State of New South Wales v Liddington (Final)

[2025] NSWSC 417

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

State of New South Wales v Liddington (Final) [2025] NSWSC 417

Hearing dates:

31 March 2025, 1-2 April 2025 & 7 April 2025

Date of orders:

1 May 2025

Decision date:

01 May 2025

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Coleman J

Decision:

(1) An order pursuant to ss 20, 25(1) and 26(6) of the THRO Act, that the defendant is subject to an Extended Supervision Order for a period of 12 months from the date of the order.

(2) An order pursuant to s 29(1) of the THRO Act, directing the defendant to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to these reasons for the period of the Extended Supervision Order.

Catchwords:

HIGH RISK OFFENDER – application for an extended supervision order – final hearing – Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 – question of whether defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence – specificity of risk of serious terrorism offence application opposed – difference between intensive corrections orders and extended supervisions orders – conditions of ESO – as the court thinks “appropriate” – extended supervision order imposed

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW)

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)

Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)

Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)

Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Attorney-General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSW CA 119

Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Amin (Final) [2023] NSWSC 1586

CXZ v Children’s Guardian [2020] NSWCA 338

Kamm v State of New South Wales (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1

Lynn V State of New South Wales [2016] NSW CA 57

Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2023] HCA 3

State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSW SC 183

State of New South Wales v Ali [2010] NSW SC 1045

State of New South Wales v BP (No.2) [2019] NSW SC 806

State of New South Wales v Galvin [2022] NSWSC 84

State of New South Wales v Naaman (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 328

State of New South Wales V Osman [2021] NSW SC 124

State of New South Wales v White [2018] NSWSC 1943

State of NSW v Alam [2020] NSWSC 295

State of NSW v Cheema (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 876

State of NSW v Elmir (Final) [2019] NSWSC 1867

State of NSW V Fayad [2021] NSWSC 600

State of NSW v Kiskonen (Preliminary) [2021] NSWSC 915

State of NSW v Liddington (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 10

The Queen v Abdirahman-Khalif (2002) 271 CLR 265

Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28

Zheng v R [2023] NSWCCA 64

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Desmond Liddington (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
J Emmett SC with K Curry and E Lovell-Jones (Plaintiff)
R Wilson SC (Defendant)

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors Office (NSW) (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid Commission (NSW) (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2024/351649

Publication restriction:

Restricted to the parties pending further order of the court

JUDGMENT

1. By summons dated 20 September 2024, the State of New South Wales as plaintiff, seeks orders that the defendant Desmond Liddington be subject to an Extended Supervision Order (“ESO”) and comply with certain conditions whilst subject to that ESO. The orders are sought pursuant the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) (“the THRO Act”).

2. On 19 December 2024 I heard the plaintiff’s application for an interim supervision order (“ISO”). On 28 January 2025, I made orders pursuant to s 27 of the THRO Act that the defendant be subject to an ISO for a period of 28 days commencing 3 February 2025, and that the defendant comply with certain conditions whilst subject to the ISO. I also ordered, pursuant to s 24(5) of the THRO Act, that two qualified psychologists or psychiatrists (or any combination of such persons) examine the defendant and provide a report to the court of the results of those examinations and that the defendant attend such examinations: State of NSW v Liddington (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 10 [228] (“the preliminary reasons”).

3. On 25 February 2025, Yehia J ordered that the ISO be extended for a period of 28 days commencing on 3 March 2025, upon the expiry of the initial ISO and that the defendant comply with the conditions of the ISO I imposed.

4. On 25 March 2025, Yehia J ordered that ISO again be extended commencing on 31 March 2025 upon the expiry of the ISO made on 25 February and that the defendant comply with those conditions.

5. On 23 April 2025, I ordered that the ISO again be extended commencing on 27 April 2025 and expiring on 3 May 2025 and that the defendant comply with the conditions originally imposed. This extension was the last that could be made as it meant the ISO had been in place for 3 months: s 28 (3) of the THRO Act.

The structure of these reasons

6. In the preliminary reasons, I recited and reviewed the evidence then relied upon by the plaintiff. As I said at the conclusion of the hearing of this application, those reasons were extensive, perhaps more extensive than is usual on preliminary applications having regard to the nature of the test for interim relief under the THRO Act.

7. Much of the evidence tendered at the preliminary hearing is again relied upon in support of the application for the ESO. I do not intend to repeat the recitation of the evidence already in the preliminary reasons, or my analysis of the evidence there presented and relied upon again on this application. These reasons should therefore be read in conjunction with the preliminary reasons. I will cross-reference to parts of the preliminary reasons where necessary.

8. Agreed facts relied upon in this application are contained in both the Statement of Agreed Facts as tendered in the preliminary hearing, and a Supplementary Statement of Agreed Facts.

9. In accordance with the orders I made in the preliminary reasons, the defendant was examined by two psychologists, Dr Katie Seidler and Dr Chelsey Dewson. I will incorporate in these reasons where appropriate, relevant agreed summaries of the expert opinions of Dr Seidler and Dr Dewson.

10. In these reasons, after discussing the statutory framework and relevant principles, I will set out the evidence relied on by the plaintiff and the defendant. I will then set out the submissions of the parties and consider whether the relief sought should be granted.

11. The parties have, necessarily, placed before the court a significant amount of material. It is not possible to reference it all. I have had the considerable benefit of receiving extensive written submissions as follows:

1. Submissions of State of NSW dated 18 March 2025 (“PWS”);

2. Final Hearing: Submissions for the Defendant dated 24 March 2025 (“DWS”);

3. Reply Submissions of State of NSW dated 27 March 2025 (“PRS”);

4. Submissions of NSW Following the Hearing dated 4 April 2025 (“PFS”); and

5. Final Hearing: Submissions for the Defendant- the Oral Evidence dated 4 April 2025 “(DFS”).

12. I have read and had regard to all those submissions and the evidence before me.

Statutory framework

13. This Court may make an ESO under s 25 of the THRO Act if it is satisfied of the threshold requirements in s 20 of that Act. Section 20 provides:

20 Supreme Court may make extended supervision orders against eligible offenders if unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of an eligible offender (called an extended supervision order) if:

(a) the offender is in custody or under supervision (or was in custody or under supervision at the time the original application for the order was filed):

(i) while serving a sentence of imprisonment for a NSW indictable offence, or

(ii) under an existing interim supervision order, extended supervision order, interim detention order or continuing detention order, and

(b) an application for the order is made in accordance with this Part, and

(c) the Supreme Court is satisfied that the offender is any of the following:

(i) a convicted NSW terrorist offender,

(ii) a convicted NSW underlying terrorism offender,

(iii) a convicted NSW terrorism activity offender, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

14. It is conceded by the defendant, and the facts as agreed establish, that the preconditions to bring the application are met. That is, the defendant is an ‘eligible offender’ who qualifies as a “convicted NSW terrorism activity offender”. This is because, at the time the proceedings were filed, the defendant was serving a sentence of imprisonment for a NSW indictable offence and had previously made statements advocating support for, and had associations with, organisations advocating support for violent extremism (see ss 4 and 10(1)(c) of the THRO Act). [1]

    1. see also [20]-[32] of the Summary of Plaintiff’s Case, Tab 18 MFI 1

15. It is also conceded by the defendant that the evidence of the two court appointed experts establishes that the defendant poses a risk of committing a terrorism offence. The issue on this application is whether the Court is satisfied to the necessary high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision.

16. I must have regard to the objects of the THRO Act. They are, relevantly, to provide for the extended supervision of certain offenders posing an unacceptable risk of committing serious terrorism offences so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community: s 3(1). A further object of the Act is to encourage the offenders to undertake rehabilitation: s 3(2).

17. I keep in mind that in determining whether to make an ESO, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration: s 25(2) THRO Act.

Legal Principles

18. In State of New South Wales v Naaman (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 328 (“Naaman (No 2)”), the Court of Appeal (Basten, Macfarlan and Leeming JJA) considered at [29] s 20(d) of the THRO Act:

29 Paragraph (d) is a complicated provision, and in light of the State’s submissions in support of ground 1 of its appeal that the primary judge had conflated various aspects of the test it prescribes, it is best to address its elements immediately.

(1) First, and no differently from par (c), this precondition to the power to make an extended supervision order turns upon the Supreme Court being of the requisite state of satisfaction.

(2) Secondly, par (d) of s 20, unlike pars (a), (b) and (c), is forward-looking. It asks not whether the State has demonstrated that a person answers certain descriptions because of what has happened in the past; rather, it (alone of the prerequisites to the availability of the power to make an extended supervision order) requires an inquiry to be made of the inherently uncertain future as to whether something will occur.

(3) Thirdly, par (d) requires the Court to be satisfied to a ‘high degree of probability’ of future events. Those qualifying words perform at least two functions. They confirm that the issue posed by the statute is not resolved by mere speculation. They also displace the ordinary position in civil litigation for findings of fact. (Section 50(1) provides that proceedings under the Act, including an appeal, are civil proceedings and are to be conducted in accordance with the law, including the rules of evidence, relating to civil proceedings.) The ordinary civil standard of proof, reinforced by s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), is replaced by the need for the Court’s state of satisfaction to be ‘to a high degree of probability’.

(4) Fourthly, that forward-looking evaluation turns upon the premise that the eligible offender is ‘not kept under supervision under the order’ which the State is seeking. On that premise, the Court is then required to determine the ‘risk of committing a serious terrorism offence’. It will be relevant to the assessment of that risk to consider both the likelihood of the offence being committed, and the relative seriousness of the offending conduct.

(5) Fifthly, the Court is then to determine whether that risk is or is not ‘unacceptable’. It is entirely possible that the Court might be very comfortably satisfied (i.e. to the requisite high degree of probability) that there is a slim probability of an unsupervised offender committing a terrorist act, and that that risk is unacceptable having regard to the consequences of the act, even if the probability of the risk eventuating is less than 50%. That result would readily be reached absent s 21, but that section makes the position clear beyond argument. That said, what is or is not ‘unacceptable’ is not otherwise defined in the Act.

(6) Sixthly, if so satisfied, then the discretion under s 20 is engaged. For example, if the Court were satisfied to a high degree of probability that an offender posed an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision, but were also satisfied that there would be substantially the same risk, or indeed a greater risk, if the offender were kept under supervision, that might ground an exercise of discretion to decline to make an order.

19. Section 25 of the THRO Act sets out mandatory considerations that the Court must have regard to, in addition to any other matters it considers relevant, when determining whether to make an ESO. I will refer to some background, the evidence relied upon by each party and then assess these mandatory considerations.

20. Before leaving the statutory framework and legal principles, reference must be made to the definition of “serious terrorism offence” in s 4(1) of the THRO Act. As Harrison J (as the Chief Judge at Common Law then was) said in State of New South Wales v Galvin [2022] NSWSC 84 (“Galvin”) at [23]:

[t]he concept of a terrorist act for the purposes of these proceedings is not some vague, inchoate and ill-defined idea operating at large.

21. The definition is:

serious terrorism offence means an offence against Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code for which the maximum penalty is 7 or more years of imprisonment.

22. This definition is significant in this matter because the evidence establishes that the defendant poses a risk of committing an offence in certain circumstances. So much appears to be conceded by the defendant. The question is whether the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision.

23. A serious terrorism offence involving a “terrorist act” must include the necessary intentions required by s 100.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (“Criminal Code”). Relevantly, that section provides:

"terrorist act" means an action or threat of action where:

(a) The action falls within subsection (2) and does not fall within subsection (3); and

(b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; and

(c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of:

(i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or

(ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public. (bold emphasis in (b) added)

24. Importantly, the definition requires both the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause and the intention of coercing or influencing by intimidation a government or intimidating the public or a section of it. As the plaintiff has accepted, it is possible for ideologically motivated violence to involve the first intention, but not the second.

25. I accept, as the plaintiff submits, that conduct amounting to a serious terrorism offence covers a broad range of conduct and does not require the commission of an act of violence: State of NSW v Elmir (Final) [2019] NSWSC 1867 per Walton J at [153]. The plaintiff also makes reference to the observations of Johnson J in State of NSW v Cheema (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 876 (“Cheema (Preliminary)”) at [84] where his Honour said, of the breadth of the terrorism offences under the Commonwealth Criminal Code:

84 In considering the breadth of terrorism offences in the Criminal Code (Cth), emphasis has been placed upon the legislative policy underlying the creation of a range of preparatory offences which serve to criminalise conduct which would not be caught by the general law of criminal attempt. In Lodhi v R (2006) 199 FLR 303; [2006] NSWCCA 121, Spiegelman CJ (McClellan CJ at CL and Sully J agreeing) said (at [66]):

Preparatory acts are not often made into criminal offences. The particular nature of terrorism has resulted in a special, and in many ways unique, legislative regime. It was, in my opinion, the clear intention of Parliament to create offences where an offender has not decided precisely what he or she intends to do. A policy judgment has been made that the prevention of terrorism requires criminal responsibility to arise at an earlier stage than is usually the case for other kinds of criminal conduct, eg well before an agreement has been reached for a conspiracy charge. The courts must respect that legislative policy.

26. It is apparent from the materials before the Court on this application, including the evidence of the defendant, and expressly accepted in the DWS that the defendant holds “...a world view that is substantially informed by perceptions around race, nationalism and scepticism of government. His expression of such views…. are, at times, offensive”. [2] However, even if those statements and beliefs are “emotive and repellent” (which the defendant also accepts), the question is whether on the whole of the evidence, they lead to a conclusion that the defendant poses the relevant unacceptable risk.

    2. DWS at [25]

27. I keep in mind the distinction drawn by Lonergan J in State of NSW v Kiskonen (Preliminary) [2021] NSWSC 915 at [87] between extreme political views advocating political change, and extremist views advocating illegal violence. The plaintiff’s case is that both the defendant’s statements and the organisations which he supports are not confined to the former category.

28. The evidence discloses that the defendant has had associations with certain persons and groups. Most of those groups are not operating in an organised or cohesive way at the present time. I will go into more detail about this when referring to the evidence of Dr Droogan below. He says that even if it cannot be said that some of these groups exist as organisations, there is some evidence of material existing online which reflects the extreme views propagated by them when they did exist. The plaintiff refers to the observations of the High Court in The Queen v Abdirahman-Khalif (2002) 271 CLR 265 (“Abdirahman-Khalif”) at [49] that:

As was held in Benbrika in effect, the nature and purpose of the provisions found in Pt 5.3 and, in particular, Div 102 of the Code dictate that they must extend to groups devoid of structural hierarchy that function in secrecy, with little formality, without a written constitution or set of rules, and without a contractual relationship between members. In such cases the existence of the terrorist organisation is thus more readily proved by evidence of what it does than by abstract analysis of its structure. And where such evidence does establish that persons have so informally associated together for the purposes of carrying out terrorist acts or supporting those who carry out terrorist acts, it is open to the jury to find that they are members of that terrorist organisation despite the absence of a constitution or rules of membership.

29. The assessment of whether the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision is a forward-looking risk assessment. It is an enquiry which requires consideration of the “inherently uncertain future” as to whether something will occur: Naaman (No 2) at [29].

29. Whilst “mere speculation” cannot be enough, there will be an element of speculation by reason of the imprecise and uncertain nature inherent in the assessment of the likely course of future events, using information based at least in part on past events. The Court must look forward and consider the risk to the safety of the community in a scenario in which the defendant is supervised, and one in which he is not. [3]

    3. see Chief Commissioner of Police v Websdale [2019] VSCA 305 where the Victorian Court of Appeal were considering risk assessment in the context of a weapons prohibition order.

30. The plaintiff referred to observations of Dhanji J in Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Amin (Final) [2023] NSWSC 1586 where his Honour referred to the approach of a court undertaking a risk assessment and the decision of Basten J in CXZ v Children’s Guardian [2020] NSWCA 338. Dhanji J was considering an application for an ESO under analogous Commonwealth legislation and at [71] said:

… I am not engaged in determining the occurrence of either past or future events, but rather, I am making a finding of fact as to a present state of affairs, albeit one related to the potential occurrence of a future event, necessarily informed by past events. I accept the approach to be taken is as discussed in Minister for Home Affairs v Benbrika [2020] VSC 888, where Tinney J said (at [394]-[395]):

394   It is worth noting that it is the overall case of the plaintiff which needs to be proved. …

395   This does not mean, however, that every item of evidence, or every aspect of the case, must be established to … any particular standard. What is required is that in the end, I am satisfied to the requisite standard of the case made on behalf of the plaintiff.

32. The assessment to be made is whether the risk posed by the defendant of committing a serious terrorism offence is “unacceptable”. As the defendant submits, this implicitly recognises that the test does not call for the elimination of all risk. What is an unacceptable risk may require a balancing of factors, including the perceived likelihood of recidivism, the relative seriousness of the conduct and offences that may be committed absent the supervision of the defendant. It is for the plaintiff to establish to a high degree of probability that the risk is unacceptable. A person may pose an unacceptable risk, even if the likelihood of them committing a serious terrorism offence is determined to be low: Kamm v State of New South Wales (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1 per Harrison J at [43].

33. It is also necessary to observe that it is the risk posed by the defendant “if unsupervised” which must be considered. If the risk can be eliminated or mitigated such that it is acceptable, by supervision of the defendant and the imposition of appropriate conditions, this fulfills the objects of the THRO Act to protect the community and also encourage the rehabilitation of the defendant.

34. There is no requirement for the Court to specify the precise serious terrorism offence as part of its risk assessment under the act: Cheema (Preliminary); Galvin. It is sufficient if the Court is satisfied that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.

Evidence relied on by the Plaintiff

35. The Plaintiff read the following affidavits at the final hearing:

1. Affidavit of Rebecca Iacono affirmed 19 September 2024;

2. Affidavit of Detective Senior Constable Kiran Sharma affirmed 11 July 2024;

3. Affidavit of Detective Senior Constable Mikhail Apostolakis sworn 11 July 2024;

4. Affidavit of Senior Constable Elliot Merrett sworn 17 September 2024;

5. Affidavit of Detective Senior Constable Loki Diel Psaila-Borrie affirmed 15 October 2024;

6. Second Affidavit of Rebecca Iacono affirmed 17 October 2024;

7. Affidavit of Heather Jackson sworn 11 March 2025;

8. Affidavit of Danielle Matsuo affirmed 12 March 2025;

9. Affidavit of Elizabeth Tsitsos affirmed 12 March 2025;

10. Second Affidavit of Kiran Sharma affirmed 12 March 2025;

11. Affidavit of Kelvin Gale sworn 13 March 2025;

12. Affidavit of Ismail Kirgiz sworn 18 March 2025;

13. Affidavit of John Xenos affirmed 18 March 2025;

14. Second Affidavit John Xenos affirmed 26 March 2025; and

15. Third Affidavit of Kiran Sharma affirmed 27 March 2025;

36. The plaintiff tendered the following exhibits without objection:

1. Exhibit 1: Statement of Agreed Facts;

2. Exhibit 2: Supplementary Statement of Agreed Facts;

3. Exhibit 3: Expert Report of Dr Katie Seidler;

4. Exhibit 4: Expert Report of Dr Chelsey Dewson;

5. Exhibit 5: Supplementary Expert Report of Dr Katie Seidler;

6. Exhibit 6: Updated Section 50 Summary re Offender Telephone System (OTS) Call Transcriptions;

7. Exhibit 7: Section 50 Summary re Prisoner Telephone System (PTS) Call Summaries;

8. Exhibit 8: Section 50 Summary re Western Australia and New South Wales Criminal History;

9. Exhibit 9: Section 50 Summary re Materials referred to in Report of Dr Julian Droogan;

10. Exhibit 10: Section 50 Summary re Associations;

11. Exhibit 11: Extracts from Exhibit RI-1 to the affidavit of Rebecca Iacono affirmed 19 September 2024;

12. Exhibit 12: Extracts from Exhibit KS-1 to the affidavit of Detective Senior Constable Kiran Sharma affirmed 11 July 2024;

13. Exhibit 13: Extracts from Exhibit JX-1 to the affidavit of John Xenos affirmed 18 March 2025;

14. Exhibit 14: Bundle of Photographs headed "Item 12" extracted from tab 81 of Exhibit RI-1;

15. Exhibit 15: Bundle of Photographs numbered pages 639 to 653 being tab 58 of Exhibit RI-1;

16. Exhibit 16: Incident Report from the Western Australian Police Force being tab 44 of Exhibit RI-1; and

17. Exhibit 17: Bundle of Printout of photographs from the Telegram Chanel ''Vinlanders /Firm 22" being tab 70 of Exhibit KS-1.

37. The Plaintiff required the Defendant and his partner Ms Fowler for cross-examination.

Evidence relied on by the Defendant

38. The Defendant read the following affidavits at the final hearing:

1. Affidavit of Melissa Tresheil Smith affirmed 20 November 2024;

2. Affidavit of Susannah Coles affirmed 20 November 2024;

3. Affidavit of Ellis Silove affirmed 15 November 2024;

4. Affidavit of Jolin Ye affirmed 19 November 2024;

5. Affidavit of Jessica Sinclair affirmed 20 November 2024;

6. Affidavit of Melissa Tresheil Smith affirmed 24 March 2025;

7. Affidavit of Joseph Harding affirmed 24 March 2025;

8. Affidavit of Susannah Coles affirmed 24 March 2025;

9. Affidavit of Desmond Liddington affirmed 24 March 2025;

10. Affidavit of Jenaya Fowler affirmed 24 March 2025;

11. Affidavit of Susannah Coles affirmed 25 March 2025; and

12. Affidavit of Melissa Tresheil Smith affirmed 31 March 2025.

39. The Defendant tendered the following exhibits without objection:

1. Exhibit A: Exhibit MTS-1 to the Affidavit of Melissa Tresheil Smith affirmed 20 November 2024;

2. Exhibit B: Exhibit SC-1 to the Affidavit of Susannah Coles affirmed 20 November 2024;

3. Exhibit C: Extracts from Exhibit MTS-2 to the Affidavit of Melissa Tresheil Smith affirmed 25 March 2025;

4. Exhibit D: Extracts from Exhibit SC-2 to the Affidavit of Susannah Coles affirmed 25 March 2025;

5. Exhibit E: Document headed Chapter 7, Countering Violent Extremism (OVE) Programs, Proactive Assessment and Intervention Service (PRAXIS); and

6. Exhibit F: Inmate Profile Document.

40. The Defendant required the following witnesses for cross-examination:

1. Heather Jackson;

2. Elizabeth Tsitsos;

3. Detective Senior Constable Kiran Sharma;

4. Dr Katie Seidler;

5. Dr Julian Droogan; and

6. Dr Chelsey Dewson.

Factual matters

Background to the defendant and his evidence generally

41. At [27] - [34] of the preliminary judgment, I set out the background of the defendant.

42. It is relevant to note that the defendant is currently serving a 12-month Intensive Corrections Order (“ICO”) which expires on 30 May 2025. That ICO was imposed for high range prescribed concentration of alcohol (“PCA”) and drive recklessly offences. He is also serving a 12-month Community Corrections Order (“CCO”) expiring on 30 May 2025 imposed for two offences of intimidation of a police officer. On 3 June 2024 the defendant was sentenced to a further ICO for a period of 2 years commencing 30 November 2024 and expiring on 29 November 2026 for 2 counts of stalk/intimidate.

43. He was released from custody on 3 February 2025 at the expiry of his custodial sentence for the index offending. Since his release he has been subject to the ISO. He has always complied with the conditions of the ISO. Sometimes, that compliance has been difficult. For example, on one occasion he was with his partner dropping her son to school and he needed to go to the toilet. This meant he had to stop on what had been an authorised travel route. By the strict terms of the conditions, this required him to get permission. This involved him having to take photos of where he was and send them to his supervising officer. The whole process took about 10 minutes. He now takes a large bottle with him to urinate in.

44. On another occasion, his partner’s dog ran from the house. Because he was not scheduled to leave the house, he could not chase the dog and had to call a neighbour to retrieve it.

45. The defendant has not been able to have any contact with his brother, Jeremy Liddington. That is because his brother holds similar extremist views to the defendant and contact with such persons was prohibited by the conditions of the ISO.

46. I mention these events to indicate that the defendant has, in so far as the evidence discloses, done everything he can to ensure he has complied with the stringent conditions of the ISO. There is no reason to think that if an ESO was made, he would fail to comply with any conditions imposed.

47. The defendant gave evidence on this application and was cross-examined. He appeared to be making a genuine effort to answer all the questions asked of him, including some questions going to private and sensitive matters. I formed the impression that, whilst not a sophisticated man, he was passionate about his beliefs. He maintains certain beliefs which, objectively viewed, are racist and offensive. He was quite open and forthright about those views and beliefs. Whilst his frankness was to his credit, the nature of some of those views and beliefs and his maintenance of them is concerning and relevant to the assessment of whether he poses the relevant risk.

48. As the plaintiff accepts in its closing written submissions following the hearing, the defendant was forthright and made appropriate concessions against his own interests. The plaintiff accepts this is to the defendant’s credit. However, the plaintiff also submitted that the defendant engaged in a significant degree of impression management and gave evidence which on some occasions was implausible. I agree with this submission.

49. The plaintiff does not submit that the defendant gave deliberately false evidence, however, it submits it was possible this was the case, and this possibility is relevant to the Court assessing the risk posed by him. I find this submission difficult to accept. I do think that on some occasions he was downplaying the activities of certain groups he had been associated with, for example by referring to his time spent with other members of Firm 22 where they “just got together and had BBQ’s”. [4] I do not consider; however, that he was deliberately giving false evidence. I consider in some instances he made statements which he then backtracked from when challenged in cross-examination. [5] However, I formed the view that those misstatements or corrections were, overall, acceptances by him of errors he had made, or corrections to things he did not remember due to the effluxion of time. For example, when responding to a suggestion that it would not be good for his case if he was a leader of the Lads Society and nurtured young men, he said: “Look, if I could remember correctly, I’d-I’d tell you straight out. I’m not going to hide nothing. I just don’t really recall that. I went to a few barbecues there, organised a couple”. [6]

    4. T 98.12-22

    5. see for example the evidence referred to in [13] of PFS regarding the Valknut tattoo

    6. T 83.9

50. I do not consider that the mere possibility that he was giving false evidence can weigh in any material way on the assessment of the risk he poses. I may be wrong on my assessment of him having seen him give evidence, but I act upon my assessment of him as a witness as part of the overall determination as to whether he poses the relevant risk. To act as the plaintiff suggests and discount my assessment of his credibility on the possibility I am wrong in that assessment, means the assessment may as well not be made at all.

51. I did not form the view that the defendant was seeking to minimise or sanitise his beliefs. He unapologetically maintains his belief with respect to race issues. He said that he has, over time, formed the view that violence is not a legitimate or useful method of achieving political change. [7]

    7. T121.9-12

52. Overall, I formed the view that whilst he did engage in some impression management, he did his best to give truthful answers to the questions asked of him. I will return to aspects of the defendant’s evidence as is relevant when dealing with the mandatory considerations under s 25(3) of the THRO Act, including his associations with persons and groups, both past and prospective.

Ms Fowler

53. The defendant’s partner, Ms Fowler, also gave evidence on the application. The plaintiff maintains that she at times acted as a conduit for communications between the defendant and known extremist associates whilst he was in custody and she is therefore a negative impact on the risk of the defendant committing a serious terrorism offence.

54. The plaintiff ultimately accepted, however, on balance that the relationship between the defendant and Ms Fowler is more positive than negative and its impact on the defendant can be seen as reducing his risk of re-offending. [8] I accept the existence of the relationship not only reduces the risk of general re-offending but also reduces the risk of him committing a serious terrorism offence. The defendant said he does not want to associate with a group that promotes violent extremism because he would be kicked out of the house by Ms Fowler and he doesn’t want to lose his family. In his words: “Life’s good. I don’t want to fuck that up”. [9]

    8. PFS at [20]

    9. T 122.34-41

55. I found that there were parts of Ms Fowler’s evidence which were difficult to accept. I have reservations with respect to her evidence about communications, or attempted communications, with Thomas Sewell. I do not accept that she attempted to contact him by text for the purposes of obtaining legal advice from him. [10] Her evidence in this regard was contrary to other objective evidence which indicated that she was trying to contact Mr Sewell on the defendant’s behalf as the defendant was a National Security Interest Inmate (“NSI”). [11]

    10. T133.31-45

    11. T11 0.19-38

56. I also do not accept her evidence about the frequency of arguments between her and the defendant. Her evidence that there has not been a lot of conflict in their relationship [12] is contrary to the defendant’s evidence that they have arguments all the time, cool off and come back to speak to each other. [13]

    12. T 141.7-19

    13. T 123.49- 123.4

57. The plaintiff does not submit that I should find that Ms Fowler gave deliberately false evidence, rather that the inconsistency between that evidence and the other objective material means I should treat her evidence generally with more caution. I accept this submission. I felt she was at times giving evidence she thought would assist the defendant and was cautious in accepting things that she thought might harm his case.

58. Overall, I consider the relationship between the defendant and Ms Fowler is a strong one. I accept the evidence of each of the defendant and Ms Fowler that he has become an important part of the family, including building a relationship with her children. I consider it to be a protective factor in the sense I have identified.

59. The plaintiff also submits that there is a possibility that the relationship will end. It submits if this occurs the risk of the defendant falling back into association with extremist individuals or organisations, and thus the risk of him committing a serious terrorism offence, will increase. The plaintiff says the possibility of the relationship ending is a relevant matter to consider in the forward-looking risk assessment the Court is engaged in. I accept that submission. The relationship with Ms Fowler and her children, and the defendant’s fear of losing that, is the strongest protective factor mitigating the risk of him re-offending.

Mandatory Statutory Considerations

Reports received from Experts appointed to examine the offender and the level of the offender’s participation in the examinations: s 25(3)(a)

Report to Dr Katie Seidler dated 12 March 2025

60. Dr Seidler, a Clinical and Forensic Psychiatrist, was requested to examine the defendant to provide a report for this Court. In making her recommendations, Dr Seidler relied on an online examination via Coviu [14] and a three-and-a-half-hour phone call on 24 February 2025 and independently completed psychometric testing by Mr Liddington. The semi-structured interview, psychometric testing, a review of documentation made available to her and an assessment of risk form the basis of Dr Seidler’s psychological risk assessment report.

    14. a secure and encrypted application that is designed for use by mental health professionals

61. By way of background, Dr Seidler noted that the defendant had "a difficult start in life", followed by a lengthy history of undiagnosed anxiety and other mental health difficulties, in which context he abused alcohol as a form of ‘self-medication'.

62. During the interview, the defendant reported that he was first exposed to the white power movement and extreme right-wing thinking when he was incarcerated in Western Australia. At that time, the defendant was already "familiar'' with the ideology, and had some support for it based on "distorted beliefs about Aboriginal people" he had formed during his upbringing. Dr Seidler noted that the defendant's support for the ideology had continued throughout his adulthood as he "found a sense of belonging, acceptance and camaraderie that had been absent in his life before this…but it does not appear that the politics of such organisations was ever a strong driver for Mr Liddington".

Diagnosis

63. Dr Seidler considered that the defendant would meet the criteria for a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) with associated anxiety. This had developed in response to the defendant’s traumas in his childhood and whilst incarcerated in Western Australia.

64. Dr Seidler also noted that the defendant had a long history of Alcohol Abuse Disorder, which has impaired the defendant’s functioning and contributed to the majority of the defendant’s offending behaviour. Dr Seidler considered the condition was currently in remission, but there remained a risk of relapse, particularly if the defendant was not subject to some external control.

65. Dr Seidler noted that the defendant reported a single episode of Major Depression in the past, however this did not appear to be a current concern. It was also noted that the defendant presented with notable traits of Antisocial Personality Disorder, though Dr Seidler opined that she could not confidently diagnose that condition.

Risk Assessment

66. Dr Seidler administered several clinical and offence specific assessment tools, noting that they are imperfect tools and should not be relied on solely in considering an individual’s risk.

67. The Violence Risk Scale, Version 2 (“VRS-2”) was used to assess the defendant’s risk of future violent offending. His results placed him in the ‘moderate range’, with 12.9% of similar scoring offenders in Canada being convicted for a further violence offence within 3 years, and 23.2% being convicted of a further violence offence within 5 years. The defendant's most salient identified risk domains were Criminal Peers, Emotional Control, Substance-Related Problems, Violence Cycle, and impulsivity.

66. The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment – Version 2 (“VERA-2R”) was administered for the purposes of conducting a meaningful analysis of an individual’s possible risk in conjunction with other information about the defendant’s history and functioning and the various ways in which any identified risk could be managed or intervened in. Dr Seidler warned that the VERA-2R cannot and should not be used for the purposes of a definitive risk prediction.

67. The indicators of VERA-2R fall into 5 domains:

1. Beliefs, Attitudes and Ideology;

2. Social Context and Intention;

3. History, Action and Capacity;

4. Commitment and Motivation; and

5. Risk Mitigating Indicators.

70. Dr Seidler noted that with respect to his beliefs, attitudes and ideology the defendant became aligned with extreme right-wing ideology early in adulthood, which provided a direction for his strong sense of resentment, grievance and anger in relation to the manner in which he had been treated by others. Dr Seidler commented that during his younger years, he identified strongly with an ideology that justified violence, ostracised and dehumanised others. Whilst Dr Seidler noted that there had been a softening in such views for the defendant in recent years, which was seemingly a function of incarceration, maturity, life experience and exposure to psychological therapy, there remained risk due to the defendant's unresolved personal grievances, him being easily triggered to anger and resentment, and his continuation to promote and prioritise the interests of White Anglo­ Australians.

71. Risk was also identified with respect of the defendant’s “Social Context and Intention Factors”, including that he had previously accessed, sought and consumed material promoting extreme right-wing ideology; sought contact with others sharing extreme right-wing ideology; and had formal connections with groups and organisations with extremist ideology. The defendant also expressed a desire to reconnect with his ideological peers going forward, though he had some insight into potential negative influences. It was noted that there was no evidence that the defendant had ever been involved in any planning or preparation for an act of violent extremism or that he had ever identified a specific target for such an action.

72. As to risk indicators based on the defendant’s “History, Action and Capacity”, Dr Seidler noted that the defendant had been exposed to extreme right-wing ideology and teachings (online and literature); had an extensive network of peer connections with others supporting extreme right-wing ideology and potentially also violent extremism; and was a leader within the subculture (formal and informal). It was also noted that the defendant had the "social and intellectual resources to participate in, encourage, direct or incite an act of violent extremism". The “Commitment and Motivation Factors” which were identified as being relevant for the defendant included that he was motivated by camaraderie, group belonging and acquisition of status.

73. Dr Seidler identified an improvement in “Protective Factors” due to self-reported distancing from extreme-right wing ideology, his engagement in psychological treatment, rejection of political violence and the support of his partner, Ms Fowler. It was noted however that the defendant was yet to develop a repertoire of strategies for dealing with challenges without violence and that his partner did not set limits on his expressions of problematic beliefs on gaol phone calls, although, on Dr Seidler's understanding, Ms Fowler did not condone violence. Dr Seidler said that the protective factors were not considered sufficient to mitigate the defendant’s “evident risks”.

74. The Structured Assessment of Protective Factors for Violence Risk (“SAPROF”) was administered for the purpose of evaluating personal and environmental factors which reduce the risk of future violent behaviour. The assessment identified that the defendant received maximum protection benefit from “the presence of strong external controls on the basis of the various orders he is subject to”. Although other protective benefits were identified, they were “not strong or well developed at the present time”.

75. The Terrorist Radicalisation Assessment Protocol- 18 (“TRAP-18”) was administered to assess the defendant’s risk of lone-actor violent extremism. It is not an actuarial measure and is not designed to be “scored” or interpreted in reference to norms. The defendant’s profile revealed he did not present with any proximal warning indicators, with the exception of partial evidence presented for a “desire to identify with a warrior mentality or extremist group as an agent for change”. There were also a number of distal indicators historically present in the defendant including personal grievance/moral outrage, adherence to an extremist and violent ideology, rigid patterns of thinking and past criminal violence.

Risk of Serious Terrorism offence

76. Dr Seidler concluded that the defendant presented with a “number of risks relating to future acts of violent extremism”. Dr Seidler acknowledged that although the risks were “not significant in number or extent if acted upon they may result in a serious terrorism offence”.

77. In making this determination, Dr Seidler considered that:

1. The defendant has a history of expressive and instrumental violence, as well as generalised antisocial conduct.

2. The defendant has a long-term alignment with extreme right-wing ideology and with groups and peers that support such an ideology, including the use of violence as an agent to effect sociopolitical change.

3. The defendant continues to desire an association with others who support an extreme right-wing ideology, although he had expressed a desire to reconnect with old friends who have prosocial interests and goals rather than those who support or advocate for violence.

4. The defendant has a long history of poor mental health which has contributed to his anger and aggression, and sense of resentment and grievance. It has also reinforced the defendant’s enmeshed peer connections, his exaggerated displays of masculinity and violence and contributed to his emotional reactivity and self-medicative alcohol abuse.

5. The defendant has never engaged in an act of terrorist violence, nor has he ever threatened the same or engaged in any behaviour that would indicate he is planning, assisting to organise, or inciting others to engage in an act of violent extremism.

6. The defendant appears to have resiled from some of his more extreme forms of right-wing ideology. Within this context, he has softened in his attitude and has reportedly demonstrated greater capacity for self-control, a greater openness to others and a re-evaluation of his goals, relationships and priorities.

7. The defendant has developing protective factors to mitigate his risk, however these factors are not yet well established, nor have they been sustained over time.

Risk Scenarios

78. Dr Seidler considered that it was not possible to quantify or qualitatively describe the likelihood of the defendant committing a serious terrorism offence. Dr Seidler opined the risk of the defendant committing such an act could include the following behaviours:

1. Inciting others to engage in a terrorist act;

2. Possessing material connected with a terrorist act;

3. Doing acts in preparation of a terrorist act; and

4. Being involved in, recruiting for, leading or supporting a terrorist organisation/group.

79. Dr Seidler considered that it was possible, though perhaps less likely that the defendant would be engaged in committing a terrorist act himself. Rather, the defendant’s risk related more to group-based violence.

80. Dr Seidler opined that, if the defendant’s risk were to manifest, it is likely that this risk scenario would occur in the context of the defendant’s peer associations, who support an extremist ideology and engaging in violent extremism, accompanied by a deterioration in the defendant’s functioning. This may include “a breakdown of his intimate partnership, a disengagement from support or rehabilitation services, a deterioration in his mental health and an increase in his alcohol abuse”.

81. Dr Seidler also noted that the most likely risk of the defendant committing a serious terrorism offence related to him being involved in a terrorist group or organisation. Whilst Dr Seidler noted that the defendant had never been involved in such a group before, the defendant had affiliations and connections with groups that support such ideology and may “reasonably progress to being identified as a proscribed group”.

Recommendations

82. Dr Seidler considered that an ESO of a 12-month duration would be appropriate. She noted that this duration would provide sufficient time for the defendant to “demonstrate and sustain the change process that has already begun and to engage in behaviour that alleviates concern about risk and provides some confident in relation to his capacity to mitigate risk”.

83. Dr Seidler opined that should an ESO be made, the conditions imposed on the defendant’s ISO were “in large part… appropriate and relevant for reducing risk, at least externally”.

84. Dr Seidler considered that if an ESO was to adversely impact Mr Liddington’s ability for prosocial and productive reintegration into the community or opportunities for important relationship and skills development, she would consider the ESO to be “antithetical to the intended purpose and possibly counter-therapeutic in relation to the management of risk”.

85. Dr Seidler was of the view that the defendant would benefit from ongoing psychological intervention. In particular, Dr Seidler opined that ongoing interventions should focus on challenging and critiquing the defendant’s thinking, developing his consequential reasoning skills and prosocial personal values, improving his communication and relationship skills, reinforcing appropriate self-affect and behaviour management skills, and addressing a history of alcohol abuse.

86. Dr Seidler noted that, whilst the defendant had expressed a willingness to comply with any conditions imposed, he did not consider that there was a need for such management and expressed that he would likely become resentful if the conditions limited his ability to reintegrate into the community. However, Dr Seidler noted that “the conditions of the ISO, do not, in and of themselves, create unnecessary restrictions and limitations and there is scope within the conditions for [the defendant] to participate in the community”.

87. Dr Seidler expressed opinions on the conditions of the ISO. Obviously, this was on the basis that these, or analogous, conditions would be imposed if an ESO was ordered.

Oral evidence of Dr Seidler

88. Dr Seidler gave evidence at the hearing and was cross-examined. She was an impressive witness. She was asked about categorising as “low, moderate or high” the risk of an offender committing a serious offence. She said:

… We’ve in this field have moved away from categorising risk from low, moderate and high, it really is very difficult to define. And how if we think, for example, a high-risk sex offender compared to a high open risk violent offender compared to a high-risk violent extremist offender, the likelihood of those aches occurring are quite different statistically. So I think when the general convention now is that using terms like that can be quite misleading and confusing.… My personal opinion these days is that it’s better to conceptualise what the risks are, how significant those risks are and what that risk might manifest in. So I’m not comfortable saying low, moderate, high. What I am comfortable saying is that there are some risks evidence (sic.) in this case. I don’t think any of those risks are particularly strong, but they’re there.(emphasis added). [15]

15. T 150. 10-27

89. The cross-examination focused significantly on differences of the supervision of the defendant under an ESO as opposed to an Intensive Corrections Order (“ICO”) and the effectiveness of the respective supervision regimes on the mitigation of risk. I deal with this issue below.

Report by Dr Chelsey Dewson dated 14 March 2025

90. On 21 February 2025 and 6 March 2025. Dr Chelsey Dewson, forensic psychologist, interviewed the defendant for the purposes of preparing a psychological assessment report. On 14 March 2025, Dr Dewson furnished the completed psychological assessment report.

91. In her report, Dr Dewson outlined the defendant's psychosocial history, noting that he had "experienced a turbulent childhood, likely impacting his developmental course and sense of self''. Dr Dewson referred to the defendant's history of alcohol abuse, including the defendant's admissions during their interview as to the link between his alcohol consumption and his poor (violent and criminal) behaviour. Although the defendant expressed a hope to establish a pattern of "social drinking" in the future, it was unclear to Dr Dewson how the defendant would moderate his intake and regulate his behavior (particularly aggression) when drinking.

92. The defendant reported that since being incarcerated he had "cut off" a number of his friendships but had maintained connections with those who had supported his and his partner over the past few years. The defendant denied being motivated to associate with people from “White Power groups", however Dr Dewson noted that he appeared to be "willing to facilitate relationships with people who were formerly in said groups, should he determine them compatible with his prosocial life goals".

93. With respect to the defendant's relationship with Ms Jenaya Fowler, Dr Dewson noted that "Ms Fowler could be classified as both a protective and risk factor for [the defendant]". In this regard, Dr Dewson noted that Ms Fowler had previously sent the defendant a photograph of a young person doing the Seig Heil and had taken a photograph of a group of men, including the defendant, holding a "Vinland" flag. Ms Fowler also appeared to have acted as a conduit between the defendant and third parties whilst he was in custody and had at times, verbalised potentially unhelpful beliefs. Dr Dewson noted that despite this "Mr Liddington appears committed to this relationship, is motivated to stay out of gaol [sic] to facilitate this relationship and Ms Fowler has no criminal history”.

Diagnosis

94. During the interview, the defendant reported that he had been diagnosed with anxiety in around 2016 and was managing this through lifestyle changes and the implementation of coping strategies.

95. The defendant also reported that he was diagnosed with PTSD in around 2010 relating to the traumas he experienced during his period of incarceration in Western Australia, as well as his childhood experiences. The defendant denied notable symptoms indicative of his disorder, suggesting that it had largely resolved, however the result of assessment using the PTSD Checklist-Specific reflected experiences of intrusive symptoms, avoidance of stimuli, negative alterations in cognitions/mood and alterations in arousal/reactivity. Dr Dewson did not consider that the defendant's symptoms at the time of her assessment warranted a current clinical diagnosis of PTSD.

Risk Assessment

96. As part of the assessment process, Dr Dewson administered several clinical and offence specific assessment tools. Dr Dewson noted the limitations of the risk assessment tools applied, particularly in relation to the prediction of violent extremism.

97. The Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (“LS/CMI”) was administered for the purpose of assessing salient risk factors, as well as treatment and service delivery considerations. The defendant's overall risk of general offending was assessed as falling within the High-risk range, with factors relevant to the defendant's risk including his criminal history, past barriers to education, experience of family problems, associations with unhelpful and antisocial peers, and history of alcohol abuse. Dr Dewson noted that the defendant scored on items relating to him being unemployed. Dr Dewson found that this high risk was likely to reduce to a medium risk upon him demonstrating positive vocational performance and healthy interactions with peers and people in authority.

98. The VRS-2 was used to assess the defendant's actuarial risk of violence. Dr Dewson noted that the VRS was not designed to specifically assess the risk relating to violent extremism and may not identify factors empirically linked to terrorism-related behaviour. The static factors relevant to the defendant's risk included his age, criminal history, use of violence throughout his life, prior supervision failures, and instability during childhood. The dynamic factors relevant to the defendant's risk included his history of violence (including group-based violence), history of antisocial activity (general and non-violent offending), criminal attitudes, associations with unhelpful peers, past aggressiveness and intimidation in interpersonal interactions, and use of weapons.

99. Dr Dewson noted that the defendant has gained insight into his violence and has been compliant with rules in custody, having shown the capacity for self-regulation and obedience in this context, and has thus far been compliant on the ISO. Dr Dewson also noted that despite this, the defendant had at times used cognitive distortions to justify violence and had a history of community supervision violations and some negativity towards people in authority.

100. The defendant's risk assessment results placed him in the Level Ill Average Risk range. At this level of risk, Dr Dewson noted that the defendant's 5-year violent recidivism rate was about 24.6%, with 75% of the defendant's cohort not violently reoffending over a 5-year period in the community.

101. The VERA-2R was administered to enable the charting of risk pathways relating to the defendant. The VERA-2R is not a predictive actuarial tool.

102. Dr Dewson identified risk factors empirically linked to violent extremism, including the defendant's history of using intimidation, threats of violence and actual violence; grievances towards minority groups, police and the Australian government; maintenance of right-wing political views; history of criminal violence; and likely access to the funding and support necessary to participate in extremist violence.

103. Dr Dewson noted that whilst the defendant reported that he now rejected violence as a social change tool, the evidence in the OTS call logs challenged these claims and suggested that he justified violence toward some groups. The defendant also denied any motivation to engage in violent extremism despite maintaining "right-wing" political views associated with "White Power". Dr Dewson opined that the defendant did not appear susceptible to influence, but "could be motivated by peers to advance a cause in the context of group affiliation". In this regard, the defendant expressed motivation to maintain relationships with some other extremists in the future, "albeit in the context of him stating that they no longer hold radicalised beliefs".

104. Dr Dewson considered that the defendant also presented with several protective factors, including self-reported moderation in values; perceived rejection of violence; taking greater responsibility for his actions; alterations in his concept of the "enemy''; and engagement with PRAXIS. Dr Dewson noted that whilst the defendant had reportedly shifted in terms of his belief system and indicated a motivation to detach himself from violent extremists, there was contrary evidence in the OTS call logs. Dr Dewson also stated that, in the context of the defendant's comments that his family and friends supported him living a lawful life, their past inability to steer him away from offending as well as the evidence suggesting that some such people themselves held problematic attitudes meant these people were likely neutral (rather than protective or risk) factors.

96. The TRAP-18 was administered to assess the defendant's risk of individual violent acts inspired by some group, movement or ideology. The TRAP-18 is not an actuarial instrument designed to specifically predict acts of lone-actor terrorism. The defendant did not present with any proximal warning behaviours, however there were distal characteristics, including personal grievance, ideology, and a history of criminal violence. Dr Dewson concluded that whilst there were some risk factors relating to lone-actor terrorism, no imminent threats were identified.

Risk of Committing a Serious Terrorism Offence

106. Dr Dewson concluded, on the basis of her assessment, that the defendant "continue[d] to hold extreme political views associated with 'White Pride"' and was "motivated to associate with people who hold similar views to his own and/or who have been (or remain) affiliated with ideological groups". Dr Dewson stated there also remained evidence that the defendant "holds grievances towards certain subsets of community members, for example, those who aren't nationalistic (and likely others)".

107. Noting the pitfalls of reducing an individual's risk to a single risk label, Dr Dewson assessed that the defendant's risk of committing a terrorist offence sat in the moderate to high range. Dr Dewson noted that the defendant was currently subject to an order, in the context of which the defendant is emotionally stable, having a solid romantic relationship, is abstinent from alcohol and is without direct contact with extremists. In this context, his risk of committing a terrorist offence is towards the lower end of the identified risk spectrum.

108. However, Dr Dewson raised concerns that, in the absence of an order, the risk would be towards the higher end of the identified spectrum in circumstances where the defendant "will reconnect with unhelpful associations, as is his expressed intent (such as with his brother and a subset of old friends). Further, once the demands of everyday life return (such as work and step-parenting responsibilities etc.), he may have difficulty managing adversity and return to avoidance-based coping (i.e., alcohol abuse). In this emotional state, his general life negativity could emerge and manifest in grievances towards others".

109. Dr Dewson noted that specific risk factors associated with the defendant's terrorism offending included "grievances towards minority groups, extreme political and social ideology, unhelpful attitudes towards violence, cognitive distortions (which likely allow him to justify his actions and overcome any moral objection to such), alcohol abuse, emotional dysregulation, unhelpful peer associations, unstable/misguided sense of identity and selected empathy deficits".

Risk Scenarios

110. Dr Dewson considered that a future terrorism offence committed by the defendant would likely be similar to the index offence. Namely, the offence would be in circumstances where the defendant was associated with an organisation that shared his ideology and encouraged (or at least tolerated) his violent behaviour. Dr Dewson noted that, in this scenario, the offence would likely occur against a person (or small number of people) from an identified group, such as a racial minority. The defendant would either act alone or with a group to intimidate or inflict violence on the victim, though this was unlikely to include a weapon. The defendant was also likely to be intoxicated and/or experiencing interpersonal conflict (such as in his romantic relationship).

111. Dr Dewson considered that a more serious, but less likely, scenario would be a similar scenario which could involve a weapon or be directed towards a larger group of potential victims.

112. Dr Dewson noted that alternative scenarios could include the defendant finding himself involved in antisemitic activity in the community or in an attack on law enforcement. Dr Dewson also suggested that other scenarios could involve the defendant joining a terrorist organisation, where he could be promoted to leadership positions and/or be involved in recruiting others to join the organisation, or obtain funds for the organisation. Dr Dewson considered that it was unlikely that the defendant would personally orchestrate or carry out a sophisticated terrorist attack.

113. Dr Dewson stated that there was a possibility the defendant would not re-offend.

114. In that scenario, the defendant would instead find employment, remain socially connected with helpful associations, manage his mental health, regulate his impulses, moderate his alcohol intake and challenge conditions relating to his ideology. Whilst he was assessed as being unlikely to renounce his White Power views, Dr Dewson noted it was possible that he could regulate his behavior in this context and denounce violence.

115. Dr Dewson noted that "[w]hilst it's not possible to predict future violence, hypothetical scenarios developed in this case suggest that there is a possibility that recidivistic behaviour ... could meet the threshold for a serious terrorism offence".

Recommendations

116. Dr Dewson opined that an ESO could assist the defendant to live a lawful lifestyle, by encouraging skill development whilst containing risk factors and protecting the community. Dr Dewson considered that any ESO imposed would need to be adequately flexible and reactive to positive changes on the defendant's behalf.

117. In Dr Dewson's view, the proposed conditions also appeared appropriate. However, Dr Dewson considered that the restrictive nature of the conditions ought to be reduced in response to positive engagement to assist the defendant with integration and maximize scope for skill development. 81 In this regard, Dr Dewson noted that the proposed conditions, in the absence of flexibility, would "inevitably impact [the defendant's] ability to reintegrate into the community and likely heighten his grievances towards the Police".

118. Dr Dewson noted that, if the defendant were compliant and continued to demonstrate compliance and stability in the community, an order of less than three years could be sufficient.

Oral evidence of Dr Dewson

119. Dr Dewson also gave evidence by audio-visual link. She was cross-examined. She too impressed as a witness.

120. She accepted that significant risk factors in this case are the defendant’s history of extreme right-wing ideology and his associations with people who share or have more extreme versions of right-wing ideology. A further significant risk factor in this case for the defendant is consumption of alcohol. She accepted that if alcohol is involved the risk of the defendant committing some sort of violent offence is much higher than his risk of committing a terrorism offence.

121. Dr Dewson accepted that there were protective factors present in this case including, that the defendant now has a family relationship with a partner and children, which, to some extent, satisfies a longing that he has experienced because of his childhood experiences. This is a protective factor in the sense that the defendant feels he now has a real family and does not need to seek any family substituted by way of associating with other men of a like mind. She accepted that the defendant’s decision to move to a normal environment in a new area which is geographically distant from his previous associates is also a protective factor.

122. With respect to her conclusion that the risk of the defendant committing a terrorist offence is “moderate to high”, she accepted that this was not a statistical based label. That is because there is no actuarial based tool able to be used with violent extremism, so the label was based on her professional judgement. She accepts that reducing a risk formulation down to a single label can be quite dangerous because it does not effectively communicate the complexity of an individual’s risk. She accepted that in this case there was a low risk of an imminent violent offence being committed by the defendant. She also said that there was a low risk of him being involved in a large-scale or sophisticated attack motivated by violent extremism. However, the view was that there is a possibility that recidivistic behaviour could meet the threshold for a “serious terrorism offence”.

123. In response to a question as to whether there was a low likelihood of something actually happening but there being a risk she said:

No, I’m saying that when we look at risk, there’s multiple parts of the risk. There is the likelihood of it happening, and we’ve got the consequences of it, the immediacy of it, the escalation, those types of factors that come in with risk. I’m saying that I don’t believe that right now, at this point, Mr Liddington is-has an imminent-imminent threat of committing a terrorism offence at this point, imminently, but I’m saying that in certain contexts-contexts, if he wasn’t to have some potential safeguards in place, that that risk could eventuate. [16] (emphasis added).

16. T17 5.39-46

124. The focus of the balance of the cross-examination of Dr Dewson was with respect to the differences between supervision under an ESO and ICO. I deal with that issue below.

The Results of any other assessment as to the likelihood of the defendant committing a serious terrorism offence: s 25(3)(b)

125. On 26 July 2024 Ms Katrina Czerkies interviewed the defendant for the purposes of preparing a risk assessment report (“RAR”). I referred to the contents of this report in detail from [73]-[100] of the preliminary reasons.

126. The RAR was based upon certain clinical and offence specific assessment tools administered by Ms Czerkies. I will not repeat the summaries of those assessments that I have included in the preliminary reasons. Based upon those matters and her assessment of the defendant, Ms Czerkies assess the defendant as being an “moderate to high” risk of “violent extremism, politically noted violence or terrorism”.

127. Ms Czerkies referred to several risk scenarios she considered present for the defendant, one of which was a repeat of the index offence most likely to occur within a group-based context and involve verbal aggression and physical violence that is perpetrated against an individual (or group) that is perceived to have brought about or perpetuated physical or reputational harm to an individual of the group or the group itself. Other alternative risk scenarios included the defendant becoming a member of a terrorist organisation, facilitating an act of ideologically motivated violence perpetrated by another member or members of an extremist right-wing group, or engaging in an act of targeted grievance fuelled violence that is perceived to be ideologically motivated which would most likely occur as a lone actor event in the context of interpersonal conflict.

128. In addition to the RAR, a Countering Violent Extremism (“CVE”) assessment was conducted on the defendant by Ms Maggie Cruickshank. I dealt with the CVE at [101]-[124] of the preliminary reasons.

129. In summary, Mr Cruickshank believed that at the time of the interview with her, the defendant was involved in positive impression management and minimisation. At the same time, she was also of the view that there were aspects of the defendant’s self-reporting in which he demonstrated insight and presented as being motivated to address.

130. Ms Cruickshank dealt with the defendant’s history of support of violent extremism, politically motivated violence and conducted a criminal and offence specific risk assessment using a number of risk assessment tools. The results of those tools are detailed in the preliminary reasons. The defendant was within the “medium” range for general offending and violence on the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (“LSI-R”), although Ms Cruickshank noted this tool was not a validated tool to measure risk specific to the context of violent extremism, politically motivated violence or terrorism and should not be used for that purpose.

131. Ms Cruickshank observed specific areas of dynamic risk for the defendant and was of the view that there was limited evidence of sufficient community supports in place for the defendant to mitigate his primary risk factors. She observed that Ms Fowler appeared to provide some emotional and practical support, however, there were some aspects of their relationship which may elevate the defendant’s risk if unmanaged.

132. Ms Cruickshank made certain recommendations which I’ve listed at [123] of the preliminary reasons.

133. Whilst the plaintiff maintains reliance upon the reports of Ms Czerkies and Ms Cruickshank, some time has passed from the date of those reports and, to an extent, they have been superseded by reports of Dr Seidler and Dr Dewson.

Options if the defendant is in the community (whether or not under supervision) that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending over time: s 25(3)(g)

134. As noted above, the defendant is currently subject to two ICO’s and a CCO. The ICOs expire on 30 May 2025 and 29 November 2026, respectively.

135. The defendant submitted that any risk that the defendant posed of re-offending, or committing a serious terrorism offence, is mitigated by the ICO and directions that can be given to the defendant by the supervising officer from Community Corrections.

136. An ICO is a sentence of imprisonment to be served in the community subject to the conditions imposed by the sentencing court. Community safety must be the paramount consideration when a sentencing court is deciding whether to make an ICO. Further, when considering community safety, the sentencing court is to assess whether the making of an ICO or serving the sentence by way of full-time detention is more likely to address the offender’s risk of reoffending: s 66 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“CSPA”).

137. An ICO must not be made in respect of a sentence of imprisonment for certain offences, including a terrorism offence within the meaning of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth): s 67 CSPA. An ICO must be subject to the standard conditions. They are that the offender must not commit any offence and must submit to the supervision of a community corrections officer: s 72-73 CSPA. At least one additional condition must be made at the time of sentence, and others can be made: s 73A CSPA.

138. Conditions may also be imposed, varied or revoked by the Parole Authority under the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) (“CASA”). This is done on the application of a Community Corrections officer or the offender. The Parole Authority cannot vary or revoke a standard condition, or impose a condition, or revoke a condition unless the sentencing court could have imposed or revoked that condition: s 81A CASA.

139. The conditions of the defendant’s ICO which expires on 30 May 2025 are the standard conditions, together with the following additional conditions:

1. to participate in any program, treatment, intervention or related activity specified in the order or by a Community Corrections officer for the period of the ICO; and

2. to participate in a rehabilitation program which the offender is directed to attend by the community corrections officer.

140. The conditions of the defendant’s ICO which expires on 29 November 2026 are the standard conditions, together with the following additional conditions:

1. to participate in any program, treatment, intervention or related activity specified in the order or by a community corrections officer for the period of the intensive corrections order-rehabilitation; and

2. comply with any community corrections directions for anger management therapy.

141. When sentenced to an ICO, the offender must comply with the following prescribed obligations:

You must comply with all reasonable directions from a Community Corrections Officer about:

a) the place where you will live

b) participating in programs, treatment, interventions or other related activities

c) participating in employment, education, training or other related activities

d) not undertaking specific employment, education, training, volunteer, leisure or other activities

e) not associating with specified people

f) not visiting or frequenting specified places or areas

g) ceasing drug use

h) ceasing or reducing alcohol use

i) drug and alcohol testing

j) monitoring your compliance with the order

k) giving consent to third parties to provide information to that officer that is relevant to your compliance with the order.

You must comply with any other reasonable directions from a Community Corrections Officer.

You must permit a Community Corrections Officer to visit you at the place where you live at any time and permit the officer to enter the premises when they visit you.

You must notify a Community Corrections Officer if you change your address, contact details or employment. You must do this before the change occurs if practicable, or within 7 days of the change occurring.

You must not leave New South Wales without permission from a community corrections manager.

You must not leave Australia without permission from the State Parole Authority.

142. In the present case, unless and until a direction of the type in [141] is given to the defendant by a Community Corrections Officer about any of the above-mentioned obligations, the only conditions to which he is subject under the ICO’s are those stated in [139] and [140].

143. I will deal with the respective submissions on whether the ICOs mitigate any risk posed by the defendant when I consider whether he poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.

The defendant’s criminal history: s 25(30(j)

144. In the preliminary reasons (at [35]-[58]) I also extensively dealt with the defendant’s criminal history in Western Australia and New South Wales. I do not intend to repeat that material here. I have noted that he is currently subject to two ICO’s, the last of which expires on 29 November 2026.

145. I am conscious that the THRO Act is not designed to prevent the commission of any offences, rather it is focused on protecting the community from the commission of serious terrorism offences: see State of NSW v Alam [2020] NSWSC 295 at [188]. The focus must be on whether the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing an offence of that kind.

The views of the sentencing judge for the index offence: s 25(3)(k)

146. In terms of the index offending, at [52]-[58] of the preliminary reasons I set out the circumstances of the index offending. There is no doubt that offending involved a callous and violent attack on the premises of Mr Gibson. It was at a time when the defendant and his co-offenders were members of the white supremacist group Firm 22. The magistrate found that the defendant demonstrated no insight in relation to the “close connection between his personal beliefs, leadership of a white extremist group and the associated offending”. He found that the defendant and his co-offenders had an understanding, arrangement and agreement that they would commit these crimes against Mr Gibson based upon their white extremist right-wing beliefs and their ideological hatred of the political and cultural views of Mr Gibson. The magistrate found beyond reasonable doubt that the offences were “motivated by hatred for, or prejudice against, a group of people to which he believed Mr Gibson belonged”.

147. Despite these findings, in my opinion it could not be found beyond reasonable doubt that the offending was done with the intention of advancing a political or ideological cause and intimidating a section of the public. The defendant had maintained that he was motivated by a perceived personal grievance against Mr Gibson and his intention was to seek information from him. I do not consider that it could be found beyond reasonable doubt that the circumstances of the offending constituted a “serious terrorism offence” within the meaning of the definition set out above.

148. The plaintiff submits that it is possible that the defendant did have the requisite intention. It submits that this possibility is relevant to the risk to be assessed. I will return to this question.

245. Dr Dewson said that scheduling did not completely mitigate risk but ensures the authorities have an idea of where the person is and assists them in ensuring the person is engaging in prosocial activities. [47]

     47. T181 .29-41

246. In its final submissions, the plaintiff accepted that “dry scheduling” as opposed to strict scheduling would be appropriate in this case. Dry scheduling does not require specification of the exact time and day of the activity, including departure and return times and the exact proposed route of travel to be taken. I consider that the conditions proposed by the defendant at the hearing on 4 April 2025 with respect to dry scheduling is appropriate. Of the conditions of the ESO. I have referred above to the example of the defendant wishing to use the toilet and having to seek approval to divert from his approved route. Dry scheduling effectively requires the defendant to provide the supervising authorities with a list of places, activities and people that the offender anticipates he would like to do the following week, but without the level of detail required for strict scheduling.

247. The defendants submitted that there should be no scheduling requirements. Whilst the benefits of electronic monitoring were also somewhat questionable, the defendant acknowledged the capacity of such monitoring to alert authorities to his presence in places he will not be an submitted that would be appropriate to have electronic monitoring without scheduling, rather than a scheduling condition.

248. I consider that it is appropriate to have a scheduling requirement, although I do not consider a strict scheduling requirement as was imposed for the ISO is appropriate. The defendant has made progress, and I have mentioned some of the consequences of the strict scheduling at [43]-[44] above. I am conscious of balancing the need for supervision without imposing conditions of a severity that would give rise to a grievance. I accept the defendant’s proposed dry scheduling condition discussed at the hearing on 4 April 2025 is appropriate. This proposal allows for risk assessment of places, activities and people but it would not criminalise the failure to engage in such activities at a particular time or at all.

249. In terms of contact with Jeremy Liddington, under the conditions of the ISO the defendant was unable to have any contact with his brother. Each of the experts were asked about the possible benefits and detriments of the defendant having supervised access with his brother. [48]

     48. see Dr Seidler at T154.1-41 and Dr Dewson at T18 3.24-184.27

250. The plaintiff proposed a condition which would allow an exception for contact between the defendant and his brother by SMS text message only with certain supervisory conditions. The defendant proposes a condition whereby the defendant may have contact with his brother at such reasonable times arranged by his enforcement officer with certain other conditions including that any contact, whether by telephone or text message or in person, would be monitored in real time.

251. I consider the defendant’s proposed condition is more appropriate. The conditions proposed by the defendant mitigate any risk of the defendant and his brother discussing extremist views or other matters which might detract from the mitigation of the risk the subject of the ESO. Further, I consider that the condition encourages further rehabilitation of the defendant and decreases the likelihood of an increased sense of grievance by reason of the stringency of the condition.

252. In terms of the other conditions, I consider those as discussed and agreed at the hearing of 4 April 2025 as being appropriate. I consider they address the relevant risk of reoffending and encourage the continued rehabilitation of the defendant.

Orders

257. The orders of the Court are:

1. An order pursuant to ss 20, 25(1)(a) and 26(6) of the THRO Act, that the defendant is subject to an Extended Supervision Order for a period of 12 months from the date of the order.

2. An order pursuant to s 29(1) of the THRO Act, directing the defendant to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to these reasons for the period of the Extended Supervision Order.

**********

SCHEDULE A

CONDITIONS OF EXTENDED SUPERVISION

DESMOND LIDDINGTON

PART A: SUPERVISION, MOVEMENTS & REPORTING

1. The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of any Enforcement Officer responsible for the supervision of the offender for the time being and obey all reasonable directions of an Enforcement Officer.

1A.   If directed by his Enforcement Officer, the defendant is to provide an honest summary of his anticipated movements (SOAM) each week (or over successive weeks), limited to places he intends to travel to, the purposes and means of his travel to those places, and the dates of travel, but unconfined by any travel route or timetable. If so directed, such a summary is to be provided on, or before the Friday prior to each week (or as otherwise agreed between the defendant and his DSO). The defendant may not, without approval from his Enforcement Officer, travel to any place not specified in his SOAM nor to any place included in his SOAM to which his Enforcement Officer has directed him not to go.

1B. The schedule of movements is limited to places he intends to travel to, the purposes and means of his travel to those places, dates of travel but unconfined by timetable.

1C. The defendant may not, without prior approval from his Enforcement Officer, travel to any place not specified in his SOAM.

1E.   When the defendant is

a)   in a public place; or

b)   can be seen from a public place

he must not have visible any tattoo which is a symbol which, under state or federal law it is illegal to display in public.

1. The defendant must be available for interview at such times and places as an Enforcement Officer (or the officer’s nominee) may from time to time direct.

2. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from an Enforcement Officer about:

   i.   where they are or have been;

   ii.   where they are going or were going;

   iii.   who they are with or were with; and

   iv.   what they are doing or were doing.

provided that such questions are reasonably required for determining whether the defendant is or has been complying with the conditions of the Extended Supervision Order.

1. The defendant must carry at all times a specified approved mobile phone and:

   i.   ensure that the defendant is available to answer any call from an Enforcement Officer or, as soon as reasonably practicable, return a call from an Enforcement Officer that the defendant was unable to answer; and

   ii.   comply with any reasonable directions given by an Enforcement Officer in relation to the mobile phone.

2. The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in their supervision, including but not limited to, their Enforcement Officer, NSWPF and CSNSW.

PART B: VEHICLES

1. The defendant must not purchase, hire, or drive any vehicle, or cause any other person to purchase or hire any vehicle for the defendant’s use, without the prior approval of an Enforcement Officer.

2. The defendant must tell an Enforcement Officer of the colour, make, model and registration of any vehicle registered to the defendant or that the defendant intends to hire or drive or otherwise use.

PART C: FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT

1. The defendant must provide any information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by an Enforcement Officer.

2. The defendant must not enter into a transaction for more than $1000 (AUD), including through an agent or a third party, without informing an Enforcement Officer.

3. The defendant must not transfer any funds outside Australia, including through an agent or a third party, without informing an Enforcement Officer, except in relation to retail purchases under $1000 of lawful goods for personal or domestic use from online retailers.

PART D: ELECTRONIC MONITORING

1. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed and not tamper with, or remove, the equipment.

PART E: ACCOMMODATION

1. The defendant must live at an address approved by an Enforcement Officer and notify an Enforcement Officer of any intention to change the defendant’s address or living arrangements.

2. The defendant must permit an Enforcement Officer to visit the defendant at the defendant’s residential address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.

3. The defendant must give an Enforcement Officer prior notification of at least 24 hours (unless a shorter period is approved by an Enforcement Officer) if they will not be at their approved address between 10pm and 5am. The notification must include the defendant’s proposed activities as well as the purposes and locations of those activities.

4. The defendant must seek prior approval from any Enforcement Officer before permitting a visitor to enter and remain, or stay overnight, at their approved address. If another resident at the approved address permits a visitor to enter and remain, or stay overnight, the defendant must notify an Enforcement Officer as soon as he is aware.

5. The defendant must not sign or otherwise enter any lease, mortgage, or hire agreement of any premises or part of any premises (e.g., storage facilities) without prior approval of an Enforcement Officer.

PART F: PLACE & TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

1. The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district specified by an Enforcement Officer.

2. The defendant must not leave New South Wales except with the approval of the Commissioner of Corrective Services.

3. The defendant must surrender any passports in their name to the Commissioner of Corrective Services, must not be in possession of any passports and must not apply for or attempt to apply for any passports.

4. The defendant must not enter any point of departure for an international destination (such as Sydney and Bankstown Airports and Sydney Cove Passenger Terminal) except in accordance with their approved schedule or as otherwise approved by the Enforcement Officer.

   Note: It is not a breach of condition 20 for the defendant to pass through the Sydney Airport whilst using the Sydney Airport Line travelling on a train.

PART G: SEARCH & SEIZURE

1. The defendant must submit to the search and seizure of any items in their possession or under their control including of their residence, their vehicle, any computer, electronic and communication devices, or any storage facility, garage, locker, or commercial facility.

2. The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to the conditions of this order.

PART H: ADDICTIONS

1. The defendant must not use prohibited drugs or obtain drugs unlawfully or abuse drugs lawfully obtained.

2. The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing.

3. The defendant must not possess or consume alcohol without the approval of an Enforcement Officer.

4. The defendant must not enter any licensed premises without the approval of an Enforcement Officer, except licensed restaurants and cafes, and the bistro and restaurant areas of hotels and registered clubs where children are permitted.

PART I: WEAPONS

1. The defendant must not possess or use any of the following:

   a. a firearm, firearm part or ammunition within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996;

   b. a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998;

   c.   a spear gun;

   d.   an explosive substance intended, by the defendant, to be used in an explosive device; or

   e.   a fuse capable of use with an explosive or a detonator, or a detonator, that is intended, by the defendant, to be used as a fuse or detonator for an explosive device (as the case may be).

2. The defendant must not possess or use any of the following, without an Enforcement Officer’s prior approval:

   a.   any article or device, not being a firearm, that is designed or intended as defence or anti-personal spray and that is capable of discharging by any means:

   i.   any irritant matter in liquid, powder, gas or chemical form or any dense smoke, except domestic cleaning products in their original packaging used for their designed purpose (e.g. dishwasher powder).

   b.   a knife, machete, sword, or any other device that consists of a single-edged or multi-edged blade or spike that is designed or adapted to inflict violence, whether actual or threatened;

   c.   any other implement made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person;

   d.   anything intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used to injure or menace a person or damage property; or

   e.   a laser pointer; or

   f.   a digital blueprint for the manufacture of a firearm or a prohibited weapon on a 3D printer or on an electronic milling machine.

PART J: PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT, COUNSELLING & MEDICAL TREATMENT

1. The defendant must attend ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by an Enforcement Officer.

2. The defendant must notify an Enforcement Officer of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that they consult, but only if the practitioner is a mental health practitioner or if the defendant consults the practitioner about matters relating to mental health (including, for the avoidance of doubt, consulting any practitioner about alcohol- or drug-related interventions).

3. The defendant must attend, upon the direction of an Enforcement Officer, any therapy sessions, disengagement services, support, and treatment programs the subject of the direction, including for the purposes of a Mental Health Care Plan or Community Treatment Order.

4. The defendant must not take prescription medications other than in the manner prescribed to him by a healthcare practitioner.

5. The defendant must agree to their healthcare practitioners and service providers, as identified in condition 30, sharing information with each other and with an Enforcement Officer, that, in the opinion of an Enforcement Officer, relate to the defendant’s risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.

PART K: EMPLOYMENT, VOLUNTEERING & EDUCATION

1. The defendant must notify an Enforcement Officer of any intention to change the offender’s employment if practicable before the change occurs or otherwise at their next interview with an Enforcement Officer.

2. The defendant must not start on the defendant’s own initiative any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of an Enforcement Officer.

PART L: COMMUNICATON, INTERNET USE & ELECTRONIC DEVICES

1. The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by an Enforcement Officer about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to internet and restrictions on deleting information).

2. The defendant must not access or use, or cause another person to access or use on the defendant’s behalf, any of the following items, unless disclosed and approved by their Enforcement Officer:

   a)   any mobile telephone device;

   b)   any fixed, landline, or satellite telephone service;

   c)   any public telephone except in the case of an emergency, provided the defendant contacts their Enforcement Officer as soon as possible after accessing or using such a public telephone;

   d)   any communication or messaging service including any software, mobile application or hardware that will facilitate that service;

   e)   any computer or tablet device;

   f)   any internet service provider account;

   g)   any electronic mail (email) account;

   h)   social media accounts; and

   i)   any websites, applications or computer programs specified by their Enforcement Officer.

3. The defendant must advise an Enforcement Officer of any change to any of the items listed above as soon as possible.

4. The defendant must not delete or attempt to delete data on any of the items listed above without the prior consent of their Enforcement Officer.

5. The defendant must not use any encryption or anti-surveillance system, software or user setting which automatically deletes data, or enables anonymous communication or anonymous user activity, without the approval of an Enforcement Officer.

6. The defendant must consent to an Enforcement Officer (or other person requested by an Enforcement Officer) remotely inspecting the items listed above in monitoring compliance with this Order.

7. The defendant must provide any details of the items listed above (including usernames, passwords, pin codes and pass codes), as directed by their Enforcement Officer.

8. The defendant must provide consent for their telephone provider, internet service provider and any social media account provider to share information about their accounts with an Enforcement Officer.

PART M: ASSOCIATIONS

1. The defendant must not contact, attempt to communicate with, or otherwise associate or affiliate (including using third parties) with any person, persons or groups or organisations specified by an Enforcement Officer, whether face to face or by written correspondence or electronic means.

2. The defendant may have contact with his brother Jeremy Liddington at such reasonable times as can be arranged by his Enforcement Officer, but not less than half an hour monthly face to face and not less than 15 minutes weekly by telephone or text message conversation, and only under the following conditions:

   i.   The defendant must permit an Enforcement Officer to monitor the contact in real time;

   ii.   The defendant must not talk about anything to do with Extreme Right Wing ideology or any other topic which his Enforcement Officer reasonably directs him not to talk about;

   iii.   The defendant must not talk about any person or group which his Enforcement Officer reasonably directs him not to talk about;

   iv.   If the defendant’s brother begins to talk about anything the defendant is not permitted to talk about, the defendant must immediately cease the contact with his brother;

   v.   The defendant is not required to use the entire half hour (face to face) or 15 minutes (telephone or text message).

3. The defendant must inform an Enforcement Officer of the identity of any person with whom they do, or are likely to, regularly associate.

4. The defendant must not contact, attempt to communicate with, or otherwise associate or affiliate with any person, persons, groups, or organisations they know or reasonably ought to know or suspect are advocating support for engaging in any terrorist acts or violent extremism.

5. The defendant must not contact, attempt to communicate with, or otherwise associate or affiliate with any person held in custody or with any person that they know is subject to a control order, on parole, or otherwise subject to a supervision order without prior approval of an Enforcement Officer.

6. The defendant must obtain written permission from an Enforcement Officer prior to joining or affiliating, whether face to face or by written correspondence or electronic means, with any group, club, or organisation.

PART N: IDENTITY & APPEARANCE

1. The defendant must not change the defendant’s name or use any other name without notifying an Enforcement Officer.

2. The defendant must not obtain or change any form of identification without prior approval from an Enforcement Officer.

3. The defendant must let an Enforcement Officer photograph them, dressed, and photograph any tattoos, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and at any time as reasonably required by the Enforcement Officer.

4. The defendant must not significantly change their appearance, including by the addition or alteration of tattoos, without prior notification to an Enforcement Officer.

PART O: EXTREMISM

1. The defendant must not engage in any act or attempt to influence others to engage in any act, that would provide support for or promote extremist ideologies or acts of violence.

2. The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, create, participate in, or listen to:

   a)   extremist material; or

   b)   other material as directed by an Enforcement Officer for reasons related to concerns regarding violence or for reasons related to their risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.

PART P: DEFINITIONS

In these conditions:

“CSNSW” means Corrective Services NSW.

“Defendant” means DESMOND LIDDINGTON, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.

"Digital Blueprint" has the same meaning as in the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) and the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW) and means any type of digital (or electronic) reproduction of a technical drawing of the design of an object.

“Enforcement Officer” means a Corrective Services Officer or Police Officer.

“Extremist material” means:

1. any material that a reasonable person would understand to be:

a.   directly or indirectly encouraging, glorifying, promoting or condoning terrorist acts or violent extremism; or

b.   seeking support for, or justifying, the carrying out of terrorist acts or violent extremism; or

1. material that a reasonable person would understand or suspect to be produced or distributed by a terrorist organisation.

Examples of ‘extremist material’ include:

1. articles, images, speeches, or videos that promote violent extremism;

2. statements or posts made on social media, chat rooms or blogs that encourage violent extremism;

3. content encouraging people to commit acts of terrorism;

4. websites created or hosted by terrorist organisations;

5. terrorist training materials;

6. videos or images of terrorist attacks or acts of violent extremism.

“Material” includes:

1. any written or printed material;

2. any picture, painting or drawing;

3. any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;

4. any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;

5. any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and

6. any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.

“NSWPF” means NSW Police Force.

“Search” includes:

1. A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant’s possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person’s body; and

2. A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant’s clothed body is touched.

“Seizure” includes:

1. the removal and taking of items of interest identified during searches from the defendant’s residence, vehicle, garage, locker, storage facility, commercial facility, or electronic device; and

2. examination and analysis of those items, including Cellebrite or other downloads of data from electronic devices.

“Terrorist act” has the same meaning as in Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and means an action or threat of action where:

1. The action:

a.   causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person;

b.   causes serious damage to property;

c.   causes a person’s death;

d.   endangers a person’s life, other than the life of the person taking the action;

e.   creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or

f.   seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic system including, but not limited to:

1. an information system;

2. a telecommunications system;

3. a financial system;

4. a system used for the delivery of essential government services;

5. a system used for, or by, an essential public utility; and

6. a system used for, or by, a transport system; and

1. the action is done, or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause;

2. the action is done, or the threat is made with the intention of:

a.   coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory, or foreign country, or of part of a State, Territory, or foreign country; or

b.   intimidating the public or a section of the public; and

1. the action is not advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that is not intended to cause serious harm to a person, cause a person’s death, endanger the life of a person, or create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public.

“Terrorist organisation” has the same meaning as it has in Division 102 of Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and means an organisation that is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act.

Endnotes

Amendments

14 May 2025 - Typographical amendment to [93]

Decision last updated: 14 May 2025