State of Queensland (State Library of Queensland) v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

[2014] QIRC 126

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	State of Queensland (State Library of Queensland) v
Simon  Blackwood (Workers' Compensation
Regulator) [2014] QIRC 126
PARTIES:	State  of Queensland (State Library of
Queensland)
(Appellant)
v
Simon Blackwood Workers' Compensation Regulator
(Respondent)
CASE NO:	WC/2014/168
PROCEEDING:	Appeal by the State Library of Queensland against a
decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator
DELIVERED ON:	12 August 2014
HEARING DATE:	23 July 2014
MEMBER:	Commissioner Black
ORDERS:	1.  The decision of the regulator to waive

compliance with section 131(1) is confirmed

2.        The matter of costs is reserved

CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION - EXTENSION OF TIME - determination about when the entitlement to compensation arose - whether failure to lodge claim within time was due to reasonable cause.
CASES:	Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act
(2003) s 131, s 141
WorkCover Queensland and Patricia Mary Downey
(2001) 168 QGIG
Appo v Q-COMP [2003] QIC 169; 174 QGIG 1120 R v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland ex
parte Heffernan (1979) Qd R 563 Quinliven v Portland Harbour Trust [1963] VR 25 ANZ Banking Group v Q-COMP (2004) 175 QGIG 1125 Black v City of South Melbourne [1963] VR 34
APPEARANCES:	Ms K. Phillipson, Counsel instructed by Crown Law
for the Appellant. Mr A. Johnson, Counsel directly instructed by Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation
Regulator), the Respondent.

Decision

[1] The State Library of Queensland (the appellant) has appealed a decision of the Review Unit of the Workers' Compensation Regulator (the respondent) to accept Daniel Abel's claim for compensation. The appeal was lodged with the Industrial Registrar on 20 May 2014. In its notice of appeal the appellant asserted (for the purposes of the subject proceedings) that Abel's application for compensation was invalid and unenforceable pursuant to s 131 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (the Act), and that there was no proper basis upon which the regulator could have waived compliance with the time limitation pursuant to s 131(5) of the Act.

[2]     Abel lodged his application with WorkCover on 18 September 2013 in respect of a psychiatric/psychological injury allegedly sustained in the course of his employment. The appellant's claim is pursued on the basis that the application for compensation was lodged more than six months after the entitlement to compensation arose.

Matters for Determination

[3]      The matters for determination in this decision are listed below:

(i)       What was the date upon which the entitlement to compensation arose?

(ii)      Has the application for compensation been lodged within six months after the date upon which the entitlement to compensation arose?

(iii)    If the application has been lodged out of time, is the delay attributable to mistake, absence from the state, or reasonable cause?

(iv) If the delay is attributable to one or more of the factors mentioned, should the discretion provided in s. 131(5) be exercised to waive the requirement in s. 131(1)?

The legislation

[4]      The relevant provisions of the Act are set out below:

"s 131 Time for applying

(1) An application for compensation is valid and enforceable only if the application is lodged by the claimant within 6 months after the entitlement to compensation arises.

(2)

If an application is lodged more than 20 business days after the entitlement to compensation arises, the extent of the insurer's liability to pay compensation is limited to a period starting no earlier than 20 business days before the day on which the valid application is lodged.

(3)

Subsection (2) does not apply if death is, or results from, the injury.

(4)

An insurer must waive subsection (1) for a particular application if it is satisfied that special circumstances of a medical nature, decided by a medical assessment tribunal, exist.

(5)

An insurer may waive subsection (1) or (2) for a particular application if the insurer is satisfied that a claimant's failure to lodge the application was due to -

(a)	mistake;
(b)	the claimant's absence from the State; or
(c)	a reasonable cause.

...

s 141 Time from which compensation payable

(1)

The entitlement to compensation for an injury arises on the day the worker
is assessed by -

(a)	a doctor; or
(b)	if the injury is an oral injury and the worker attends a dentist - the

dentist.

(2)

However, any entitlement to weekly payment of compensation starts on –

(a)	if a doctor or dentist assesses the injury as resulting in total or partial incapacity for work on the day the worker stops work because of the injury - the day after the worker stops work because of the injury; or
(b)	if a doctor or dentist assesses the injury as resulting in total or partial incapacity for work on a day later than the day the worker stops work because of the injury - the day the doctor or dentist assesses the injury.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) are not intended to limit any availability for compensation for the day of injury provided for under part 8.

(4) Subsection (2) is subject to section 131(2).".

Factual Background

[5]      Abel was employed by the State Library of Queensland under a temporary contract of employment between March 2008 and 15 March 2013. In late January and early February 2013 Abel was involved in a job selection process. On Tuesday 12 February 2013 he emailed his supervisor and foreshadowed a request to take stress leave the following month (March). He said that his mental state was in tatters and that he was exhausted. Eventually he commenced a busy overseas trip on 18 March 2013 which saw him visit friends in various cities in Europe before returning to Australia on 18 April 2013.

[6]      On 1 March 2013 Abel attended his long time general practitioner, Dr Mammino. Prior to visiting Dr Mammino Abel said in his oral testimony that he was feeling stressed and anxious, he wasn't sleeping, he was grinding his teeth and that he had a panic attack. Abel said that he attended on Dr Mammino because he was worried about the panic attack and that he couldn't control his breathing. He said that his sweat was smelling like ammonia and that he was worried about what this condition might mean.

[7]     Dr Mammino's consultation notes disclose that Abel presented with "excessive sweating & smelly odour in armpits - stressed". The notes record that Abel said that he had lost his job at the state library. His weight and blood pressure were recorded and a series of blood tests were ordered. A further entry in the notes read "work related stress".

[8]      Dr Mammino said in his oral evidence that he considered Abel to be "stressed out" rather than depressed. He said that excessive sweating was not a symptom of depression but he did say that sweating indicates that the patient is "tensed up" and showing "signs of anxiety". While his notes did not include any record of incapacity, it was his oral evidence that he did not think that Abel was capable of doing work the way that he was and that Abel was "very down". Dr Mammino said that Abel had not requested a medical certificate and that none was issued. He suggested that because Abel was not working, a certificate was not necessary. Abel was offered sleeping pills, which he declined, but no other medication was prescribed.

[9]      Abel's next visit to a doctor was on 24 June 2013 when he attended the Old Cleveland Road Clinic and saw Dr Horn. The consultation notes show that Abel presented with fever and a sore throat with swollen glands. In her oral evidence Dr Horn recalled that when she saw Abel on 24 June 2013 "he was quite easy going and relaxed". While the notes do not include any reference to workplace events or workplace stress, Dr Horn did say in her oral evidence that during this consultation she and Abel did have "a conversation about some issues he was having at work". She said that Abel told her that he had been a whistleblower and that he attributed his failure to secure a particular position to the fact that he had made a complaint against another employee of the State Library. Dr Horn also alluded to a conversation about a possible WorkCover claim. In this regard her evidence at T1-42 and T1-45 is set out below:

"...I think I said to him at the time that he needed to think carefully about whether he would pursue a WorkCover claim because it did end up being messy and most people suffered with doing it.

... there was no talk about being a work - you know, there was talk about making a claim, but at that stage, he wasn't going to make any WorkCover claims and was just seeing how things were going."

[10]    Abel visited the Old Cleveland Road Clinic again on 26 August 2013 when he was seen by Dr Joyce. The consultation notes show the reason for attending as "fever and throat sore started after late night shift at work". The notes also record that Abel "has been more stressed lately with work and this may be having an impact". It was not clear which workplace was being discussed but Abel did say in his evidence that he started casual bar work in a hotel in late August 2013.

[11]    Subsequent to the 26 August 2013 visit, Abel attended the same Clinic on 5 September and 17 September 2013 where he was seen by Dr Horn. The visit on 5 September 2013 appeared to be for the purpose of discussing the results of blood tests while the consultation notes show that the visit on 17 September 2013 related to a throat infection, a rash and tonsillitis. The consultation notes of neither visit include any reference to work or work related stress.

[12]   On 18 September 2013 Abel sought legal advice in respect to his circumstances. He lodged a WorkCover claim on the same day in respect of a psychiatric/psychological injury sustained over a period of time commencing 1 February 2013. On 24 September 2013 he attended on Dr Horn and asked her to issue a workers' compensation medical certificate. Two days later on 26 September he attended on Dr Mammino and was issued with another workers compensation medical certificate. In a letter to WorkCover dated 12 February 2014 (Exhibit 6) Dr Mammino said that the reason for Abel's visit was "to obtain a workers' compensation certificate from the day he first attended me".

[13]    Dr Horn's consultation notes of Abel's visit on 24 September 2013 set out a history of workplace events provided by Abel. The notes also disclose that Abel was feeling stressed and anxious and that he was still looking for a new job. In her oral evidence Dr Horn said that Abel did seem to be more tense and agitated then he was at the 24 September 2013 consultation. Dr Horn said that she felt that Abel was suffering from anxiety and she issued a workers compensation medical certificate. She gave the following evidence at T1-43 about Abel's condition:

"...he was definitely a bit stressed and anxious about it. He was [indistinct] He was having some trouble sleeping because he was spending a lot of time thinking about it and we did note that he had the four episodes of tonsillitis in the past four months, when previously, as far as I know, he hadn't had a significant number of episodes in a short period of time."

[14]   Dr Horn stated that Abel did not raise in any of the June or September consultations that he had been suffering panic attacks.

[15]   Three workers' compensation medical certificates were in the proceedings as Exhibits 7, 9, and 10. Dr Mammino issued a certificate on 26 September 2013 (Exhibit 7). The certificate included a diagnosis of "work related stress" and stated that the worker was first seen for the injury on 1 March 2013. No information was provided in respect to either the workers stated date of injury or the workers stated cause of injury. However, the certificate indicated that the injury/disease was consistent with the worker's description of cause. The certificate indicated that the worker would not be able to work at all from 1 March 2013 to 30 June 2013 and said that the worker would require treatment for the same period.

[16]    Dr Horn issued a certificate on 24 September 2013 (Exhibit 9). The certificate did not include a diagnosis of illness or injury but did express under Part B a finding relevant to the condition that Abel "has been suffering with anxiety, poor sleep, 4 episodes of tonsillitis on 4 months - none previously".

[17]    The certificate disclosed that the workers stated date of injury was 18 October 2012 and also described the workers stated cause of injury as "whistleblower of sexual harassment claims in workplace". The certificate also stated that the worker was first seen for the injury on 24 June 2013 and indicated that the injury/disease was consistent with the worker's description of cause. The certificate did not provide for any time off work and stated that the worker would be fit to return to normal duties from 24 September 2013.

[18]    Dr Horn also issued a certificate on 5 December 2013 (Exhibit 10). This certificate did not include a diagnosis of illness or injury but did express under Part B a finding relevant to the condition that Abel "has been suffering with anxiety, poor sleep, 4 episodes of tonsillitis on 4 months - none previously".

[19]    The certificate disclosed that the workers stated date of injury was 18 October 2012 and also described the workers stated cause of injury as "whistleblower of sexual harassment claims in workplace. Forced out of work now stress/anxiety/depre". The certificate stated that the worker was first seen for the injury on 25 June 2013 and indicated that the injury/disease was consistent with the worker's description of cause. While the certificate did not include any stated incapacity for work it did state that the worker would require treatment from 5 December 2013 to 31 January 2014. The medical management plan prescribed a treatment of "counselling, dental care" and included a referral to a "psychologist and dentist".

When did the entitlement to compensation arise?

[20]   It was the appellant's submission that Dr Mammino made an assessment of Abel on 1 March 2013 and that this assessment was sufficient to satisfy s 141(1) of the Act. The respondent on the other hand, submitted that the assessment of injury pursuant to s 141(1) did not occur until the consultation with Dr Horn on 24 September 2013. In the alternative the respondent argued, but with less vigour, that the assessment may have been made by Dr Horn during Abel's consultation with her on 24 June 2012.

[21] Section 131(1) of the Act provides that an application for compensation is valid and

enforceable only if it is lodged within six months after the entitlement to compensation

arose. Section 141(1) provides that an entitlement to compensation arises on the day

1

the worker is assessed by a doctor. In Downey Hall P. held that "assessed by a doctor"

means "assessed by a doctor as resulting in total or partial incapacity for work.

I.E.where the commencement of the limitation period is said to be triggered by the

activity of a doctor, it is necessary to show that a doctor has assessed the alleged injury

2

as involving partial or total incapacity". In Appo Hall P. observed that the word used in s 141 is "assessed", not "diagnosed". He also said that he was not attracted to the argument that "there is no assessment until the assessment is made manifest in a certificate". He added that he could see "no reason why time should not run against a worker who, for example, declines the issue of a certificate after being informed by a medical practitioner that he is partially incapacitated for work".

[22]   The determination of a date of assessment involves a consideration of Abel's consultations with various general practitioners between 1 March 2013 and 30 September 2013. Given the submissions of the parties, particular attention is given to the consultations on 1 March 2013 and 24 September 2013.

[23]   The appellant submitted that the evidence supported a conclusion that Dr Mammino had formed the view that Abel wasn't capable of doing his job when he saw him on 1 March 2013. The appellant considered that the offer of sleeping pills by Dr Mammino amounted to an offer of treatment, albeit in relation to symptomatology. While Dr Mammino did not make a diagnosis at that time and took the view that Abel didn't have depression, he confirmed that he considered that Abel was suffering from work-related stress and at that time he had displayed signs of anxiety. While Dr Mammino did not issue a certificate, the view was expressed that nothing swings on the issue because Abel said that he was not working at the time and Abel did not ask for a certificate.

[24]    The appellant submitted at T1-52:

"In my submission, it's fairly clear that the worker, Mr Abel, was assessed by

st

Dr Mammino on the 1 of March 2013 in relation to issues he had in the workplace with the employer, the appellant. He was assessed by Dr Mammino at that stage as suffering from work-related stress and anxiety and that he was not fit or permanently or temporarily incapacitated for work at that time. In my submission, it is clear then that the entitlement to compensation arose on that day when he was assessed by a medical practitioner and assessed as being totally or partially incapacitated for work."

[25]   The respondent distinguished between "stress" and "anxiety" and submitted that the expression "work-related stress" is a descriptor of symptomatology rather than being a psychiatric or psychological disorder. It was further submitted that "work-related stress" is not an assessable or diagnosable condition and is not an injury as contemplated by section 32 of the Act. It was submitted that:

	In his consultation of 1 March 2013 Dr Mammino treated symptoms rather than cause. He did not issue any certificate or make any notation as to incapacity.
	The 1 March 2013 consultation did not give rise to an assessment. Further there was no diagnosis of injury.
	Dr Mammino accepted the Abel wasn't depressed, but was rather just stressed from work. He didn't go into the circumstance as to the cause of the worker's stress. No reference to anxiety is included in the consultation notes and no diagnosis of anxiety was entered.
	Dr Mammino's evidence to the effect that Abel was more "worked up" than depressed does not support a finding that an injury has been sustained sufficient to enliven s 141 and then s 131.

[26]   The respondent raised the prospect that Abel's injury may have been assessed by Dr Horn on 24 June 2013, however I decline to find in favour of this proposition. While Dr Horn said that Abel discussed some circumstances associated with his employment with the State Library on 24 June, he did not refer to the relevant injury. Dr Horn's notes did not include any reference to stress or anxiety and in her oral evidence she described Abel's presentation on 24 June 2013 as easy going and relaxed. I also exclude from consideration the consultation with Dr Mammino on 26 September 2013. By the time that Abel attended on Dr Mammino on 26 September, he had already been assessed by Dr Horn for the same injury.

[27]   When Abel attended on Dr Horn a few days after consulting a solicitor on 24 September 2013, he was clearly embarked on a process of reconstruction. Despite attending at the Old Cleveland Road practice on 24 June, 26 August, 5 September and 17 September 2013 and not raising to any significant degree the issue of work related stress and anxiety, on 24 September 2013 Abel provided a detailed account of past workplace events . I am not suggesting that Abel's account might not be accurate, but it is a reconstruction which is not consistent with the immediately preceding consultations in terms of injury or symptoms of illness. In the circumstances, where available and relevant, contemporaneous accounts are preferred. Be that as it may, on 24 September 2013 Dr Horn said that Abel presented with symptoms of stress and anxiety, and based on the history provided to her by Abel, made a connection between the symptoms and Abel's past employment with the State Library. While she issued a workers' compensation medical certificate on that day, the certificate did not certify any period of partial or total incapacity.

[28]    Similarly Dr Mammino was asked to reconstruct events in Abel's consultation with him on 26 September 2013 when he was asked to issue a retrospective workers compensation certificate. The certificate he issued included a diagnosis of "work related stress" and stated that the worker was first seen for the injury on 1 March 2013. The certificate indicated that the worker would not be able to work at all from 1 March 2013 to 30 June 2013 and said that the worker would require treatment for the same period.

[29]   These assessments are then to be contrasted with the attendance by Abel on Dr Mammino on 1 March 2013. This visit occurred a few weeks after Abel had requested some time off work in order to mitigate stress. In Abel's email of 12 February 2013 (Exhibit 1) he indicated that his mental state was in tatters and that he was exhausted and that he wanted to take some stress leave in the immediate future. When Abel attended on Dr Mammino he informed him, inter alia, that he was suffering workplace stress. Dr Mammino made an entry in his notes to the effect that Abel was suffering work related stress, he ordered blood tests and offered to prescribe sleeping pills. Abel declined any offer of medication and did not request a medical certificate.

[30]   While Dr Mammino said in his oral testimony that Abel was more stressed out than depressed, he opined that that he did not think that Abel "was capable of doing work the way that he was" (T1-22). While he did not issue a medical certificate certifying that Abel had an incapacity for work he did say that he was under the impression that Abel was not employed when he attended the consultation. It may be inferred from this evidence that Dr Mammino did not turn his mind to the issuance of a certificate about unfitness for work because it was not necessary to do so.

[31]    In a context where a choice has to be made between the consultations of 1 March and 24 September 2013, I conclude that that the evidence associated with Abel's consultation with Dr Mammino on 1 March 2013 is sufficient to support a conclusion that

Dr Mammino assessed the alleged injury as resulting in a partial incapacity for work on this date.

[32] It follows that Abel's application for compensation lodged with WorkCover on 18 September 2013 fell outside of the statutory time limit prescribed by s 131(1).

Was the failure to lodge within the statutory time period due to mistake, reasonable cause or absence from the state?

[33] Section 131(5) of the Act provides a discretion to waive the time limit prescribed in s 131(1) in the event that Abel's failure to lodge his application within time was due to -

(a)	mistake;
(b)	the claimant's absence from the State; or
(c)	a reasonable cause.

[34] The approach to be adopted was discussed in R v Workers' Compensation Board of

3

Queensland ex parte Heffernan	where Kelly J, with whom Stable SPJ and Dunn J
agreed, held that:

"The first matter for consideration is what was the duty of the Office in relation to an application filed after the expiration of the six months period prescribed by clause 4(2) of the Schedule. Firstly, it was required to consider whether the failure to make the application within the prescribed time was due to mistake, absence from Queensland, or other reasonable cause. If it was not satisfied that the failure was due to any of those matters then there is no power to waive the time provision and that would be the end of the matter. If, however, it was satisfied that the failure was due to any one of those matters the question arises whether the time provision must then be waived or whether the Office has a discretion whether or not to do so, and if there is such a discretion, what matters it may properly take into account in its exercise."

[35]    In determining whether the exercise of discretion was compulsory, Kelly J, at page 568,

4

said:

"In my view the context of clause 4(2) itself would not indicate that the word 'may' has a compulsive meaning. For instance, I do not consider that, having provided a limitation period of six months, the legislature would have intended that the limitation should automatically be waived merely because the failure to make the application within the prescribed period was due to absence from Queensland, irrespective of any other circumstances as, for example, a long and unexplained delay in making the application after the applicant had returned to Queensland."

[36]    The expression "reasonable cause" was considered by Scholl J in Quinliven v Portland

5

Harbour Trust where the view was formed that a reasonable cause was one:

"...which a reasonable man would regard as sufficient, a cause consistent with a reasonable standard of conduct, the kind of thing which might be expected to delay the giving of notice by a reasonable man".

[37]    However in ANZ Banking Group v Q-COMP[6] Hall P cautioned that:

[6]

"...too much should not be made of the reasonable mind. The limitation period and the power to waive the limitation period are to operate in circumstances in which workers suffering physical, psychiatric and psychological injuries are seeking to claim benefits. It will frustrate the purpose of the Act if a failure to meet the time limit attributable to the very "injury" complained of is to be denied pardon because a reasonable person who (of course) would not be suffering from the "injury", would have met the time limit."

[38]    It the case of Black v City of South Melbourne[7] the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria considered the meaning to be given to "reasonable cause" as it appeared in s 34(1) of the Limitations of Actions Act 1958 (Vic). Before citing the passage by Scholl J. shown above the Full Court said:

[7]

"The inquiry here appears to be of a much wider kind justifying a more liberal attitude. The expression 'reasonable cause' appears to us to mean some act or omission which operated to prevent the giving of notice, and which was reasonable in the circumstances".

[39]    The issue for determination is whether Abel has been able to show that a reasonable act or omission operated to prevent him from filing his application within the prescribed time, or whether Abel has been able to demonstrate factors which might delay a reasonable person in filing the application.

[40] The appellant submitted that that the discretion vested in s 131(5) should not be exercised and that there was no reasonable cause why the application for compensation was not lodged within the time period. It was submitted that there was no medical evidence or anything else to suggest that Abel was not capable of completing an application for workers compensation within the statutory time frame. He was able to arrange and participate in a busy overseas trip, he considered himself well enough to resume work on a casual basis at the state library after his return from overseas, he engaged actively with the state library after his return in completing an exit survey and corresponding with Professor Roland Sussex, he was able to move residence, and he was able to commence and continue in employment at the Urban Hotel in Spring Hill.

[41]    The respondent however argued that a positive determination of "reasonable cause" was supported by the following factors:

	Abel considered that he was suffering from work related stress as early as January 2013 when he first raised the need to take time off with his supervisor;
	Abel's employer did not provide him with any advice concerning workers' compensation benefits when he raised the prospect of time off through stress;
	Abel was out of the state for a month;
	Abel suffered a set back in April 2013 when, at a time when he expected to resume employment, he was told that he did not have a casual job at the State Library;
	Abel experienced regular bouts of illness, particularly tonsillitis which may have shifted his focus away from a consideration of a WorkCover claim;
	Abel had no previous experience with the lodgement of workers' compensation claims;
	Abel had no knowledge of the statutory time limit;
	While Abel was aware that he could lodge a workers compensation claim, he was counselled against lodgement by Dr Horn in the 24 June 2013 consultation;
	In the end result, Abel was less than three weeks late in the lodgement of his claim.

[42]    After consideration of the competing submissions I accept the position advanced by the respondent that when the immediately abovementioned facts and circumstances are considered in conjunction with the relevant authorities, there is a basis to arrive at a balance of probabilities conclusion that the delay in lodgement of Abel's application for compensation was due to reasonable cause.

Credit

[43]   Some of the evidence pointed to a finding of credit adverse to Abel. Abel said that Dr Mammino advised him during the 1 March 2013 consultation that the State Library was a toxic place to be in and recommended that Abel should leave the organisation because of the impact it was having on him. Dr Mammino regarded this proposition as "rubbish". Abel said that he had experienced panic attacks before seeing Dr Mammino on 1 March 2013 and also before seeing Horn on 24 June and 24 September 2013 but he did not raise these attacks with any of the GP's he visited from March 2013 to September 2013. Further both Dr Horn and Dr Mammino denied that Abel had reported to them that he had experienced panic attacks.

[44]    While I accept that there is a basis to conclude that Abel has, in providing his version of events, relied on a mix of fact and fiction, any finding of credit adverse to Abel is not determinative of the question to be answered in these proceedings.

Discretion to Extend

[45] Having concluded that reasonable cause existed, it remains to be decided whether I should exercise my discretion to waive compliance with section 131(1). On balance, I consider that a combination of factors support a conclusion that compliance should be waived. Principal among these factors is that Abel was out of the state for a period of time, he was suffering from repeated bouts of tonsillitis and was not in robust physical condition, he may have been influenced by his doctor in prevaricating over a decision to lodge a claim, he had no previous experience with WorkCover claims and he was unaware of any time limit for lodgement of his claim, and finally his claim was lodged less than three weeks after the due date and immediately after he attended upon his solicitors.

[46] The decision of the regulator to waive compliance with section 131(1) is confirmed. The matter of costs is reserved.

[47] I order accordingly.

1

WorkCover Queensland and Patricia Mary Downey (2001) 168 QGIG 382.

2

Appo v Q-COMP [2003] QIC 169; 174 QGIG 1120.

3

R v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland ex parte Heffernan (1979) Qd R 563 at 567

4

Ibid.

5

Quinliven v Portland Harbour Trust [1963] VR 25 at 28.

ANZ Banking Group v Q-COMP (2004) 175 QGIG 1125.

Black v City of South Melbourne [1963] VR 34 at 36.