge Harbison made various interlocutory orders, including orders for the filing and…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read State of Victoria v Davies and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2003] VSCA 65
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Victoria brought an application against Davies, a former employee, for an order that privileged surveillance videotapes be disclosed before the hearing of the case. The County Court of Victoria was tasked with determining the validity of the condition imposed on Davies to disclose these tapes before the hearing. The central legal issue before the court was whether the requirement for pre-hearing disclosure of privileged surveillance videotapes was proper, especially in the absence of statutory or court rule authority.

The court examined whether the power to mandate such disclosure rested with the judge, and if such a requirement was justified. It was argued that no statutory or valid court rule authorised the judge to compel the disclosure of the tapes prior to the hearing or to prevent their use in cross-examination if they had not been disclosed. The court also considered whether certain provisions of the County Court Rules, the Accident Compensation Act 1985, or directions under that Act could serve as the necessary authorisation. Ultimately, the court found that the requirement to disclose the tapes before the hearing was improper because there was no legal basis for such a condition.

The court held that the power to require disclosure of privileged materials before a hearing did not exist unless explicitly provided by statute or a valid court rule. Given that no such authority was present in this case, the court ruled that the condition imposed on Davies was invalid. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to legal principles governing disclosure and privileged information, ensuring that such requirements are justified by clear statutory or rule-based authority. The final orders of the court were that the condition imposed on Davies to disclose the surveillance videotapes before the hearing was improper and, therefore, invalid.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involved an application by the State of Victoria against an individual named Davies. The application concerned the admissibility and disclosure of surveillance videotapes, which were considered privileged. The tapes were obtained during a surveillance operation on Davies and were intended to be used as evidence against him in proceedings brought by him against his former employer. The State of Victoria argued that the tapes were privileged and should not be disclosed to Davies before the hearing. The central issue was whether the privilege attached to the tapes could be waived by the mere act of listing them in the court book index, and if the judge had the power to require their disclosure or to prevent their use at trial if they were not disclosed, in the absence of statutory or court rule authority.

The matter came before the court as an application by the State of Victoria seeking an extension of time and arguing against the disclosure of surveillance videotapes to the applicant, Davies. Prior to this application, Davies had listed the videotapes in the court book index, which the State of Victoria argued amounted to a waiver of privilege. The case had not proceeded to a full hearing, and no prior decisions or rulings were made on the substantive legal issues. The focus of the application was on the procedural aspect of whether the tapes could be disclosed and used in evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether privilege was waived by the mere act of listing the surveillance videotapes in the court book index.
2. Whether, in the absence of authority from statute or valid rule of court, a judge has the power to require pre-hearing disclosure of the videotapes to the applicant or to prevent their tender, use in cross-examination, or admission in evidence if they were not disclosed.
3. Whether R.34A.29 of Ch.I of the County Court Rules provides such authorisation in the event of non-compliance with R.34A.35(4)(d).
4. Whether sections 134(2DA) and (2DD) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 or the Directions under section 135AB provide such authorisation.

Held
1. The court held that the mere act of listing the surveillance videotapes in the court book index did not constitute a waiver of privilege.
2. The court concluded that, in the absence of authority from statute or valid rule of court, a judge does not have the power to require pre-hearing disclosure of the videotapes to the applicant or to prevent their tender, use in cross-examination, or admission in evidence if they were not disclosed.
3. The court held that R.34A.29 of Ch.I of the County Court Rules does not provide the required authorisation in the event of non-compliance with R.34A.35(4)(d).
4. The court held that neither sections 134(2DA) and (2DD) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 nor the Directions under section 135AB provide the required authorisation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by addressing the issue of whether the listing of the surveillance videotapes in the court book index constituted a waiver of privilege. The court found that the act of listing the tapes in the court book index was not an explicit or implicit waiver of privilege, and thus, the privilege remained intact. Regarding the second issue, the court considered whether a judge has the power to require pre-hearing disclosure of the videotapes to the applicant or to prevent their tender, use in cross-examination, or admission in evidence if they were not disclosed. The court held that, in the absence of authority from statute or valid rule of court, a judge does not have such power. The court further considered R.34A.29 of Ch.I of the County Court Rules, which did not provide the required authorisation in the event of non-compliance with R.34A.35(4)(d). Lastly, the court examined sections 134(2DA) and (2DD) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 and the Directions under section 135AB, and concluded that neither provided the required authorisation. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that, in the absence of statutory or court rule authority, a judge does not have the power to require pre-hearing disclosure of privileged materials or to prevent their use if they were not disclosed.