SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 3767 of 2002
| STATE OF VICTORIA |
| Appellant |
| v. |
| CAROLYN SUSAN DAVIES |
| Respondent |
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JUDGES: | CALLAWAY, BATT and CHERNOV, JJ.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 27 March 2003 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 June 2003 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2003] VSCA 65 | |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Extension of time – Condition that privileged surveillance videotapes be disclosed before hearing improper .
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE – Whether privilege waived by listing documents in court book index – Surveillance videotapes of applicant for leave to bring proceedings against employer – Whether, in absence of authority of statute or of valid rule of court, power in judge to require pre-hearing disclosure of tapes to applicant or to prevent tender of tapes, not having been disclosed but being admissible evidence, or their use in cross-examination – Whether R.34A.29 of Ch.I of County Court Rules is such authorisation in event of non-compliance with R.34A.35(4)(d) – Whether Accident Compensation Act 1985, s.134(2DA) and (2DD) or Directions under s.135AB such authorisation.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr J.H.L. Forrest, Q.C. | Deacons |
| For the Respondent | Mr J.T. Rush, Q.C. Mr S.B. Spittle | Maurice Blackburn Cashman |
CALLAWAY, J.A.:
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons for judgment prepared by Batt, J.A. Subject to one qualification, I agree in them and in the orders that his Honour proposes.
The qualification, which may be no more than a clarification, is that I should like to reserve the question whether, in some circumstances and to some extent, a power such as that conferred by Rule 34A.19 of Chapter I of the County Court Rules authorizes a direction precluding the tendering of admissible evidence.[1] It is clear that that rule could not sustain the order made by the learned primary judge in the present case. Similarly, even if the better view is as stated by Batt, J.A. at [35], there may be some circumstances where it is too late to permit an undiscovered document to be used.
[1]Reasons of Batt, J.A. at [34].
There is usually no occasion to set aside an interlocutory order that has been overtaken by a judgment given after trial or by an order like that made on 1 November 2002; but in this case it is appropriate to set aside the order made on 15 October 2002 and to extend the time limited for compliance with paragraph 10 of Judge Harbison's directions because they will have continuing relevance for the rehearing.
BATT, J.A.:
By originating motion filed on 23 April 2001 in the County Court at Melbourne the respondent as plaintiff sued the appellant for leave under s.135A(4)(b) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 to bring proceedings for damages for personal injuries claimed to have arisen out of or in the course of her employment with the appellant as a school teacher.
At a directions hearing on 3 December 2001 Judge Harbison made various interlocutory orders, including orders for the filing and…
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- Case
- [2003] VSCA 65
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the power to mandate such disclosure rested with the judge, and if such a requirement was justified. It was argued that no statutory or valid court rule authorised the judge to compel the disclosure of the tapes prior to the hearing or to prevent their use in cross-examination if they had not been disclosed. The court also considered whether certain provisions of the County Court Rules, the Accident Compensation Act 1985, or directions under that Act could serve as the necessary authorisation. Ultimately, the court found that the requirement to disclose the tapes before the hearing was improper because there was no legal basis for such a condition.
The court held that the power to require disclosure of privileged materials before a hearing did not exist unless explicitly provided by statute or a valid court rule. Given that no such authority was present in this case, the court ruled that the condition imposed on Davies was invalid. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to legal principles governing disclosure and privileged information, ensuring that such requirements are justified by clear statutory or rule-based authority. The final orders of the court were that the condition imposed on Davies to disclose the surveillance videotapes before the hearing was improper and, therefore, invalid.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application by the State of Victoria seeking an extension of time and arguing against the disclosure of surveillance videotapes to the applicant, Davies. Prior to this application, Davies had listed the videotapes in the court book index, which the State of Victoria argued amounted to a waiver of privilege. The case had not proceeded to a full hearing, and no prior decisions or rulings were made on the substantive legal issues. The focus of the application was on the procedural aspect of whether the tapes could be disclosed and used in evidence.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether privilege was waived by the mere act of listing the surveillance videotapes in the court book index.
2. Whether, in the absence of authority from statute or valid rule of court, a judge has the power to require pre-hearing disclosure of the videotapes to the applicant or to prevent their tender, use in cross-examination, or admission in evidence if they were not disclosed.
3. Whether R.34A.29 of Ch.I of the County Court Rules provides such authorisation in the event of non-compliance with R.34A.35(4)(d).
4. Whether sections 134(2DA) and (2DD) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 or the Directions under section 135AB provide such authorisation.
Held
1. The court held that the mere act of listing the surveillance videotapes in the court book index did not constitute a waiver of privilege.
2. The court concluded that, in the absence of authority from statute or valid rule of court, a judge does not have the power to require pre-hearing disclosure of the videotapes to the applicant or to prevent their tender, use in cross-examination, or admission in evidence if they were not disclosed.
3. The court held that R.34A.29 of Ch.I of the County Court Rules does not provide the required authorisation in the event of non-compliance with R.34A.35(4)(d).
4. The court held that neither sections 134(2DA) and (2DD) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 nor the Directions under section 135AB provide the required authorisation.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by addressing the issue of whether the listing of the surveillance videotapes in the court book index constituted a waiver of privilege. The court found that the act of listing the tapes in the court book index was not an explicit or implicit waiver of privilege, and thus, the privilege remained intact. Regarding the second issue, the court considered whether a judge has the power to require pre-hearing disclosure of the videotapes to the applicant or to prevent their tender, use in cross-examination, or admission in evidence if they were not disclosed. The court held that, in the absence of authority from statute or valid rule of court, a judge does not have such power. The court further considered R.34A.29 of Ch.I of the County Court Rules, which did not provide the required authorisation in the event of non-compliance with R.34A.35(4)(d). Lastly, the court examined sections 134(2DA) and (2DD) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 and the Directions under section 135AB, and concluded that neither provided the required authorisation. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that, in the absence of statutory or court rule authority, a judge does not have the power to require pre-hearing disclosure of privileged materials or to prevent their use if they were not disclosed.