SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
State of Queensland v Coffey [2005] QSC 212
PARTIES:
JOHN LAWENCE COFFEY
(plaintiff)
v
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first defendant)
and
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIVE SERVICES
(second defendant)JOHN LAWRENCE COFFEY
(plaintiff)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first defendant)
andPRISON OFFICER MAHMUD BAJAMOVIC
(second defendant)
and
PRISON OFFICER GRAHAM BARKER
(third defendant)
and
PRISON OFFICER NEIL PECKHAM
(fourth defendant)
and
PRISON OFFICER GLEN BOUNDY
(fifth defendant)
and
POLICE OFFICER RON MIENTJES REG. NO. 5677
(sixth defendant)
and
POLICE OFFICER GREGORY SMITH REG NO. 5027
(seventh defendant)FILE NO/S:
Cairns S 595 of 2004
Cairns S 596 of 2004DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court, Cairns
DELIVERED ON:
29 July 2005
DELIVERED AT:
Cairns
HEARING DATE:
20 June 2005
JUDGE:
Moynihan J
ORDER:
1. In each action the claim and the statement of claim are struck out.
2. The plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs of and incidental to the application and the actions to be assessed on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld)
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)Holmes v Adnought Sheet Metal Fabrication Pty Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 378
COUNSEL:
Ms K Philipson for the defendants
SOLICITORS:
Crown Law for the defendants
The plaintiff appeared on his own behalf
MOYNIHAN J: The defendant in each of these actions applies to have the claim and the statement of claim struck out on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to comply with the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (PIPA) Chapter 2 Part 1.
In each action the defendants filed and served conditional notices of intention to defend taking the point that the proceedings were a nullity because they were commenced contrary to s 9 of PIPA without an order pursuant to either s 18(1)(c) or 43(1) of the Act.
The applications can conveniently be dealt with and disposed of together. Mr Coffey, the plaintiff in each action sues the State of Queensland (and named individuals in action 596) for damages for personal injury consequent upon a number of alleged breaches of duty owed to him as a consequence of his being incarcerated.
The plaintiff acts on his own behalf. The proceedings already have a troubled history because of that, the intricacies of the requirements of PIPA and the plaintiff’s distrust of the defendants and their legal representatives.
I should make clear that I don’t consider that attitude is justified. It apparently flows from the matters mentioned in the previous paragraph. It is compounded by the plaintiff’s mis-appreciation of the relevant law and proceedings manifest in his oral and written submissions.
Section 9 of PIPA provides that before starting a proceeding in a court based on a claim for personal injury a claimant must give written notice in the approved form to a person against whom the proceedings are proposed to be started. The pre-action procedures provided for in Chapter 2, are substantive as opposed to procedural, see s…
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- Case
- [2005] QSC 212
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the interplay between the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act and the Limitation of Actions Act, assessing whether the statutory provisions allowed for an exception to the general limitation periods. It considered whether the commencement of proceedings under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act could override the limitation periods set out in the Limitation of Actions Act. The court also referred to the relevant case law, notably Holmes v Adnought Sheet Metal Fabrication Pty Ltd, to understand how the Queensland courts had previously interpreted similar statutory provisions. The court concluded that the statutory provisions did not provide an exception to the general limitation periods and that the plaintiff's claims were time-barred.
Consequently, the court found that the plaintiff's claims were invalid as they were not commenced within the prescribed timeframes. The court struck out the claims and statements of claim in their entirety, as they were statute-barred. The defendants were awarded costs of and incidental to the application and the actions, to be assessed on the standard basis. The plaintiff's claims against the defendants were dismissed, and the proceedings were terminated.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. In each action the claim and the statement of claim are struck out.
2. The plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs of and incidental to the application and the actions to be assessed on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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