State of Tasmania v Thorpe

Link copied
Case Copied 11 min read

[2011] TASSC 18

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:                 State of Tasmania v Thorpe [2011] TASSC 18

PARTIES:  STATE OF TASMANIA
  v
  THORPE, Stephen Leslie

FILE NO/S:  9/2009
DELIVERED ON:  18 April 2011
DELIVERED AT:  Burnie
HEARING DATE:  14 April 2011
JUDGMENT OF:  Evans J

CATCHWORDS:

Statutes – Acts of parliament – Operation and effect of Acts – Retrospective operation – In respect of procedure – When not retrospective.

Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s27.

Rodway v R (1990) 169 CLR 515, followed.
R v Haas [1997] TASSC 6; Attorney-General's Reference No 1 of 2004 (2005) 13 Tas R 395, referred to.
Aust Dig Statutes [1149]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  A Shand
             Respondent:  G A Richardson
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Respondent:  G A Richardson

Judgment Number:  [2011] TASSC 18
Number of paragraphs:  13

Serial No 18/2011
File No 9/2009

STATE OF TASMANIA v STEPHEN LESLIE THORPE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  EVANS J

18 April 2011

  1. When it appears that a condition of a suspended sentence of imprisonment has been breached, the Sentencing Act 1997, s27(1), authorises the Director of Public Prosecutions and other specified persons to apply to the court that imposed the sentence, to make consequential orders under that section. By amendments to that section which came into force on 1 January 2011, if the court is satisfied of the breach, and if the conduct which constitutes the breach is itself an offence punishable by imprisonment, the court "must activate" the suspended sentence unless of the opinion that to do so "would be unjust". Prior to 1 January 2011, the court's discretion when dealing with a breach of a condition of a suspended sentence was not so fettered. The issue for my determination is whether these amendments apply to an application to a court under s27, subsequent to 1 January 2011, in respect of a suspended sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to that date, and an asserted breach committed prior to that date. As explained in authorities to which I will refer, the issue is not whether these provisions are of retrospective effect. If the amendments are procedural they apply prospectively to prescribe the manner in which the proceeding is conducted, even if the proceeding relates to past events.

  1. The issue is raised by the Director of Public Prosecutions' application to activate a sentence of imprisonment imposed on the respondent on 23 February 2009, the whole of which sentence was suspended on condition that he be of good behaviour for a period of two years. The Director of Public Prosecutions contends that the respondent breached this condition by committing the crime of assault upon a pregnant woman on 6 June 2010. The respondent was convicted of that crime on 14 April 2011. He does not dispute that he has breached the condition. He contends however that he should not be dealt with for the breach pursuant to s27 as amended, but as it was before 1 January 2011.

  1. Prior to 1 January 2011, the Sentencing Act, s27(4),…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read State of Tasmania v Thorpe and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2011] TASSC 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Tasmania, the State of Tasmania brought an action against Thorpe, challenging the validity of certain provisions in a recently enacted statute. The dispute centred around whether specific provisions of the statute applied retrospectively, potentially affecting Thorpe’s rights under prior legislation. The court was tasked with determining the retrospective effect of these provisions and their implications for Thorpe’s case.

The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the statute in question and whether its provisions could be applied retrospectively. The court needed to assess whether the new provisions were intended to apply to situations that arose before their enactment or if they only governed future conduct. Additionally, the court had to consider the principles of statutory interpretation, including the presumption against retrospective legislation, and how these principles applied to procedural changes in the statute.

The court examined the language of the statute and found that the provisions in question were clearly intended to modify procedures for future actions, not to affect past situations. The court emphasised that retrospective application of procedural laws is generally disfavored unless the language of the statute explicitly provides for such an application. Given that the statute did not contain any language indicating an intent to apply retrospectively, the court concluded that the provisions could not be applied to Thorpe’s case. Consequently, the court held that the provisions were not retrospective and did not affect Thorpe’s rights under the previous legislation.

The final orders of the court were that the provisions in question did not apply retrospectively and, therefore, did not impact Thorpe’s rights. The court ruled in favour of Thorpe, affirming the limited scope of the statute’s provisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.