State of New South Wales v Hunt (Final)

[2025] NSWSC 521

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

State of New South Wales v Hunt (Final) [2025] NSWSC 521

Hearing dates:

16 May 2025

Date of orders:

22 May 2025

Decision date:

22 May 2025

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Wright J

Decision:

(1) An order pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order (the Extended Supervision Order) for a period of two years from the date of the order.

(2) An order pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), directing that the defendant, for the period of the Extended Supervision Order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to these orders.

Catchwords:

HIGH RISK OFFENDERS – supervision and other orders under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) – application for extended supervision order (ESO) – ESO not opposed – conditions to be imposed as part of the ESO – no point of principle

Legislation Cited:

Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW), s 12

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3, 5B, 5D, 5H, 5I, 6-7, 9, 11

Cases Cited:

State of New South Wales v BP (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 806

State of New South Wales v Hunt (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 47

Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28; (2015) 249 A Crim R 65

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Robert John Sean Hunt (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
A Mykkeltvedt (Plaintiff)
T Weller-Wong (Defendant)

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2024/440986

JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. By a summons filed on 21 November 2024, the plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, sought an extended supervision order (ESO) under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (CHRO Act) in respect of the defendant, Mr Robert John Hunt, as well as interim orders pending the final determination of the matter.

2. A preliminary hearing took place on 6 February 2025.

3. On 14 February 2025, Sweeney J made the following orders:

“(1) Pursuant to s 10A of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is subject to an Interim Supervision Order from 28 February 2025.

(2) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, the Interim Supervision Order is to be for a period of 28 days.

(3) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, I direct that the defendant, for the period of the Interim Supervision Order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment.

(4) Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act:

(a) I appoint two qualified psychiatrists and/or two registered psychologists, or one qualified psychiatrist and one registered psychologist, to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and when a date for the final hearing is fixed; and

(b) I direct the defendant to attend those examinations.”

4. On that same day, her Honour published her reasons: State of New South Wales v Hunt (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 47 (the Preliminary Judgment).

5. In accordance with the orders of Sweeney J the defendant was examined by Dr Sathish Dayalan, psychiatrist, and by Professor Susan Hayes, forensic psychologist. Following their examinations, each expert provided a copy of their report to the Court.

6. On 16 May 2025, the matter came before me for a hearing in relation to the final relief sought. At that hearing, the defendant did not wish to be heard in opposition to the making of an ESO for two years. In addition, the parties had reached agreement in respect of most of the conditions which might be imposed as part of any ESO.

Facts and matters agreed

7. Commendably and in accordance with cl 26(i) of Supreme Court Practice Note SC CL 12, for the purposes of the final hearing the parties produced an Updated Joint Statement of Agreed Facts dated 12 May 2025 and signed on behalf of each party. In all the circumstances and in light of all the evidence in this matter, I was satisfied that it was appropriate to accept the facts as agreed between the parties.

8. In addition, the background to this application and to the making of the ISO was set out in some detail in the Preliminary Judgment of Sweeney J. In light of the material before me, I respectfully adopt her Honour’s relevant findings and conclusions. Relevant parts of that judgment should be read in conjunction with this judgment and I shall not repeat all of that material in this judgment.

Defendant’s background

9. The defendant is 64 years old and will shortly turn 65. From an early age, the defendant was exposed to significant adversities. At about seven years of age he was placed into the care of the Minister due to persistent behavioural problems and spent his formative years in and out of juvenile facilities. While in State care he suffered persistent sexual abuse over the course of several years.

10. The defendant has poor literacy skills equivalent to a mild to moderate disability. It is possible that he suffers from ADHD or a brain injury and he has been assessed as in the low average level of intelligence. As an adult he has had a number of trades-based occupations but has been unemployed since 2010 and is currently unable to work due to health issues.

11. The defendant currently lives in the community alone in private rental accommodation.

12. The defendant has committed a number of sexual offences, including serious sex offences as defined in the CHRO Act against four female children, aged between 8 and 14 in the 1980s and 1990s. Further information concerning this offending is set out in the Preliminary Judgment at [18] to [20]. The defendant also has convictions for nonsexual offences dating back to the 1970s. His most recent offences involve breaching conditions of his ESO in November 2022 and February 2024 as described at [26] of the Preliminary Judgment.

The index offending

13. On 9 February 2012, the defendant was sentenced to 6 years and 9 months imprisonment for four counts of aggravated sexual assault contrary to s 61(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and two counts of sexual intercourse with a person between the age of 10 and 14 years contrary to s 66C(1) of the Crimes Act. The defendant was also sentenced at that time for an offence of failing to comply with reporting conditions under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (CPOR Act). Two other offences were taken into account on a Form 1 namely an aggravated indecent assault contrary to s 66M(2) of the Crimes Act and a failure to comply with reporting obligations under the CPOR Act. The nature and circumstances of that offending are set out in the Preliminary Judgment at [21]-[25].

First ESO

14. The defendant was released to parole in relation to the index offences on 24 December 2019.

15. He was initially subject to an Interim Suppression Order (ISO). Subsequently an ESO with conditions (the First ESO) was imposed for a period of three years commencing on 4 August 2020.

16. The defendant made substantial progress on the Frist ESO by September 2022, attaining Stage 4 with his not being required to have electronic monitoring or scheduling, as referred to in the ESO Completion Report dated 12 September 2022 by Mr Mystakidis, Senior Psychologist with the Serious Offenders Assessment Unit.

17. The defendant subsequently failed to comply with the First ESO on a number of occasions.

18. On 24 November 2022, the defendant was observed sitting in a café speaking to a female who had a young child in a pram. He had known the woman for a year and a half and met her a couple of times a week. She had two daughters, a seven-year-old and a four-month-old. When the defendant’s mobile telephone was searched two dating profiles on separate dating applications were located and no approval had been sought or received to participate in those services. In addition, a review of the telephone disclosed regular contact with another female which had not been disclosed to the defendant’s supervising officers. The female indicated she had known the defendant for about two years, saw him two to three times a week and regarded him as being like a father figure. The female had four children including two daughters aged five and two. As a result, the defendant was convicted of four counts of failing to comply with an ESO contrary to s 12 of the CPOR Act. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of two years commencing on 25 November 2022 with a non-parole period of one year.

19. On 12 February 2024, the defendant made two telephone calls each to a different male on the Child Protection Register whom the defendant had met in custody or while living at the Integrated Support Centre, Campbelltown. On 17 February 2024, the defendant again called one of the males whom he had telephoned on 12 February 2024. As a consequence, the defendant was convicted of three counts of failing to comply with an ESO contrary to s 12 of the CPOR Act and was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of one year and two months commencing on 22 February 2024 with a non-parole period of seven months. The defendant’s severity appeal against that sentence was dismissed by the District Court.

20. As a result of the suspension of the First ESO while the defendant was serving sentences of imprisonment, the First ESO was eventually due to expire on 28 February 2025.

The ISO

21. As noted above, the State has applied for a further ESO in respect of the defendant together with interim relief. The application for interim relief including an ISO was dealt with by Sweeney J in the Preliminary Judgment. The ISO made by her Honour was extended on two occasions. The ISO as extended will now expire on 23 May 2025.

22. I turn now to consider whether a further ESO should be imposed on the defendant as sought by the State by way of final relief.

Statutory preconditions for the making of an ESO

23. The parties expressly agreed that all statutory preconditions to the making of an ESO have been met, subject to the Court being satisfied that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk within s 5B(d) of the CHRO Act.

24. In light of that agreement and on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the prerequisites in s 5B(a), (b) and (c) of that Act are satisfied; and, the requirements of ss 5H, 5I, 6 and 7 had been complied in this matter.

25. As to the making of an ESO in those circumstances, ss 5B and 5D relevantly provide:

“5B   Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if:

…

(d)  the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.”

…

5D   Determination of risk

For the purposes of this Part, the Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.”

26. The Court’s determination of the application for an ESO is to be made in light of the objects of the CHRO Act found in s 3 as follows:

“3 Objects of Act

(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.

(2) Another object of this Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.”

27. The determination of whether an ESO should be made is governed by s 9 of the CHRO Act which provides:

“9   Determination of application for extended supervision order

(1)  The Supreme Court may determine an application for an extended supervision order:

(a)  by making an extended supervision order, or

(b)  by dismissing the application.

(2)  In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Supreme Court.

(2A)  (Repealed)

(3)  In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must also have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant:

(a)  (Repealed)

(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such examination,

(c)  the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment,

(d)  the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence,

(d1)  any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,

(e)  any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs,

(e1)  options (if any) available if the offender is kept in custody or is in the community (whether or not under supervision) that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending over time,

(e2)  the likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an extended supervision order,

(f)  without limiting paragraph (e2), the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order,

(g)  the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,

(h)  the offender’s criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,

(h1)  the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,

(i)  any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence.

(4)  In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order in respect of an offender, the Supreme Court is not to consider any intention of the offender to leave New South Wales (whether permanently or temporarily).”

28. Furthermore, the term of an ESO is to be set in accordance with s 10 which relevantly provides:

“10 Term of extended supervision order

(1) An extended supervision order commences when it is made, or when the offender’s current custody or supervision expires, whichever is the later.

…

(1A) An extended supervision order expires at the end of—

(a) such period (not exceeding 5 years from the day on which it commences) as is specified in the order, or

(b) if the order is suspended for any period, the period specified in paragraph (a) plus each period during which the order is suspended.

…”.

Should an ESO be imposed?

29. In the present case, the defendant did not oppose, but did not consent to, the making of an ESO and did not take issue with the term of the ESO being two years. The defendant did take issue with a number of the proposed conditions, if an ESO was to be imposed.

30. In determining whether the condition in s 5B(d) was met because I was satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant posed an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under the supervision of an ESO, and whether to make such an order, I had regard to the safety of the community as the paramount consideration in accordance with s 9(2), to the matters identified in the relevant paragraphs of s 9(3) of the CHRO Act and to the relevant provisions of the CHRO Act including those identified above and the two objects of that Act stated in s 3.

31. Since there was no opposition to the imposition of an ESO, I shall not refer in detail to all of the material I have considered. It is sufficient to note that I have taken into account as required by s 9(3) of the CHRO Act the following:

1. The assessment reports of Dr Furst, psychiatrist and Dr Seidler, psychologist referred to and summarised at [27] – [29] of the Preliminary Judgment together with the information at [33] of that judgment;

2. The risk assessment report of 10 February 2024 of Mr Mystakidis, Senior Psychologist with the Serious Offenders Assessment Unit, referred to and summarised at [34] – [46] of the Preliminary Judgment and his supplementary report;

3. The Risk Management Report of Ms Hape, Community Corrections Officer, of 15 March 2023, referred to and summarised at [47] of the Preliminary Judgment;

4. The defendant’s psychological report dated 28 March 2023 prepared by Ms Spatz, psychologist, for the purposes of the severity appeal in the District Court on 1 February 2023;

5. The HISOP treatment report of Ms Sweller, psychologist, 27 June 2019 concerning the defendant’s completion of the HISOP, referred to and summarised at [31] of the Preliminary Judgment, noting also the information at [30] and [32] of that judgment; and

6. The defendant’s criminal history and the remarks on sentence by Toner DCJ when sentencing the defendant for the index offending on 9 February 2012.

32. In addition, I have had particular regard to the most recent information and opinions provided in the reports of Dr Sathish Dayalan, psychiatrist, and Professor Susan Hayes, forensic psychologist, obtained as a result of Sweeney J’s orders for the defendant to be examined. These two witnesses also gave oral evidence before me which was consistent with their reports and related principally to the appropriateness of various proposed conditions.

33. In her report dated 10 April 2025, Prof Hayes pertinently noted that the results of testing indicated that the defendant functioned in the range of borderline intellectual disability at a level lower than 98% of his age peers but noted that his daily living skills were an area of relative strength and in that regard he functions in the average range of ability. Prof Hayes confirmed diagnoses of chronic paedophilic disorder (non-exclusive type), depression and anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance use disorder (polydrug use) in remission.

34. In Prof Hayes’s opinion the defendant’s paedophilic disorder and his PTSD contributed to his risk of committing a serious sex offence and his borderline intellectual disability meant that he had a limited ability to foresee the consequences of his actions, potentially leading to impulsivity and limited ability to problem solve. Using the Assessment of Risk and Manageability of Individuals with Developmental and Intellectual Limitations who Offend (ARMIDILO– S) risk assessment tool in conjunction with the STATIC – 99 tool, she placed the defendant in the “High Risk” category for sexual offending with an overall risk level of “high”.

35. Prof Hayes was of the opinion that the defendant could not be managed in the community without an ESO being imposed. The professor also emphasised the need on the part of officers supervising the defendant for awareness of his borderline intellectual disability and how he might be supported to achieve compliance with conditions and to avoid breaches because of a lack of understanding or awareness. In her opinion the appropriate duration of any ESO was two years in order to implement services, establish increased levels of support and assistance and to establish appropriate psychological or psychiatric counselling programs.

32. Dr Dayalan provided a report dated 11 April 2025 in which he diagnosed the defendant with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), chronic substance use disorder (cannabis and stimulants) in remission and chronic paedophilia (non-exclusive type, sexually attracted to females). He considered that the defendant’s ASPD resulted in impaired impulse control, failure to conform to social norms and disregard for the well-being of others which were associated with an increased risk of sexual reoffending. He was also of the view that substance use, especially stimulant use, was an important contributory factor in the defendant’s sexual offending and recommended abstinence from illegal drugs to manage the risk. Dr Dayalan considered that the sexual deviant interest/urges associated with paedophilia directly contributed to the defendant’s risk of sexual offending and recommended psychological and pharmacological treatment. He noted that the defendant’s more recent behaviour may suggest poor insight into high-risk scenarios and/or an intent to engage in paraphilic behaviour and recommended that the defendant attend maintenance sessions.

33. Assessing the defendant using the Static 99 Revised Version (Static – 99R) and the STABLE 2007 tools, Dr Dayalan noted that the defendant’s Static – 99R score placed him in the “above average risk category”. On STABLE 2007, the assessment showed that the defendant presented with a high density of criminogenic needs. Dr Dayalan did note the limitations on both of the tools referred to.

34. The doctor was of the view that the defendant’s risk of committing a serious sex offence could not be managed in the community without an ESO being imposed and, although the defendant had exhibited behaviour in recent years that increased his risk of sexual offending in the community, an ESO would assist to prevent further escalation.

35. As to the appropriate conditions, Dr Dayalan opined that it was important to have the option to enforce restrictive conditions such as electronic monitoring and a schedule of movements if there was an escalation of risk but these should be suspended if no longer warranted. He also recommended the use of visual prompts and repetition to ensure the defendant understood the conditions.

36. As to the term of any ESO, the doctor was of the opinion that a period of two years was appropriate to enable ongoing areas of concern to be addressed and to allow for a graded reduction in the restrictions imposed.

37. In all the circumstances and bearing in mind the absence of opposition, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious sex offence if not kept under supervision of an ESO and that it is appropriate to make an ESO for two years.

Conditions of ESO

42. The conditions that may be imposed as part of an ESO are governed by s 11 of the CHRO Act. The conditions must include the condition in s 11(2) that the defendant is not to leave New South Wales except with the approval of the Commissioner of Corrective Services and may include, but are not limited to, those specified in s 11(1) of the CHRO Act. Section 11(1) relevantly provides as follows:

“An extended supervision order … may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate, including (but not limited to) directions requiring the offender—

(a) to permit any corrective services officer to visit the offender at the offender’s residential address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address, or

(a1) to permit any corrective services officer to access any computer or related equipment that is at the offender’s residential address or in the possession of the offender, or

(b) to make periodic reports to a corrective services officer, or

(c) to notify a corrective services officer of any change in his or her address, or

(d) to participate in treatment and rehabilitation programs, or

(e) to wear electronic monitoring equipment, or

(ea) to reside at an address approved by the Commissioner of Corrective Services, or

(f) not to reside in or resort to specified locations or classes of locations, or

(g) not to associate or make contact with specified persons or classes of persons, or

(h) not to engage in specified conduct or classes of conduct, or

(i) not to engage in specified employment or classes of employment, or

(j) not to change his or her name, or

(k) to report to police and provide information to police about the conditions imposed on the extended supervision order or interim supervision order and the offender’s residential address, or

(l) to comply with any obligation that could be imposed on the offender under Part 3 of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 if the offender were a registrable person within the meaning of that Act and were not the subject of an interim supervision order or an extended supervision order, or

(m) to comply with specified requirements in connection with the offender’s access to and use of the internet, or

(n) to provide any corrective services officer with requested information in relation to any employment or any financial affairs of the offender.”

43. The terms of s 11(1) make it clear that the conditions which may be imposed are ones with which an offender is directed to comply and do not include directions to persons other than the offender who is to be the subject of an ESO.

44. The application of s 11 does not require that there must be a specific, demonstrated link between the past offending which is the basis of the ESO and each condition. Rather, the Court must be satisfied, having regard to the scope, purpose and objects of the CHRO Act, that it is appropriate to impose a particular condition so as to address the risk of future offending of the type which was the basis of the order: Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28; (2015) 249 A Crim R 65 at [53] (Beazley P, McColl and Ward JJA). As I said in State of New South Wales v BP (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 806 at [11], there may be a sufficient connection between the condition and the risk if, for example:

1. the condition addresses a means of controlling possible risk factors related to the type of offending in question;

2. the condition is designed to avoid situations where the offender’s rehabilitation or reintegration into the community might be compromised; or

3. the condition does not directly relate to the offender's risk but promotes the efficacy of the order containing other conditions which do.

45. By the time of the final hearing, the representatives of the parties had considered the 48 proposed conditions and, after discussions, had reached an agreed position in relation to many of them. During the final hearing Prof Hayes and Dr Dayalan gave oral evidence and were cross-examined in relation to competing proposed conditions. In addition, the parties made submissions concerning appropriate conditions and, by leave, informed the Court after the hearing of their respective final positions on some of the previously disputed conditions.

46. The conditions which are undisputed are proposed conditions 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 48. I have considered these undisputed proposed conditions and am satisfied that they are appropriate in the circumstances to address the risk of future serious offending by the defendant and should be imposed.

47. A number of proposed conditions have been deleted or are not pressed. These are conditions 2, 9, 19, 30 and 47.

48. The proposed conditions which remain in dispute were proposed condition 5, which relates to a schedule of movements, and proposed condition 24, which relates to non-association.

49. As to proposed condition 5, it was not in dispute that it was appropriate in the defendant’s case for there to be a condition which permitted a Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) to require the defendant to provide, and adhere to, a schedule of movements in some form. Prof Hayes was of the opinion that an appropriate condition of this sort would have the benefit of encouraging the defendant to plan ahead and of increasing his awareness of being monitored. She was also of the view that if his schedule of movements did not extend to including information in relation to the timing or duration of activities, its utility in assisting him to structure his days would be diminished. She did, however, note in effect that the defendant would need assistance in formulating such a schedule and adhering to it because of the intellectual disability. As to the degree of precision required of the timings and routes, Prof Hayes was generally of the view that this should be a matter for the discretion of the DSO, depending on the fluctuations in the defendant’s behaviour and mental condition. Dr Dayalan was of a similar view to the effect that the requirement for a schedule of movements should be able to be varied depending on the current level of risk identified so that if there has been escalation in risk, the requirement should be more prescriptive and if he is fairly stable, it could be less restrictive.

50. In the end, the defendant proposed the following condition to which the State was prepared to agree with the addition of the word in bold and underlined:

“If directed, the defendant must, with appropriate assistance from his DSO having regard to his literacy difficulties, provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided three days before it is due to start. This schedule will not require the defendant to provide a precise timetable or routes or of travel unless the DSO forms the view that it is reasonably required, having regard to the defendant’s current risk profile.”

51. In my view, having regard to the risk factors in relation to the defendant and the evidence of Prof Hayes and Dr Dayalan, the proposed condition with the addition of the word “precise” achieves an appropriate balance between flexibility and risk mitigation. Such a condition will allow less restrictive scheduling for the defendant except if the DSO, responding to the types of fluctuations or escalation to which the experts referred, forms the view that precise timetabling and specification of routes are reasonably required in order to manage the risk of the defendant committing a further serious offence. Accordingly, I shall include the condition with the addition of the word “precise” as proposed by the State.

52. As to proposed condition 24, the State’s primary position was that non-association requirements should be entirely in the discretion of the DSO and thus contended for a condition in the following terms:

“The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by the DSO.”

53. The defendant contended that the defendant should be entitled to contact his friend [RC] who, it was common ground, is on the Child Protection Register and a person who has been convicted of sexual offending against children under the age of 16. This was put on the basis that the defendant had few social contacts or friends and social connections such as that with [RC] made the defendant feel more accepted and thus should be seen as a positive influence on him. The defendant’s proposed condition 24 was as follows:

“The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by the DSO.

The defendant may have contact with his friend [RC] at such reasonable times as can be arranged by his DSO or delegate by telephone or in person provided that the contact is monitored in real time by a DSO or delegate.

If the DSO forms the view on reasonable grounds, that the contact between [RC] and [the defendant] becomes inappropriate having regard to [the defendant’s] risk profile, the DSO may direct [the defendant] to cease any contact with [RC] temporarily or indefinitely.

It will be a breach of this order for the defendant to fail to comply with such a direction.”

54. Prof Hayes accepted that if [RC] were rehabilitated, contact with him might be prosocial and beneficial for the defendant but if this were not the case then contact could increase the risk of the defendant committing a serious sex offence. Prof Hayes was effectively of the view that it would be most appropriate for the DSO to assess whether contact with [RC] would adversely impact the risk of reoffending before contact was permitted. On the basis that supervised contact with [RC] would be allowed, Prof Hayes accepted that this would permit the DSO to determine the extent of pro or negative social influence on the part of [RC] on the defendant. She also agreed that it would be sensible for the DSO to have a discretion to terminate contact between the defendant and [RC] on an ongoing basis, should the DSO form the view that the contact between them became inappropriate in some relevant way.

55. Dr Dayalan’s evidence included that the defendant had identified to him that he would deal with a stressful situation or a problem by calling [RC], but had added that he could no longer talk to [RC] and there were no other problem solving strategies that the defendant reported. This contact and the fact that it had previously not been disclosed in breach of the First ESO were said by Dr Dayalan to raise concern because an association with someone who has a history of sexual offending could lead to an increase in the deviant sexual interests and behaviour. Dr Dayalan accepted that there could be some positive aspects to the defendant having contact with [RC] if [RC] has been fully rehabilitated and also if his nature of offending was quite different. If the contact between the defendant and [RC] were monitored directly, for example, by the DSO being present, that would allow some of Dr Dayalan’s concerns about discussions between them raising topics that might promote unhelpful behaviours.

56. There were some pro-social interactions available to the defendant including participation in the Men’s Shed and the motorcycle club. Nonetheless, I accept that pro-social interactions are limited for a person with the defendant’s criminal history and that contact with [RC] has some potential to be beneficial for the defendant’s development and rehabilitation thus reducing his risk of reoffending. If such contact is permitted in an appropriate way, it will also reduce the likelihood of the defendant contacting [RC] in contravention of the conditions of his ESO. If such contact is to occur, it is preferable that the contact with [RC] be monitored directly by a DSO. This will provide a basis for assessment of whether any aspect of the contact is likely to increase the relevant risk posed by the defendant or whether the contact is entirely pro-social. In addition, if the DSO can prohibit contact with [RC] if the view is reasonably formed that such contact should not occur in light of the defendant’s risk of committing a further serious sex offence, the risk posed by the defendant can be properly managed.

57. The State submitted that, if I were of the view that some form of contact should, at least initially be permitted, the condition should read as follows (with additions and deletions from the defendant’s version in mark up):

“The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by the DSO.

Subject to the defendant requesting and receiving prior approval from his DSO, the defendant may have contact with his friend [RC] at such reasonable times as can be arranged by his DSO or delegate by telephone (with the call to be on speakerphone) or, if the DSO consider such contact appropriate having regard to all prevailing circumstances, in person. Unless directed otherwise, the defendant must not have contact with [RC] in the absence of direct supervision from the provided that the contact is monitored in real time by a DSO or delegate and any such contact is not to occur more than fortnightly.

If, having regard to [the defendant’s] risk profile and/or the progress of his rehabilitation, the DSO forms the view on reasonable grounds, that the contact between [RC] and [the defendant] should not occur becomes inappropriate having regard to [the defendant’s] risk profile, the DSO may direct [the defendant] to cease any contact with [RC] that such contact is prohibited, whether temporarily or indefinitely.

It will be a breach of this order for the defendant to fail to comply with such a direction.”

58. In my view, both the version proposed by the defendant and the version proposed by the State have difficulties. In addition, the use of sophisticated language such as “associate with” in the conditions could be avoided, when the definition of “associate” makes clear that what is intended is in effect “meet or be in contact with”. In the defendant’s case, using simpler language in this condition would be of assistance given the matters raised particularly by Prof Hayes. The version propounded by the State includes restrictions which not need to be specified in the condition because they can be adequately addressed by the DSO at the time of considering any requests for a meeting or contact. In addition, the State’s proposed form of the condition contains a discretion to permit less restrictive contact or meeting with [RC], which is worthwhile preserving as it obviates the need for the parties to seek to have the Court vary the condition should that become appropriate.

59. Taking into account all of the relevant circumstances, I am of the view that the condition in relation to non-association should be as follows:

“A. The defendant must not meet or be in contact with any person specified by the DSO.

B. Unless the DSO tells the defendant in writing he can meet or be in contact with [RC] with different or no restrictions, the defendant must not meet or be in contact with [RC] except if:

(i) the defendant has asked for and obtained prior approval from his DSO to meet [RC] with a DSO present or to be in contact with [RC] by telephone on speakerphone with a DSO present, at a reasonable time that can be arranged with the DSO;

AND

(ii) the DSO has not told the defendant that such meeting or contact must stop, if the DSO has formed the view on reasonable grounds relating to the risk posed by the defendant or his rehabilitation that the meeting or contact should not occur or continue.”

60. Finally, in the proposed schedule of conditions attached to the summons there were some definitions of terms that have not been used in the conditions to be imposed. These unnecessary definitions have been deleted. In addition, minor changes have been made to the proposed schedule of conditions to make them shorter or clearer.

Orders

61. For all these reasons, the orders of the Court are:

1. An order pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order (the Extended Supervision Order) for a period of two years from the date of the order.

2. An order pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), directing that the defendant, for the period of the Extended Supervision Order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to these orders.

**********

SCHEDULE TO THE ORDERS MADE ON 22 MAY 2025 IN RESPECT OF THE DEFENDANT ROBERT JOHN SEAN HUNT

Conditions of supervision

In these conditions:

“Associate” includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or to communicate by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).

“CSNSW” means Corrective Services NSW.

“Commissioner” means Commissioner for Corrective Services.

“Defendant” means Robert John Sean HUNT, also known as Robert John CAULL, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.

“DSO” means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.

“NSWPF” means NSW Police Force.

“Search” includes:

a. A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant’s possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person’s body; and

b. A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant’s clothed body is touched.

PART A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Monitoring and Reporting

62. The defendant must submit to the supervision, and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

Note: The Court notes the defendant’s difficulties with literacy. Directions must be given orally (either in person or by telephone) and confirmed in writing (unless it is impractical to give an oral direction). If it is impractical to issue an oral direction, a written direction will only be effective if the defendant’s DSO or their delegates from CSNSW satisfies themselves that the defendant understands the directions taking into account the defendant’s difficulties with literacy. Standing directions are to be reviewed and discussed on a regular basis between the DSO and the defendant, having regard to the defendant’s difficulties with literacy.

63. [deleted]

64. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations.

Electronic Monitoring

65. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with, or remove, the equipment.

Schedule of movements

66. If directed, the defendant must, with appropriate assistance from his DSO having regard to his literacy difficulties, provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) three days before it is due to start. This schedule will not require the defendant to provide a precise timetable or routes or of travel unless the DSO forms the view that this is reasonably required, having regard to the defendant’s current risk profile.

67. If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, he must tell his DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless the DSO approves a shorter period.

68. The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency, or if there is a reasonable explanation for the deviation which is provided either orally or in writing to his DSO or any other person supervising him as soon as possible and in any other case not later than 24 hours after the deviation.

PART B: Accommodation

69. The defendant must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change the defendant’s address or living arrangements.

70. [deleted]

71. The defendant must allow a DSO to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the approved address.

72. The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address or any alternative approved addresses (if relevant) without the approval of a DSO.

73. The defendant must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at his approved address and must not permit any person to stay overnight, at his approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside at his approved address), without the prior approval of a DSO.

PART C: Place and travel restrictions

74. The defendant must surrender any passports held by him to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any passports, and must not attempt to apply for any passports.

75. The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner.

76. The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district specified by a DSO.

77. Without limiting condition 15 above, the defendant must not go to any of the following without the prior approval of a DSO:

1. Day-care centres, pre schools and schools;

2. Amusement parlours, amusement parks and theme parks;

3. Cinemas;

4. Libraries and museums;

5. Camping grounds and caravan parks;

6. Children’s playgrounds, parks and areas with play equipment provided for the use of children;

7. Pools, playing fields and sporting facilities;

8. Concerts, theatre shows, movies, events and activities intended for the entertainment of children;

9. Residences where the defendant knows that persons knows that persons aged under 18 years ordinarily reside.

PART D: Employment, finance and education

78. The defendant must take all reasonable steps to participate in interventions as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development programs.

79. The defendant must not start on his own initiative any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of a DSO.

80. [deleted]

PART E: Drugs and alcohol

81. The defendant must not use prohibited drugs or abuse drugs unlawfully obtained.

82. The defendant must submit to drug testing.

83. The defendant must attend and participate in programs and courses for drug rehabilitation as reasonably directed by a DSO and must not discharge himself from such programs and courses without prior approval of a DSO.

PART F: Non-association

Association with Children

84. The defendant must not associate with anyone who he knows or reasonably should know is under 18 years of age, other than:

1. Incidental contact in a public place such as contact during the course of a minor’s employments; or

2. With the written permission of a DSO in accordance with any requirements reasonably determined by a DSO.

Association with others (not children)

85. A. The defendant must not meet or be in contact with any person specified by the DSO.

B. Unless the DSO tells the defendant in writing he can meet or be in contact with [RC] with different or no restrictions, the defendant must not meet or be in contact with [RC] except if:

1. the defendant has asked for and obtained prior approval from his DSO to meet [RC] with a DSO present or to be in contact with [RC] by telephone on speakerphone with a DSO present, at a reasonable time that can be arranged with the DSO;

AND

2. the DSO has not told the defendant that such meeting or contact must stop, if the DSO has formed the view on reasonable grounds relating to the risk posed by the defendant or his rehabilitation that the meeting or contact should not occur or continue.

86. Without limiting condition 24, the defendant must not:

1. Associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.

2. Associate with any person currently held in custody without the prior approval of a DSO.

87. If the defendant associates on a social basis with a person who he knows or becomes aware is the parent or guardian of or has care and control of a child under the age of 18 years, he must notify the DSO as soon as possible of that association. The DSO may want to tell the person of the defendant’s criminal history if it is reasonably necessary. In that situation the defendant must either permit the disclosure or he can choose to disclose the information himself, and allow the DSO to confirm same. Alternatively, the defendant can choose to voluntarily cease association with the person without the defendant or the DSO disclosing his criminal history.

88. The defendant must obtain written permission from DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.

Part H: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

89. The defendant must give his DSO a list of all devices he uses to communicate with or to access the internet as soon as practicable within 24 hours of obtaining the device or joining the service or application. Such list is to be provided orally or in writing. This incudes, phones, tablet devices, data storage devices, computers (the Devices). This also includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses, login names or other user names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant as well as the nature and details of the internet connection as directed.

90. The DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) may remotely inspect an internet account used by the defendant including the defendant’s email addresses, social media accounts in monitoring compliance with this Order.

91. [deleted]

92. The defendant must obey any reasonable directions by his DSO about the use of the Devices or payphones including but not limited to:

1. Producing his Devices if requested to do so by a DSO;

2. Prohibiting the defendant deleting records on the Devices regarding searches carried out using search engines, websites accessed, text messages sent and received, emails sent and received, and data downloaded.

93. The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with his DSO.

94. The defendant must advise the DSO of any change in the inventory of Devices listed in condition 28 within 24 hours.

Part I: Search and seizure

95. If the DSO forms a reasonable suspicion that a search (of the type referred to in sub-paragraphs (d) to (g) below) is necessary:

1. For the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant’s approved address;

2. To monitor the defendant’s compliance with this order, or

3. Because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence;

Then the DSO must inform the defendant of the basis for that suspicion and, having done so, may direct, and the defendant must submit to;

4. Search and inspection of any part, or anything, in the defendant’s approved address;

5. Search and inspection of any part of, or anything in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant;

6. Search and inspection of any part of, or anything in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant, and/or

7. Search and examination of his person.

96. For the purposes of the above condition 34:

1. A search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat-down search.

2. To the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a DSO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the directions of the DSO.

NOTE:

“Garment search” means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant’s possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person’s body.

“Pat-down search” means a search of a person where the person’s clothes body is touched.

97. During a search carried out pursuant to condition 34 above, the defendant must allow the DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) to seize anything found, whether in the defendant’s possession or not, which the DSO believes on reasonable grounds will compromise:

1. The safety of residents or staff at the defendant’s approved address;

2. The welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or

3. The defendant’s compliance with this order; or which the DSO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence. If the DSO does not hold that reasonable belief or suspicion, then the items must not be seized.

98. The defendant must allow CSNSW to search any Device that he may use. The power to search includes but is not limited to:

1. CSNSW inspecting his Device’s logs, text messages sent and received, emails sent and received, images or data downloaded and records regarding searches using search engines and websites accessed;

2. CSNSW photographing text messages or images or screenshots on his Device and downloading data from the Devices using hardware and software that CSNSW determines is necessary to carry out that download; or

3. CSNSW seizing the Device for the purposes of examination and or preservation of evidence in connection with suspected breaches of Interim or Extended Supervision Orders made by the court or any other criminal offence punishable by a maximum of 2 years or more imprisonment.

99. The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions 34 to 37 above.

Part L: Personal details and appearance

100. The defendant must not change his name from Robert John Sean Hunt or use any other name without notifying a DSO.

101. The defendant must not significantly change his appearance without the approval of a DSO.

102. The defendant must let a DSO photograph him, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to his appearance.

103. If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification he must provide a DSO with such details.

Part M: Medical Intervention and Treatment

104. The defendant must notify his DSO of the identity and address of any health care practitioner that he consults.

105. The defendant must attend all psychological and psychiatric assessments, therapy, support, rehabilitation and treatment that his DSO tells him to attend, unless he provides a reasonable excuse to his DSO for his non-attendance.

106. The defendant must notify his DSO immediately if he ceases to take or declines to commence taking any medication prescribed to him.

107. The defendant must agree to his healthcare practitioners sharing information with the DSO as to the fact of his attendance at appointments and his overall progress in therapy or counselling including the practitioner’s general opinion as to the development of his insight into offending, risk factors and attitudes to reduce his risk of offending.

Note: it is understood that a relationship of trust and confidentiality with healthcare practitioners is fundamental to the defendant’s engagement with and treatment by his healthcare practitioners.

108. [deleted]

109. The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating him, if deemed necessary by the DSO as related to the defendant’s risk of committing a serious offence.

Decision last updated: 22 May 2025