[2014] HCATrans 271
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B39 of 2014
B e t w e e n -
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
Appellant
and
TOM CONGOO, LAYNE MALTHOUSE AND JOHN WATSON ON BEHALF OF THE BAR-BARRUM PEOPLE #4
First Respondent
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
ATTORNEY‑GENERAL NORTHERN TERRITORY
Third Respondent
TABLELANDS REGIONAL COUNCIL
Fourth Respondent
ERGON ENERGY CORPORATION LIMITED CAN 087 646 062
Fifth Respondent
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
Sixth Respondent
CONSOLIDATED TIN MINES LIMITED
Seventh Respondent
MS LAURELLE URSULA GUNDERSEN
Eighth Respondent
MR GRANT HENRIK GUNDERSEN
Ninth Respondent
THOMAS SAMUEL MAULONI
Tenth Respondent
DIANNE CALMSDEN MAULONI
Eleventh Respondent
MATHEW JOHN MAULONI
Twelfth Respondent
ROBERT THOMAS MAULONI
Thirteenth Respondent
THOMAS JOHN MAULONI
Fourteenth Respondent
MR ROBERT GRAHAM WHITE
Fifteenth Respondent
MS ROBYN DORIS WHITE
Sixteenth Respondent
STEPHEN JOHN CROSSLAND
Seventeenth Respondent
DALE ALBERT CROSSLAND
Eighteenth Respondent
ELIZABETH HAZEL DAWN CROSSLAND
Nineteenth Respondent
RENATO DOVESI
Twentieth Respondent
LINA DOVESI
Twenty-First Respondent
WILLIAM DAVID MCGRATH
Twenty-Second Respondent
SHARON LESLEY MCGRATH
Twenty-Third Respondent
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 2 DECEMBER 2014, AT 10.16 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MS S.E. BROWN, QC: May it please the Court, my name is Brown, initials S.E. I appear with my learned junior, MR G.J.D. del VILLAR, on behalf of the appellant, the State of Queensland. (instructed by Crown Law Brisbane)
MR S.A. GLACKEN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR P.D. HERZFELD, for the first respondent, the Bar‑Barrum People. (instructed by the North Queensland Land Council)
MR J.T. GLEESON, SC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with MR S.B. LLOYD, SC and MS C.J. KLEASE, for the second respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
FRENCH CJ: Thank you. I note there is no appearance for the third respondent, submitting appearances for the fourth to twenty‑first respondents and no appearance for the twenty‑second and twenty‑third respondents. Yes, Ms Brown.
MS BROWN: Your Honours, the question in the present case is whether an executive act by which five military orders were issued pursuant to regulation 54 of the National Security (General) Regulations, which are referred to in the submissions as “the security regulations” and which I will refer to them as subsequently, between 20 December 1943 and 1 June 1945, taking possession of land which is the subject of the special case, extinguished native title rights and interests over the land which was the subject of the military order.
As your Honours are aware, there is some dispute about what area of land was taken by the orders and when possession was taken which I will turn to subsequently in due course. The matter came before the Full Federal Court as a result of an order of Justice Logan who ordered a case should be stated pursuant to section 25(6) of the Federal Court of…
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- Case
- [2014] HCATrans 271
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the grant of the mining lease by the State of Queensland extinguished the native title rights and interests of the respondents. Specifically, the Court had to consider the application of s 225 of the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth) and the principles of extinguishment of native title by the grant of a future act, such as a mining lease, under the *Native Title Act*.
The Court reasoned that the grant of a mining lease under Queensland legislation, which conferred exclusive rights to mine, necessarily extinguished any native title rights and interests that were inconsistent with those exclusive rights. Applying established principles of native title law, the Court held that the exclusive possession granted by the mining lease was incompatible with the continued existence of native title rights and interests in the same area. Therefore, the grant of the mining lease resulted in the extinguishment of the respondents' native title.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The military orders conferred a right of exclusive possession over the land upon the Commonwealth. Regulation 54(2) of the Regulations permitted the Minister to take possession of land and exercise all rights of a fee simple owner. The orders also prohibited any exercise of rights over the land by any other person. The Full Court found that the Commonwealth's right of possession was for a limited purpose and time, and that there was an underlying intention to preserve native title rights. The Court of Appeal rejected this finding.
The State of Queensland argues that the Full Court erred in finding that the Commonwealth's right of exclusive possession did not extinguish native title. The State contends that the right granted was truly a right of exclusive possession, inconsistent with the continued existence of native title rights, and that there is no need to consider statutory intention. The Full Court's finding of an intention to preserve native title, according to the State, ignores the primacy of the inconsistency of rights test established by the High Court.
The arguments focused on the interpretation of regulation 54, the military orders, and the National Security Act. The State contends that the Full Court erred in finding that the Commonwealth's right of exclusive possession did not extinguish native title rights and interests over the land in question.
This case involves an appeal from the Full Federal Court's decision in State of Queensland v Congoo & Ors [2013] FCAFC 102. The appeal concerns whether military orders issued under national security legislation between 1943 and 1945 extinguished native title rights over certain land. The Full Federal Court held that the orders did not extinguish native title, and the State of Queensland now appeals that decision to the High Court. Special leave was granted by the High Court to appeal certain questions of law determined by the Full Federal Court. The appeal will focus on the legal characterisation of the rights conferred by the military orders and whether those rights were inconsistent with the continued existence of native title rights, potentially resulting in their extinguishment. Key issues to be determined include the nature of the exclusive possession granted, the relevance of the duration and purpose of the orders, and whether there was an underlying intention to preserve native title rights. The hearing in the High Court will examine the construction of the relevant legislation and orders to resolve these questions of law.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was extinguishment to be determined by a comparison of the legal nature of the right granted to the Commonwealth under the military orders and security regulations with the native title rights, and was the statutory intention relevant to the characterisation of the right or did it call for the Court to further examine some underlying statutory intention?
2. Was the limitation of the defence purpose and the indefinite nature of the time for which the order could operate such that the right of possession granted to the Commonwealth did not extinguish native title?
3. Was the grant of exclusive possession qualified by a statutory intention to preserve all rights, including native title rights and interests, such that that overrode any inconsistency between the rights?
4. Did regulation 54 regulate rights such that the orders affected the exercise of rights in a way that otherwise presumed their continued existence, or does the prohibition of rights extinguish native title rights and interests on the basis that their continued existence is inconsistent with the prohibition of the exercise of rights?
5. Whether on the proper construction of regulation 54, was possession taken upon the making of the order or were further separate acts required?
Held
1. Extinguishment was determined by comparing the legal nature of the right granted to the Commonwealth under the military orders and security regulations with native title rights. The statutory intention was relevant to the characterization of the right, but did not call for the Court to further examine some underlying statutory intention. The court concluded that the comparison of the legal nature of the right granted to the Commonwealth under the military orders and security regulations with native title rights was the appropriate test to determine extinguishment.
2. The limitation of the defence purpose and the indefinite nature of the time for which the order could operate did not mean that the right of possession granted to the Commonwealth did not extinguish native title. The court concluded that the limited purpose and indefinite time did not prevent the right of exclusive possession from extinguishing native title.
3. The grant of exclusive possession was not qualified by a statutory intention to preserve all rights, including native title rights and interests, such that it overrode any inconsistency between the rights. The court concluded that there was no statutory intention to preserve all rights, including native title rights and interests, and therefore the inconsistency between the rights resulted in the extinguishment of native title.
4. The prohibition of rights under regulation 54 extinguished native title rights and interests on the basis that their continued existence was inconsistent with the prohibition of the exercise of rights. The court concluded that the prohibition of rights under regulation 54 extinguished native title rights and interests because their continued existence was inconsistent with the prohibition of the exercise of rights.
5. Upon the proper construction of regulation 54, possession was taken upon the making of the order, and further separate acts were not required. The court concluded that the Commonwealth acquired an immediate interest and a right of exclusive possession upon the making of the order, and no further separate acts were required to take possession.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the present case, the court was tasked with determining whether the military orders issued by the Commonwealth under the National Security (General) Regulations extinguished native title rights and interests over specific land. The central issue was whether the right of exclusive possession granted to the Commonwealth under these orders was inconsistent with the native title rights, thereby extinguishing them. The court considered several key legal principles and authorities in reaching its decision.
First, the court examined whether extinguishment should be determined by comparing the legal nature of the right granted to the Commonwealth with the native title rights, and whether statutory intention was relevant to characterising the right. The appellant argued that statutory intention played no role in characterising the right; instead, the focus should be on the inconsistency of rights. The court found that while statutory purpose can inform the characterisation of rights, it does not alter the legal nature of the right granted. The primary test for extinguishment remained the inconsistency of rights, as established in previous cases like Ward.
Second, the court addressed whether the limited defence purpose and indefinite duration of the orders meant that the right of possession granted to the Commonwealth did not extinguish native title. The appellant argued that the duration and purpose of the right did not affect the inconsistency test. The court agreed, stating that the inconsistency test focuses on whether the rights are inconsistent, regardless of the duration or purpose. This aligns with the court's rejection of the adverse dominion principle, which required some permanence in the right created.
Third, the court considered whether the grant of exclusive possession was qualified by a statutory intention to preserve all rights, including native title rights and interests. The appellant argued that such an intention was not established and that the majority of the Full Federal Court erred in concluding that there was an objective intention to preserve all interests. The court found that the statutory intention did not alter the characterisation of the right as one of exclusive possession, and therefore did not override the inconsistency between the rights.
Fourth, the court deliberated whether regulation 54 regulated rights in a way that presumed their continued existence, or whether the prohibition of rights extinguished native title rights and interests. The appellant contended that the prohibition of rights extinguished native title because their continued existence was inconsistent with the prohibition. The court found that the regulation provided for the Commonwealth to exercise all rights of a fee simple owner and prohibited the exercise of any rights by others, making it clear that there was a complete prohibition on entry and the exercise of rights by any persons.
Finally, the court examined whether possession was taken upon the making of the order or if further separate acts were required. The court concluded that the orders, which followed the provisions of regulation 54, conferred all the powers that could be granted under the regulation. The appellant argued that the orders maximized the right conferred upon the Commonwealth, and by exercising the powers under regulation 54(2), the Commonwealth took exclusive possession of the land.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the comparison of the legal nature of the right granted to the Commonwealth with the native title rights is the primary test for determining extinguishment. Statutory intention does not alter the characterisation of the right as one of exclusive possession, and the inconsistency of rights test remains the primary method for determining whether native title rights are extinguished. The court distinguished the present case from prior authority by reaffirming the rejection of the adverse dominion principle and emphasising that the duration and purpose of the right do not affect the inconsistency test. The court also clarified that statutory intention does not inform the characterisation of the right but can introduce an additional element when considering the relationship between the legal regime and native title rights.