State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 166
PARTIES:	State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) (Appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent)
CASE NO:	WC/2022/32
PROCEEDING:	Appeal against a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator
DELIVERED ON:	27 June 2025
HEARING DATE:	4 – 10 April 2024 10 July 2024 (Respondent's Closing Submissions) 10 October 2024 (Appellant's Closing Submissions) 19 November 2024 (Respondent's Closing Submissions in reply) 6 December 2024 (Appellant's Closing Submissions in reply)
MEMBER: HEARD AT:	Pidgeon IC Brisbane
ORDERS:	1. The Appeal is dismissed. 2. Failing agreement between the parties, a decision on costs will be subject of a further application to the Commission.
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – appeal against review decision of respondent – where appellant is the Department in which the injured worker previously worked – where the worker suffered a psychiatric or psychological injury – whether the worker's psychiatric or psychological injury arose out of or in the course of the worker's employment – whether employment was a significant contributing factor to the worker's psychiatric or psychological injury – whether the injury arose in or out of the course of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way – where work-related stressors were a significant contributing factor or factors to the worker's injury – appeal dismissed
LEGISLATION:	Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 s 9, 11, 32, 141
CASES:	Allen v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2018] QIRC 41 Allwood v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 088 Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 103 Blackwood v Toward [2015] ICQ 008 Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 De Alwis v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2016] ICQ 8 Deshong v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 205 Dickenson v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 68 Edmunds v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 285 Gilmour v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 022 Granato v Workers Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 162 Myer Holdings Ltd AND Q-COMP (WC/2013/118) – Decision O'Neil v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 310 Qantas Airways Limited v Q-COMP (2006) 181 QGIG 301 Q-Comp v Rowe [2009] ICQ 32 Read v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 072 Robinson v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] ICQ Sheridan v Q-COMP [2009] ICQ 33 SSX Services Pty Ltd v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 62 State of Queensland (acting through Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services) AND Q-COMP and Mrs B (C/2013/2) – Decision State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 53 State of Queensland (Department of Communities Disability Services) AND Q-COMP and Mrs B (WC/2011/247) – Decision State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Beverley Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447 Toodayan and Toodayan v Metro South Hospital and Health Service & Others [2023] QIRC 036 Tuesley v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 71 Verhagen v Q-COMP (2008) 189 QGIG 542 Whipps v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 29
APPEARANCES:	Ms K. Riedel of Counsel instructed by Crown Law for the Appellant. Mr S. Gray of Counsel directly instructed by the Respondent.

Reasons for Decision

The State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) ('DAF') ('the Appellant') appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator') dated 3 February 2022 to set aside a decision of WorkCover Queensland to reject Ms Fullerton's application seeking compensation for psychological injury in accordance with s 32 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the WCR Act').
Ms Fullerton was a worker pursuant to s 11 of the WCR Act through her employment with the Appellant within the National Red Imported Fire Ant Eradication Program ('RIFA program' or 'the program') within Biosecurity Queensland. Ms Fullerton was employed as an AO8 Manager (Community and Stakeholder Engagement) within this program from 1 July 2019 to February 2021.

Ms Fullerton's role 'involved coordinating communications with target audiences, to advise them about the presence of fire ants and what was being done to eradicate them'.[1] Her role supported the treatment program and did not actually involve the treatment of fire ants.[2]

The Respondent identifies the following events or factors which it says are causally connected with the development of Ms Fullerton's injury:[3]

·The structural nature of the organisation, which involved both arms of the state and federal governments, led to Ms Fullerton experiencing a low level of control over some aspects of her work (Factor 1 in the Appellant's Statement of Facts and Contentions (‘SOFC’));
·Ms Fullerton developed extreme stress and anxiety about her role and an inability to actually deliver any of her work (Factor 3 in the Appellant's SOFC); and

·The demands of Ms Fullerton's role were high, requiring extended work hours, including working on weekends (Factor 4 in the Appellant's SOFC).

It is not in dispute that Ms Fullerton suffered a psychiatric or psychological disorder. On that basis, the matters in dispute for my determination are:
·the date of injury, or as the Respondent contends, whether the date of the injury is necessary to determine;
·whether Ms Fullerton's psychiatric or psychological injury arose out of or in the course of her employment, or whether employment was a significant contributing factor; and
·whether the injury is removed by the reasonable management action provisions of the WCR Act.
The hearing of the appeal is to be conducted as a hearing de novo.[4]
The Appellant bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms Fullerton's claim is not one for acceptance.[5]

The crux of the Appellant's case is that Ms Fullerton's claim should not be accepted because:[6]

·the injury did not arise out of or in the course of her employment but rather, was caused by events and medical issues unrelated to her employment;
·further and alternatively, the work-related stressors nominated by Ms Fullerton are unsubstantiated;

·further and alternatively, with regard to the work-related stressors, any injury suffered by Ms Fullerton arose out of, or in the course of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with her employment; and
·further and alternatively, with regard to the work-related stressors, any injury suffered by Ms Fullerton arose out of, or in the course of, her expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against her.

Date of injury

It is agreed that Ms Fullerton's application for compensation was lodged on 9 March 2021.
With respect to the date of injury, Industrial Commissioner Hartigan (as her Honour then was) in Tuesley v Workers' Compensation Regulator stated:[7]
[26] As noted by Deputy President Bloomfield in Kiesouw, events which occur after a worker suffers a psychological or psychiatric injury, cannot have contributed to the development of such an injury. Consequently, there is a need to identify when an injury occurred so as to only permit material relevant to the development of causation of that injury to be canvassed in an appeal proceeding.
(Citations omitted)
In terms of s 141 of the WCR Act, the Respondent says that the focus should be the date upon which the doctor forms the opinion that Ms Fullerton suffered an injury in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as distinct from simply requiring time off work. To that end, the Respondent directs me to Blackwood v Toward.[8] In that decision, at paragraph [29], his Honour Martin J said:
Section 141(1) concerns the worker and whether, in the opinion of a doctor or other nominated medical professional, the worker has suffered a "personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury" as described in s 9. That is what is meant by "the worker is assessed by … a doctor". To confine it as the respondent suggests is to equate assessing a worker with assessing an injury.
Further, in De Alwis v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator),[9] at paragraph [4], his Honour Martin J said:
In Blackwood v Toward, it was held that in order for a doctor to "assess" an injury as an "injury" within the meaning of the Act there must be evidence of some evaluation, that is to say, some conclusion or expression of opinion that the injury arose out of the employment.
The Respondent's position is that, ultimately, 'it is not necessary for a determination about the date of injury because all matters discussed in the oral and documentary evidence before the Commission are relevant to the claimed injury'.[10]
While the Appellant states that Ms Fullerton's application for compensation identified the date of injury as 8 February 2021, the Respondent says that it was WorkCover that nominated this as the date of injury.

The Appellant notes that the date of decompensation is often considered to be the signifier of the injury.[11] To that end, the Appellant says that the evidence before the Commission identifies 8 February 2021 as the date of Ms Fullerton's injury. The Appellant says that between 1 July 2019 and 8 February 2021, Ms Fullerton 'had been able to work consistently and complete work that her superiors were happy with and endorsed'.[12]

The Appellant points to the evidence of psychiatrist Dr Greig Richardson, whose evidence was that Ms Fullerton's performance as outlined at paragraph [15] above indicated that Ms Fullerton was not adversely affected by a particular psychiatric or psychological disorder during that time and that she was 'working successfully'.[13]

The evidence demonstrates that on 8 February 2021, Ms Fullerton attended on her General Practitioner, Dr Thakrar, who wrote in her consultation notes that Ms Fullerton was experiencing 'a lot of stress, just separated from husband'.[14] Dr Thakrar issued Ms Fullerton with medical certificates which stated that she was unfit for work during the periods 9 February 2021 to 12 February 2021[15] and 16 February 2021 to 19 February 2021.[16] Ms Fullerton took sick leave from work during these periods.[17]

On 5 March 2021, Dr Thakrar issued a work capacity certificate stating that Ms Fullerton had required treatment over the period 9 February 2021 to 5 April 2021 and had no functional capacity for any type of work until 5 April 2021. The work capacity certificate also stated that Ms Fullerton was first seen in the practice for the injury of '… stress – anxiety and physical symptoms' on 8 February 2021.[18]

Later, in response to correspondence from WorkCover, Dr Thakrar wrote on 23 March 2021 that: Ms Fullerton's diagnosis was stress – anxiety and resulting in somatic/physical symptoms (dizziness, chest pain, palpitations); that she was first seen in the practice in relation to the issues on 8 February 2021; and, Ms Fullerton had used sick leave before being issued with a work capacity certificate.[19]

Dr Thakrar's evidence was that she had initially provided Ms Fullerton with regular medical certificates because Ms Fullerton needed time off work, however, it subsequently became a WorkCover claim.[20]

I have reviewed the consultation notes for the visits following the 8 February consultation. On 11 February 2021, Dr Thakrar records that Ms Fullerton had been seen at the Royal Brisbane & Women's Hospital Emergency Department on 9 February 2021 with the presenting problem listed as 'GP REF – RESOLVED CHEST DISCOMFORT, PALPITATIONS 3/7 INTERMITENT <10SECONDS DURATION'.[21]

Dr Thakrar's notes of Ms Fullerton's 11 February 2021 visit also state:[22]
Work related stress – over 12-18/12
Recent email à got her very upset
She contacted EAPP (psychology service for employees) à had her supervisor - Andrew visit her at home.
Needs some time off.
….
Reason for visit
Results discussed- high cholesterol – also noted to be high in 2018
Stress
Also now worried re: ? possible heart issues
Discussed – reluctantly agrees to start Rx and will see cardiologist.
Need to fax letter to get triaged for appt.
On 16 February 2021, Ms Fullerton, again, attended on Dr Thakrar. The notes of that consultation record state:[23]
…
Worked yesterday à various emails, etc à got very teary and upset.
Not ready yet to go to work.
Has contacted work psychological services – waiting for appt.
Saw Amy last year – suggested she contact her and check -?continue with sessions
…
Dr Thakrar said that Ms Fullerton was first prescribed an anti-depressant on 2 March 2021.[24]
The consultation notes for the visits on 11 and 16 February 2021 appear to demonstrate a continuation of symptoms related to Ms Fullerton's condition as it was on 8 February 2021.

It was Dr Thakrar's evidence that Ms Fullerton's injury was caused by the work duties performed by Ms Fullerton and that there were a number of incidents which accumulated over time.[25]

The Respondent notes that Dr Richardson, who had been informed that the date of injury was 7 February 2021, thought it was an over-time progressive build up issue[26] and points to his evidence at the hearing: [27]
I felt it was one issue relating to the build up of stressors that reached their zenith, if you like, or nadir on the 25^th. I saw the – is – saw it as an over-time progressive build-up issue.
…
Dr Richardson was of the view that the events of 25 February did not give rise to a second injury, but were 'an extension of the primary issues at work and as such does not constitute a second claim but is part of the original claim which differs from her General Practitioner'.[28]

The Respondent says that Dr Thakrar's explanation that Ms Fullerton just wanted time off and then things had developed[29] is consistent with an injury developing over a period of time and is also the same opinion expressed by Dr Richardson.
The Respondent submits that Dr Thakrar did not say the date on which she formed the opinion that Ms Fullerton had suffered an injury in accordance with the provisions of the WCR Act, as distinct from simply requiring time off work.

Taking into account the authorities set out above which require the relevant medical practitioner to not just assess that there has been an injury, but to form the opinion that it is an injury arising out of or in the course of employment, I accept the Respondent's submissions that it is difficult to positively define a date of injury from Dr Thakrar's evidence.

Dr Thakrar and Dr Richardson agree that the injury arose over a period of time resulting from the work-related factors Ms Fullerton sets out.

Given that the evidence before the Commission in this matter refers overwhelmingly to those work-related factors over a period of time leading up to the series of consultations with Dr Thakrar and the issuing of medical certificates in February, I tend to agree with the Respondent that it is not essential to determine a date of injury for the purposes of this matter.
However, I take into account that Dr Richardson is of the view that a work-related injury was already in place by the time of the events of 25 February 2021 and that Dr Thakrar specifically notes on 11 February 2021 that Ms Fullerton needed some time off work, and refers to work-related stress over the preceding 12 to 18 months. It seems clear to me that Ms Fullerton had sustained the injury over a period of time in the lead up to the period in February when Ms Fullerton took time off work.

With reference to the letter Dr Thakrar sent to WorkCover on 23 March 2021, I note that Dr Thakrar is of the view that 'all [Ms Fullerton's] symptoms [were] triggered by work-related matters – meetings/emails/communications' and that she was first seen for her 'current issues' on 8 February 2021. While there is no record of Dr Thakrar specifically assessing the injury as 'work related' in the consultation notes taken on 8 February 2021, by 23 March 2021 Dr Thakrar, when asked, provided an opinion that the symptoms commenced on 8 February 2021 and that Dr Thakrar believed they were all triggered by work-related matters. The first time a WorkCover certificate was issued was on 8 March 2021.

I understand that the Appellant claims the injury is not work-related and that the work-related factors cannot be made out. However, to the extent that a date of injury is required in order to determine what evidence will be heard by the Commission, I have determined that the date of injury is 8 February 2021.

As the matter of date of injury had not been determined at the hearing, there was some limited evidence presented which related to events post-8 February 2021. To some extent, that evidence simply confirms the matters which were already in place by 8 February 2021, for example ongoing discussions about the language and messaging in the lifestyle campaign. However, as I determine the matters in issue, I am focused on the evidence as it relates to events up to and including 8 February 2021.
Is the personal injury one arising out of, or in the course of employment and is employment a significant contributing factor to the injury?

Pursuant to s 32 of the WCR Act, an injury is one which has arisen out of or in the course of employment, if employment has significantly contributed to the injury.
The Appellant submits that Ms Fullerton's claim is not one for acceptance, because her employment was not a significant contributing factor to her injury. The Appellant submits that as of the date of injury, Ms Fullerton was impacted by several significant health or life events unrelated to her employment. The Appellant submits that it was those events, and not Ms Fullerton's employment, which caused her to decompensate.[30]

Non-employment related factors nominated by the Appellant
Health issues and significant life events

The first non-employment related factor the Appellant identifies is some physical health issues Ms Fullerton was dealing with, in the context of her family history:[31]
a.       On 18 December 2020 (in circumstances where Ms Fullerton's mother died at the age of 70 from bowel cancer and her father died at the age of 60, from stomach cancer)[32] Ms Fullerton attended the Royal Brisbane and Women's Hospital complaining of a 'two day history of left lower quadrant tenderness, persisting and worsening. Lethargic. Family history of bowel cancer'. A CT scan of her 'Abdomen + Pelvis + C' was performed to 'Confirm diverticulitis'. The preliminary report indicated, inter alia:[33]
i.An ovoid, fat density focus immediately anterior to the mid descending colon with surrounding inflammatory change.
ii.No diverticulosis.
iii.A predominantly fat density exophytic lesion arising from the posterior aspect of the mid segment of the kidney measuring 54 x 46 x 44mm. this renal lesion was considered likely to be an angiomyolipoma.
iv.An 11mm radiodense lesion arising from the cortex of the lower pole right kidney. This was considered likely based upon that scan, to represent a haemorrhagic cyst.
b.       On 22 December 2020, Ms Fullerton consulted her general practitioner, Dr Arita Thakrar. Dr Thakrar gave evidence at the hearing and said that she made contemporaneous notes of her consultations with Ms Fullerton reflecting what they discussed during the consult and what Dr Thakrar considered to be important and pertinent history.[34] The consultation notes which Dr Thakrar made on 22 December 2020 were as follows:[35]
i.Travelled to Tasmania in Motorhome.
On 23 Nov – noticed ankles swollen – now gone.
Has HT – was taking Rx on and off.
Is taking it regularly.
Worried re: heart – discussed – monitor – review.
ii.Recent pain in LIF – seen RBH – had CT scan – see report.
Also had urine and blood tests.
Advised has right renal lesions – needs to see urologist.
Had abdo USS in 2013 – lesion present – was smaller – almost doubled in size.
Has private health – given names of urologists.
….
Reason for visit:
Right Renal lesion
BP Check
Actions:
Cardiovascular Risk Evaluation: 5% probability of developing cardiovascular disease in the next five years.
c.       On 11 January 2021, Ms Fullerton consulted urologist, Dr Stuart Philip. Dr Philip prepared a report to Dr Thakrar, of the same date, in which he said, inter alia:[36]
i.The CT scan performed on Ms Fullerton identified a 5.4cm likely angiomyolipoma posteriorly in the right kidney as well as a second anterior lesion, measuring 11mm, that was slightly more indeterminate.
ii.Ms Fullerton had an ultrasound performed in 2013 and he had seen the report. It indicated that she had a 28mm lesion that was likely an AML at that stage. There was note made of a second 9mm lesion in the same kidney. Dr Philip presumed that it was the 11mm lesion they were now seeing.
iii.He discussed the risk of a spontaneous bleed from an angiomyolipoma.
iv.He arranged for Ms Fullerton to have a formal triple phase renal CT.
d.       On 1 February 2021, Ms Fullerton consulted Dr Philp again. He advised her that her recent triple phase renal CT showed a second smaller lesion within the right kidney which enhanced with contrast. He told her that it was possible that it represented a small renal cell carcinoma. It was to be monitored over the course of six months.[37]
e.       On 8 February 2021, Ms Fullerton consulted Dr Thakrar and the consultation notes were as follows:[38]
Saturday – out sorting things in boat – felt 'funny' – irritable, headache – assumed low BWL as had not eaten. Felt a bit dizzy. Also 'bit of irritation in throat'. Got home took BP 95/57.
Had some food later BP was better.
No chest pain, sweats etc.
Sunday – bit tired, rested, BP improved – took BP med's.
Admits to being under a lot of stress, just separated from husband. Relationship issues many years.
…
Reason for visit:
Vasovagal attack (?)
BP Check
Results from RBWH from Dec reviewed.
See EG - ??IHD – need to refer for cardiac assessment.
f.        Ms Fullerton was subsequently issued medical certificates by Dr Thakrar for the periods 9 February 2021 – 12 February 2021[39] and 16 February 2021 to 19 February 2021[40] (and subsequently) which stated that she was unfit for work. On 5 March Dr Thakrar issued Ms Fullerton a work capacity certificate which stated:

i.Ms Fullerton had required treatment over the period 9 February 2021 to 5 April 2021. She had no functional capacity for any type of work until 5 April 2021.
ii.Ms Fullerton was first seen at the practice for the injury (stress – anxiety and physical symptoms) on 8 February 2021.

g. On 23 March 2021, Dr Thakrar wrote to WorkCover in relation to Ms Fullerton and indicated that:[41]
i.Ms Fullerton's diagnosis was 'stress – anxiety and resulting in somatic/physical symptoms (dizziness, chest pain, palpitations)'.
ii.She was first seen at the practice in relation to the issues on 8 February 2021.

iii.Ms Fullerton used her sick leave before being issued a work capacity certificate.

The Appellant says that the consultation notes made by Dr Thakrar make no mention of any work stress or work-related issues during the consultation on 22 December 2020,[42] or 8 February 2021.[43] Instead, the Appellant says that during the consultation on 22 December 2020, Dr Thakrar recorded that Ms Fullerton was worried about heart issues.[44]
Further, during the consultation of 8 February 2021, the Appellant says Dr Thakrar noted that Ms Fullerton was concerned about her heart. She also notes that the separation from her husband was a source of worry and stress, as well as the renal issues (namely the kidney lesions) which were being investigated. The Appellant notes that Dr Thakrar said she was gathering general information about triggers, cardiac or other issues,[45] and says it is significant that no reference to any work-related trigger or issue was noted at that time.[46]
The Appellant concludes that Ms Fullerton took leave between 14 November 2020 and 3 January 2021[47] and that it was during this time and on returning to work that she experienced personal issues including the breakdown of her marriage, an 'unresolved cancer scare' in circumstances where both of her parents died of cancer at age 60 and 70; and cardiovascular issues. The Appellant says that it was these issues which caused Ms Fullerton's decompensation and psychiatric injury and were the 'catalyst' for the issuing of medical certificates certifying her unfit for work and identifying the date of injury as 8 February 2021.[48]

Further, the Appellant submits that the work-related factors identified as contributing to her injury are not able to be made out on the evidence and on this basis, her employment was not a significant contributing factor to the injury.
Respondent's submissions – non-employment related issues

The Respondent submits that the medical evidence led in the Appellant's case proves that Ms Fullerton's employment is a significant contributing factor to her psychiatric or psychological injury.[49]
With regard to the 18 December 2020 imaging which identified a 'right renal lesion', the Respondent notes that the reported impression states, '… Non-urgent evaluation recommended'. The Respondent points to Dr Thakrar's evidence that 'non-urgent evaluation recommended' indicated that there was no serious health impact for Ms Fullerton at the time. Dr Thakrar's evidence was that the report demonstrated normal findings and did not require management for any adverse psychological or psychiatric reaction from Ms Fullerton.[50]

With regard to the report provided by Dr Philip to Dr Thakrar on 11 January 2021 (canvassed above at paragraph [40] of these reasons),[51] Dr Thakrar's evidence was that the matters she discussed with Ms Fullerton about the scan was that she had been reassured by Dr Philip about the benign nature of the findings. Dr Thakrar did not need to issue any medical certificate for time off resulting from this matter.[52]

With regard to the further review of Ms Fullerton by Dr Philip on 1 February 2021, the Respondent notes that Dr Philip reported to Dr Thakrar amongst other things, that there was a second, smaller renal lesion which could represent a small renal cell carcinoma, but that if it were the same lesion which appeared on the 2013 scan, the lack of growth was extremely reassuring.[53] The Respondent says Dr Thakrar's evidence was that she discussed with Ms Fullerton that the lesion was benign, was the same from 2013, hadn't changed much, and it was reassuring that it was unlikely to be cancer.[54] Dr Thakrar also said that the reference to carcinoma was 'obviously just the possibilities of the lesion that was found in that side'.[55]

Dr Thakrar was asked about the reference in the notes of the visit on 8 February 2021 where she noted that Ms Fullerton 'admits to being under a lot of stress', 'just separated from husband. Relationship issues many years'. Dr Thakrar's evidence was to the effect that she asked Ms Fullerton about her experience of worry and stress given there were 'symptoms overlapping like headaches, chest pain, and so on …'. Dr Thakrar said she thought the reference to Ms Fullerton's marriage separation and relationship issues arose from a discussion about how Ms Fullerton got to hospital when she was working on the boat. It did not appear from Dr Thakrar's evidence that Ms Fullerton's marriage breakdown was a major topic of conversation, more that it arose in the context of a broader discussion where Ms Fullerton had explained she was working on the boat with her husband but had clarified that they had separated.[56]

The Respondent points to the evidence of Dr Richardson who said that in his experience, when someone has a lot of stress or pressure in their job, there can be an adverse impact on the marital relationship.[57]

Dr Richardson said that a martial relationship experiencing stress can still be 'loving, supportive or stable'.[58] Dr Richardson's evidence was that it is in keeping with the development of a psychiatric disorder for a person to describe stress and pressure at work that then has a severe impact on the marital relationship.[59]

Conclusion re: non-health related issues

I accept that Ms Fullerton was experiencing a range of health concerns and that her family medical history is referred to in the medical notes. I also accept that Ms Fullerton is separated and now divorced from her husband. However, these factors do not, on their own, act to quarantine Ms Fullerton's injury from being compensable. It is necessary to consider the evidence as it relates to 'work-related issues' and whether work-related issues were a significant contributing factor to the personal injury. As argued by the Appellant, if the work-related matters the Respondent relies upon in stating that the injury is one for acceptance are found to not be made out, the appeal will succeed.
The Commission heard expert medical evidence as to the work-related factors the Appellant claims did not contribute to the injury. The Commission also heard evidence from a number of lay witnesses who gave evidence about the nominated work-related factors.

Work-related factors

The medical evidence as it relates to 'work related issues'

Dr Thakrar

On 11 February 2021, Dr Thakrar's notes of a consultation with Ms Fullerton include reference to work-related stress over the past 12 to 18 months, a recent email which had upset her, that she had contacted the work Employee Assistance Program, that her supervisor had visited her at home and that she needed some time off work. It was on this day that Dr Thakrar issued Ms Fullerton with a medical certificate stating that she was unfit for work from 9 February to 12 February 2021.[60]
Dr Thakrar's evidence was that Ms Fullerton had discussed working long hours and after hours at home and that this caused her stress.[61] In cross-examination, Dr Thakrar said that this reference was to Ms Fullerton having to work long hours in her role.[62]

While there had been a reference to a work email in Dr Thakrar's notes, she was unable to recall anything Ms Fullerton had said about the email.

Ms Fullerton saw Dr Thakrar on 25 February 2021 and her notes include that Ms Fullerton had returned to work on Tuesday 23 February 2021. I note that events described during this consultation occurred after the date of injury. The notes record that Ms Fullerton had told Dr Thakrar:[63]
Various discussions going on in the office, today called in for meeting by highest level.
Told "everything was her fault", etc. Advised she will be transferred to another dept.
Became very upset and emotional
Crying++ ever since.
Cannot think clearly. Feels angry.
Seeing psychologist tomorrow.
Friends and husband looking out for her.
…
Reason for visit:
Stress
The Respondent refers the Commission to a work capacity certificate Dr Thakrar issued on 8 March 2021 which contains the following:[64]
(a)Ms Fullerton's stated date of injury was 25 February 2021;
(b)Ms Fullerton was first seen in the practice for the injury on 8 February 2021;

(c)The diagnosis was Work related stress à anxiety and physical symptoms;

(d)The mechanism of injury of several incidents over a period of months was consistent with the clinical findings; and

(e)Ms Fullerton required treatment from 9 February 2021 to 5 April 2021, and would be reviewed again on 5 April 2021.

Dr Thakrar's evidence was that she had nominated 8 February 2021 as the date of injury because that was the episode where Ms Fullerton was dizzy on the boat, and that was when she started issuing the medical certificates, including the first medical certificate on 8 February 2021.[65]
The Respondent notes that there was a 'bigger trigger' on 25 February 2021.[66] This appears to be the date upon which Ms Fullerton determined that she was unable to work as a result of her symptoms.

The Respondent also points to a report Dr Thakrar provided to WorkCover in response to a series of questions posed by it where she stated the following:[67]
(a) Ms Fullerton's employment was a significant contributing factor in causing her injury;
(b) the causative events which led to the onset of the work-related diagnosis was a number of incidents over a period of months;

(c)      the work-related diagnosis was expressed as:
Stressàanxiety and resulting in somatic/physical symptoms (dizziness, chest pain, palpitations).
(d)      There were no external factors or pre-existing conditions contributing to Ms Fullerton's psychological injury;
(e)      All Ms Fullerton's symptoms are triggered by work related matters – meetings/emails/communications;

(f) Ms Fullerton had been referred to a psychologist for treatment;

(g) Ms Fullerton will also see a cardiologist to exclude cardiac causes for her physical symptoms; and

(h) Ms Fullerton had been a patient of the practice since 6 January 2020 (Q 7).

Dr Thakrar's evidence was that the causative events were the work duties Ms Fullerton had to perform and that the pressure of the work Ms Fullerton did, built up over time.[68]
The Respondent notes that Ms Fullerton saw a cardiologist who advised Dr Thakrar that Ms Fullerton did not require blood pressure tablets and that she suffered from 'situational hypertension' where the high blood pressure was related to Ms Fullerton's work.[69]

Dr Richardson

Dr Greig Richardson was engaged by WorkCover to assess Ms Fullerton and produce a report as a part of Ms Fullerton's claim. Dr Richardson's report is dated 3 August 2021.[70]
The Respondent notes that Dr Richardson diagnosed Ms Fullerton as having an adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood, with a differential diagnosis of an acute stress disorder.[71] Dr Richardson provides his report on the basis of documents provided by WorkCover and the individual he is assessing.[72]

Dr Richardson's evidence was that he takes a history of the presenting complaint from the individual he is assessing. He said that he tries to '… make it clear in a linear manner. This is the nature of the journey, what are the circumstances of the injuries, what treatment she had, where she had [it], that sort of thing … so we have a complete understanding of the nature of the injury and its sequalae and the circumstances in which it has occurred.'[73] Dr Richardson said that his diagnosis is based on that information from the individual but also it is in the context of other reports he had.[74]

Dr Richardson's evidence was that he 'is not a detective' and so he relies on the individual's personal history and what they say has occurred. Dr Richardson said that if some material fact he has considered in forming his opinion was wrong, it could change his opinion.[75]

Ms Riedel took Dr Richardson through his report and clarified the matters that Dr Richardson had identified in the 'history of the presenting complaint' part of his report. Dr Richardson agreed that these matters fed into his opinion regarding causation and diagnosis. In summary, these matters were:[76]
·Difficulty matching expectations of national steering committee with what could be developed due to interventions by DAF;
·Difficulty with role and clarity;

·Difficulties understanding the requirements of different organisations, which led to conflict and difficulties moving through appropriate approval channels;

·Writing and preparing campaigns to achieve goals and having these cancelled by the Department and the Minister's office;
·Developing extreme stress and anxiety about her role and the inability to deliver any of the work;
·Significant difficulties with Ms Beck, Director of Communications whom she felt began micromanaging her and being overly critical of her performance. Being under scrutiny of Ms Beck while not being directly accountable to Ms Beck; and
·Believing it was impossible to reconcile a Queensland Government organisation wishing to have their imprimatur on a program that was essentially nationally funded.

Dr Richardson also took into account Ms Fullerton's report that she had a loving, stable relationship with her husband.[77]
Dr Richardson confirmed that the history given by Ms Fullerton included that the demands of her role were somewhat high and she had worked on weekends from the beginning of her employment in July 2019.[78]

The Respondent points out that Dr Richardson understood that Ms Fullerton felt she had a low level of control over aspects of her work.[79] The Respondent also notes that Dr Richardson seemed to understand that Ms Fullerton was having trouble working with both her employer, the State Government and the Federal Government level Steering Committee.[80]

Dr Richardson's opinion is that Ms Fullerton's employment was the major significant contributing factor to the diagnosed injury:[81]
I consider employment to be the major significant contributing factor to her injury with Ms Fullerton documenting from the beginning of her employment that demands of her role were high and she found herself working on weekends with feelings at times she had a low level of control over some aspects of her work given the structural nature of the organisation which involved both arms of the state and federal governments.
Subsequently with difficulties with role clarity, Ms Fullerton as I have documented reported difficulties understanding the requirements of the different organisations which led to conflict and difficulties moving through the appropriate approval channels.
Subsequently she found herself developing extreme stress and anxiety about her role and an inability to actually deliver any of her work with her stating it became obvious to her that she began to lose the support of Mr Graeme Dudgeon with her developing extreme distress and panic episodes for which her General Practitioner Dr [Artia] Thakrar issued her a certificate for stress leave and referred her to counselling with Psychologist Amy Underwood.
To this end I consider employment to be the major significant contribution factor to her injury.
Dr Richardson said that the major stressor articulated by Ms Fullerton was working on weekends and having a low level of control over some aspects of her work given its structural nature involving both State and Federal Governments.[82] Dr Richardson said nothing in the personal history provided to him made him think there was anything else in Ms Fullerton's experience commensurate with the difficulties she was experiencing at work.[83]
With reference to the stressor Ms Fullerton identified in that she had developed campaigns which had received approvals, only to have them changed at the very end, Dr Richardson said that the reason for the change of the advertising campaign was not what had the impact, rather, it was the fact of the change itself.[84]

The Appellant argues Dr Richardson's opinion should not be accepted by the Commission

The Appellant submits that in forming his opinion, Dr Richardson 'relied heavily, if not exclusively', upon the information contained in the documents provided to him by WorkCover Queensland and Ms Fullerton.[85] The Appellant notes that Dr Richardson said his opinion regarding the cause of injury was based on all information, particularly that regarding health reasons leading up to the stress.[86] Dr Richardson also said that if the underlying facts contained in the information before him changed, it would impact on his opinion regarding the cause of Ms Fullerton's injury.[87]
The Appellant says that when he formed his opinion about Ms Fullerton, Dr Richardson was unaware of what the Appellant says were the significant, contemporaneous health and life events experienced by her as outlined above. The Appellant also says that Dr Richardson was unaware that Ms Fullerton took leave from work between 14 November 2020 and 3 January 2021[88] or that she had been given medical certificates for time off work between 9 and 22 February 2021.[89] Further, the Appellant says that Dr Richardson relied on Ms Fullerton's description of being in a loving, stable relationship with her husband and was not aware that Ms Fullerton had separated from her husband.[90]

The Appellant says that Dr Richardson identified a range of work-related factors as having caused Ms Fullerton's injury,[91] however, Dr Richardson's evidence is flawed and should not be accepted by the Commission on the basis that it was:
(a)'formulated in a vacuum' devoid of knowledge of Ms Fullerton's significant health and life events between December 2020 and February 2021; and
(b)the factual basis for his opinion has not been made out, rendering his opinion irrelevant.[92] The Appellant points to various authorities supporting the proposition that an expert's opinion must have a relationship with the facts proved, or else it is irrelevant.[93]
While the Respondent says that the Appellant 'made no effort to disentangle the nominated events with Dr Richardson', the Appellant says this is untrue. The Appellant says that the law is clear and cites Heydon J in Dasreef:[94]
[90] Function of the proof of assumption rule. The function of the proof of assumption rule is to highlight the irrelevance of expert opinion evidence resting on assumptions not backed by primary evidence. It is irrelevant because it stands in a void, unconnected with the issues thrown up by the evidence and the reasoning processes which the trier of fact may employ to resolve them. If the expert's conclusion does not have some rational relationship with the facts proved, it is irrelevant. That is because in not tending to establish the conclusion asserted, it lacks probative capacity. Opinion evidence is a bridge between data in the form of primary evidence and a conclusion which cannot be reached without the application of expertise. The bridge cannot stand if the primary evidence end of it does not exist. The expert opinion is then only a misleading jumble, uselessly cluttering up the evidentiary scene. (citations omitted)
The Appellant says that Dasreef has been followed by the Commission. This matter was addressed in the Appellant's written submissions where reference was made to Vice-President O'Connor's decision of Toodayan:[95]
[238] There are numerous cases, including Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles and Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (Dasreef) that clearly outline the duty of an expert and the issue involved with unproven assumptions in expert witness reports.
[239] Heydon J, in Dasreef, addressed several of those issues in his judgment. He said:
An expert opinion is not admissible unless evidence has been, or will be, admitted, whether from the expert or from some other source, which is capable of supporting findings of fact which are sufficiently similar to the factual assumptions on which the opinion was stated to be based to render the opinion of value.
[240] Later in the decision, his Honour noted that:
If the expert's conclusion does not have some rational relationship with the facts proved, it is irrelevant. That is because in not tending to establish the conclusion asserted, it lacks probative capacity…(this extract appears above at [286]).
[241] Unless there is evidence to support the assumptions in an expert report, the report will be given little weight by the Commission. (citations omitted)

The Appellant also refers to Granato[96] where Industrial Commissioner Knight discusses principles relevant to the issue of the admissibility of evidence. Of particular relevance is the Commissioner's observation that where the 'factual underpinning of the report is disturbed by, for example, the rejection by the tribunal of parts of that underpinning, then it follows that the report itself is weakened to that extent'.[97]
The Appellant repeats that between 1 July 2019 and 8 February 2021, Ms Fullerton had been able to work consistently in her role,[98] and was considered capable by her supervisors and was meeting her KPIs.[99] The Appellant points to Dr Richardson's evidence which was that this conduct indicated that Ms Fullerton was not adversely affected by a particular psychiatric or psychological disorder during that time and was working successfully.[100]
What conclusions can be drawn from the medical evidence?
The Respondent says that having regard to the evidence of Dr Thakrar and Dr Richardson, the factors which have a causal connection with Ms Fullerton's diagnosed injury are:[101]
(a) The structural nature of the organisation which involved both arms of the state and federal governments led to Ms Fullerton experiencing a low level of control over some aspects of her work. This includes Ms Fullerton's difficulties understanding the requirements of the different organisations, resulting in conflict and difficulties moving through the appropriate approval channels.
Low role clarity where she had two masters (Factor 1) in the appellant's SOFAC.

(b) Ms Fullerton developed extreme stress and anxiety about her role and an inability to actually deliver any of her work. This naturally includes the impact of the change made to the advertising campaign.
Campaign changes (Factor 3) in the appellant's SOFAC.
(c) The demands of Ms Fullerton's role were high, requiring extended work hours, including working on weekends.
Workload (Factor 4) in the appellant's SOFAC.

The Respondent says that while Ms Fullerton spoke to Dr Richardson about a deteriorating relationship with Ms Beck and that she felt Ms Beck was micromanaging her, this was not a matter identified by Dr Richardson as being a significant contributing factor to the injury.[102]
As the Appellant contends that the factual basis for Dr Richardson's opinion has not been made out, and noting the authorities set out above in the Appellant's submissions, it is necessary to turn to the evidence before the Commission in determining whether the nominated stressors did, in fact, exist.

Consideration of the work-related factors said to have contributed to Ms Fullerton's injury

The Respondent submits that it is important to consider the distinction between a worker's perception of events occurring in the workplace and the Commission's determination of the reality of what occurred.[103] The Respondent cites some cases containing judicial commentary regarding this matter.
The Respondent first turns to Sheridan v Q-COMP,[104] where President Hall wrote (emphasis added by Respondent):
… In respect to psychological injury, there is an "egg-shell psyche" principle which is the equivalent of the "egg-shell skull" principle, compare State Transit Authority of New South Wales v Chelmer [2007] NSWCA 249 at paragraph 40 per Spigelman CJ. So long as the events within the workplace are real rather than imaginary, it matters not that they impact upon the claimant's psyche because of a flawed perception of events attributable to a disordered mind, … The inability of a worker to psychologically cope with an attitude or manner of another worker is analogous to a worker being unable to cope with any other feature, including a physical feature, or aspect of the work environment, Flinders Power Operating Services Pty Ltd (formerly NRG Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd) v Amato [2007] SAWCT 33 at paragraph 125. There is of course a statutory deviation from the general rule where the psychological disorder arises out of or in the course of a claimant's expectation or perception of reasonable management action been taken against the worker, compare s. 32(5)(b) of the Act…

The Respondent also cites President Hall in Q-Comp v Rowe[105] (emphasis added by Respondent):
but for s. 32(5) of the Act, at least at a conceptual level, a psychological injury arising out of interaction between a worker's personality and the work environment would be compensable, compare Flinders Power Operating Services Pty Ltd (formerly NRG Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd) v Amato [2007] SAWCT 33 at paras 125 and 126.
The Respondent then turns to Gilmour v Workers' Compensation Regulator,[106] where his Honour, Vice-President O'Connor rejected an argument that the worker's psychiatric injury developed due to his unique personality traits and misperception of events occurring in the workplace (Respondent's emphasis added):
[60] I do not accept that this is a case in which it can be said that "the only significant contributing factor" was the appellant's own peculiar attitude which led to the injury.
[61] In Attorney General's Department v K (2010) 8 DDCR 120 R 52 Acting President Roche drew the following conclusions of the relevant authorities dealing with perception:
a)employers take their employees as they find them. There is an "egg-shell psyche" principle which is the equivalent of the "egg-shell skull" principle (Spigelman CJ in Chelmer at [40]);
b)a perception of real events, which are not external events, can satisfy the test of injury arising out of or in the course of employment (Spigelman CJ in Chelmer at [54]);
c)if events which actually occurred in the workplace were perceived as creating an offensive or hostile working environment, and a psychological injury followed, it is open to the Commission to conclude that causation is established (Basten JA in Chelmer at [69]);
d)so long as the events within the workplace are real, rather than imaginary, it does not matter that they affected the worker's psyche because of a flawed perception of events because of a disordered mind (President Hall in Sheridan);
e)there is no requirement at law that the worker's perception of the events must have been one that passed some qualitative test based on an "objective measure of reasonableness" (Von Doussa J in Wiegand at [31]), and
f)it is not necessary that the worker's reaction to the events must have been "rational, reasonable and proportionate" before compensation can be recovered.
In that decision, Vice-President O'Connor went on to say that he accepted that the appellant had a demanding workload and went on to find that it was more probable than not that there was a clear causal connection between the worker's employment and the psychiatric or psychological condition.[107]
The Respondent says that the above authorities are important to keep in mind because the Appellant argues that Ms Fullerton's injury is caused by her unpreparedness to work in the manner required and because of her desire to change existing practices relating to the approval of campaigns.[108] The Respondent argues that it was the system Ms Fullerton had to work within that caused her injury.

The expert evidence regarding the relevant stressors or factors is set out above. Ms Fullerton was asked about her visit to Dr Thakrar on 8 February 2021. Ms Fullerton's evidence was that she was stressed and continued to work up until 8 February 2021 but on the weekend before 8 February, her blood pressure was quite low. She said that she went to work on the Monday and burst into tears and then went to see the doctor. Ms Fullerton agreed that she told the doctor she was under a lot of stress and said that she 'was talking to her about stress relating to the decision that was taken by the Minister', and 'the leadup to all of that with the difficulty in understanding who was in charge and able to direct decision-making'. Ms Fullerton said that she was working 'ridiculous hours' to try and get the work done.[109]

I will now consider the submissions of the parties and the evidence before the Commission with regard to:
·Factor One: Low Role Clarity
·Factor Two: Micromanagement

·Factor Three: Campaign Changes

·Factor Four: Workload

I note that regarding each of these factors, the Appellant first argues that the factor cannot be substantiated on the evidence. In the alternative, the Appellant argues that if established, each factor is extinguished by the operation of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. Where I find that a factor has been established, I will consider whether it is removed by s 32(5).
Factor One: Low Role Clarity
Respondent’s submissions
Prior to the time Ms Fullerton was performing her role, the RIFA program had already been established and was operational. While it was being run by the Queensland Government, it was being funded by state and federal governments and was subject to a range of stakeholders.
This stressor relates to the interactions Ms Fullerton had involving the Steering Committee and the Department, or as was perceived by Ms Fullerton as the 'two masters issue'.
Ms Fullerton's role was managerial and included elements of media, stakeholder engagement and communication with the general public. The Respondent summarises the evidence of Mr Letts, the bio security officer in charge of the program at the relevant time, regarding elements of the role as follows: [110]
(a) with Queensland landholders, which was a critical part of the potential success of the program;
(b) responsibility for media releases and general communications, dealing with the media and those sorts of things; and

(c) a responsibility for reporting back to the steering committee in relation to all of those elements that were being delivered within the program.

Mr Letts' evidence was that the biosecurity fire ant response was of a scale that had not been seen before. Mr Letts said that he met weekly with the Minister's office and generally speaking, 25% of conversations were around the program.[111]
The Steering Committee featured heavily in the evidence throughout the hearing. Mr Letts described the role of the Steering Committee as being to give cost share partners oversight they would normally have by way of a consultative committee or a National Management Group:[112]
…it wasn't clear which, but at least to give them a seat at the table to have some input and say into the way that the program was being run and to – to monitor the performance of the program and report back as much as anything.

The Steering Committee had terms of reference which involved it providing guidance and support.[113] Mr Letts said that the membership of the Steering Committee changed with time, but that it was:[114]
… made up of people in either roles like myself or perhaps a level down, in terms of the general manager, invasive species type roles. They have some technical and scientific background in relation to invasive species control and eradication, so that it was as much as anything to give them an opportunity to have input into the way the program was being run. It – obviously they also had a responsibility in terms of accountability around the money – the way the money was being spent, the reporting back to their various jurisdictions in – on -on -on that. So yeah, all of those elements, as you would expect.
Mr Letts said that there was an agreement in place for each of the states to make a financial contribution to the program but that the financial accountability for the program sat with the Queensland Government.[115]
With reference to the program's governance plan, Mr Letts' evidence was that risks associated with the program flowed back to '… primarily, the Queensland Government'.[116] Mr Letts said '… it was as much about managing the risk that the steering committee members may actually walk away if we weren't running the program in a solid, accountable, you know, risk-mitigation manner …'.[117]

I agree with the Respondent's submission that Mr Letts' evidence demonstrates the importance of the steering committee's role in the oversight of the program and that the steering committee took a very hands-on approach to its responsibilities.[118]

The Appellant asserts that Ms Fullerton was unwilling to work in the manner required or that she had some kind of particular preference with regard to the way the program ran, including the governance arrangements. However, the evidence demonstrated that the tension and complexities of the relationship between the Queensland team implementing the program and the Steering Committee oversight role existed well before Ms Fullerton took up her role.

Prior to Ms Fullerton's employment, Ms Louise Morgan held a role with similar responsibilities. The Respondent draws my attention to correspondence to and from Ms Morgan which addresses issues which clearly remained unresolved when Ms Fullerton took up the position.[119] The emails demonstrate that from as early as 28 June 2018, there was an awareness of the matters regarding communication about the program, branding and media and the interaction between the Queensland program and the Steering Committee.
The first email is from the then general manager Mr John Jordan and was sent to Ms Morgan and Dr Wendy Craik (Chair of the Steering Committee), among others, and related to the published 10-year eradication plan. Several issues were raised in that email. In the interests of brevity, I have adopted the summary of this material set out in the Respondent's submissions (including the Respondent's emphasis):[120]
(a) Branding and letterhead for the program: Mr Jordan wondered whether as this is a national agenda, it arguably should be branded as such, rather than the Queensland Government?
Ms Morgan informed that it had been discussed in the past and the conclusion was that branding is accurate for a nationally funded program that is administered by a particular state i.e. for publications such as the 10 year plan, National Program is branded at the top, and Queensland Gov crest signified at the bottom right hand corner (as Qld is the combat state administering the effort).
The branding and independence scenario has also been discussed previously for the web space as detailed in a paper that was submitted to the Steering Committee at the first meeting. The Steering Committee agreed with the recommendation to leave the web space as is, as the most practical and efficient course of action. See Paper attached for your review.
(b) Protocol and pathway for the SC to release media, communique etc. – I imagine this will be via the secretariat following approval of the Chair?
Ms Morgan answered that the media release scenarios is very much a new process that sits outside of the department or Ministerial media protocols. As the aim for a media release is to be an independent, impartial message and from the Steering Committee, I would suggest FYI to Mins Office (so not held up in process and also no surprises their end) and released by the Chair, rather than secretariat (who is DAF personnel) – a generic email account for the steering committee would be an effective tool for this process and possibly other communication needs. The department's media team could support with supply of media outlet contacts to send to. The media contact would also be the Chair (or other nominated committee spokesperson in this circumstance.

A further email within that chain of emails shows that by 12 December 2018, the matter of media releases and the capacity of the steering committee to issue these independent of the Queensland program was still under discussion.[121] I again adopt the Respondent's summary of the content of an email where Ms Morgan provided more background on previous discussions:[122]
In my experience, there are two ways to progress a media release in this new scenario:
1. Via the department which would be subject to department media protocol (i.e. issued by the media team) and Ministerial comment;
2. Via the Steering Committee independently – if the media release is to be an independent, impartial message from the Steering Committee, it is suggested to be issued by the Chair, rather than secretariat being DAF personnel with a DAF email address. A generic email account for the Steering Committee would be an ideal tool for this process, and for other communication needs. The department's media team could support this process with supply of media outlet contacts to send to. It is suggested the media contact would also be the Chair (or other nominated steering committee spokesperson) in this circumstance.
Ms Morgan goes on in that email to note that option 2 (above) raises questions, including: whether it would be appropriate for the Steering Committee Secretariat to be fielding media enquiries and who would prepare and issue written statements and at what stage the Minister would be involved, particularly when issues are contentious.[123] Ms Morgan concludes the email by saying that the issues needed to be clarified to 'ensure a smooth process of issuing media releases in a timely fashion'.[124]
Ms Fullerton commenced employment in July 2019 and these matters were still not resolved. Ms Fullerton gave evidence that soon after her employment in the role, Dr Craik raised this matter with her. Some months after Ms Fullerton's commencement, Ms Morgan provided her with some information about these discussions. It is clear from this email sent in September 2019 that those matters were not resolved.[125]

Mr Letts' evidence was that 'branding' matters were a subject of discussion at the Steering Committee and that this 'bemused' him as what was needed was a recognisable brand for the program, rather than being concerned about 'whether or not it was a national cost-share program or whether it was a Queensland Government program'.[126] Mr Letts said that he was 'always looking to try and accommodate the steering committee funding partners as much as [he] possibly could in relation to these sorts of wishes even though [he] didn't necessarily see the sense in it …'.[127]

The Respondent says that the evidence of Ms Morgan and Mr Letts regarding the 'branding' issues and tensions between the Steering Committee and the Queensland program needs to be compared with Ms Phillips' evidence.
Ms Phillips was the Engagement Manager for Biosecurity Queensland. Ms Phillips gave evidence about her understanding of the branding and imagery used on the RIFA program material and communications for the program. Ms Phillips spoke about a review of the program's communication program and activities undertaken by herself and Ms Morgan prior to Ms Fullerton's commencement. Ms Phillips said that she participated in a lengthy meeting with Mr Dudgeon and Ms Fullerton to present the recommendations of that review in the early days of Ms Fullerton commencing in the role.[128]
Ms Phillips understood that there had been some call from the Steering Committee with regard to branding of the RIFA program,[129] and that Ms Fullerton 'wanted documents tailored for the program'.[130] Ms Phillips said that the Steering Committee did not have any accountability, and that it could provide advice but ultimately, delivery of the program had to work within Queensland Government guidelines. Ms Phillips said that there were times where this created a conflict.[131]
Ms Phillips appeared to be of the view that branding had not been an issue before Ms Fullerton took up her position. This is not supported by the evidence of Mr Letts, and Ms Morgan. Ms Phillips said that Ms Fullerton was looking for a document that 'actually stepped out' how materials would represent Queensland as delivering the program but acknowledge the other funding partners nationally.[132] It appears that this document has now been adopted and is used by other states within the Biosecurity system.[133]

Ms Phillips said that due to the interest of the Steering Committee in these matters, she produced a fire ant branded version of the document. Ms Phillips said that Ms Fullerton was negative about the processes outlined in the document and that she gave the impression 'she just wanted to operate autonomously outside of these processes and systems'.[134] However, when asked about the requests the Steering Committee was making about how media releases would go out or about how information would be branded, Ms Phillips said, 'so that's not my area of expertise, that's Hayley Beck's area'.

I have reviewed the document that was put together to provide guidelines for the issuing of communications by the program. It clearly contains an 'approvals' page which had space for Dr Wendy Craik, as Steering Committee Chair to approve the document. I do not accept that this was simply 'for noting' or that a communication would be issued without Dr Craik's endorsement. The need to receive sign off from both the Queensland program leader and the national Steering Committee Chair clearly demonstrates the situation in which Ms Fullerton found herself.

On 22 August 2019, Ms Fullerton raised the 'two masters' issue by email in which she demonstrates an understanding of the Government approvals process but also addresses the matters raised by Dr Craik regarding branding and approvals for communications. Ms Fullerton worked for the Queensland Government and was required to work within the Queensland Government policies and structures to do her work, however, she also reported to and received guidance from the Steering Committee and Dr Craik was in direct contact with her.

The correspondence in evidence demonstrates that the branding issues and the management of State Government and Steering Committee expectations continued to be an issue and that Ms Fullerton continued to brief Mr Dudgeon on these matters, communicate with Ms Phillips about the branding document and through Mr Letts, took the branding document to the Steering Committee.[135] She also provided feedback received from the steering committee to Mr Dudgeon who responded to her by email.[136]

On 4 January 2020, Dr Craik provided feedback to Ms Fullerton regarding the Strategic Communication and Engagement Plan and stated that it should be considered by the Steering Committee along with budget discussions.[137]

On 20 January 2020, Ms Fullerton communicated with Dr Turley, Ms Fullerton's direct supervisor at the relevant time, among others, further discussing the matters Dr Craik had raised about branding and noting that the paper provided by Ms Phillips would not address the matters raised by Dr Craik. Ms Fullerton described a paper she would be presenting to the Steering Committee discussing not only cost-share branding matters, but also media protocols and major announcements.[138]

Ms Fullerton appeared to be actively seeking ways to deal with the preferences of Dr Craik and the Steering Committee within the confines of Queensland Government approval processes. One way Ms Fullerton suggested to do this was by the program submitting campaign information to the Government Advertising and Communication Committee ('GACC') for information only rather than approval. As Ms Fullerton put it, the Queensland Government only contributes 10% of the funding for the program but the GACC process was adding 'another layer of red tape' for the program to get communications out into the market.

Ms Fullerton presented the paper she prepared defining the issue between the Steering Committee and the Queensland Government to the Steering Committee on 20 February 2020.[139] Attending that meeting was Ms Fullerton's manager, Mr Dudgeon, Dr Turley, the Strategy Director and others. Mr Letts attended the meeting as an observer. Any suggestion that this was a personal agenda of Ms Fullerton's cannot be sustained.

The evidence demonstrated tension between the Queensland Government and the Steering Committee regarding the 'Lifestyle' campaign. At this stage, decisions were being made about communication regarding fire ants in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic messaging from government. The Minister's office had not provided approval for the campaign or associated medial releases. There was some discussion about media releases to be issued by the Steering Committee and Mr Dudgeon questioned the capacity of the Minister's office to have a 'power of veto' over the Steering Committee media releases. Mr Dudgeon's evidence was that he believed the Minister and Dr Craik had discussed the matter and the Steering Committee was able to have its own media releases, as long as the Minister's office had a capacity to look at them and provide feedback.[140]

In April 2020, Dr Craik was reporting to the Steering Committee that she had a discussion with the Minister where she expressed a view that as most of the funds for the Program are not from Queensland, things such as the advertising campaign should be going to GACC for information only, and not approval.[141]

Mr Dudgeon agreed that one of Ms Fullerton's tasks was to assist to resolve the process for Steering Committee communications.[142] Mr Dudgeon's evidence was to the effect that sometime after Ms Fullerton left, some of these suggested changes were adopted.[143]

Dr Turley gave evidence that he was aware of the matter of the 'two masters'.[144]

Mr Dudgeon's evidence was clear that Ms Fullerton was progressing the matters addressing the 'two masters' arising from Dr Craik and the Steering Committee.[145]
Discussions on this matter continued, with Ms Bock from the Department of Premier and Cabinet communicating with Ms Beck, among others, on 26 June 2020 and by email on 29 June 2020. The view expressed by Ms Bock was that as the campaigns were Queensland-led and developed by the Queensland Government, they should be reviewed and approved via the GACC process.

The matter was ongoing and on Sunday 9 August 2020, Ms Fullerton sent an email to Dr Turley further explaining the discussion paper and discussions she had had with Ms Beck. On 11 August 2020, Ms Fullerton wrote to Ms Beck requesting something in writing regarding the position on branding. Ms Beck sent an email to Mr Dudgeon and Mr Turley attaching the feedback Dr Craik had provided the Minister's office regarding the discussion paper.[146]

In that email, Ms Beck states that it is important for everyone to be on the same page, referring to the Minister's office, the RIFA program, the Department and the Steering Committee. Ms Beck also acknowledged Ms Fullerton's frustration with having 'two masters' and expressing hope that the policy and procedure would clear that up.[147]

Dr Turley then emailed Ms Fullerton asking her to review the documents, providing some of his own observations about them.[148]

The Respondent submits that Ms Fullerton had a responsibility to her employer but was also accountable to the Steering Committee and on this basis, the 'two masters' issue was 'very real'. Further, the Respondent submits that the 'two masters' issue was not of Ms Fullerton's own doing but was an integral part of her employment and is a significant contributing factor to her injury.[149]
Appellant's submissions
The Appellant says that the evidence demonstrates Ms Fullerton did not have 'two masters' and that the nature of her role and what was in its ambit was 'readily apparent'.[150]
The Appellant sets out the RIFA program arrangements which mean that while it is funded by State, Territory and Federal Governments, it is based in Queensland as Queensland is the 'combat state'. The Steering Committee and its' chair, Dr Wendy Craik provide strategic oversight rather than direction. With reference to the Terms of Reference for the Committee, the Appellant points out that the Steering Committee has no legal basis or legal authority.[151]

The Appellant submits that Ms Fullerton knew she was employed by the Queensland Government and that she worked in the RIFA Program and that was part of Biosecurity Queensland.[152] The Appellant also submits that Ms Fullerton understood that she was an employee of the Queensland Government and her salary was not being paid by the Steering Committee.[153]

The Appellant also submits that Ms Fullerton understood that she reported to Mr Dudgeon, a Queensland Government employee and head of the RIFA program, and later Dr Turley. Further, the Appellant submits that Ms Fullerton understood that she was ultimately answerable to the Minister of Agriculture. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton understood that she was subject to the Code of Conduct; that there were governance and standards with regard to communication and engagement that applied to the whole of the Department; that the RIFA programs marketing campaigns were to be submitted to GACC for approval and required endorsement from Ms Beck; and the reason for the GACC process.[154] The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton knew the Steering Committee's role and the governance of the program and that Mr Dudgeon was the line of report between RIFA and the Steering Committee.

The Appellant says that in cross-examination, Ms Fullerton stated that during her employment she had wanted clarity as to the accountability of the Queensland Government, who the decision-makers were with regard to the RIFA program and which she was to follow. She also sought clarity about corporate branding.[155] The Appellant says that while Ms Fullerton says that she wanted clarity on these matters, she understood these matters from August 2019 at the latest.[156]

The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton also knew from September 2019, at the latest, that the corporate branding used for the RIFA program was correct for a nationally cost shared program where the program was being administered by Biosecurity Queensland as part of DAF; that it was not possible to remove the Queensland Government logo from the uniform of RIFA Program staff as the field uniforms required the Government logo pursuant to the Biosecurity Act 2014 (Qld) for authorised access purposes; and that media releases issued via DAF would be subject to the Department's media protocol and Ministerial comment.[157]

The Appellant notes that ultimately, Ms Fullerton finalised the branding protocol and that it was the last thing she delivered before she went off sick.[158]

Based on the above, the Appellant says that Ms Fullerton's role was very clear and that that she understood she was a Queensland Government employee reporting to Mr Dudgeon who was in charge of the RIFA Program. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton understood that she had to comply with Queensland Government policy and processes and that the Steering Committee had no power to direct her in how she performed her role and that it was not her 'master'. The Appellant says that the fact Ms Fullerton sought guidance and approval from Mr Dudgeon and other members of DAF when the Steering Committee requested things of her, is evidence that she knew that.[159]
Appellant submits that matters regarding the 'two masters' issue were reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way
The Appellant says that in the event there was a lack of clarity surrounding Ms Fullerton's role and the identify of her 'master': the Department's response to those matters constituted reasonable management action; the management action was reasonable and undertaken in a reasonable way; and that any lack of clarity arises from Ms Fullerton's expectation or perception of that reasonable management action.[160]
The Appellant points to what it says were attempts to provide Ms Fullerton with a greater understanding of the RIFA Program and the Steering Committee and how both operated:
·A PowerPoint presentation provided by Ms Phillips and Ms Morgan;
·Meetings with Mr Letts and Mr Dudgeon to discuss lines of accountability;
·Connecting Ms Fullerton with senior members of DAF experienced in communication and engagement;
·Mr Dudgeon facilitating meetings between the Chair of the Steering Committee and the Minister;
·Mr Dudgeon's suggestion that Ms Fullerton prepare a discussion paper about media and campaign submissions for the RIFA program with assistance from the Corporate Communication team;
·Resources (documentary and personnel) available to Ms Fullerton to understand her role, the RIFA Program and the Steering Committee.

The Appellant says that the issue of working with multiple stakeholders, including the Steering Committee and other arms of the Queensland Government was not something that Ms Morgan or Ms Phillips, as they were both previously employed in Ms Fullerton's role, experienced and it did not impact Mr Dudgeon's understanding of the RIFA Program.[161]
The Appellant says that the responses to the 'two masters' issue constituted management action and was conduct taken in relation to Ms Fullerton in managing, handling, directing or controlling her. The Appellant says that where Ms Fullerton had raised issues regarding working with multiple stakeholders where no other senior staff members had done so, the Appellant's actions in responding to these issues were reasonable and taken in a reasonable way.

The Appellant says that alternatively, Ms Fullerton did not interpret the various directions and information given to her as assistance or support.[162]
In reply, the Respondent says that the application of s 32(5) does not involve a comparison of whether other workers experienced similar issues.
With regard to the Appellant's submission that Ms Fullerton's injury arose out of her expectation or perception of the reasonable management action being taken against her, the Respondent says that the operation of s 32(5)(b) requires identification of management action being taken 'against' the interests of Ms Fullerton.
Consideration regarding Factor 1: Low role clarity

Factor 1 has been made out on the evidence

The evidence clearly demonstrates that the 'two masters' issue existed and was a persistent feature of Ms Fullerton's employment with the Appellant.

There is no evidence before the Commission that the 'two masters' issue was initiated by Ms Fullerton, or that these were personal views she held. It is apparent to me that the 'two masters' issue impacted Ms Fullerton's ability to do her work. It existed before she took up her role and continued to be an issue throughout the time she worked in the position. I do not accept any submission that Ms Fullerton was unable or unwilling to work within the confines of the Department's or Government's policies and procedures. It seems that Ms Fullerton was attempting to find a way to address the issues and concerns of Dr Craik and the Steering Committee while also working within the GACC approval process.

While the Appellant argues that Ms Fullerton was aware that she was employed by the Queensland Government and reported to Mr Dudgeon with the knowledge that Dr Wendy Craik had no line management of her or capacity to direct her, I readily accept that her experience in the role was more nuanced than that.
Ms Fullerton's role required her to interact with many stakeholders, perhaps none more so than the Steering Committee and its chair, Dr Wendy Craik. Dr Craik's preferences, frustrations and expectations were communicated to Ms Fullerton and there were clear tensions regarding branding and communication in circumstances where the Steering Committee represented parties contributing 90% of the funding for RIFA. While it is not unusual for there to be national cooperation regarding biosecurity issues, the evidence demonstrates that the RIFA program was unprecedented in its size and scale.

It is the case that a worker may find themselves in a complex context which gives rise to stress, even when the key individuals involved are not their direct line managers or ultimate decision-makers.
I do not accept the Appellant's submission that the 'two masters' issue was something experienced only by Ms Fullerton or that she had created the issue where no such tension existed. The 'two masters' stressor was real and not imagined.[163]
The tensions between the Steering Committee and the RIFA program existed prior to Ms Fullerton's appointment to the role. It is immaterial whether anyone else employed in the program was concerned about how to deal with the competing expectations or desires of the Steering Committee, the RIFA and the Minister's office. The test is not comparative. Ms Fullerton's role was directly impacted by these matters, and it is enough that she found dealing with the tension stressful.
Factor 1 is not excluded by 'management action'

I do not accept that any of the actions the Appellant identifies as 'management actions' with regard to the 'two masters' stressor constitute management action for the purposes of s 32(5).
As a preliminary matter, management action is not defined in the WCR Act. The authorities in this area have established that management action must be in relation to specific management action directed at the appellant's employment itself, and not action forming part of the everyday duties and tasks the worker performed in their employment.[164]
In Allwood v Workers’ Compensation Regulator[165] Deputy President O'Connor (as his Honour then was) described 'management action' in the following terms:[166]
The concept of management action in the context of a worker's employment, and for the purposes of the Act, is not so broad that it encompasses anything and everything that a manager does or says in the particular workplace, rather the expression 'management action' relates to those actions undertaken when managing the worker's employment…
…
…The exclusory action in s 32(5) of the Act was, in my view, intended by the Parliament to related to specific management action directed to the appellant's employment itself, as opposed to action forming part of the everyday duties or tasks that the worker performed in their employment…
(my emphasis)
Following Allwood, the Commission has made findings with respect to management action, some of which I will summarise below. This summary is not intended to be exhaustive, however, I have been guided by the parameters drawn by the Commission with respect to whether an action will be considered management action for the purposes of the WCRA in previous decisions of the Commission.
In Allen,[167] Deputy President O'Connor (as his Honour then was) determined that a meeting held to discuss the appellant’s position description, remuneration and hours of work constituted management action for the purposes of s 32(5) of the Act.

In Edmunds,[168] Industrial Commissioner Power determined that a conversation between a manager and the worker which '… progressed into a discussion about the Appellant's physical injury and fitness for work …' is management action.
In O'Neil,[169] I held that decisions and actions with respect to the worker's '… role, duties, workload and support provided to him to undertake his work duties during the relevant period and during times of leave during the relevant period were 'management actions' for the purposes of s 32(5)'.
In each of these decisions, the actions taken are aimed at the worker's employment and are specific, rather than generic or steadily reproduced in the course of the worker's normal duties. Further, the action which was held to be management action within these decisions does not seek to manage business or departmental operations rather than the employee's employment.
With respect to this matter, the actions which the Appellant submits are management actions are not, in my view, aimed at managing Ms Fullerton in an analogous way to the actions canvassed in the preceding decisions. Rather, the actions were aimed at facilitating business or departmental organisation within the Department or the RIFA program, and not Ms Fullerton or her employment itself. I will set out my reasons for why each action cannot be understood to be management action from paragraphs [163]–[169] of this decision.

The Respondent says that the Appellant's submissions relating to Ms Fullerton's work hours are a 'gross misstatement' of the evidence. The Respondent says that the fact Ms Fullerton had accumulated 70-days of flex time and TOIL demonstrates the 'sheer volume of work' Ms Fullerton was doing and the time required of her position. The Respondent says that it is extraordinary that during a period of 20-months, Ms Fullerton accumulated such a large amount of flex time and TOIL.[350]
The Respondent notes that all flex time and TOIL was approved and that the approval occurred because Ms Fullerton had to work those extra hours to discharge the duties required of her employment.[351]
The Respondent provides an analysis of the 86-week period from 1 July 2019 to 28 February 2021 saying that if allowing for public holidays et cetera, that is a period of 83 weeks. The Appellant says that excluding periods she was on leave, this means that on average, Ms Fullerton accrued about .85 of a day each week because of the extra time spent by her.[352] The Respondent says that if leave periods are excluded, the average weekly accrual of TOIL is far more significant.[353]
The Respondent says that it does not matter that Ms Fullerton was compensated by accumulating flex time and TOIL and that what matters is the sheer demands of her job.[354]
With regard to the Appellant's argument that the amount of leave taken by Ms Fullerton was almost three times the amount of annual leave that would have been available to her over the course of the period she worked with the Appellant, the Respondent says that this fundamentally misrepresents the work Ms Fullerton was required to do and the demands of her role. The Respondent says that Ms Fullerton could not achieve what was required of her in the allocated working hours of her job.[355]
Appellant's further reply

The Appellant maintains that its assessment of Ms Fullerton's working hours was fair and accurate and revealed Ms Fullerton's hours of work fluctuated. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton did not consistently work in excess of her contracted hours.[356]
With regard to the Respondent's submission that Ms Fullerton's role could not be achieved in her working hours, the Appellant says that Ms Fullerton's timesheets indicate that there were times when she was able to perform her role in less than the allocated work hours and that there were times when she was able to take 89.53 days of leave during her employment. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton was able to achieve what was expected of her in her working hours and that the amount of leave she took in that time would, in itself, have curtailed her working hours.[357]
Consideration regarding Factor 4: Workload
Factor 4 is established

I am satisfied on the basis of the available evidence that Ms Fullerton experienced a significant workload and that this work was undertaken in circumstances often characterised by preparing materials in time for meetings or deadlines. That was the nature of the work. It seems to me that further pressure was brought to bear by the urgent and important nature of the RIFA program. Added to this was the complex environment Ms Fullerton was working in, as explored above in Factor 1 where there is extensive discussion about the role of the Steering Committee and the program being situated and run by the Department.
Workload across DAF was clearly something recognised at the time. Ms Fullerton was not the only person experiencing issues with 'red tape' and approvals processes and high workload. Ms Fullerton herself recognised that she needed to have ways to deal with her workload and that the accumulation of flex time and TOIL was an indicator of the additional hours she was undertaking.

While at one point the Appellant's representative asked a question of Ms Fullerton to the effect that she was working long hours and gained the benefit of TOIL and accrued time, there is no evidence before the Commission of any suggestion that Ms Fullerton misused flex time or TOIL accruals. Mr Dudgeon and Dr Turley properly signed off on Ms Fullerton's timesheets and accruals.
The sheer amount of flex time and TOIL accrued by Ms Fullerton during her time in the role are evidence that, either due to the need to get work done, or the 'sprint' nature of her work patterns, there were periods where Ms Fullerton was working significantly more time in the week than her allocated hours. I accept that Ms Fullerton needed to work these hours in order to get her work done.
It also seems that Ms Fullerton's workdays involved attendance at many meetings and that there was some frustration that time spent at meetings made it difficult to complete work tasks.
It seems that the Appellant's argument is that any workload pressures or long hours Ms Fullerton was undertaking are mitigated by the fact that she accessed periods of leave using the flex time and TOIL she had accumulated.
Flex time and TOIL are important entitlements as they provide recognition for additional hours worked by an employee. However, it is not necessarily the case that the impact of a high workload is reduced or alleviated by the provision of flex time and TOIL. The time spent working while one is accumulating flex time and TOIL is time spent after hours or on weekends. This means not attending to personal commitments to self and others. Ms Fullerton's evidence was that she would have preferred to be working normal hours and not accumulating flex time or TOIL. When Ms Fullerton returned from an extended weekend or a period of flex time or TOIL utilisation, there was still work awaiting her, and the patterns of work characterised by either deadlines or out of hours tasks requiring her attention remained.
I accept that Ms Fullerton had a heavy workload and that she undertook significant work outside of regular work hours. Ms Fullerton's large amount of accumulated TOIL time, approved via her timesheets, is evidence of the number of additional hours she was working. Ms Fullerton found the working environment and system of work stressful.
Is Factor 4 removed because of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way?

I have considered the Appellant's submission that the pattern of work and requirement for communication and engagement material to be completed to meet deadlines was management action. I have also considered the submission that Ms Fullerton was aware of the requirements of the GACC process. The Appellant says that these requirements were not simply action forming part of the everyday duties Ms Fullerton performed in her employment. I disagree. The GACC process is one that must be followed by all Departments, not specifically Ms Fullerton. This is not a situation where Ms Fullerton was subject to some directed and specific instruction that she produce work to meet deadlines which had been created to manage her work and performance. The approvals process was more general and involved a range of people. The submissions made by the Appellant regarding the extra resources available and the suggestion that Ms Fullerton did not need to complete tasks herself but could delegate them makes it clear that any direction regarding deadlines was a direction to the program and not to an individual person.
With regard to the second limb of the Appellant's argument that this factor is excluded due to management action, I accept that there were discussions held with Ms Fullerton about workload and the hours she was working. I also accept that suggestions may have been made to her about delegating tasks, streamlining work and additional resources available to her. These 'suggestions' are not specific intervention or direction given to Ms Fullerton by way of management action directed at her to address the amount of TOIL she was accumulating because of working additional hours. In any case, I find that this stressor arises from the amount of work Ms Fullerton had to do and the additional hours required for her to get it done. The stressor does not arise from management actions purportedly taken in response to Ms Fullerton raising concerns about workload.
Is Factor 4 excluded on the basis that Ms Fullerton's injury arose out of her expectation or perception of the management action being taken against her?

The evidence indicates that while Ms Fullerton struggled with the workload and the hours associated with the role, she got on with the job, working within the required processes necessitated by GACC. Ms Fullerton did the work necessary to meet deadlines and worked with her team and others in the program as required.
The evidence simply demonstrates that Ms Fullerton had a lot of work to do. She had so much work to do that she accumulated many, many hours of flex time and TOIL. She held concerns about how she could complete the tasks she was required to complete. These things were real and they were stressful to her. I am satisfied that Factor 4 is substantiated and is not excluded on the basis of s 32(5)(a) or (b).
Was employment a significant contributing factor to Ms Fullerton's injury?

The expert witnesses were of the view that employment was a significant contributing factor to Ms Fullerton's injury.
The Appellant invites me to disregard Dr Richardson's evidence on the basis that the factual underpinnings he relied upon have not been established at the hearing. For the reasons given above, I have found that except for Factor 2 (or 'Micromanagement'), the evidence supports the stressors Dr Richardson relied upon in forming his diagnosis.
A review of Dr Richardson's report and oral evidence leaves me with the impression that the matter of micromanagement did not hold the same significance as the factors relating to the 'two masters' issue, the impact of the campaign changes, and the matter of workload and hours of work. I am satisfied that Dr Richardson’s evidence is admissible.
Both Dr Thakrar and Dr Richardson were aware of Ms Fullerton's marriage breakdown. Relationships can be complex and in this particular context, I have no issue reconciling Ms Fullerton's marriage separation with her description of the relationship as loving and stable. There is no evidence before the Commission to indicate that Ms Fullerton's marriage breakdown was of such significance that its contribution to any personal injury should serve to displace the employment-related stressors established at the hearing.
Dr Thakrar was Ms Fullerton's treating GP and was aware of the physical health issues Ms Fullerton was experiencing. Dr Thakrar was of the view that Ms Fullerton's psychological injury arose out of employment.
As I have determined regarding Ms Fullerton's marriage breakdown, even if her physical health issues had some contribution to her psychological condition, I am satisfied that the work-related stressors were a significant contributing factor or factors to Ms Fullerton's injury. Therefore, employment was a significant contributing factor to Ms Fullerton’s injury.
Is the injury removed by the reasonable management action provisions of the Act – s 32(5)(a)-(b)?

For the reasons I have given above, I am satisfied that Factors 1, 3 and 4 are not removed by the reasonable management action provisions of the WCR Act.
Is the claim one for acceptance?
For the reasons set out above, Ms Fullerton's claim is one for acceptance. Therefore, the decision to approve the claim remains undisturbed.

Orders

I make the following orders:

1. The Appeal is dismissed.
2. Failing agreement between the parties, a decision on costs will be subject of a further application to the Commission.

[1] Appellant's written closing submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 10 October 2024 [3]; TR1-67, LL14-34.

[2] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [3]; TR5-5 LL25-26.

[3] While 'micromanagement' was initially identified as 'factor 2' contributing to Ms Fullerton's injury, this factor is not pursued in the Respondent's case following the hearing.

[4] Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031, [24]–[27].

[5] SSX Services Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 62, [29] citing State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Beverley Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447; State of Queensland (Department of Communities Disability Services) AND Q-COMP and Mrs B (WC/2011/247) – Decision; State of Queensland (acting through Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services) AND Q-COMP and Mrs B (C/2013/2) – Decision; Myer Holdings Ltd AND Q-COMP (WC/2013/118) – Decision; Qantas Airways Limited v Q-COMP (2006) 181 QGIG 301.

[6] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [7]; Appellant's Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions filed in the Industrial Registry on 22 June 2023 [3], [7], [8].

[7] [2021] QIRC 71.

[8] [2015] ICQ 008.

[9] [2016] ICQ 8.

[10] Respondent's written closing submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 10 July 2024 [138].

[11] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [13] citing Robinson v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] ICQ [16]; Dickenson v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 68; Whipps v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 29.

[12] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [15](a) with reference to the Performance Development Agreement completed on 6 October 2020 and again on 2 February 2021 (Exhibit 1, [85]); Mr Turley's evidence that he had no concerns with the worker's work performance at TR4-56 LL12-14; Mr Dudgeon's evidence that Ms Fullerton was a very capable employee with a strong work ethic at TR3-31 LL32-33; TR3-15 LL42-45.

[13] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [15](a); TR3-56 LL40-45.

[14] Exhibit 12.

[15] Exhibit 15.

[16] Exhibit 17.

[17] Exhibit 23.

[18] Exhibit 21.

[19] Exhibit 20.

[20] TR4-16 LL30-34.

[21] Exhibit 14.

[22] Exhibit 13.

[23] Exhibit 16.

[24] TR4-20 LL10-15.

[25] T4-26 LL4–14.

[26] TR3-70 LL3-25

[27] Respondent's submissions (n 10), [132] citing TR3-70 LL5-25.

[28] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [129] citing Exhibit 1, 644.

[29] TR4-16-17.

[30] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [20].

[31] Ibid [20].

[32] Exhibit 9; TR4-18 LL31-45.

[33] Exhibit 11; Exhibit 10.

[34] TR4-3 ll26-47; T4-4 LL1-7; T4-3 LL38-41.

[35] Exhibit 10.

[36] Exhibit 18.

[37] Exhibit 19.

[38] Exhibit 12.

[39] Exhibit 15.

[40] Exhibit 17; TR4-23 LL35-45; TR4-24 LL1-5.

[41] Exhibit 20.

[42] Exhibit 10.

[43] Exhibit 12.

[44] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [21(a)].

[45] TR4-9 LL11-21; Exhibit 12.

[46] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [21(b)].

[47] Exhibit 6.

[48] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [33].

[49] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [39(b)]

[50] Ibid [59]; TR4-20 LL30-40.

[51] Exhibit 18.

[52] TR4-21 LL10-25.

[53] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [64]; Exhibit 19.

[54] TR4-15 LL5-25.

[55] TR4-5 LL27-29.

[56] TR4-9.

[57] TR3-56 LL20-25.

[58] TR3-56 LL27-29.

[59] TR3-56 LL31-38.

[60] Exhibit 15.

[61] TR4-22.

[62] TR4-23 LL1-5.

[63] Exhibit 16

[64] Exhibit 21.

[65] TR4-23, TR4-24.

[66] TR4-24 L14.

[67] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [85]; Exhibit 20.

[68] TR4-25-TR4-26.

[69] TR4-26; Respondent’s closing submissions [68].

[70] Exhibit 1, 631.

[71] Exhibit 1, 639-640.

[72] TR3-48 LL35-45.

[73] TR3-49 L20 – TR3-50 L5.

[74] TR3-50 LL5-15.

[75] TR3-50 LL20-30.

[76] TR3-50 L40 – TR3-52 L30.

[77] TR3-52 L35-40.

[78] TR3-54 LL10-15.

[79] TR3-54 LL30-40.

[80] TR3-54 L45 – TR3-55 L15.

[81] Noting that the question Dr Richardson was required to answer was whether employment was a significant contributing factor; Exhibit 1, 641-2.

[82] TR3-57 LL15-25.

[83] TR3-57 LL25-30.

[84] TR3-62 LL40-45; TR3-63 L10 – TR3-64 L5.

[85] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [24]; TR3-48 LL33-45; T3-54; Exhibit 1, 631.

[86] TR3-69 LL5-7.

[87] TR3-49 LL33-46; TR3-50 LL20-32.

[88] Exhibit 6.

[89] TR3-68 LL33-46; TR3-50 LL20-32.

[90] TR3-68 LL22-26; TR3-61 LL39-47; TR3-52.

[91] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [28]; Exhibit 1, 631.

[92] Ibid [30].

[93] See for example Toodayan and Toodayan v Metro South Hospital and Health Service & Others [2023] QIRC 036.

[94] Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 ('Dasreef').

[95] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [30]; Toodayan and Toodayan v Metro South Hospital and Health Service & Others [2023] QIRC 036 ('Toodayan').

[96] Granato v Workers Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 162 ('Granato').

[97] Ibid [53].

[98] Exhibit 6.

[99] TR4-56 LL12-14; TR3-31 LL32-33; TR2-15 LL43-45.

[100] TR3-56 LL40-45.

[101] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [118].

[102] Ibid [119].

[103] Ibid [29].

[104] [2009] ICQ 33,16.

[105] [2009] ICQ 32.

[106] [2019] QIRC 022.

[107] Gilmour [62]-[70].

[108] With reference to paragraphs [24] and [25] of the Appellant's SOFC.

[109] TR5-76–TR5-78.

[110] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [140] with reference to TR1-25 LL5-20.

[111] TR1-14 LL5-40; TR1-24 LL45-50.

[112] As summarised in Respondent's submissions (n 10) [143] with reference to TR1-16 LL35-45.

[113] Exhibit 1, 627.

[114] TR1-19 LL20-28.

[115] TR1-20 LL15-35.

[116] TR1-21 – TR1-22.

[117] TR1-21 – TR1-22.

[118] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [148], [149].

[119] Exhibit 1, 7-9.

[120] Exhibit 1, 7-9; Respondent's submissions (n 10) [151].

[121] Exhibit 1, 8.

[122] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [152].

[123] Exhibit 1, 8.

[124] Exhibit 1, 8.

[125] TR1-74; Exhibit 1, 7.

[126] TR1-31 – TR1-32.

[127] TR1-31 – TR1-32.

[128] TR2-7, TR2-8.

[129] TR2-17.

[130] Exhibit 1, 701 and TR2-20 – TR2-21 L20.

[131] TR2-18.

[132] TR2-18.

[133] TR2-18.

[134] TR2-20, L25-26.

[135] Exhibit 1, 10.

[136] Exhibit 1, 12.

[137] Exhibit 1, 16.

[138] Exhibit 1, 18.

[139] Exhibit 8.

[140] TR3-44 LL5-20.

[141] Exhibit 1, 65.

[142] TR3-40 LL40-45.

[143] TR3-44 L30 – T3-45 L2.

[144] TR4-47 LL1-30.

[145] TR3-39 LL25-40.

[146] Exhibit 1, 104.

[147] Exhibit 1, 104.

[148] Exhibit 1, 116.

[149] Respondent's submissions (n 10) 55, [258], [259].

[150] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) 16, [36].

[151] TR1-18 LL28-48; Exhibit 1, 628.

[152] TR5-83 LL5-32; TR5-90 LL1-3.

[153] TR5-109.

[154] These matters are not controversial and were put to Ms Fullerton who agreed with them. In the interests of brevity, I will not footnote extracts of the transcript here.

[155] TR5-98; TR5-109; TR5-110.

[156] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) 21 [50]; Exhibit 1, 3.

[157] Ibid [51]; Exhibit 1, 7.

[158] Ibid [52]; TR5-67

[159] Ibid [53].

[160] Ibid [54].

[161] Ibid [60](f).

[162] TR5-106 LL17-20, LL40-46.

[163] Gilmour v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2009] ICQ 33,16.

[164] Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 103, [73] citing Read v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 072, [8]–[10] and Allwood v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 088, [57]–[68]. Also cited in Deshong v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 205, [91].

[165] Allwood v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 88 ('Allwood').

[166] Ibid [60], [68].

[167] Allen v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2018] QIRC 41 ('Allen').

[168] Edmunds v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 285 ('Edmunds') [65].

[169] O'Neil v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 310 ('O'Neil').

[170] Exhibit 1, 660.

[171] TR5-6 LL35-36.

[172] Verhagen v Q-COMP (2008) 189 QGIG 542, 546.

[173] Appellant's submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 6 December 2024, [31].

[174] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [63].

[175] TR5-9 LL22-24; TR5-74 LL17-20; TR5-93 LL29-35.

[176] TR5-94 LL39-45; TR2-40 LL20-34.

[177] TR2-41 LL28-34.

[178] TR2-61 LL38-39.

[179] TR2-61 LL43-48.

[180] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [75].

[181] TR2-50 LL6-10; TR5-95 LL24-30.

[182] TR1-28 LL10-20.

[183] Exhibit 1, 664.

[184] Exhibit 4.

[185] Exhibit 1, 210, 261, 332, 556.

[186] Exbibit 1, 537.

[187] Exhibit 1, 542.

[188] Exhibit 1, 556.

[189] Exhibit 1, 586.

[190] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [198]; Exhibit 1, 194.

[191] Exhibit 1, 195.

[192] Exhibit 1, 425.

[193] Exhibit 1, 258 – I note that this was ultimately submitted on 22 May 2020.

[194] Exhibit 1, 205.

[195] Exhibit 1, 198.

[196] Respondent's submissions (n 10), [203]–[205], [212]–[223].

[197] Exhibit 1, 25.

[198] Exhibit 1, 28.

[199] Exhibit 1, 27.

[200] Exhibit 1, 29.

[201] Exhibit 1, 30.

[202] Exhibit 1, 29.

[203] Exhibit 1, 31.

[204] Exhibit 1, 41.

[205] Exhibit 1, 40.

[206] Exhibit 1, 40.

[207] Exhibit 1, 58, 59.

[208] Exhibit 1, 582.

[209] Exhibit 1, 595.

[210] Exhibit 1, 156.

[211] Exhibit 1, 170.

[212] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [285].

[213] Exhibit 1, 162.

[214] TR2-61 LL5-20 and TR2-62 LL30-45.

[215] TR2-62 L45-TR2-63 L1.

[216] TR2-64 LL10-30.

[217] TR3-36 L30 to TR3-37 L15.

[218] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [292], [293].

[219] Exhibit 1, 169.

[220] Exhibit 1, 169.

[221] Exhibit 1, 168.

[222] Exhibit 1, 165.

[223] Exhibit 1, 167.

[224] Exhibit 1, 167.

[225] Exhibit 1, 174.

[226] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [307].

[227] TR1-57 LL15-35.

[228] TR1-57 L25 – TR1-58 L1.

[229] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [309].

[230] Ibid [309].

[231] Exhibit 1, 660, TR1-55 LL10-30.

[232] TR1-54 L25 – TR1-55 L45.

[233] TR3-37 LL20-30.

[234] TR1-56 LL10-40.

[235] TR1-56 LL30-45.

[236] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [315].

[237] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [80]; TR3-51 LL33-35; TR3-52 LL1-8; TR3-60 LL10-25; TR3-63 LL31-44; TR3-64 L1-3; TR3-64 LL45-47; TR3-65 L1-7.

[238] TR3-65 LL1-7.

[239] Exhibit 1, 194.

[240] TR5-110, LL33-35.

[241] TR5-33 LL31-42, Exhibit 1, 196.

[242] TR2-57 LL41-43; TR2-58 LL1-3.

[243] Exhibit 1, 205.

[244] Exhibit 1, 31; TR2-54, LL17-29.

[245] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [87]–[88].

[246] Ibid [89].

[247] Exhibit 1, 687–700.

[248] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [89].

[249] Exhibit 1, 125–127, 165; TR5-53 LL12-17; TR5-74 LL12-27.

[250] TR2-54 L28.

[251] TR5-33 LL12-19.

[252] Exhibit 1, 206.

[253] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [92]–[93].

[254] TR2-56, LL28-49 –TR2-57 LL1-2.

[255] Exhibit 1, 64.

[256] Exhibit 1, 80–82.

[257] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [99].

[258] TR1-54 LL31-37.

[259] TR5-137 LL1-3.

[260] Exhibit 27, Exhibit 28, TR5-141; TR5-142, LL1-20.

[261] Exhibit 1, 174-179.

[262] Exhibit 1, 182; TR1-39 LL27-28.

[263] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [101].

[264] Ibid [102].

[265] Ibid [103].

[266] Ibid [104]; Exhibit 1, 691.

[267] Exhibit 2.

[268] Exhibit 6.

[269] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [106].

[270] Ibid [107]; State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 53.

[271] Ibid [108].

[272] Ibid[109].

[273] Ibid [111]; TR5-143 LL16-29; Exhibit 3.

[274] TR5-138; LL39-47; TR1-139 LL19-22.

[275] TR5-139 LL1-2.

[276] TR5-139 LL4-6.

[277] TR2-75 LL6-8.

[278] Exhibit 1, 147, 165–166, 167–169.

[279] TR3-60-TR3-63.

[280] TR3-63-TR3-64.

[281] TR1-70 LL10-25.

[282] TR1-93 LL5-15.

[283] TR1-68 LL15-30.

[284] TR1-69 LL5-15.

[285] TR1-69 LL5-15.

[286] TR1-101 LL1-10.

[287] TR1-97 LL30-35.

[288] TR1-96 LL20-30.

[289] TR1-100 LL20-30.

[290] TR1-96 LL40-45.

[291] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [324], [325]; TR2-47 LL5-10.

[292] TR1-98 LL20-30.

[293] TR1-97 LL0-11.

[294] TR2-46 LL15-25.

[295] TR1-97 LL10-25.

[296] TR1-98 LL1-5.

[297] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [338]; Exhibit 1, 66.

[298] TR2-12 LL5-10; Exhibit 1, 79.

[299] Exhibit 1, [98].

[300] Hereafter, 'TOIL' refers to Time Off In Lieu; Exhibit 1, 696.

[301] Exhibit 1, 696.

[302] Exhibit 1, 158.

[303] TR3-16.

[304] TR3-15-TR3-16.

[305] TR3-15-TR3-16.

[306] TR3-15-TR3-16.

[307] TR3-15-TR3-16.

[308] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [350].

[309] Exhibit 6.

[310] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [351].

[311] TR5-158.

[312] TR5-174.

[313] Exhibit 1, 159.

[314] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [116]–[117].

[315] TR5-158 LL1-7.

[316] TR5-158 LL11-19.

[317] TR5-158-TR5-159.

[318] TR5-182 LL1-17.

[319] Exhibit 6.

[320] TR5-159; Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [120](a).

[321] Ibid [120](b)-(g).

[322] Ibid [121].

[323] Ibid [121].

[324] Ibid [122].

[325] Ibid [123].

[326] Ibid [25]-[27].

[327] TR2-56.

[328] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [130]; State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 53.

[329] TR1-153; TR3-16.

[330] TR3-15-T3-18.

[331] TR3-17 LL42-45.

[332] TR3-16-T3-17.

[333] For example: TR1-26; TR1-27; TR1-30

[334] TR2-43 LL30-37.

[335] TR1-70 LL13-19; TR2-43 LL19-23; Exhibit 1,1; Exhibit 1, 83.

[336] TR5-55 LL38-47.

[337] TR1-82 LL37-42; TR2-4 LL42-49; TR5-27 LL18-25.

[338] TR2-45 LL1-5; Exhibit 1, 701.

[339] TR1-97 LL23-26; TR2-47 LL4-10.

[340] TR2-47 LL4-10.

[341] TR2-56; Exhibit 1, 85-86; TR5-58 LL15-19.

[342] TR5-9 LL33-44.

[343] Exhibit 1, 5.

[344] Exhibit 1, 79.

[345] Exhibit 1, 98.

[346] Exhibit 1, 180.

[347] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [134]; TR1-37; TR1-38 LL1-3.

[348] TR5-54 LL30-47; TR5-55 LL1-30.

[349] Exhibit 1, 147-149; Exhibit, 165-166; Exhibit 1, 167-171, Exhibit 1, 180-181.

[350] Respondent's closing submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 19 November [54].

[351] Ibid [55].

[352] Ibid [56].

[353] Ibid [57].

[354] Ibid [58].

[355] Ibid [59].

[356] Appellant's submissions in reply (n 174) [47]-[53].

[357] Ibid [57].

[2025] QIRC 166

27 June 2025