State of New South Wales v Jackson

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[2008] HCATrans 193

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S534 of 2007

B e t w e e n -

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Applicant

and

CHRISTOPHER JACKSON BY HIS NEXT FRIEND MELISSA JACKSON

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 MAY 2008, AT 2.14 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR B.W. WALKER, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS S.E. PRITCHARD, for the applicant.  (instructed by Hicksons Lawyers)

MR D.T. KENNEDY, SC:   If your Honours please, I appear on behalf of the respondent with my  learned friend, MR C.A.W. HART.  (instructed by Bale Boshev Lawyers)

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER:   Your Honours, some have said that there remains an interesting outstanding question at common law as to the need for confidentiality of some kind or another in order for there to be what has been called litigation privilege in the category legal professional privilege, but this case raises it under the Act, under the Evidence Act, and it erases it according to definitions which, in our submission, relate to nearly everyday transactions in the preparation for litigation involving the presentation of facts.

HEYDON J:   Can I just interrupt, Mr Walker, you raised – or the written summary of argument raises three special leave questions.  Do you press them all?

MR WALKER:   No, number (1).  Thank you, your Honour.  The statutory definition in question is the critical one in relation to confidential document.  A confidential document is that which is referred to as the second alternative way in which the litigation privilege under section 119 might arise.  If that confidential document was prepared for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services, et cetera, then evidence is not to be adduced of its contents.

Now, the definition of confidential document is the one where, in our submission, serious error with far-reaching consequences as authority for the practice of adversarial litigation and the provision of legal services in connection with it has intruded.  Under section 117, the definition section for section 119, the:

confidential document means a document prepared in such circumstances that, when it was prepared:

(a)      the person who prepared it, or

(b)      the person for whom it was prepared,

was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law.

It could be said quite precisely that this is a case where the error in question was the erroneous understanding and application to the facts of this case in the Court of Appeal of the preposition “for” in the phrase “the person for whom it” that is the document “was prepared”.

Could I take your Honours to page 26 of the application book, paragraph 39, in Justice Giles’ reasons?  To remind your Honours of the personages in question, Ms Jackson…

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Details
Case
[2008] HCATrans 193
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of the State of New South Wales against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning the interpretation of section 14(1)(b) of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW). The dispute arose from a claim for damages for personal injury brought by Mr. Jackson against the State. Mr. Jackson alleged that he suffered injury as a result of the negligence of officers of the State. The central issue was whether the limitation period for bringing such a claim had expired.

The High Court was required to determine whether the Supreme Court had erred in its interpretation of section 14(1)(b) of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW), which provides a six-year limitation period for actions for damages for negligence. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the cause of action accrued at the time of the negligent act or omission, or at the time the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of that act or omission. This involved an analysis of when the "damage" contemplated by the section was suffered.

The Court reasoned that the accrual of a cause of action for negligence, for the purposes of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW), occurs when the plaintiff suffers damage. This damage must be more than merely nominal or trivial; it must be of a kind that is actionable. Gleeson CJ and Heydon J held that the Supreme Court had correctly applied this principle in finding that Mr. Jackson's cause of action had not been statute-barred at the time his proceedings were commenced. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

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