State of New South Wales v Strong

[2025] NSWSC 663

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

State of New South Wales v Strong [2025] NSWSC 663

Hearing dates:

24 June 2025

Date of orders:

30 June 2025

Decision date:

30 June 2025

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Yehia J

Decision:

(1) Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW):

(a) I appoint two qualified psychiatrists or psychologists (or any combination of such persons) to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and

(b) I direct that the defendant attend those examinations.

(2) Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, the defendant be subject to an Interim Supervision Order.

(3) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, the Interim Supervision Order is to commence on 6 July 2025 and be in force for a period of 28 days.

(4) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, I direct that the defendant, for the period of the Interim Supervision Order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment.

(5) I order that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.

Catchwords:

HIGH RISK OFFENDER – interim supervision order – where no issue is taken with the making of the order – the Court is required to be independently satisfied of the statutory preconditions – dispute as to appropriate conditions – balancing the intrusion on a defendant’s liberty and privacy with the safety of the community, which must be given primacy – order made – conditions amended

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61I

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 4A, 5B, 7(4), 10(2), 10A, 10C, 11, 15(4)

Habitual Criminals Act 1957 (NSW)

Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), s 14

Cases Cited:

Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374

Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57

State of New South Wales v Cole (Final) [2024] NSWSC 1640

State of New South Wales v Holschier (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 341

State of New South Wales v Keech [2024] NSWSC 408

State of New South Wales v Sturgeon [2019] NSWSC 559

State of NSW v Tozer [2017] NSWSC 109

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Robert Strong (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
Ms M England SC with Ms R Thampapillai (Plaintiff)
Mr B Fogarty (Defendant)

Solicitors:
NSW Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2025/00168639

Publication restriction:

Nil

Judgment

1. By summons filed on 1 May 2025, the State of New South Wales (“the plaintiff”) seeks an order under s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”), appointing two qualified psychiatrists or registered psychologists to examine Mr Robert Strong (“the defendant”) and report to the Court (with consequential orders).

2. The plaintiff also seeks an interim supervision order (“ISO”) pursuant to s 10A of the Act for 28 days from 6 July 2025, when Mr Strong’s current extended supervision order (“ESO”) expires. The final relief sought by the plaintiff is an ESO for a further period of three years.

3. The orders previously made under the Act in relation to Mr Strong include:

1. On 29 July 2016, Harrison J (as his Honour then was) made a continuing detention order (“CDO”) for a period of two years.

2. On 3 October 2018, R A Hulme J made an ESO for a period of five years.

Summary of the plaintiff’s position

4. There are three foundations for Mr Strong’s recent progress towards stability and pro-social community engagement.

5. First, there is the extremely high level of support that he receives from disability support workers, under an intense package of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) funding. Mr Strong’s acceptance of these supports is presently entirely voluntary. Furthermore, should the NDIS funding cease for any period, it may lapse in its entirety because Mr Strong is now eligible for aged care funding given his age.

6. Second, there are the “repeated, rolling” Community Treatment Orders (“CTOs”) that have now been in place for many years (although there is no guarantee that they will continue, and no recent assessment of the impact of Mr Strong’s neuro-cognitive decline). The CTOs have contributed to the relative stabilisation of Mr Strong’s long-term psychotic illness and ensured that he continues to take anti-libidinal medication in accordance with the ESO. Mr Strong has indicated that he wishes to discontinue this treatment, once the ESO lapses.

7. Third, there is the ESO itself. The conditions of electronic monitoring and those restricting Mr Strong’s relapse into substance abuse are highly significant. Mr Strong has a decades-long history of relapsing into substance abuse, with related homelessness, disengagement from support services, and eventual relapse into sexual offending. Any fear that electronic monitoring would hinder Mr Strong’s pro-social community engagement is not borne out by the evidence.

8. These three foundations, together, support Mr Strong’s recent progress. His many complex risk factors in relation to his elevated risk of further sexual offending remain, although these foundations mostly contain them. The current ESO “has been pivotal in ensuring that these peripheral support structures do not fall away”. Should this foundation be removed, the structures would collapse.

9. The Court would be satisfied to a high degree of probability that Mr Strong poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious sex offence if not supervised under an ESO, even if the conditions of such an order are confined.

Summary of the defendant’s position

10. For the preliminary hearing, the defendant accepts that the statutory preconditions for the making of an order under ss 10A and 7(4) of the Act are met. The defendant makes the following submissions in response to the “Summary of Plaintiff’s Position”:

1. While it is true that Mr Strong’s NDIS plan, funding, and engagement is voluntary:

1. There is no evidence to suggest that it will cease, rendering him homeless and without support for daily living and community access which he currently receives. His NDIS plan and support has now been in place since 2021 and his “promising progress in the community” is a testament to how successful and robust his NDIS support is.

2. From 31 May 2016 to 25 October 2023, the defendant was the subject of a guardianship order, with the Public Guardian as appointed guardian. While it was allowed to lapse on review by the Tribunal, on 25 October 2023, on the basis that the Tribunal was persuaded there was no longer any need for it, the Tribunal noted:

“[18] We explained to the participants that if there is any change to Mr Strong’s circumstances it is open to anyone with a genuine concern for his welfare to bring a further application to the Tribunal if required.”

3. If the defendant were to seek to terminate his NDIS plan and funding and/or disengage from his supports (including his accommodation) “anyone with a genuine concern for his welfare” may “bring a further application to the Tribunal” seeking a guardianship order with functions of accommodation and services to compel him to remain as an NDIS participant, be accommodated with support, and impose restrictive practices to compel him to take his depot medication.

2. The plaintiff notes that the defendant has been on “repeated, rolling” CTOs since being released into the community and while the plaintiff contends “there is no guarantee that they will continue”, there is, conversely, no guarantee that they will not. The defendant submitted that there is every likelihood that they will continue given how successful they have been. Further, the defendant will remain a “mentally ill person”, as defined in s 14 of the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) (“MH Act”) by reason of his continuing condition of schizophrenia. Although he has a history of non-compliance, the efficacy of the rolling CTOs is unquestioned. In Mr Samuel Ardasinski’s Risk Assessment Report dated 17 December 2024 (“the December 2024 Risk Assessment Report”) it is noted that the defendant’s “diagnosed psychotic illness has been quite stable for many years now, thanks in no small part to hi[m] being made subject to repeated, rolling Community Treatment Orders (CTOs).”

3. According to an email from the defendant’s senior behaviour specialist and psychologist, Ben Fulham, dated 16 April 2025, the defendant has:

1. Been compliant with his mental health treatment and CTO conditions

2. Been working well with his NDIS service providers day to day

3. Been following ESO rules and not been in trouble for a while

4. Been developing good skills and independence

4. According to the Corrective Services NSW (“CSNSW”) ESO Completion Report, dated 18 June 2024 and authored by Community Corrections Officer, Jamie Burton (“June 2024 ESO Completion Report”):

“[The defendant’s] case management appears to have sufficiently intervened to address his criminogenic factors. Since 2023 he has progressed from Stage 1 to Stage 3 of the electronic monitoring scheme and has not been charged with any offences or served any time within a custodial centre. [The defendant’s] mental health appears to be the primary consideration for his overall well-being and reduction of high-risk behaviours. This appears to be sufficiently managed via a Community Treatment Order, which will likely continue upon expiration of the Extended Supervision Order. It would appear that no further order is required, should [the defendant] continue on his current trajectory. [Emphasis added]

5. This report is approximately one year old, and it is submitted that the defendant has continued on his positive trajectory to date.

11. The defendant accepts that the statutory preconditions for the making of an order under ss 10A and 7(4) of the Act are met. In respect of the conditions of any ISO, the defendant submits that 13 identified conditions should not be imposed.

Background

12. The defendant was born in Northern Tablelands, NSW and is 66 years old.

13. The defendant has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and has been assessed as presenting with low cognitive functioning, as a result of his mental illness. He appears to also be experiencing some form of neurocognitive decline, namely, dementia. He has been prescribed anti-libidinal medications since 2015.

14. The defendant has a long history of drug and alcohol use. He has been diagnosed with substance misuse disorder and has been intoxicated during the commission of a number of his offences.

15. The defendant has a long history of sexual offending dating back to 1975. The sexual offending includes assault with intent to rape, multiple counts of inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse, multiple counts of sexual intercourse without consent, indecent assault, and act of indecency. The defendant has a history of offending against both female family members and strangers, and his victims have ranged in age from 17 to 83 years of age.

16. The defendant receives the Disability Support Pension and is supported by the NDIS. The defendant resides in NDIS supported accommodation at Macquarie Fields, NSW.

17. Since his release from custody in 2018, the defendant has been subject to repeated, rolling CTOs under the MH Act, each one enforced for a period of six months. The most current CTO commenced on 8 May 2025 and will lapse on 7 November 2025. The medications mandated by the CTO include Risperidone for schizophrenia and Medroxyprogesterone, an anti-libidinal.

18. The defendant’s finances are controlled by the Public Trustee, and he is no longer subject to a Guardianship Order.

Index offence

19. On or about 14 February 2010, the defendant committed the offence of sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 61I of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The defendant was staying with his sister and her adult daughter (the victim) in Sydney. The defendant and the victim had been drinking alcohol with the victim's friends at a local hotel. They returned home and the victim went to bed. The victim woke to find the defendant had removed some of her clothing and was having penile-vaginal intercourse with her. The defendant was 50 years of age at the time of the offending.

20. On 21 September 2011, following a plea of guilty, the defendant was sentenced by North DCJ to a term of imprisonment of 6 years and 3 months commencing on 16 February 2010 and concluding on 15 May 2016, with a non-parole period of 4 years commencing on 16 February 2010 and expiring on 15 February 2014.

21. The remarks on sentence for the index offence included findings that:

1. The defendant took advantage of the victim's unconscious state.

2. The offence was opportunistic brought about by heavy drinking leading up to the actual incident.

3. The defendant did not employ the use of threats or pressure before or after the offence but took full toll of the victim's vulnerability due to her being asleep after a heavy night of drinking.

4. The defendant took advantage of the victim in the home in which she was living, and he is the uncle of the victim.

5. The defendant's capacity to reason and to fully appreciate the rightness or wrongness of having sex with his niece while she was asleep was related to his mental illness and, therefore, to some extent lessened his moral culpability.

6. The defendant was highly intoxicated at the time of committing this offence and noting that although this was self-induced, this tended to lessen the moral culpability of the offence.

7. Dr Furst diagnosed the offender with schizophrenia, poly-substance dependence, antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality traits, as well as a history of depression.

8. Due to the defendant's mental illness, his moral culpability was reduced, and he was a less appropriate vehicle for general deterrence.

9. The defendant's record disclosed a history of sexual offending over a period of thirty-five years, and he generally re-offends within a very short period of being released from custody.

10. The defendant expressed remorse in talking to the police and during a confidential psychological pre-sentence assessment.

Other relevant offending

22. The defendant has a significant history of sexual offending, attempted sexual offending, and stalking and intimidation in relation to women. It includes the following offences:

1. Assault female (charged 20 February 1975): The offending occurred in 1975 against a woman who was carrying her 20-month-old son. The defendant placed his hands up the victim’s dress, and it was alleged he placed his hands on her thigh. The defendant was released on probation for 12 months to be of good behaviour.

2. Assault with intent to rape (charged 30 May 1977): The offending occurred in May 1977. The defendant entered a flat occupied by a 28-year-old, taking with him a length of dog chain. He presented a fork to the woman and hit the victim multiple times to the upper part of her body and head. The defendant wrapped the dog chain around her throat and pulled it tight causing her to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, the defendant was attempting sexual intercourse with her. The defendant was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.

3. Indecent assault (charged 13 January 1997): The defendant approached the victim and extended his arm to shake hers. After shaking hands and letting go, he reached down and grabbed her groin area with one hand and the zipper of her pants with another. The victim ran away before contacting police. On 18 February 1997, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 months commencing on 13 January 1997.

4. Act of indecency with person 16 years or over (charged 14 September 1999): The victim commenced running along a trail and as she approached a bridge, the defendant was standing there and exposed his genitals to her as well as fondling them. The victim was afraid for her safety, continued running, and ran back to the carpark. The defendant followed her for a short distance. The defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 months commencing on 17 September 1999 and concluding on 16 March 2000, with an additional term of 3 months’ supervision concluding on 16 June 2000.

5. Stalk with intent; intimidate with intent; offensive language; custody of knife in a public place (charged 4 October 2000): In January 1998, while in prison for other matters, the defendant began sending numerous letters to the victim. The letters were of an explicit sexual nature. The victim had never been in any relationship with the defendant, and he had no reason to make these written advances towards her.

6. In mid-August 2000, the defendant moved to a location directly across the road from where the victim was living with relatives. The defendant began watching the victim and her house across the road and was bragging to other persons that the victim was “his woman” and “his missus”. At around 9:00pm on 1 September 2000, the defendant was outside the victim’s house in the dark and followed her when she left the house to go out. The victim had to run to a friend’s house to call a taxi to get away from the defendant. Later that night, the defendant was watching the victim as she left a number of pubs in the company of friends. On 3 September 2000, the defendant was outside the victim’s home in an intoxicated state where he swore and yelled abuse and threats towards her, despite her not being home.

7. On 4 October 2000, police observed the defendant acting suspiciously outside a pizza store in Newtown. Police observed that he appeared to be concealing something in the sleeve of his jacket, which, upon a search, was revealed to be a large black handled knife with a 15 cm serrated blade.

8. On 20 February 2001, the defendant was convicted and sentenced as follows:

1. Stalk with intent – 5 years’ imprisonment concluding on 3 October 2008 with a non-parole period of 3 years concluding on 3 October 2006.

2. Intimidate with intent – 4 years’ imprisonment commencing on 4 October 2001 with a non-parole period of 3 years concluding on 3 October 2003.

3. The charges of offensive language and custody of a knife were taken into account on Form 1.

23. On 29 June 2001, the defendant was pronounced a "habitual offender" by Freeman DCJ pursuant to the Habitual Criminals Act 1957 (NSW).

24. On 29 July 2016, Harrison J made a CDO in respect of the defendant for a period of two years.

25. On 3 October 2018, R A Hulme J ordered that the defendant be subject to an ESO for a period of 5 years to commence on 3 October 2018. Following periods of suspension pursuant to s 10(2) of the Act, that order expires on 6 July 2025.

Risk Assessment Report

26. Samuel Ardasinski, Senior Forensic Psychologist at Corrective Services NSW, prepared a Risk Assessment Report (“RAR”) on 17 December 2024.

27. Mr Ardasinski's assessment of the defendant's risk of future offending, using the following tools, conveyed:

1. On the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol (RSVP) Version 2, the defendant was assessed as presenting an elevated risk of committing further sexual violence of a similar nature to his previous offences, and his case prioritisation was considered as "High" (RAR [31]).

2. On the Structured Assessment of Protective Factors against Sexual Offending (SAPROF-SO), the defendant was determined to have a moderate loading of protective factors that would inoculate against risk (RAR [38]).

3. On the Dynamic Risk Factors (Actuarial Assessment) - Sexual Offending (STABLE-2007), the defendant received a score of 13 suggesting a high density of criminogenic needs relative to other male sexual offenders (RAR [36]).

1. Mr Ardasinski identified the defendant's risk factors as follows (RAR [33] - [34]):

1. Substance abuse.

2. Unstable mental health, with feelings of paranoia or persecution.

3. Sexual pre-occupation and sexualising potential victims.

4. Feeling lonely, unwanted or worthless, and lack of intimate relationships.

5. Impulsivity and poor capacity to plan.

6. Poor work ethic/ability and an abundance of idle time.

7. Poor prior compliance with supervision and treatment, and poor insight into risk.

8. Lack of community support and suitable accommodation.

28. As to future potential risk scenarios, Mr Ardasinski's opinion is that the "most likely" scenario is that the defendant could commit a further sexual act or an act of sexual touching upon an adult female stranger or an acquaintance. Mr Ardasinski opined that if all the structures, currently in place, fell away (some of which he noted are only voluntary), there may be a higher likelihood of physical coercion being used in future sexual violence if the defendant used alcohol to excess in a state of arousal and encountered a vulnerable female (RAR [41]). He considered the ESO to have been "pivotal" in ensuring that the peripheral support structures, including the NDIS and mental health supports, did not fall away.

Section 9(3)(c) and (d) results of relevant assessments

29. There have been various assessments of the defendant (further to those outlined above), as summarised below:

1. Level of Service Inventory - Revised (LSI-R): assessed in October 2024, scoring in the "Medium" range of risk for general reoffending.

2. STATIC-99R: assessed in April 2020, with a score of 5 placing him in the "Above Average" risk for sexual recidivism.

3. HCR-20: assessed in 2019 as exhibiting a "high loading on static risk factors for future aggression".

4. ARMIDILIO-S: assessed in 2019, with results indicating a "High" loading of dynamic risk factors, and some protective factors.

Section 9(3)(d1) ­- report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can be managed in the community

30. On 4 February 2025, Scott Abbott, Senior Community Corrections Officer, prepared a Risk Management Report (“RMR”).

Sections 9(3)(e) and (e1) - treatment or rehabilitation programs and options that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending

31. The defendant has undertaken the following programs:

1. Completion of the high intensity Self-Regulation Program for Sex Offenders (SRP­SO) between 23 October 2012 and 20 March 2014.

2. Participation in Forensic Psychology Service (“FPS”) upon the commencement of the current ESO in 2018. Despite reported engagement to an appropriate standard, the defendant's ability to undertake meaningful engagement was impacted by his disability and as such FPS intervention was discontinued in 2013.

Sections 9(3)(e2), (f), and (g) - likelihood of compliance with an ESO, previous compliance with parole and other obligations

32. The defendant has been convicted for failing to comply with his current ESO as follows:

1. Fail to comply with extended supervision order (x 2) (charged 30 March 2019): The defendant took an oral drug test, and the results showed positive for the presence of a prohibited drug (Buprenorphine). On 16 April 2019, the defendant was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment. On 11 July 2019, the sentence was varied to a term of imprisonment of 3 months and 12 days commencing on 30 March 2019 and expiring on 11 July 2019.

2. Fail to comply with extended supervision order (charged 29 April 2020): In November 2019, the defendant met the victim during his Aboriginal art therapy class. He wrote the victim a number of letters, asked for the victim's relationship status, and her full name and date of birth. He revealed he had a photograph of the victim and asked for her address. On 12 December 2019, the defendant was issued with a written direction not to associate with the victim. On 27 April 2020, information was received that the defendant had disclosed to his forensic psychologists that he had been masturbating while having sexual thoughts about the victim. The defendant denied having any contact with the victim. It was then revealed that the defendant had contacted the victim via her mobile phone. On 30 April 2020, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 months commencing on 29 April 2020 and expiring on 28 October 2020.

3. Fail to comply with extended supervision order - 2 counts (charged 18 January 2022): On 18 November 2021, directions were issued to the defendant regarding his use of classified material and use of social media. During a search of his phone on 8 January 2022, it was revealed that the defendant accessed "Facebook" at least 15 times. He also downloaded the "Facebook Lite" application. The search also revealed that the defendant had accessed at least 46 different pornographic videos through adult websites, in breach of his current ESO. On 3 February 2022, the defendant was sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment commencing on 18 January 2022 and expiring on 17 October 2022, with a non-parole period of 6 months expiring on 17 July 2022.

4. Fail to comply with extended supervision order (charged 14 October 2022): On 7 October 2022, a search of the defendant's phone revealed a number of downloaded pornographic videos, and the search history showed several searches for pornographic material, in breach of the current ESO. The defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 9 months to commence on 14 October 2022 and expire on 13 July 2023, with a non-parole period of 6 months expiring on 13 April 2023.

Sections 9(3)(h) and (h1) - offender's criminal history and views of the sentencing court

33. The defendant's criminal history is characterised by repeated sexual offending against adult women of varying ages dating back to 1975. The defendant has repeatedly exhibited stalking behaviour and used serious violence to commit sexual offences in the past.

Section 9(3)(i) - any other information as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence

34. With the benefit of his NDIS-funded supports and treatment under CTOs, the defendant has taken pro-social steps.

Consideration

35. The four preconditions in s 5B of the Act for the making of an ESO are:

5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order. Each of these preconditions is satisfied.

36. Regarding s 5B(a), Mr Strong is an “offender” within the meaning of ss 4A and 5 of the Act. He is over 18 and has served a sentence of full-time imprisonment following convictions for a “serious offence”, namely a conviction for maliciously causing assault occasioning bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse and sexual intercourse without consent in 1983. This is a “serious sex offence” pursuant to s 5(1)(a) of the Act. Although those sentences are complete, the definition of “offender” includes offenders who have served a sentence for a serious offence in the past: s 4A(b) of the Act.

37. When the Court undertakes the exercise in ss 7(4) and 15(4), the Court is not involved in “weighing up the documentation or resolving any conflicts, inconsistencies or uncertainties” that appear in the documentation: see State of New South Wales v Sturgeon [2019] NSWSC 559 at [6]. Rather, the Court is to consider (as a prerequisite for the matter to advance to a final hearing), whether it is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, establish to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if they are not kept under supervision.

38. In State of NSW v Tozer [2017] NSWSC 109, Garling J summarised the key principles informing the unacceptable risk precondition as held by the Court of Appeal in Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57:

1. The determination of the existence of an unacceptable risk is an evaluative task, which requires a normative context in which to be made;

2. the preferable approach is to give the words their everyday meaning in the context of the provision in which they appear and having regard to the objects of the Act;

3. In the context of the Act, the evaluation being made by the Court is “... directed to the assessment of risk in the context of making the community secure from harm as opposed to guaranteeing its safety and protection”; and

4. The risk which must be unacceptable is one of the commission of a serious violent offence, if the individual is not kept under supervision.

39. The phrase a “high degree of probability” in s 5B(d) of the Act indicates something “beyond more probable than not”: see Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 at [21]. A finding of risk requires proof to a higher degree than the civil standard of proof, though not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. As held in State of New South Wales v Holschier (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 341 there must be:

“[56] … [A] firm foundation, rather than a merely reasonable basis, for the conclusion that the risk posed by the offender is unacceptable absent supervision. Reasonable satisfaction is of itself insufficient.”

40. The approach to be taken at a preliminary hearing was summarised by Garling J in State of New South Wales v Sturgeon [2019] NSWSC 559:

“[5] A preliminary hearing does not require the Court to be satisfied that the matters in the supporting documentation will be proved. The Court is only required to be satisfied that if those matters are proved, an order would be justified, bearing in mind the elevated standard of proof, namely ‘a high degree of probability’: s. 5B and s. 5C …

[6] The Court, in undertaking this exercise, is not involved in weighing up the documentation or resolving any conflicts, inconsistencies or uncertainties which appear in the documentation. It is no part of the Court’s function to predict the ultimate result, or assess the likelihood of the ultimate result. If on the matters alleged in the supporting documentation it is open to the Court at a final hearing to make a CDO or [an] ESO, then a conclusion that the Court would be justified in making the order, is inevitable. The issue is to be resolved without considering what evidence might be called by [the defendant] at a final hearing, and without taking into account any evidence which may be called by a defendant at an interim hearing, because such evidence would not cast light upon what is alleged in the supporting documentation: Attorney-General (NSW) v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119 at [98].”

41. Under s 10A of the Act, the Court has power to make an ISO if it appears to the Court:

1. that the offender’s current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and

2. that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.

42. It is appropriate to give weight to risk avoidance at the preliminary phase.

43. A preliminary hearing must be conducted within 28 days after the application is filed in the Supreme Court (or within such further time as the Supreme Court may allow): s 7(3) of the Act. If the Court is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, the Supreme Court must make orders regarding the psychiatric or psychological examination of the offender: s 7(4) of the Act.

44. The defendant, through his tutor, Dr Katherine Johnson, does not oppose the order allowing for his examination by two psychiatrists or psychologists, the ISO, or the ancillary order.

45. I am satisfied that the threshold preconditions under the Act are met. I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documents would, if proved, establish to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if he is not kept under supervision.

Conditions

46. The defendant submits that 13 of the proposed conditions should not be imposed. The defendant submits that the conditions relating to electronic monitoring, a schedule of movements, drug and alcohol (conditions 17(a) and 20 only), search and seizure, personal details and appearance, and NDIS support, are inappropriate and unnecessary. The defendant points to the significant progress he has made, particularly, over the last two years, during which he has demonstrated compliance with existing orders and treatment.

47. The defendant further submits that the comprehensive conditions which will apply to an interim order, are sufficient to mitigate risk without being onerous, punitive, or paternalistic.

48. The plaintiff submits that the schedule of conditions is necessary to provide adequate monitoring and supervision to maintain the necessary supportive framework ensuring the continued progress of the defendant.

49. Both parties have taken me to relevant evidence in support of their respective submissions.

50. In State of New South Wales v Cole (Final) [2024] NSWSC 1640 at [138], I referred to the principles relevant to a consideration of the necessity of conditions, by reference to the decision in State of New South Wales v Keech [2024] NSWSC 408 at [45]:

“[138] In Keech I set out the principles to be considered in assessing the necessity of conditions proposed by the plaintiff at [45]:

‘As indicated earlier in this judgment, the real issue between the parties is whether, and to what extent, the conditions proposed by the plaintiff are necessary and/or appropriate. A summary of the principles regarding the imposition of conditions attaching to a supervision order are helpfully summarised in the defendant’s written submissions (at [30]) and are extracted below:

(i) Having served their sentence, an offender has a right to personal liberty, although this right is not absolute: State of NSW v Donovan [2015] NSWSC 1254 at [83].

(ii) In imposing conditions, the Court needs to strike a balance between competing considerations to provide an outcome which is fit and proper: State of NSW v Ali [2010] NSWSC 1045 at [88]; State of New South Wales v Fisk [2013] NSWSC 364 at [96].

(iii) It is relevant that a breach gives rise to criminal penalty of up to 5 years imprisonment, which supports the position that a proper basis must be shown to warrant the imposition of each condition: Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28 at [48].

(iv) A link to past offending is not necessary, but conditions should address the risk of future offending based on the scope, purpose and objects of the Act.

(v) Conditions should focus on mitigating the risk of a ‘serious offence’, and not on reoffending generally: State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003 at [36]-[38].

(vi) Conditions must not be unjustifiably onerous, punitive, paternalistic, in the ‘general’ public interest, or for the convenience or efficiency of those supervising the offender: State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855 at [89].

(vii) An identifiable and substantive purpose is required for each condition. Speculation that it will be useful will not suffice: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 483 at [36].

(viii) Conditions imposed ought to be the least intrusive conditions that are still consistent with the objects and purpose of the Act: Lynn v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 57 at [129]-[131].’

See also State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813 at [44].”

51. I turn to consider the conditions which are opposed by the defendant.

Electronic Monitoring (Condition 5)

52. There has been no offending, or any charge laid on the defendant since 14 October 2022. According to the June 2024 ESO Completion Report, the defendant appears to be on a positive trajectory. He remains on a CTO (most recently made on 8 May 2025 and to expire on 7 November 2025). He appears to be responding well to the treatment order.

53. On 8 May 2025, the defendant’s electronic monitoring brace was removed and there has been no evidence of any non-compliance, absconding, or breach behaviour.

54. On the other hand, Mr Ardasinski, in the RAR dated 17 December 2024, states: “In my view, the two most important ESO conditions to manage Mr Strong’s risk of sexual reoffence are those mandating electronic monitoring and conditions which serves to restrict Mr Strong’s returning to problematic substance use”.

55. The RMR dated 4 February 2025, states that a condition for electronic monitoring would allow Community Corrections to monitor Mr Strong’s movements in the community in real-time. Additionally, it would allow for Community Corrections to conduct regular movement audits to identify any concerning patterns in the defendant’s behaviour that may relate to his identified risks of reoffending.

56. Although the electronic monitoring brace has been removed, the material establishes that external controls are important to mitigate risk and promote the defendant’s successful integration into the community. At this stage of the proceedings, I am satisfied that the electronic monitoring condition is appropriate.

Schedule of Movements (Conditions 6 to 8)

57. The plaintiff submits that these conditions are a further necessary external control to ensure compliance and to mitigate risk. In the event that Mr Strong’s risk changes rapidly, intensive and regular monitoring would be required.

58. The defendant has not had to provide a schedule of movements since March 2024. He has stabilised in the community and has sufficient funding through the NDIS to have almost constant support, with male support workers accompanying him in the community. According to the June 2024 ESO Completion Report, the defendant has had no further instances of inappropriate relationships since 2021. His antipsychotic medication appears to have had a positive effect, and he has consistently presented without significant mental disturbance.

59. The preparation and submission of a schedule of movements is an onerous task, particularly for someone with Mr Strong’s mental health conditions. Notwithstanding the fact that his disability support workers may provide him with assistance in the preparation of the schedule, I am persuaded that conditions 6-8 are unnecessary and place an undue restriction upon the defendant in circumstances where the identified risks are adequately addressed by multiple conditions which will attach to the order.

60. Accordingly, I will not impose conditions 6-8.

Drugs and alcohol (Conditions 17(a) and 20 only)

61. The defendant opposes conditions 17(a) and 20, on the basis that he has been abstinent for several years and has a demonstrated history, where he has been complying with court orders in the last two years. The defendant further submits that the remaining drug and alcohol conditions provide adequate and necessary supervision to ensure that he will not relapse.

62. It is a credit to the defendant that he has been abstinent from drugs and alcohol for a lengthy period of time and that he has been subject to random alcohol and drug testing throughout his supervision with no concerns noted since 2019. The defendant has also demonstrated insight into the risks attendant on his use of alcohol and drugs.

63. However, the defendant has a long-standing history of substance abuse issues, commencing during his childhood. Although, in more recent times he has been abstinent and compliant, his progress must be considered in the context of decades of substance abuse. Condition 17(a) and 20 are not onerous and do not unnecessarily infringe upon the defendant’s liberty. Condition 17(a) would allow the defendant to possess, purchase, or consume alcohol with prior approval from a Departmental Supervising Officer (“DSO”). The condition is flexible to permit him to consume alcohol, for example, at venues where alcohol is sold when in the company of his support staff. I note that according to an OIMS record of a case conference about the defendant, on 4 March 2025 (attended by his senior behavioural specialist and psychologist Ben Fullam, his NDIS support coordinator and an NDIS support worker), it was suggested that the defendant could attend karaoke at a local hotel in Macquarie Fields. The proposed conditions would not prohibit him from doing so with the approval of a DSO.

61. Conditions 17 and 20 are appropriate and will be imposed.

Search and seizure (Conditions 33 to 36)

65. The plaintiff submitted that these conditions are necessary to mitigate two risks. First, the risk of behaviours relating to writing and sending letters of a menacing and threatening nature to women. Second, to mitigate the risk of the defendant accessing pornography.

66. The evidence reveals a history of the defendant writing and sending letters to women, initially declaring his feelings but, in the face of rejection, containing threats of violence. The last time that such conduct was engaged in by the defendant was in 2021.

67. In respect of the defendant’s access to pornography, I observed that there are multiple conditions limiting and/or regulating the defendant’s access to the Internet and other electronic communication. These conditions allow for remote monitoring of the defendant’s social media accounts by a DSO.

68. I am satisfied that there are sufficient and adequate conditions to allow monitoring and supervision of the defendant with regard to risky letter writing behaviour or access to pornography, without having to impose the search and seizure conditions. In my view, the search and seizure conditions, are an unnecessary infringement on the defendant’s liberty at this stage of his demonstrated progress in the community.

69. Accordingly, I will not impose conditions 33-36.

Personal details and appearance (Condition 41)

70. The defendant does not oppose conditions which prohibit the use of an alias and require him to notify a DSO of any change of his name or appearance within 24 hours of such change. Condition 41 is unnecessary and highly intrusive in the circumstances. There is no evidence that suggests the defendant has or is likely to significantly change his appearance.

71. Accordingly, I will not impose condition 41.

NDIS conditions (Conditions 49 and 50)

72. The defendant opposes conditions 49 and 50 on the basis that there is no evidence that suggests the defendant is unlikely to renew his NDIS plan or to disengage with his NDIS support. He has reported that he is happy with the way things are right now and does not want to change anything.

73. The NDIS package has provided the defendant with enormous support including, but not limited to, accommodation. Without stable accommodation, it is highly likely, if not inevitable, that the defendant’s mental health would deteriorate, and he would relapse into illicit drug and alcohol use. Stable accommodation is an essential foundation upon which to build the framework and structure required to address, treat, and support the defendant’s complex needs.

74. Requiring the defendant to apply for renewal and remain engaged with NDIS funded carers, is not an imposition. It does not unnecessarily infringe his liberty. Indeed, it is a protective factor of the highest order.

75. I am satisfied that conditions 49 and 50 should be imposed.

Orders

76. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

1. Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW):

1. I appoint two qualified psychiatrists or psychologists (or any combination of such persons) to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and

2. I direct that the defendant attend those examinations.

2. Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, the defendant be subject to an Interim Supervision Order.

3. Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, the Interim Supervision Order is to commence on 6 July 2025 and be in force for a period of 28 days.

4. Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, I direct that the defendant, for the period of the Interim Supervision Order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment.

5. I order that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.

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SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS

In these conditions:

“Associate” includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or communicating with by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).

“CSNSW” means Corrective Services NSW.

“Commissioner” means Commissioner for Corrective Services.

“Defendant” means Robert Strong, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.

“DSO” means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.

“Electronic Identity” means each of the following:

1. an email address,

2. a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,

3. a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,

4. any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.

“Material” includes:

5. any written or printed material;

6. any picture, painting or drawing;

7. any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;

8. any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;

9. any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and

10. any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.

“NSWPF” means NSW Police Force.

“Search” includes:

11. A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant’s possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person’s body; and

12. A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant’s clothed body is touched.

“Schedule of movements” refers to a weekly plan (referred to in Conditions 7-9), to be submitted to a DSO each Wednesday and which commences on the following Saturday if approved by a DSO.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Monitoring and Reporting

1. You must accept the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

2. Where a direction maybe given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.

3. You must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising you, about:

1. where you are or have been;

2. where you are going;

3. who you are with or have been with;

4. what you are doing or have been doing; and

5. the nature of your associations.

4. You must agree to any information relating to your risk, supervision or rehabilitation being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

Electronic Monitoring

5. You must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with or remove the equipment.

Schedule of Movements

6. Condition not imposed.

7. Condition not imposed.

8. Condition not imposed.

Part B: Accommodation

9. You must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change your approved address or living arrangements.

10. If directed, you must be at your approved address overnight between the hours specified by a DSO unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO.

NOTE: For the purposes of Condition 10, overnight means a time no earlier than 9:00pm and no later than 6:00am.

11. You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address, provided such visits do not occur with unreasonable frequency on any day or night.

12. You must not spend the night anywhere other than your approved address or any alternative approved addresses without the approval of a DSO.

13. You must not permit any person to stay overnight at your approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there) without the prior approval of a DSO.

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

14. You must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner.

15. You must not go to any place specified by a DSO.

16. You must not attend any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment, without the prior approval of a DSO.

Part D: Drugs and alcohol

17. You must not:

1. Possess, purchase or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO;

2. Possess or use prohibited drugs; or

3. Abuse prescription drugs.

18. You must submit to drug and alcohol testing.

19. You must not enter any licensed premises (including hotels, bars, racecourses and licenced clubs, but excluding cafes and restaurants) without the prior approval of a DSO.

20. You must attend and participate in programs and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as reasonably directed by a DSO and must not discharge yourself from such programs and courses without prior approval of a DSO.

Part E: Non-association

21. You must not associate with any person specified by a DSO.

22. Without limiting condition 21, you must not associate with any person:

1. who is consuming or under the influence of alcohol; or

2. who you know is consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.

NOTE: You are not required to comply with condition 22a if a DSO has given you prior approval to associate with a person consuming or under the influence of alcohol

23. You must not engage the services of sex workers without the prior approval of a DSO.

24. You must agree to a DSO disclosing your criminal history to another person with whom you commence an intimate relationship. Before any disclosure is made, you will first be given the opportunity to make the disclosure yourself within a timeframe as identified by a DSO.

Part F: Weapons

25. You must not possess or use any of the following:

1. a firearm, firearm part or ammunition within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996; or

2. a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.

26. At any time you have left your approved address, you must not have in your possession any knife (or cutting instrument) or any rope, chain or other instrument of restraint.

Part G: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

27. You must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO the use of electronic devices and access to the internet.

28. You must disclose the following information to a DSO if directed:

1. Aliases, electronic identities and log-in names;

2. Email addresses;

3. Telephone numbers;

4. SIM cards;

5. Applications used (including any social networking service);

6. Online gaming services;

7. Instant messaging services;

8. Service provider account numbers; and

9. All passwords and log-in details.

29. You must give a DSO a list of the electronic devices you use to communicate with or access the internet. This includes computers, phones, tablet devices, data storage devices and gaming devices. You must advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately.

30. You must provide a list of communication devices and data storage devices in your possession and advise a DSO of any change to the inventory immediately.

31. You must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by you, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.

32. You must provide consent for your telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about your accounts with a DSO.

Part H: Search and seizure

33. Condition not imposed.

34. Condition not imposed.

35. Condition not imposed

36. Condition not imposed

Part I: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

37. You must request and obtain approval from a DSO to purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified as Category 1 Restricted and Category 2 Restricted as defined under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth), or any other material as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to risk of committing a serious offence.

Part J: Personal details and appearance

38. If you change your name or use any other name than Robert Strong, you must inform a DSO within 24 hours.

39. You must not use any alias, log-in name other than “Robert Strong”, or a name other than those provided to a DSO under condition 38, or use any email address other than those known to a DSO under condition 28 above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that requires to the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.

40. You must notify the DSO within 24 hours of any significant changes to your appearance.

41. Condition not imposed.

42. If you change the details of any current form of identification or obtain further forms of identification, you must provide a DSO with such details.

Part K: Medical intervention and treatment

43. You must undergo any ongoing psychological or psychological assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction

44. You must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that you consult.

45. You must take medications that are prescribed to you by your healthcare practitioners (including anti-libidinal medication) and only in the manner prescribed.

46. You must notify a DSO immediately if you cease to take or decline to commence taking any medication as referred to in the above condition

47. You must agree to your treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on your progress and attendance, and information you have told them, with each other and with a DSO.

48. You must agree to any information obtained under condition 47 being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

Part L: NDIS conditions

49. You must agree to apply for the renewal of your NDIS funding package (at least to its current level of financial and other support), in sufficient time to allow the application to be processed before the current NDIS plan lapses, and must do everything necessary to support that application being made.

50. You must agree to accept supports under your NDIS funded package, and remain engaged with your NDIS-funded carers.

Decision last updated: 02 July 2025