State of South Australia v Totani

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[2010] HCATrans 096

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Adelaide  No A1 of 2010

B e t w e e n -

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Appellant

and

SANDRO PETER TOTANI

First Respondent

DONALD BRIAN HUDSON

Second Respondent

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 21 APRIL 2010, AT 10.16 AM

(Continued from 20/4/10)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

FRENCH CJ:   Before we hear from you, Mr Walker, Mr Solicitor for South Australia, the grant of special leave and the orders that you seek in the notice of appeal relate to the answers to the questions reserved to the Full Court, but there were dispositive orders made by Justice Bleby on 28 September 2009.  They appear at appeal book 165.  Are you seeking that those orders be set aside?

MR HINTON:   Yes, your Honour.

FRENCH CJ:   You would probably need to seek an amendment of the grant of special leave to cover that, I would think?

MR HINTON:   Yes, your Honour, and I so apply.

FRENCH CJ:   Mr Walker, would there be any difficulty from your point of view with that?

MR WALKER:   No, it would appear to follow.

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, all right, thank you.  Yes, thank you, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER:   Your Honours, the course I wish to follow is to address on aspects of the statutory process by which a control order may be obtained, with the effects it may have, being a process in which, of course, the Magistrates Court of South Australia plays a part, not the whole part.  It plays the whole part, ostensibly in relation to the grant of a control order, but not with respect to the whole part when it comes to the reason why a control order is seen to be justified by Parliament and neither, of course, does it play the whole part when it comes to all the consequences.

The purpose for the argument I wish to put concerning the nature of the process, the particular aspect we wish to highlight, is of course to show that the necessary appearance of independence from, in particular, the Executive branch – that includes the legislative branch authorising the Executive branch of the judicial branch – the necessary appearance of independence being one which, in our submission, is impermissibly entrenched upon by this legislative scheme.  The appropriate place then to start is with section 8 which gives rise eventually to the section 10 declaration which itself, of course, is at the heart of and, we say, provides the real justification as seen by the legislature for the imposition of a control order. 

Under section 8, one sees that the Police Commissioner applies to the first law officer, the Attorney-General.  The application has formal requirements which includes some matters of substance, namely, for example, paragraph 8(2)(d), setting out the information supporting the specified grounds.  No doubt under subsection (2) there are…

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Details
Case
[2010] HCATrans 96
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal by the State of South Australia against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia concerning the application of forfeiture provisions under the *Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 1995* (SA). The dispute arose from an application by the State to forfeit assets allegedly derived from or used in connection with serious criminal offences committed by Mr. Totani. The Supreme Court had overturned a forfeiture order made by a judge of that court, finding that the legislation did not permit forfeiture of assets that were not directly linked to the commission of the offences.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper interpretation of section 12 of the *Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 1995* (SA), specifically whether it authorised the forfeiture of property that was merely "associated with" serious crime, even if that property was not directly used in or derived from the commission of the offences. The Court also considered whether the Act required a direct causal or instrumental link between the property and the criminal activity.

The High Court, by majority, held that the language of section 12(1)(b) of the Act, which permitted forfeiture of property that was "used in or in connection with the commission of a serious crime," did not require a direct causal or instrumental link. The Court reasoned that "in connection with" was a broad phrase that encompassed a wider range of associations than mere direct use or derivation. The majority found that the property in question, which included a valuable racehorse, was sufficiently connected to the criminal enterprise to fall within the scope of the forfeiture provision, even if it was not directly used in the commission of the specific offences for which Mr. Totani was convicted.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia and restoring the original forfeiture order.

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