State of South Australia v Nguyen

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Adelaide No A36 of 1991

B e t w e e n -

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Applicant

and

MA.NH THUONG NGUYEN and KIM

BANG TRAN

Respondents

Application for special leave

to appeal

BRENNAN J
TOOHEY J

McHUGH J

Nguyen 1 13/3/92

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 13 MARCH 1992, AT 9.33 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J.J. DOYLE, QC, Solicitor-General for South Australia:

May it please the Court, I appear with my learned

friend, MR W.P. WHITE for the applicant.

(instructed by the Crown Solicitor for South

Australia)

MR S.W. TILMOUTH, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear

with my learned friend, MS D.J. ESZENYI, for the

respondent. (instructed by Camatta Lempens)

BRENNAN J: Yes, thank you, Mr Solicitor. The Registrar of

the Court has been informed by Messrs Johnston

Withers, solicitors for the second respondent in

these proceedings, Kim Bang Tran, that they have

been instructed not to appear on the special leave

application. Yes, Mr Solicitor.

MR DOYLE:  If the Court pleases. The point on which we seek

special leave in this matter is the state of
section 7(9)(b) of the Criminal Injuries

Compensation Act. Our submission is that the

majority was wrong in holding that the attack by

the victim, as I may call him, on the defendant was

not a relevant circumstance under that provision

or, if it was relevant, that it was insignificant.

TOOHEY J:  Mr Solicitor, is that the only point on which

special leave is sought?

MR DOYLE: It is, Your Honour.

TOOHEY J:  So the broader questions of public policy and so

on relevant to the reduction or disqualification in

respect of the incident which gave rise to the

claim we can put to one side, can we?

MR DOYLE:  To this extent, Your Honour: although

Justice Olsson said that our submissions raised

public policy in a very broad fashion, our

submission was all along simply that it is a matter

of what is relevant and what we put was that

sometimes what is relevant may look like public policy but the argument was never advanced as a separate argument under the head of public policy

and any submissions were put were put all along

under the rubric of circumstances relevant. So

public policy as an independent head is not

advanced.

TOOHEY J: But to the extent that it arises, I understand

from what you say that it arises only in relation

to the later incident.

MR DOYLE: That is so, Your Honour. Before the Full Court

the question of the extent of the reduction because

of conduct contributing under subparagraph (a) was

Nguyen 2 13/3/92

raised, but we do not suggest that that is a point

warranting the grant of special leave. So the only

matter which we suggest warrants the grant of

special leave is the issue under subparagraph (b).

TOOHEY…

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Details
Case
[1992] HCATrans 90
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, the State of South Australia, sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The respondents were Ma.nh Thuong Nguyen and Kim Bang Tran. The dispute concerned the interpretation of section 7(9)(b) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, specifically whether an attack by the victim on the defendant was a relevant circumstance for reducing or disqualifying compensation.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the majority of the Full Court of South Australia erred in holding that the victim's attack on the defendant was not a relevant circumstance under section 7(9)(b) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, or if it was relevant, that it was insignificant. The applicant contended that the majority's interpretation unduly restricted the scope of section 7(9)(b) by reading it *ejusdem generis* with the preceding subparagraph (a), thereby limiting its application to circumstances analogous to those in subparagraph (a).

The applicant's argument, as presented to the High Court, was that section 7(9)(b) should not be interpreted narrowly. They submitted that there was no textual basis within the Act to restrict the circumstances considered relevant under subparagraph (b) to those similar to subparagraph (a). The applicant argued that the majority's approach, which involved reading subparagraph (b) in light of the preceding language, was an incorrect construction of the statutory provision. The applicant clarified that while public policy considerations might arise, their argument was solely focused on the interpretation of "relevant circumstances" under section 7(9)(b) and not on public policy as a separate, independent ground for reduction or disqualification.

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Evidence Before The Court

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