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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A36 of 1991 B e t w e e n -
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Applicant
and
MA.NH THUONG NGUYEN and KIM
BANG TRAN
Respondents
Application for special leave
to appeal
BRENNAN J
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
| Nguyen | 1 | 13/3/92 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON FRIDAY, 13 MARCH 1992, AT 9.33 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.J. DOYLE, QC, Solicitor-General for South Australia:
May it please the Court, I appear with my learned
friend, MR W.P. WHITE for the applicant.
(instructed by the Crown Solicitor for South
Australia)
| MR S.W. TILMOUTH, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear |
with my learned friend, MS D.J. ESZENYI, for the
respondent. (instructed by Camatta Lempens)
BRENNAN J: Yes, thank you, Mr Solicitor. The Registrar of
the Court has been informed by Messrs Johnston
Withers, solicitors for the second respondent in
these proceedings, Kim Bang Tran, that they have
been instructed not to appear on the special leave
application. Yes, Mr Solicitor.
| MR DOYLE: | If the Court pleases. | The point on which we seek |
special leave in this matter is the state of
section 7(9)(b) of the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act. Our submission is that the majority was wrong in holding that the attack by
the victim, as I may call him, on the defendant was
not a relevant circumstance under that provision
or, if it was relevant, that it was insignificant.
| TOOHEY J: | Mr Solicitor, is that the only point on which |
special leave is sought?
MR DOYLE: It is, Your Honour.
| TOOHEY J: | So the broader questions of public policy and so |
on relevant to the reduction or disqualification in
respect of the incident which gave rise to the
claim we can put to one side, can we?
| MR DOYLE: | To this extent, Your Honour: although |
Justice Olsson said that our submissions raised
public policy in a very broad fashion, our
submission was all along simply that it is a matter
of what is relevant and what we put was that sometimes what is relevant may look like public policy but the argument was never advanced as a separate argument under the head of public policy
and any submissions were put were put all along
under the rubric of circumstances relevant. So
public policy as an independent head is not
advanced.
TOOHEY J: But to the extent that it arises, I understand
from what you say that it arises only in relation
to the later incident.
MR DOYLE: That is so, Your Honour. Before the Full Court
the question of the extent of the reduction because
of conduct contributing under subparagraph (a) was
| Nguyen | 2 | 13/3/92 |
raised, but we do not suggest that that is a point
warranting the grant of special leave. So the only matter which we suggest warrants the grant of
special leave is the issue under subparagraph (b).
TOOHEY…
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- Case
- [1992] HCATrans 90
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the majority of the Full Court of South Australia erred in holding that the victim's attack on the defendant was not a relevant circumstance under section 7(9)(b) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, or if it was relevant, that it was insignificant. The applicant contended that the majority's interpretation unduly restricted the scope of section 7(9)(b) by reading it *ejusdem generis* with the preceding subparagraph (a), thereby limiting its application to circumstances analogous to those in subparagraph (a).
The applicant's argument, as presented to the High Court, was that section 7(9)(b) should not be interpreted narrowly. They submitted that there was no textual basis within the Act to restrict the circumstances considered relevant under subparagraph (b) to those similar to subparagraph (a). The applicant argued that the majority's approach, which involved reading subparagraph (b) in light of the preceding language, was an incorrect construction of the statutory provision. The applicant clarified that while public policy considerations might arise, their argument was solely focused on the interpretation of "relevant circumstances" under section 7(9)(b) and not on public policy as a separate, independent ground for reduction or disqualification.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi